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This thesis investigates how institutions influence political institutions and economic agents’ in making 
SEZ policy decision and why do these institutions affect the decision. Most existing literature tended 
to study SEZs economic outcomes, the advantages and disadvantages, and some have emphasised on 
the political nature of the SEZ development process. While the study on the institutions that influence 
the policymaking process by key policy actors and why is rare especially in Indonesia.  
By developing an analytical framework that combines NIE institutional concepts and Williamson’s 
institutional constraints model, this study examines what have up until now been separately used to 
study their influence in SEZ policy reform. The combination enabled an analysis on the interplay 
between Indonesia’s political institutions, policymaking process under economic reform strategies, 
and policy outcome with regards to SEZ. The empirical case studies presented here show traces of 
policy interventions and is well-suited to highlight the role that institutions play in determining 
behaviour. They put more stress on revealing actors’ decision in SEZ policymaking. This study found a 
causal logic whereby some institutional determinants constrain the state (political actors and 
economic agents) into making the market well-functioning thereby increasing the risk of SEZ policy 
change. The actors’ boundedness to their own rationalities has complicated the process of SEZ policy 
formulation which resulted in SEZ mixed performance. It promotes further questions on the policy 
appropriateness and the actors’ logic in their policy choice. 
The study argues that institutions matter in SEZ policy process and its relevant policies. It further argues 
that SEZ policymaking relevant constraints involve behavioural assumptions, formal and informal rules, 
human actors, and modes of interaction between various economic agents and political institutions. 
Findings indicate that policy and institutions have been mutually influencing each other, entailing 
change or continuity of the status quo and contributing to the institutional arrangement where the 
government’s current policy decisions affect what options become available in the future. 
Furthermore, the choice of policies and institutions and their implementation depend on the relevant 
political landscape and its importance is, in general, undisputed. This study also shows that despite the 
success of implementing economic development policies and programmes that have managed to 
restore macroeconomic stability for economic revival, institutional problems in the economic reform 
process remain. 
The thesis reveals that the SEZ policymaking process in the following regimes has been potentially 
affected by the bureaucratic legacy of previous authoritarian rulers. SEZ policy debates and 
controversies by different regime periods lead to the continual intra-elite rivalry and interjurisdictional 
competition which still seemed to colour the access to state power while inter-factional tension 
emerged with higher intensity in the RDO era, often reflected in elite polarisation and thus lead to 
higher uncertainty, higher transaction costs, and stagnant growth. Therefore, this study suggests that 
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This study was initially motivated by the interesting outcomes of Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policy 
which triggered some debates. The debates are mostly about why and how the SEZ policy 
implementation and performance are different not only between countries who adopt it but within a 
country in different periods such as in Indonesia. The issue has become a topic of further discussion 
that despite all efforts the policy always appears unsuccessful. This motivated the author in writing 
this thesis when the author was first assigned to conduct a joint SEZ policy observation with other 
government bodies in 2008. 
Further discussions on that matter have concluded some problems related to the policymaking process 
and the factors behind them which include history, culture, procedures, legislation, attitudes, norms, 
beliefs, etc. However, there have been challenges in determining what the reasons affect the 
differences, how and where to start the investigation. The first step in finding the answers was to 
search the relevant literature. 
Preliminary Review of the Literature 
The initial search for the suitable literature was to explore the contemporary international literature 
on SEZ. SEZ represents a more contemporary form of economic zone and has gained popularity since 
the 1980s. After long, SEZ is supposed to have made its way to become one of the most important 
mechanisms in attracting investment both domestic and international. But, in relation to its 
performance, there has been differing levels of performance outcome between one developing 
country to another as well as from one period to another in only one developing country such as 
Indonesia.  Therefore, the institutional analysis of this thesis will be based upon and discussed in a later 
section. 
SEZ policies that are successful in countries like the Dominican Republic and China may result in weak, 
unintended, and negative effects in Indonesia or other developing regions such as in Latin America 
(the case of maquilas in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela) where the impacts of 
these policy reforms are highly dependent on circumstances (Hausmann et al. 2005: 23), such as 
political and economic. In political term, Indonesia’s changing political system from authoritarian to 
democratic has changed some abstract and general SEZ institutional principles, i.e. the rules of the 
game (rulers, legislations or property rights) and play of the game (the organisation) at the national 
and subnational levels which resulted in a larger span of bureaucratic system in a decentralised 
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government. Moreover, in economic term, despite sharing similar Asian values and being more 
interventionist, Indonesia and China are incomparable in terms of 1) creating own supporting 
industries to empower domestic business sector and ensure the availability of cheap raw materials as 
the country’s new sources of competitiveness other than cheap labour; 2) enhancing their Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) framework and establishing their own source of bank loan to finance the SEZ 
infrastructure rather than being overly reliant on the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Knoth 
2000; Das 2013). The experience of the world’s most successful SEZs, especially in terms of the 
experience of subnational government’s policy processes particularly post-decentralisation, is still 
sought by the government of Indonesia (GOI). 
Is SEZ policy in accordance with the expectation of theory? 
SEZs are all about FDI (Carter and Harding 2011: xv). There is a substantial source of literature 
concerning the nature and extent of SEZ policies that support FDI strategy for economic growth. Using 
different measurements, the robustness of the findings varies. Ge (1999) finds that compared with 
foreign portfolio investment and commercial lending, FDI is the primary driver of capital, technology 
and knowledge transfers from developed to developing countries under multinational activities as they 
are motivated by long-term goals and fewer volatility perspectives. Evidence suggests that SEZ 
establishment is an effective vehicle to attract foreign multinationals and Ge (1999) further claims SEZ 
has a role in promoting economic transition and liberalisation (Ibid: 20-1). Carter and Harding (2011) 
further reaffirm the claim that through SEZs, FDI and trade liberalisation still result in economic 
development and poverty alleviation, particularly in Asia. Other FDI studies suggest that FDI 
contribution is beneficial for growth even though the host countries have limited human capital stock 
under the condition that adequate absorptive capabilities are available to accept the advanced 
technologies (Borensztein et al. 1998). Most responses to criticism do note, however, that their results 
are not necessarily generalizable to SEZs throughout the world (Madani 1999; Glick and Roubaud 2006; 
Aggarwal 2007). This will depend on the host government policy strategy in terms of efficiency.  
Moreover, there are varying results on the performance of SEZs. Their success and failure often derive 
from aspects concerning location (Pradeep and Pradeep 2008), near national borders, urban areas, 
skilled labour, and infrastructure quality (Moberg 2012). Others allude to other recipes for success, i.e. 
zones areal size (Farole and Akinci 2011: 221) and perfect timing (Yuan and Eden 1992). SEZ success 
stories also mainly involve providing a sound and clear legal and regulatory framework (e.g. SEZs in 
Malaysia and Singapore). Another aspect depends on the developing countries’ geographical position, 
either land-locked/hinterland area or coastal regions (e.g. countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Japan, and 
the Philippines located near an international trading lane along a coastal region are more 
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advantageous than if located in a hinterland as it will be in isolation to the trade wave). Moreover, the 
SEZs are even more successful if well-connected to the domestic market (Moberg 2012) whereby local 
sources are drawn by zone investors as factors of production (Farole and Akinci 2011: 217). Other 
aspects concern the host countries’ political underpinning (e.g. democratic governance such as South 
Korea and Malaysia tend to have more chance of success than socialist governance aside from China 
and Vietnam such as North Korea). In addition, evidence suggests that the successful SEZ is simply due 
to the policymakers’ decision in choosing the right industry for the respected countries. For instance, 
some industries may contribute to a country’s growth geared towards high technology businesses such 
as Taiwan, China, and India, while some countries like Bangladesh may not benefit from the industry 
unless garment producers can invest in its zones to attract significant investment (Farole and Akinci 
2011: 41). Therefore, these controversial facts that SEZ as a policy instrument yield mixed results 
related to this study. 
Institutions matter in SEZ policy process 
The different outcomes1 of the SEZ policy have drawn the author to review the work of North (1990) 
on the influence of institutions on actors’ behaviour and choice in policy. The author further adopts 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) as this approach is conceptualised through delineating (1) 
‘Institution matters’ to determine the success or failure of economic reform policymaking towards 
growth, due to market failure. It further underlines the empirical analysis by attempting to understand 
the role of institutions to SEZ policy process which lacks consistency in the policy’s performance 
especially in a system of transition by delineating the concept of institutional change. The fundamental 
concern of this thesis is how much institutions matter and which ones, not just how institutions matter 
(North 1990 in Slater 2011: 1, emphasis added).  
Additionally, North (1990) asserts that institutional economics produces answers through 
interpretations of formal and informal rules and the understanding of human cognition (perception or 
intuition) to reduce uncertainty in human interaction (Ibid: 6). The cognitive factors refer to the 
development of meaningful beliefs and habits (rules). In North’s (2005b: 163-4) words,  
“the importance of understanding how evolving mental models (ideologies or religions) 
constrain the choice set of the players engaged in the process of institutional change not 
only through a clear understanding of the belief structure underlying the existing 
institutions but also margins at which the belief system may be amenable to changes”.  
Based on North’s interpretations, this study intends to explore the institutional challenges as 
constraints to the policymaking dynamics of key policy actors which draws upon Williamson’s (2000) 
framework of institutional constraints or known as social analysis theory and discover why it produces 
                                                          
1The outcomes is discussed further in chapter 2. 
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mixed results. Williamson’s study will serve as the study’s main theoretical guidance on the interaction 
of human actors and their modes of interaction. Further details will be elaborated in chapter 2 that 
synthesises existing NIE literature. 
(2) In a policy context, drawing upon the work of Spiller et al. (2003) on Latin American development 
policy, this study pays more attention to the connection between political institutions and 
policymaking and uses the concepts to describe the structure of authoritative policymaking—formal 
and informal institutions along with governance structure and resource allocation—concerning the 
practice of authoritative governance in a polity. This study provides valuable insights into the politics 
of policymaking (specifically the process of SEZ restructuring) (Joskow 2008 in Lieberherr 2009:1).  
(3) In mapping the political context, this study supports March and Olsen’s (1990, 2004) proposition 
on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ that: “Action, policymaking included, is driven by rules of appropriate 
or exemplary behaviour, organised into institutions”. The logic is viewed on to what extent the human 
action is construed while the importance of rules includes normative and cognitive levels in an SEZ 
structure and society. 
1.2. The Indonesian Context 
Nearly two decades since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 1997-8, the Indonesian politics has 
experienced a profound transformation from an authoritarian regime with a highly-centralised polity 
to a democratic regime with a more evolving, pluralistic, and diffused system with an increasingly 
vigorous parliament (through the Reformasi).  
This transformation has also led to a far more liberal development policy. Albeit neoliberal 
policymaking has always been an object of dispute, the dominant theme in Indonesian politics since 
independence has been the quest for growth and maintaining the status quo. The world’s largest 
archipelagic state began investment (FDI) and export-oriented policies essential to the formation of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the 1970s. Internal and external pressures such as political turbulence 
after AFC, ethnic conflicts, corruption, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and free trade 
agreements (FTAs) have influenced SEZ formulation as an integral part of the neoliberal policy and 
economic reform, where the government’s primary motive has been to bring investment into the 
country and hold legitimate power by any means possible2.  
Over the last four decades, Indonesian SEZ has undergone an evolution in which the terminology, 
period, and locations vary (See Table 1.1). At first, the objective of the SEZ scheme during new order 
(NO) in the early 1970s was to alleviate poverty by reducing unemployment then the SEZ strategies 
                                                          
2The empirical chapters 5 and 6 provide the evidence 
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were further diversified based on the focus of development and institutional environments underlying 
the flexible diversification strategy. However, these characteristics will play a part in the scope of this 
thesis to explain the different context underlying their policy formulation specifically the FTZ, EPZ, and 
the SEZ (new form) types.  
Table 1.1 
 
From the outset, the state dominated the rules of the game (dirigiste) with protectionist and strong 
interventionist measures. Despite SEZ proliferation marked by the launching of the Batam Bonded 
Warehouse3 in the 1970s (Wahyuni 2009), there was no significant improvement in FDI inflows taken 
by the NO regime other than the low-end labour-intensive industry. Moreover, the overall 
development of these zones4 has not provided optimal results and there are many obstacles to their 
implementation.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the country subsequently emerged economically strong; the SEZ policy has 
encouraged more investments into the country, however, severe contradictions underlie the process. 
After a series of economic reforms to make room for a more laissez-faire system, marked by minimal 
state intervention, the government adopted an export-led growth (EOI) strategy and intense FDI-
oriented approach after 19865. For example, export processing zones (EPZs) within Indonesia’s 
industrial estates on the outskirts of Indonesia’s major cities were concentrated mainly in Java in 1989, 
                                                          
3Subsequently initiated the mushrooming of the EPZ-type mainly in Java Island in 1980s (Warr 1989). 
4Under import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies by imposing higher tax and other barriers for infant 
industry protection 
5Further details in chapter 2 
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continued by Integrated Economic Development Zones (KAPET) located in rural and underdeveloped 
regions in 1996, then by Batam Free Trade Zone (FTZ) which officially opened in 2000. During the 
reform and democratic order (RDO), KAPET was strengthened to focus on reducing regional inequality 
especially to eastern regions; and during the SBY period, a new SEZ scheme based on the region’s 
resource potential arose in 2009 under Law No. 39/2009 via the economic corridors platform6. 
Subsequently, SEZs became market-driven and resource-based and aimed at serving various sectors 
and markets. Looking below the surface, SEZ’s fundamental institutions were weak—increased by the 
devastation of the AFC. The RDO in 1998 to 2014 sought to encourage the revival of the SEZ policy 
after it had stalled. This caused serious political economic challenges for not only the RDO where four 
contradictory leaders7 after Soeharto offered erratic economic policy direction but until the changing 
democratic regime of Joko Widodo (Jokowi). This study investigates how SEZ policy transformed (from 
Habibie until Jokowi period) and why. 
1.3. Statement of Research Problem 
SEZ being widely accepted throughout the world (WEPZA; Farole and Akinci 2011) is displayed when 
the Indonesian government (GOI) since the 1970s designed several reform strategies including SEZ to 
improve the growth and competitiveness of exports through domestic and foreign investment (Daeng 
2008; Maramis 2012). However, despite SEZ policy implementation applying different investment 
policies with different incentive provisions, the outcome has shown insignificant results and 
controversy.  
Furthermore, aggravated by the first AFC, Indonesia’s tradable and non-tradable sectors started losing 
their spark, continuing even after the recent global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 (Table 4.4 in chapter 
4). Although the economic performance has been largely unsatisfactory (Warr 1983, 1989; 
Jayanthakumaran 2002, 2003; Halim 2007) with exports decreasing and industrial growth stagnating, 
the RDO insist on continuing the economic marathon into a deeper neoliberal ideology by adopting a 
more liberalised SEZ concept for FDI purposes. They were compelled to take advantage of the trade 
liberalisation policy and encourage FDI through SEZs, leaving many to question whether SEZs are good 
for economic reform (Daeng 2008: 64). Therefore, it remains a subject of scholarly debate as to why 
this scheme has always emerged; how institutions are responsible for these economic performances 
and why? Hence, the nature and pattern of this contradiction—the political economy of SEZ and its 
institutional intricacies—will be critically examined. And corollary questions are; how do institutions 
                                                          
6Will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 3 
7BJ Habibie (21st May 1998—20th October 1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (20th October 1999—23rd July 2001), 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (23rd July 2001—20th October 2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY (20th 
October 2004—20th October 2014). 
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affect actors’ behaviour and which kind of institutions? What do actors consider to take in the SEZ 
formulation decision? 
They chose to develop SEZ policy through a sequence of formal legislation and other institutional 
methods aimed to enhance the control of government concerning the management and SEZ localities 
during the SEZ policy implementation due to the ongoing conflicts of interest among the relevant 
authorities. These are the cardinal reasons for the thesis topic where these results dispel the popular 
view that SEZ policy has a ‘multiplier’ effect on economic growth; instead, it only increases the 
liberalisation level in every regime government. But, why did Indonesia show incapable to extract 
benefit from the SEZ scheme? This will be explored in the empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6 where chapter 
4 constitutes the historical context of Indonesia’s institutional framework. 
The significance of institutional analysis is that it allows the author to apply practical knowledge in an 
inclusive range of political economic settings in Indonesia with its democratic dynamism. According to 
Harriss et al. (2003: 10), “the state is always a reflection of the holdover power within a society, 
representative of the dominant economic interest groups”. This study also contributes to the 
understanding of the role of the state in policy formation, its implementation, economic outcomes, 
and political agenda. The author particularly focuses on information on the SEZ policy action by the 
successive regimes in a complex set of institutional contexts that include the normative, regulative, 
and cognitive features (Scott 1995 in Hazakis 2014 where Hazakis changed normative feature to 
organizational) that shape and transform SEZ policies where there is an acknowledged lack of research.  
Characteristically, SEZ studies are highly segmented. Given this idiosyncratic nature, most studies focus 
on specific segments of the SEZ which analyse the static economic effects8 of neoclassical assumptions 
(Aswicahyono and Maidir 2003; Robertson et al. 2004; Wu 2007; Adam and Tisdel 2008; Seshadri 2011; 
Vickers 2012), giving little consideration to the institutional economic approach. This thesis is a narrow 
study analysis that tries to avoid common drawbacks that other broader studies produce. It marks a 
departure from earlier studies that: first, focus mainly on the economic dimensions in a global context 
(map more comprehensive research trends across transitional developing countries that have over-
generalised in macroeconomic terms9) or favour cross-country regression studies (Knoth 2000; Nicola 
2009; Rossi 2011; Nyangu 2012). Instead of studying institutions from purely economic and 
quantitative positivist approaches (such as cross-sectional and time-series analyses10), this study 
                                                          
8Studies on the SEZ programme’s formal institutions mostly capture the static economic measures: investment, 
contributions through taxes, employment, exports, indirect employment, and other short-term mechanisms. 
9Among the most popular studies: the World Bank/IMF (1980s), Lal (1983, 1992), and Krueger (1992).  
10Focussing on economic growth and trade liberalisation, cross-country and time-series analysis are often the 
case in economic research (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Devereux and Lapham 1994; Edwards 1998; Rodriguez 
and Rodrik 1999; Greenaway et al. 2002; Redding 2002). The research outcomes describe that on aggregate the 
8 
 
contributes to the contemporary debates on how political regimes and processes impact policy 
formulations (enriching the debate proposed by Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Lavigne 1999) and 
affect the socioeconomic dimensions in Indonesia through broadening the scope of knowledge in a 
qualitative case study design, hitherto unexplored by positivist approaches. Furthermore, this single 
country study may yield greater proceeds than further cross-country analysis. 
Second, the inherent relation between SEZ policy and policymaking has not been wholly discussed and 
looks like two separate political economic phenomena without linkages (Daeng 2008; Hadi et al. 2011), 
which is not the case. Moreover, the 40-year history of economic zones,11 its resultant evolution, and 
economic importance was documented as separate studies. Those studies have not clarified the 
political-economic dynamism with respect to SEZ policy and policymaking as two interrelated areas 
and how political-economic transition (as restructuring or change) has influenced SEZs policies in 
Indonesia.  
Third, NIE study in Indonesia is still at an emergent stage given the dominance of NCE thought12 and 
the analytical or methodological vulnerabilities involved in displaying and assessing cognitive-related 
procedures. It was only after the publication of Yustika (2005) with his study of the socio-economic 
and institutional conditions of sugar cane farmers in East Java, which institutional economic studies in 
Indonesia began to have some scientific research. Among the most notable ones also include Purbayu 
(2010) through the aspects of Indonesian economy analyses the failure of the neoclassical economy 
(NCE) and the relevance to the contemporary institutional economic study. To avoid the sensitive issue 
of institutional analysis, the theme of the precarious connection between policy and institutions or 
cognition (individual perception) has been overlooked and appeared unpopular among the Indonesian 
studies on good governance, policy, and development. This is due to the political sensitivity of the 
subject during Soeharto’s tenure (Mas’oed and Savirani 2011: 75)13.  
                                                          
confident yet low impact of trade liberalisation on growth over-generalised the significance toward individual 
countries where there is growth heterogeneity across countries that should be explained (see Morgan and 
Kanchanahatakij 2008). The common drawbacks stems from the empirical analysis that a one-size-fits-all to a 
large extent more effective in broader economic studies, but scepticism over the validity, generality, hypothesis 
that links growth to openness, calculation to openness, and how a country changes its trade openness level are 
inconsistent and the growth heterogeneity is undetermined (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 2002).  
11Contributors on the history of SEZ see for example Easterling (2007) and Neveling (2014a, 2014b) 
12Neoclassical economics became dominant in universities in the second half of the 1970s (Bresser-Pereira 2012: 
347). 
13The sensitive nature of NIE study was to a certain extent associated with the empirical evidence in Mas’oed 
and Savirani’s (2011) political and sociological research on ‘financing politics’ which was revealed in a twenty-
year span (1990-2010). 256 post-graduate students’ theses were assessed. 13% were written during the Soeharto 
era with a significant increase in interest on the theme to an unprecedented 87% during the post-Soeharto era. 
It relates to the more controlled political system by the NO government; studies on political parties were limited, 
and elections were held with expected results. Meanwhile in the post-Soeharto era there were vibrant political 
parties with a relaxed and open political life. 
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Fourth, until today, there has been no comprehensive research ever been carried out on the politics 
of Indonesia’s SEZ policy especially in the policymaking process employing an eclectic institutional 
economic approach by any Indonesian or western scholars. Research on SEZ in Indonesia, up to 2000s 
still limited to studies with topics specifically on the SEZ feasibility issues, its impact to national 
economy, and development planning policies (Wahyuni and Ng 2008; Darmawan 2008; Wahyuni et al. 
2010; Wahyuni and Astuti 2011; Vickers 2012; Hertanti and Chaturvedi 2012, CSIS 2015). Most studies 
on Indonesian politics lay more emphasis on the NO authoritarian or the NO continuing influence on 
the contemporary political structure (Percaya 2000, Tahyar 2012, Korte 2013, Choi 2011, and Raffiudin 
2015). They either discuss the good governance context (Korte 2013; Choi 2013), state or politico-
business relations (Fukuoka 2012; Raffiudin 2015), Sino-Indonesian relations (Percaya 2000), state-
society relations (Buehler 2014), or state-religion relations (Metera 2012). Hence, drawing upon Harold 
Crouch’s argument (1979), the claim is still that several aspects of the NO patrimonialism persist (Korte 
2014; Mackie 2010 in Raffiudin 2015: 6; Tahyar 2012). Moreover, many Indonesian democracy scholars 
were mostly influenced by the oligarchy thesis14 (Buehler 2014: 157). While other democracy scholars, 
such as Robison and Hadiz (2004), Webber (2006), and Case (2009, 2015) point out other perspectives 
that the new forms of political patronage between the old and new political institutions, economic 
agents, and their clients have impeded the democratisation process. 
Therefore, this thesis attempts to fill the gap by assessing political intrigues of the SEZ policymaking 
and by adopting Williamson’s theory as a guide. This study posits that institutions do matter in SEZ 
policymaking and that one institution affects other institutions in the action taken by policymakers 
resulted in mixed policy outcome under different presidential periods, thus how it happens and why 
will be the focus. 
1.4. The focus of the study 
Grounded by empirical case study, under the NIE approach, this study scrutinises the interplay 
between institutions and the politics of policymaking. Scholarship on the relationship between 
institutions and political influences tended to view authoritarian countries as inconsistent to the 
relationship between institutions and attracting investment (Jensen et al. 2011: 2), believing that 
access to factors of endowment is more influential to the nature of institutional intervention devised 
by the state (Combarnous and Rougier 2010: 4). This thesis provides insights into the political channels 
through which institutions affect the SEZ policymaking in Indonesia.  
The specific context of this thesis starts when the regional autonomy or decentralisation legislation 
was enacted in 1999 followed by the constitutional reform in 2000. Following Soeharto’s state and 
                                                          
14See Robison and Hadiz (2004, 2005), Hadiz (2010), and Winters (2011) 
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populist government prior to 1997, the RDO regime not only changed the bureaucratic structure of the 
governance but they also changed the structural legislation related to investment promotion and other 
neoliberal policies, i.e. labour standards, land acquisition, and spatial planning entitlements to help 
smooth the SEZ policy process on the pretext of curbing poverty and inequality under the economic 
reform and development. These policies were found to have adverse effects (as will be elaborated in 
chapter 4) as the well-placed were the main beneficiaries of a highly patronage-based and rent-seeking 
system, such as the oligarchs and bourgeois, hereafter cronies (Abonyi 2005; Aspinall and Mietzner 
2010; Datta et al. 2011). However, the other neoliberal policies above are not considered in this thesis 
instead they serve only as impetuses for policymakers to design the appropriate SEZ scheme. 
Evidently, the overall empirical evidence on the outcomes of SEZ policies in Indonesia shows mixed 
results. First, despite strong belief among scholars15, Indonesia’s continuous efforts of constantly 
changing the facade of SEZ policy to effectively balance GDP growth or strengthen the industrialisation 
capacity or prosperity of the nation, boosting country competitiveness and seeking significant 
influence on the flow of investment, have largely failed16 (Daeng 2008: 127-261). Second, Indonesia’s 
continued ill-advised economic policies at the expense of society’s best interests have resulted in a 
widening economic inequality. It has provoked controversy for a number of reasons: 1) activists have 
protested about the likely impact of the neoliberal ideology, i.e. SEZ and investment policy running 
against The Indonesian economic ideology— ‘Pancasila’; in particular, with regard to the importance 
of and realising the ideals of economic justice and ‘nationalism’ (Ibid: 178-185). 2) The government is 
challenged on whether they are a hindrance, or a facilitator of economic growth and prosperity as will 
be presented in chapter 4.  
The study focuses on the SEZ policymaking from the RDO period of 1997-2014 until the beginning of 
Jokowi’s presidency (2015 until early 2016) when SEZ has been a key policy instrument for economic 
reform specifically investment promotion. The study not only have an interest in the new resource-
based term SEZ17 that many provinces and districts in Indonesia have been enthusiastic18 to embrace 
with varying degrees of intensity, the interest also lies with two traditional forms of the zone as 
empirical case studies, possibly unique in their own right: the EPZ in the greater Jakarta area and FTZ 
in Batam. While Indonesia’s SEZ policies and economic growth explain much about local SEZ policy 
outcome, regional responses in neoliberal promotion from external (IFIs) to internal forces (developed 
                                                          
15For example, Mallampally and Sauvant 1999; Sun 2002; OECD 2002; Wignaraja 2003; Dahlman 2007; Pitelis 
2008, 2014; Delgado et al. 2012. 
16 See Figures and Tables in chapter 4. 
17The SEZ’s basic concept is elaborated in the following chapter. 
18Since the government released SEZ Law No. 39/2009, more than 62 municipalities and districts have proposed 
to promote their areas into either natural resources-based or tourism-based SEZs and until today (as per January 
2016), nine regions have been approved and designated into SEZs (SEZ National Council 2014).  
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since the NO and originated from the influential neoliberalist role of multiple key state and non-state 
actors) inevitably vary. Jakarta EPZ and Batam FTZ briefly illustrate this. They are considered the most 
important SEZs which over the years have attracted a significant amount of investment, especially prior 
to the AFC, and contributed to the success of the resource-based industrialisation strategy in Indonesia 
(Sivananthiran 2009).  
Moreover, the significance of Jakarta EPZ also resides in its role as a prototype for further zones of this 
kind and other SEZ forms, while Batam FTZ has a geopolitical and geostrategic significance since its 
location is adjacent to Singapore. The Jakarta and Batam municipal governments have been just as 
enthusiastic as other provinces and districts in converting the already established EPZs and FTZ into an 
SEZ under political elites’ interference but through the hands of their respective zone management 
bodies, PT Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (KBN) and Batam Industrial Development Authority or BIDA. 
They introduce numerous additional incentives and benefits to facilitate investment and 
accommodate large public and privately-owned domestic and foreign corporations as Indonesia 
continues to compete with other countries such as Vietnam and China in a national ‘race to the 
bottom.’  
The empirical case studies narrate the complex institutional dilemma and offer an investigation of a 
unique period in the era of economic and political reforms in Indonesia. Through these cases, this study 
shows the intricate SEZ policymaking between and within key policy actors (national and sub-national 
elites) and their related bodies. It further analyses the institutional nature, scope and dimension of the 
challenges confronting the ruling elites’ circle of power regarding policy intervention amidst the 
political repercussions and economic difficulties. The study also analyses modes of economic 
coordination. It refers to how political institutions (the ‘rules of the game’) defining the procedures 
through which public policy is made, i.e. authoritarian or democratic government) mitigate or reduce 
uncertainty (the degree of trustworthiness) included in transaction costs or administrative costs. 
The study uses NIE theory and Williamson’s social analysis model as guidance where each layer of the 
institutional constraints are explained in chapter 2, while the analytical framework derived from the 
theory is discussed in chapter 3.  
The study tries to analyse problems associated to the influence of institutions in policy formulation 
through SEZ arrangements where existing literature has not adequately made contribution particularly 
linking Williamson’s institutional constraints and SEZ policy process into an integrated analytical 
framework. Voluminous literature mainly focused on the nature and extent of the SEZ political 
economy in recent years and its empirical arguments but the institutional dynamics, formal (policy and 
regulatory framework) and informal context (socio-political culture) have not been emphasised or fully 
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analysed in relation to SEZ’s significance to the policymaking process. Although so far, political 
economic studies on SEZ have shown a balance between macro-level (institutional environment) and 
micro-level (institutional arrangement) studies, however, studies conducted tend to use quantitative 
rather than qualitative approach not focused on the institutional theory and political factors but rather 
on the economic factors. Moreover, they are still largely contributed by Western scholars i.e. Knoth 
(2000), Seshadri (2011), and Moberg (2012). Therefore, the study tries to fill the void in knowledge of 
SEZ policymaking in Indonesia and contributes to the theoretical discussions on its institutional 
dimension. 
1.5. Research Questions, Aims, Central Proposition, and Hypotheses 
Guided by three research questions, this thesis intends to answer:  
1. What are the institutional intricacies surrounding the process of SEZ policymaking? 
2. How and why do institutions influence the behaviour of actors in SEZ policy decision? 
3. Which institutions affect the SEZ policy decision and why? 
The aims of this study are 1) to examine the intricacies behind the process of making the SEZ policy, 2) 
to investigate how institutions influenced political institutions and economic agents’ decision and why 
do these institutions affect the decision, 3) to analyse the type of institutions generally affect the 
decision.  
Based on my research questions, this study will work on the following central proposition and 
hypotheses: 
The proposition and hypotheses started from the personal experience and literatures on the progress 
and setbacks of SEZ programme in Indonesia while working in the Ministry of Finance followed by the 
literature review on new institutional economics and its relevant theories and concepts including 
Williamson’s social analysis (this study uses the term ‘institutional constraints’ rather than social 
analysis as it is better suited to the study of institutions at hand). Using Indonesia as the case, the 
author connects the proposition and hypotheses with the research questions as follows: 
The central proposition based on the first research question:  
The institutional intricacies that surround the SEZ policymaking process concern with the interaction 
of one institution to another that influence actors’ behaviour and policy decision in a dynamic and 
complicated set of policy formulation strategies which caused higher uncertainties and transaction 
costs.  
To elaborate the proposition into more clarity in the case of Indonesia 1) informal institutions, both 
productive and non-productive, have not been compatible in support of formal institutions and vice 
versa, 2) property rights are not yet optimal in the bureaucratic level of SEZ policymaking process 
during transitional period of centralist paradigm shift towards decentralisation, 3) continuous and 
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discontinuous SEZ bureaucratic policies have shifted the pattern of abuse of power by a handful of 
people in public institutions hindering the clarity of contractual relation of the SEZ relevant authority, 
4) lack of clarity of the principal-agent relationships lead to moral hazard, adverse selection problems, 
and uncertain structural incentives. 
Hypothesis 1 
Informal institutions have a very strong influence on the functionalities of formal institutions in the SEZ 
policy process and actors’ institutional preference tends to use informal practices more than formal 
practices during the SEZ implementation level rather than the formulation level due to the policy has 
been established and running and the actors’ cultural and ideological beliefs are developed at the 
implementation level. 
Hypothesis 2 
Bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviours emanate when actors unable to settle conflicts 
occurred in the policy process and principal-agent, moral hazard, and adverse selection problems in 
SEZ governance structure at the central government level render contractual relationships to be 
unclear at the local government level. 
1.6. The Study Significance  
 
This study contributes to the issue and current literature on SEZ policymaking, the policy 
implementation and policy outcome. The study sheds more light on the EPZ and FTZ type in regional 
level rather than the SEZ in general. It contributes to the theoretical knowledge of SEZ policy process 
under the reform and democratic regimes by employing institutional analysis for both theoretical as 
well as analytical frameworks depart from conventional views of SEZ as a simple reform policy tool. 
This study develops a more dynamic analysis and more nuanced, empirically viable and politically 
grounded theories of human behaviour to policy choice. It does not take technology as the defining 
factor of policy and institutional change as inferred by institutionalists, Hodgson and Stoelhorst (2014), 
however, this study adopts knowledge factor as one of the significant aspects for actors in using 
information they possess in the SEZ or economic reform policymaking process as suggested by 
independent scholars, i.e. Moberg (2012) and Datta et al. (2011). 
1.7. The Thesis Organisation  
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 2 sets the baseline for the 
research and conceptualises the NIE theoretical framework and related concepts and relate them to 
Williamson's hierarchy of institutional constraints. It also explains the relevant SEZ policy literature and 
develops the gaps in knowledge. This chapter delivers the interplay between political institutions, 
policymaking process under economic reform strategies, and policy outcome with regards to SEZ. The 
chapter argues that institutions matter in economic reform policy and its relevant activities. It further 
argues that SEZ policymaking relevant constraints involve behavioural assumptions, formal and 
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informal rules, human actors, and modes of interaction between various economic agents and political 
institutions. The interplay between institutions and SEZ policymaking is an empirical question. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the analytical framework and methodology to provide direction of how the study 
is conducted. The chapter adopts Williamson’s (2000) theory to guide the analytical process. It also 
describes why the methodologies used in the study are the appropriate approaches by rationalising 
the use of qualitative approach by employing case study design. The chapter also highlights the 
research protocols and limitation of the research methodology. 
Chapter 4 examines Indonesia as a case study by utilising the evidence found from the field, literature 
review, document, and media analysis. This chapter touches Indonesia’s historical context in 
policymaking including SEZ trajectories by different ruling elites. It spells out the institutional 
framework that influences policy process and prevailed both before and during the years of reform. It 
further analyses the structure of the emerging democratic reconfiguration and the evolution of 
Indonesia’s SEZ related policies, i.e. investment policies, its derivatives, and implementation under 
different ruling elites that ultimately points to how the trajectory of SEZ policymaking actually appears 
in the future. This chapter validates the central proposition in chapter 1. It demonstrates the mandate 
of the highest leadership in Jakarta being executed, interpreted, and disputed by diverse actors at the 
central, regional and parliamentary levels. It leads to how SEZ policymaking being implemented at 
different time and space. This chapter also elucidates the standard features from other countries’ SEZ 
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as measures of success. From those indicators (criteria) what are all the features more common in the 
selected countries in their success and compare them to Indonesia. This process is to find which 
country has more factors of success compare to others and which country has less common factors. 
Chapter 5 highlights the first thematic series of institutional intricacies represented by the role of 
informal institutions in human motivations and social structure and its effect on formal institutions. 
The chapter will provide evidence to test the first hypothesis. It shows how localised political variables 
in the Jakarta EPZ in the KBN (Kawasan Berikat Nusantara) industrial zone can thwart institutional 
change initiatives. This chapter argues that the downsizing role of the state between 2009 and 2014 
points to something more than an upsurge of collective displeasure generated from state-owned 
enterprises’ (SOEs) mishandling of the port management and the Jakarta Bay SEZ reclamation 
episodes. This chapter reveals that the inclusive informal institutions that were strongly influenced by 
the prevailing norms of behaviour, ideologies, and values of the new order under political economic 
complexity coexist with formal ‘rules of the game’ resulted in both durable and fragile institutional 
change in distinct contextual bases during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) period which at times 
the nature of formal rules tend to provide weak incentives for policymakers to make SEZ policies and 
reveals that more informal processes govern SEZ policymaking and shape the incentives that 
policymakers might have in requesting SEZ policy change in the implementation level. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the second thematic series of institutional intricacies represented by political 
negotiations that took place within the local political institutions and economic agents on the topic of 
Batam FTZ transformation, and a specific step of political wisdom displayed by the reform and 
democratic order period. The chapter answers whether the second hypothesis can be justified. It plots, 
first, the regular FTZ policy change (and subsequent ambiguities) that happened within the economic 
reform policy where the zone managers (represented by BIDA) and local authority (Pemkot Batam) 
tried to negotiate with the unstable formal legislation of the bureaucratic order, and to validate the 
inevitability behind the SEZ policy formulation in its own hypothetical terms. It is the mixture of these 
aspects that clarify to what extent the incumbent presidents take on SEZ policy reform proposals in 
the first place. The chapter draws from the last two layers of the institutional constraint rationale by 
Williamson (2000) which considers aligning regulatory intervention with the allocation of resources 
issues related to understanding the ways in which actors try to minimise transaction costs under 
principal-agent, moral hazard, and adverse selection problems. It involves balancing the incentive 
structures and compliance rule among the different stakeholders under the SEZ policy perspective in 
the SEZ system of rules, policy setting or regulation formulation and its enforcement (directed and 
monitored). This chapter also depicts that patrimonial relations, entrenched in the NO, still emerge in 
the local polity as a result of the devolving power structure noteworthy in the Reformasi period. This 
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chapter argues that SEZ initiatives in Batam became politicised not only, borrowing Das (2012), in 
intent and meaning but also in the execution process. The BIDA-Pemkot Batam conflicts in the NO are 
the peak of sequences of inherent paradoxes rooted in the way the BIDA and Pemkot Batam went 
about managing the Batam FTZ under transformation. They are not impartial episodes. The BIDA and 
Pemkot conflict show that their channel in policy execution initiatives was translated into exercises in 
maximising political benefits. The chapter founds the importance of policy negotiation in supporting 
any effort at SEZ policy reform. 
Chapter 7 will state the results of my study. It presents significant findings directly and precisely 
includes some discussion around the institutional factors which both encourage and discourage SEZ 
policymakers. The author will state whether my hypotheses can be accepted. The author does not 
profess the hypotheses or the evaluation and conclusions to be definitive. What the author will show 
in the findings is that the author hopes to discover most aspects of the category based on usability 
theory. The chapter states the contribution of this study to knowledge, draws some shortcomings of 
the study, and provide suggestions for further research. This study generally acknowledged that 
studying institutions which have touched the course of a policy process in Indonesia is highly sensitive 
as it involves studying the actors behind it. Therefore, this study contributes to the understanding of 

















Literature Review and Conceptual Framework  
Introduction 
After laying out the introductory material and the study objective, this chapter aims, first, to review 
the existing literature on institutions as the study’s main theoretical guidance explaining why and how 
institutions influence the actors’ behaviour and action toward economic reform policy decision 
making. Second, this chapter aims to highlight the gaps from the current institutional economics and 
SEZ literature which this study tries to fill in.   
The new institutional economics (NIE) will be employed to understand the institutional settings of the 
Indonesian government’s SEZ policy orientation as their economic reform strategy. This study will 
explore these challenges through a unified conceptual framework which synthesises existing NIE 
literature.  
After the introduction, before discussing the theoretical literature the chapter turns to the concept of 
‘actors’ responsible for the SEZ policy transformation. The chapter consists of two subchapters. The 
first subchapter introduces the institutional framework as the theoretical foundation and the second 
subchapter discusses the literature on SEZ. The first subchapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section introduces the NIE by unravelling it from the neoclassical economics (NCE) to explain that 
institutions matter in economic reform policy. The second section elaborates Williamson’s hierarchy 
of institutional constraint framework as a guide to the analytical approach which underpins the various 
practical and epistemological elements. It stems from the institutional characteristics of the Indonesian 
SEZ policy to show how the NIE and interrelated concepts can be applied in practice. This section 
includes the manifestation of NIE theory and literature to the political context through evidence from 
other countries’ experience East Asian Tigers, India, and the Indonesian authoritarian New Order as 
special cases. The third section outlines the conceptualisation of ‘institutions’ and related concepts, 
and explicitly states the causal links between history, path dependency, and ‘institutional change’ 
context and its main characteristics that inform and underpin the key actors’ behaviour. It incorporates 
concepts related to the political economy context i.e. asymmetric information and collective action, 
bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour, the logic of appropriateness, and the intertemporal 
and credible commitment framework by outlining the state intervention in the process of policymaking 
to present a cohesive and clear overview of the study’s theoretical foundations. They represent the 
kind of political compulsions which underlies Indonesian SEZ policymaking development.  
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The second subchapter sets out more general forms of literature on the rationale of SEZ. This 
subchapter consists of three sections, the first section addresses SEZ definition, typologies, and 
characteristics. The second section presents SEZ importance from a global perspective. The third 
section explores the literature on SEZ outcome. Finally, the final part concludes the entire chapter. 
 Key Policy Actors   
Drawing from Hoffmann (2010), which derives from Henisz’s (2000) ‘institutional environment’ 
approach and Tsebelis’ (2003) ‘veto players’ approach, the key actors or elites discussed here are 
actors engaged in the SEZ policymaking process and known to have their vested interests or rights in a 
governance system. They are described as the two crucial political economic variables or operating 
stakeholders in the political-economic sphere: 1) political institutions or legislators or political actors 
and the parties. They are executives or policy implementers in North’s (2005b) terms (the three main 
arms of government, the executive, legislative, and judiciary) and beneath these government, branch 
are state actors or bureaucrats in government agencies such as Pemkot Batam (Municipal 
government); 2) economic agents or economic institutions a. technocrats in the Indonesian context in 
Amir’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2013) terms, refer to two groups of leading scholars, b. the economists 
and the technologists/engineers chosen by the incumbent regime as advisers of the government in 
carrying out economic policy decision-making, such as BIDA (Batam Industrial Development Agency) 
and c. the zone developer and management: state-owned companies including KBN in Jakarta EPZ, an 
independent agency supervised by the central government. The use of economic agents and political 
institutions in this chapter, at times, are used interchangeably with policymakers or key actors. 
Political institutions in the cases here also refer to the public authorities, voting or majority rules or 
proportional representation, the constitution, and the management of collective problems. This can 
be attributed to the hidden action performed by, for instance, Jusuf Kalla, the former vice president of 
the SBY regime. However, other actors also emerged during the SEZ policy processes. For example, 
non-state actors such as privately-owned companies, KCN and KTU (Their roles will be discussed in 
chapter 5). Since the presence of uncertainty necessitates that individuals anticipate future wants and 
needs, it is argued that non-state actors who have the skills to recognise and implement opportunities 
by making decisions in the face of uncertainty emerged, hence, organising by instructing others and 
paying wages (Coase 1937 in Lieberherr 2009: 5). The multiplicity of actors involved in the SEZ policy 
is part of the Indonesian strategy to involve actors of trade, industry, and investment in exercising 
trade liberalisation termed the free trade area with Indonesian SEZ characteristics. The subchapter 
turns the discussion to explain the institutional theoretical framework and related concepts to inform 
the importance of institutions to actors’ behaviour. 
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A. Institutional Framework  
1. Understanding NIE 
 
NIE has gained prominence in analysing institutions within the sub-disciplines of political economy and 
public policy and is one of the most important innovations in the contemporary study of politics (Bates 
2007: 174). By employing NIE, it is crucial to analyse the ways in which economic agents and political 
institutions deal with uncertainties and informs the overall orientation and approaches of this study. 
This perspective has been known to obtain better results than other frameworks in development 
studies. In particular, the author stresses the understanding of institutional change in the economic 
reform strategy to SEZ policy (the empirical terms of this study in chapter 4 refer to the decentralisation 
and SEZ related policies, i.e. investment laws, labour laws) especially the policymaking process and the 
outcomes (ramifications) by policymakers.  
NIE theory can open the black box19 of the weak application of neoclassical economics (NCE) theory by 
key actors in solving economic issues in developing countries. NIE theory is a reaction of dissatisfaction 
toward ‘market failure’ in NCE theory and an enrichment and continuation of the NCE view by offering 
answers to enhance and develop NCE. NIE was important for economic policy during the 1990s as it 
was against market domination and offered encouraging strategies for policy interferences unnoticed 
by orthodox economists (Harriss et al. 2003: 7).  
The process of restructuring from the failure of market liberalisation has made NIE a well-known 
subject in social science literature. “NIE is a body of ideas which is essentially dynamic or at least seeks 
to introduce an element of dynamism into the static stereotype of NCE” (Harriss et al. 2003: 9). NIE 
gained global attention as it analyses modes of economic coordination. It is particularly suited to those 
interested in studying the political economies of countries that have yet to reach―so often depicted 
as the ‘ultimate goal’―full industrialisation (Finger et al. 2005; Joskow 2008). 
The interplay between institutions, transaction costs and NCE and the bargaining and negotiation of 
the transactions at the lowest cost possible puts more emphasis on the role of actors (economic agents 
and political institutions) as asserted by North: 
“It was Ronald Coase who made the crucial connection between institutions, transaction 
costs, and neoclassical theory (Coase 1960). The neoclassical result of efficient markets 
only obtains when it is costless to transact. Only under the conditions of costless 
bargaining will the actors reach the solution that maximises aggregate income, regardless 
of the institutional arrangements.......Efficient markets are created in the real world when 
competition is strong enough via arbitrage and efficient information feedback to 
                                                          
19This concept draws on Williamson’s (2000: 602) ‘firms and bureaus’ concept. 
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approximate the Coase zero-transaction-cost conditions and the parties can realise the 
gains from trade inherent in the neoclassical argument” (North 1993: 344). 
In addition, the institution is important for establishing long-term economic growth since institutions 
form an incentive structure (rules) to run the economy and the actors.  
NIE presents the study of the serious relationship between cognition and institutions in the good 
governance context. Good institutions encourage transactions to be carried out effectively and 
efficiently to reduce transaction costs by improving access/allocation to resources and quality of 
information and encourage the establishment of rules. NIE is important because institutions can 
organise and eliminate friction and uncertainty in policy, reduce transaction cost and strengthen the 
governance20 to increase economic growth (Ibid: 8). NIE contributes by adding discussion on the 
institutional failures as the cause of underdevelopment in many countries (Bardhan 2007; Purbayu 
2011). The institutional failure according to Bardhan (2007) refers to the weak structure of the contract 
and the law (such as SEZ policy framework), and the weak rules of third-party enforcement (in 
Indonesia, this entity belongs to the High Court as shown in figure 4.6, however, the parliament as the 
legislature since the Indonesian constitutional change has the power to control the mechanism of law 
executed by the president as the executive), whereas it should be strengthened to carry out market 
transactions. In a policymaking context, Johnson (1999) measures the role of institutions in 
policymaking to avoid failure through specific approaches which resemble Bardhan in some respects, 
such as structure, conduct and performance21 (political institutions) to compare original intentions 
(policymaking process) and actual management performance (policy outcome). For the purpose of the 
study, however, these measures will be synchronised with the study by Spiller et al. (2003) in a later 
subchapter with regard to political institutions (structure), policymaking process (conduct) and policy 
outcome (performance).  
The characteristics of NIE according to some experts are constantly trying to explain the importance 
of institutions (institutions matter), as a reference model for firms or states against the rational 
individual behaviour to prevent the possibility of unacceptable human interaction. NIE is attributed as 
the foundation by development planners and policymakers trying to adopt an institutional economic 
approach to explore political economic issues (Toye 2003: 64). Moreover, a more empirical work by 
                                                          
20‘Governance’ in a more contemporary context, according to the World Bank (2010) cited in Hoffmann (2010: 
53) is defined “as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. 
This includes, (i) the process by which those authorities are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of 
the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. 
21“Structure is used to identify what was originally set out in any legislation including design of policy instruments; 
conduct is used to identify how the legislative programme was interpreted and managed in practice; and 
performance is used to assess how well the policy system met the original objectives of the programme in terms 
of delivering the scheduled benefits to the targeted recipients” (Johnson 1999: 1). 
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Lim (2012) suggests the role that institutional quality plays in a market transaction is important and 
complements the already robust literature, i.e. Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) 
such as to increase capital accumulation or investment. However, enhancing economic growth also 
requires a well-structured financial sector. Therefore, NIE is employed to delve into the role of 
institutions as vital determinants of economic reform, in this study is attributed to the policymaking.  
NIE builds its ideas that institution and the structure and functions of an organisation seeking to 
achieve a level of efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) to minimise overall costs. In NCE, competitive 
market conditions can be a natural selection, where only the efficient firms or states will benefit; but 
it should also be noted that the real-world is an open-ended and unstable environment, evidenced by 
the unexpected 1997 and 2008 crises. In order to overcome the unstable world, NIE functions at two 
levels: macro-level environment or institutional environment and micro-level environment or 
institutional arrangements.  
The institutional environment contains political, social and legal structural rules characterised, among 
others, by individual organisations through elaborating rules and requirements in order to receive 
legitimacy and support regarding the voting arrangements, for example, in the executive, legislative, 
and judiciary levels. These arms of government or ‘political institutions’ throughout history engage in 
stabilising economic activities and the budget allocation procedures to create order and reduce 
uncertainty (North 1990, 1991). It can be referred to as reaching the level of equity. These arms define 
the set of options and therefore determine which economic transactions have more economic value 
(effectiveness).   
The institutional arrangement is an arrangement between economic units to address and discover a 
way in which the relationship between units takes place, either by way of cooperation or competition. 
The institutional arrangement according to Williamson is analogous to the term ‘institution’ (Kirsten 
2009: 57). Institutional arrangements could also be a way to address transactions, either through the 
traditional free market, the quasi-market or a contract model that uses hierarchy in a state or firm. It 
can be related to the governance structure and to understanding the importance of defining and 
enforcing contract laws to achieve a perfectly functioning legal system (enforceability). 
To illustrate both levels, when giant multinational firms (MNCs) or investors are desperate to enter SEZ 
in Indonesia or other host country markets due to facing international competition, they tend to 
change the environment to favour their interest rather than modify the internal structures in response 
to the environment. For instance, the choice they took to economise the transaction cost, instead of 
trying to make the established policy more efficient, they often put pressure rather than negotiate 
with the host government to call for reducing import tariffs (Katz and Kahn 1978 in Harriss et al. 2003: 
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89). Moreover, they craft a favourable labour policy without labour unions threatening to derail the 
effort through opening new job opportunities and keep the minimum wage at the lowest level 
possible. Easterling (2007: 76) reminds us that the maquiladoras in Latin America also “organise a form 
of labour exploitation that is stable and within the law.”  
These negotiating attempts are attributed to the choice taken by the government who created various 
SEZ policies (for growth and infrastructure development) in different political settings in Indonesia, 
which underscores the phenomena on the influence of political hazards. According to Henisz (2000): 
“…..where multinational firms have a varied choice of market entry mode based on the 
extent to which they face expropriation hazards from their potential joint-venture 
partners in the host country (the level of contractual hazards). As political hazards 
increase, the multinational faces an increasing threat of opportunistic expropriation by the 
government. Partnering with host-country firms that possess a comparative advantage in 
interactions with the host-country government can safeguard against this hazard. 
However, as contractual hazards increase, the potential benefit to the joint-venture 
partner of manipulating the political system for its own benefit at the expense of the 
multinational increases as well, thereby diminishing the hazard-mitigating benefit of 
forming a joint venture”. (Ibid: 334) 
The next section elaborates a framework by Williamson (2000) to elucidate the hierarchy of 
institutional constraints and their relations to actor’s institutional preference to grasp the institutional 
intricacies surrounding their decisions, why and how institutions affect their decisions, and which 
institutions affect their decisions.  
2. The ‘Hierarchy of Institutional Constraints’ 
This section presents Williamson’s framework on the hierarchy of institutional constraints (known as 
social analysis theory) as the theoretical guidance used in this study. It is a basis for understanding 
causal relations (or causal mechanism in Gerring 2004) to explain how and why they have an influence 
on actors’ behaviour especially in the cases presented in this study.  
Williamson distinguishes institutions into four interrelated levels of constraints or ‘reciprocity’22: 
informal rules, formal rules, governance structure, and resource allocation. Institutions in each higher 
level impose constraints and will have long-term effects on the level below it (Künneke 2007; Beckman 
and Padmanabhan 2009). Figure 1 shows the relationship of each level in the hierarchy (model) 
followed by the explanation of what constitutes each level. The blue square box represents the four 
levels where each level consists of the institutions that influence actors’ behaviour and imposes 
constraints from the topmost level of informal rules affecting the course of formal rules immediately 
                                                          
22The term ‘reciprocity’ was coined by Putnam et al. (1993) 
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below it, then formal rules that have an influence on governance structure, and lastly governance 
structure that affect the allocation of resources as the lowest level. 
The yellow rectangle constitutes each institutional barrier while the grey oval represents the 
dimensions of each institution. The full green down arrow shows the relationship between higher and 
lower levels where higher level determines the constraints on the level below. It also describes the 
general maximum duration of each level in years. The reversed dashed grey arrow shows the opposite 
relationship that connects the lower and higher levels which indicates feedbacks. In a complete SEZ 
policy process, the system is interconnected as described in chapter 4, but for the purpose of this 
study, the author adopts this framework by dividing the hierarchy into two parts to separate the SEZ 
policymaking episodes to illustrate the focus on the dimensions. The separation does not mean the 
institutional context in Williamson’s model not well-connected, it basically intends to show the 
different aspects of institutional constraints through the lens of different levels. The empirical chapters 
in chapters 5 and 6 outlines in detail the applications of the first and second episodes where the first 
and second levels in chapter 5 affect each other, while the third level affects the fourth level and vice 
versa in chapter 6. 
Figure 2.1 
 
The author found this framework particularly relevant for this study as Williamson’s hierarchy is useful 
for understanding the complex institutional dilemma in Indonesia and the subsequent effect on 
economic reform strategy. Institutions are dynamic and they adapt to changes in a society. Therefore, 
this concept is used to distinguish different categories of institutional constraints which have an impact 
on the policymaking process.  
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The first level as the most fundamental and highest level is informal rules inherent and embedded in 
society. It serves as a symbol of social institutions, social structure and human motivations that take 
centuries to evolve to influence the economy (Azfar 2006: 967). Based upon the work by Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) “informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”23 (Ibid: 727). Informal rules are 
enforced by groups within society, and underpinned by: ethics, informal agreements and conventions, 
unwritten prevailing norms and values, ideologies/ beliefs, conventions, sanctions, attitudes, traditions 
or cultures, customs, and various implicit codes of conduct with a variety of names and designations 
(North 1991: 97). The form of enforcement system in this level lies in its self-enforcement mechanisms 
which vary on the degree of impact it has to the society, such as reciprocity expectation, obligation, 
adherence to internalised norm (standard operating procedures), boycotting, use of violence or 
threats, ostracism, shunning, gossip, and shaming (Jütting and De Soysa 2005: 5; Jütting et al. 2007: 
31).  
They usually extend, elaborate, and modify formal rules outside the official framework. For example 
1) Trust, the tendency to cooperate among individuals who meet occasionally since individuals usually 
have the same assessment about what type of behaviour would make mutually beneficial cooperation; 
2) Ethics and values, tend to restrict the behaviour of individuals to establish norms; 3) Political norms, 
usually implicit and typically restrict the behaviour of politicians and civil servants. In the context of 
this thesis, as in Helmke and Levitsky (2004), we treat informal institutions and norms synonymously. 
The frequency at this level changes gradually. It is culturally and socially rooted in many generations 
and economists do not consider this level as variables of institutional analysis that affect economic 
performance. However, this level is particularly relevant in Indonesia, as culture and ideology are the 
two most relevant characteristics that can affect formal institutions and are deeply inherent in the 
society for many years. Despite excluding the cultural approach, this study incorporates the intricate 
cultural behaviour as informal rules. Moreover, Indonesian nationalism is the predominant ideology 
since the Old Order and ‘small kings’ are also entrenched in the political culture of every ruling elite. 
They play a large part and have a persistent impact upon the national character in the long-run (North 
1991: 111).  
The second level emphasises the ‘institutional environment’ (formal rules) that takes decades to gel 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 970). It constitutes the legal rules such as ‘property rights’ (rules of the 
game), public organisations or ‘bureaucracies’. In contrast to informal institutions, “formal institutions 
are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely 
                                                          
23See also North 1990; Lauth 2000; and Brinks 2003.  
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accepted as an official” (Ibid: 727). These types of constraints generally include designed and defined 
constitutions (North 1991: 97) and written rules enforced by the state such as statutes, legislation, 
agreements, contracts, legal constitutions, property rights, and common law. These rules constitute 
political, economic, and business agreements which are valid from the local, regional, national, and 
international levels. For example, 1) Statute, legal documents or formal legislation, regulate the 
incentive structure and influence actors’ behaviour (individual or private organisations), i.e. companies 
in the market; 2) Civil servants contract, affects incentives in public organisations and other forms of 
contract between individuals or private organisations, personnel, budget, procurement, reporting and 
auditing procedures; 3) Constitutional Law, affects the incentives for politicians at various governance 
levels. It defines responsibilities, fiscal and political relationships. “These formal rules are generally 
thought to be codified entities that officials (rulers) ostensibly apply through regularised enforcement 
mechanisms” (Jütting and De Soysa 2005: 5; Jütting et al. 2007: 31). The enforcement mechanism 
includes official sanctions, such as fines, incarceration, criminal punishment, etc.  
The structure of this level is constrained by the shadow of the past, a history that repeats itself to 
uphold the right order. The frequency of change at this level is estimated at between ten and a hundred 
years (Williamson 2000 in Kunneke 2008: 12-13). “The definition and enforcement of property rights 
and of contract laws are important features…. that are difficult to change” (Ibid). 
This level includes political institutions or separation of powers/shared authority. It includes how 
powers are assigned to federal and local governments; for example, in a decentralisation or regional 
autonomy system in Indonesia or federal system in India, the extent to which citizens can directly 
participate in the rulemaking through referenda or the existence of a free press. Regional autonomy is 
one manifestation of the democratic process because it is characterized by the sharing of power. The 
division of power can be either vertical or horizontal. Vertical embodied by the authority delegation 
from the national to the subnational government, while horizontally by way of empowerment of 
parliament and the involvement of civil society in the public policy making and implementing the 
process. Interjurisdictional competition in Jakarta SEZ in chapter 5 best describe the category at this 
level when inter ministries compete over SEZ budget approval and project proposals. While Inter-
factional tension emerged between the executive and legislative parties in chapter 6 constitutes 
conflicts over legislative and constitutional procedures. Thus, through regional autonomy, the process 
of interaction, interrelation and interdependence among numerous actors are likely to occur based on 
their respective power and function. 
The third level emphasises the ‘governance’, ‘contracts’ in this respect ‘policy’, and ‘transaction cost 
economics’. All of which cannot be separated from ‘the agency’ or legal institutions, the laws and their 
enforcement that take years to legislate. This level considers aligning governance structures 
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(regulatory intervention, vertical and horizontal accountability) with the cost of transaction consisting 
of execution of the contract, policy formulation and its enforcement. The idea is to use democratic 
procedures to improve the applicable institutional arrangements (Ensch NA). This level focuses on the 
‘play of the game’ or the organisation associated with transaction costs incurred due to actors’ action 
on negotiations, monitoring or legal settlement and related to the perspective of actors on the 
allocation of economic resources (Kunneke 2008: 13). Thus, it relates to institutions of governance. 
Property rights deals (national laws and regulations) are institutional arrangements because they 
allocate property rights to individuals, groups or governments. Intra-elite rivalry in chapter 6 best 
describes this level where property rights deals were not explicitly determined in the contract 
agreement or law. 
According to an earlier study by John R. Commons, a transaction in governance encompasses three 
values: conflict, mutuality, and order (1932: 4). “Not only does transaction cost economics subscribe to 
the idea that the transaction is the basic unit of analysis, but governance is an effort to craft order, 
thereby to mitigate conflict and realise mutual gains” (Williamson 2000: 599). It refers to aligning 
multiple contractual, complex and incomplete institutional arrangements, and whether adaptation is 
the main issue of economic organisation (Hayek 1945 as cited in Williamson 2000: 600) seeking the 
suitable instruments to minimise transaction costs and carry out an exchange (Brousseau and Glachant 
2008). The government will always change towards more efficient governance that can minimise 
transaction costs which have an impact on the allocation of resources. The frequency of change takes 
place relatively quickly between one to ten years. Williamson (2000) considered this a central issue of 
institutional economics and assumes the enforcement of governance is not costless. Equally important, 
the emergence of a good governance structure that ensures the certainty of interaction and 
transaction between actors or stakeholders requires money (i.e. the existence of conflict resolution, 
the certainty of the contract system, etc.) (Mayers 2005: 3). 
The fourth level refers to the level at which neoclassical (NCE) analysis works, especially dealing with 
‘resource efficiency and incentive structures’. It is a continuous level or the use of law by private parties 
can be established over much shorter periods (Ibid: 973-6).  
Constantinides (1986: 35) concludes that the cost of transaction reduces the volume and frequency of 
trade after including transaction costs in an investment equilibrium study. Other studies framed by 
NCE theory demonstrates the importance of transaction costs that reduce risk in investments (Musole 
2007: 36). Institutional constraint at this level takes place continuously (all the time) following the 
change in economic incentives, the price of resources and manpower allocation. In other words, 
institutions change following the changes in the price of transaction inputs and vice versa (Williamson 
2000: 600). The most interesting advances when adding behavioural aspects within the institutional 
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change and economic reform model have been on understanding the ways in which actors try to 
minimise transaction costs. There are problems that may increase transaction costs at this level: the 
‘principal-agent problem’, ‘moral hazard problem’, and the ‘adverse selection problem’.  
Principal-agent problems occur if there are conflicting objectives between a principal—a person who 
delegates responsibility—and an agent—who accepts responsibility, at which time imperfect 
information occurs that affects a collective outcome (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). This type of situation 
has engendered moral hazard, a term generally used by economists, in which the agent bears little 
consequence for his actions. For instance, a president must motivate his ministers, who may have 
different goals, to accomplish the president’s objectives such as sanctioning a law in his favour. Moral 
hazard will display a broader principal-agent problem with the tendency for asymmetric information 
where the agents’ action cannot be observed by the principal or referred to as ‘hidden action’ 
problems (Ibid). Principal-agent problems and moral hazard can be reduced by institutions that 
establish effective monitoring or feedback mechanisms which can make performance and results more 
transparent and measurable. Ideally, the monitoring mechanism should be accompanied by an 
enforcement mechanism where the management provides effective punishment or exerts control over 
exchanges. The acceptance, compliance (voluntarily or under coercive practice), and enforcement 
mechanism of formal and informal rules may have been well established under the society’s prevalent 
conditions, but at the same time are rendered ineffective if their acceptance and enforcement are 
weak (Azis 2008). However, it is difficult to distinguish which problems are associated with the principal 
and the agent if the role of each individual is unclear. To illustrate, in the Indonesian case, Pepinsky 
(2012: 8) argues that the accountability structure in the RDO has shifted from the strict bureaucracy 
of the NO. Therefore, it is unlikely to identify a specific principal-agent relationship because 
accountability is a dynamic process that moves either up or down the government level.  
In combination, these four levels of analysis are intended to provide a comprehensive overview of how 
policymaking practices concretely function. This model is used to investigate how and why institutions 
hinder each other and which types of institutional subjects are assumed and encouraged and what 
forms of institutional rationality make policy outcomes possible. It captures the reasoning that 
institutional constraints may lead to risks of higher uncertainty and transaction costs through conflicts 
between actors such as intra-elite rivalry, inter-factional tension, and interjurisdictional competition. 
Before turning to the next section, the following subsection explains the concepts of intra-elite rivalry, 
inter-factional tension, and interjurisdictional competition used to describe the conflicts between 
actors or government bodies in a different time (period of government) and space (situation) that 




 The intra-elite rivalry, inter-factional tension, and interjurisdictional competition thesis  
This study adopts three terms above generally used in political and intergovernmental competition 
studies to represent the situation of conflicts between two contending bodies or within an institution 
to win the rights to power. The intra-elite rivalry as the term literally suggest is a form of political or 
non-political elite competition in a governance structure and is derived from Dick and Mulholland 
(2011: 65-85) in their study on Indonesia and elites’ behaviour where the state is the arena of 
contestation. While inter-factional tension generally means tensions in the faction of legislative bodies 
and is derived from many sources, for instance, Ramet (1995) on social currents on Eastern Europe’s 
great transformation, Bengio and Ben-Dor (1999) on the political chaos in the Arab world, and Van der 
Biji (2014) on the history of Great Britain’s military operation in Turkey, Egypt and Yemen during British 
colony. The interjurisdictional competition on the other hand based on the study by Kenyon (1997: 14) 
is defined as “the manner in which the free movement of goods, services, people and capital constraints 
the actions of independent governments in a federal system” (ACIR 1991: 10).  These terms describe 
the conflicts of interests between actors, political institutions or independent bodies represented by 
economic agents or other stakeholders. The terms are used in chapters 5 and 6 as part of the key 
findings. 
3. Institutions, Institutional Change and Related Concepts 
This section points out the general understanding of institutions and their related concepts in order to 
understand how institutions influence SEZ policymaking.  
i. Conceptualising ‘institutions’  
North (1990: 4-16) describes ‘institutions’ as “humanly devised constraints (formal rules and informal 
rules) that structure political, economic, and social interaction”. By virtue of its form, this study applies 
NIE as it highlights North’s (1990) two types of institutions which interact among societies: informal or 
unwritten rules (norms and conventions) and formal or written rules (laws and regulations). Therefore, 
organisations and individuals attempt to reach their goals and interests within an institutional 
structure in the form of ‘formal rules’ and ‘informal rules’ that depend on the levels of acceptance in 
the enforcement standards and practices by the society either legally (formally) or through their social 
norms and cultures (informally). It is important to distinguish these rules and to know how they are 
enforced (North 1990, 2003). The fundamental concern is how much institutions matter and which 
ones, not just how institutions matter (North 1990 in Slater 2011: 1, emphasis added). Following North, 
this study defines rules as institutions and societies’ key institutions are its political ‘rules of the game.’ 
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This study investigates to what extent institutions channel politics of policymaking and understand the 
political patterns in a society when political rules change.  
Institutions regulate public and private actors, their organisations, and the interrelated transaction 
between them and the society (Nabli and Nugent 1989). Institutions influence how people make 
decisions to improve wellbeing. The relationship between institutions and organisations has a 
significant impact that affects the outcome of economic performance (Azis 2000; North 2005a).  
However, a phenomenon that has evolved across countries is that even though two countries or two 
or more presidential eras within a country may have comparable formal and informal institutional 
settings, they may create different outcomes and have very different economic performance. The rules 
agreed upon by different countries or presidential eras is something that must be adhered to (have 
the power of sanction) with the aim of perpetuating or creating order. However, since the power of 
sanction or enforcement mechanism is different between countries or regime periods, the outcome 
of their performance is also different. Moreover, institutions usually determine constraints on human 
behaviour as imposed by societal rules (Roland 2003: 5).  
For the study at hand, studies by Jütting and De Soysa (2005: 3) and Jütting et al. (2007: 32) are of 
relevance on a general level. They divide the constraints into conditions which are permitted and 
prohibited to carry out activities by individuals. Henceforth, to solve collective dilemmas in human 
action, institutional constraints promote some individual behaviours (through incentive 
structure/frameworks) and prohibit other behaviours (through enforcement mechanisms) (North 
1990, 2005a; Azis 2009).  
“Institutions are among the tools that fallible humans use to change incentives to enable 
fallible humans to overcome social dilemmas” (Ostrom 2005:125).  
By using the tools, whatever their forms, either formal or informal, institutions provide the ‘rules of 
the game’ that society facilitates for human connection, and reduce the uncertainty by establishing a 
stable structure or pattern (which is not necessarily efficient) that will regulate human/social 
interactions and behaviour in a society (the enforcement mechanism) (Williamson 1985; North 1990 
in Shirley 2005; North 1992, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; 2006; Kasper and Streit 1998; Hodgson 2003). An 
effective enforcement mechanism is the kind of pattern that involves a predictable structure to 
everyday life (North 2005a), while interaction depends on the level of economic, political, and social 
activities. As North (1991) puts it: 
“The degree to which they are effective is subject to varying circumstances, such as a 
government’s limited coercive force, a lack of organised state, or the presence of strong 
religious precept” (Ibid: 97).  
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Therefore, in explaining differences in economic performance, besides increasing social order through 
effective enforcement mechanisms, key policy actors are important elements and integral parts of the 
institutional framework (Azis 2009). The study’s theoretical concern is that the institutional change or 
rules of the game in a governance system is much related to the change in the key policy actors. The 
possible explanation to this is discussed in detail in chapter 4, due to tensions arise in every aspect of 
society caused by bureaucratic chaos left by Soeharto and Habibie’s personal political agenda for 
presidential election, the reform order in 1999 had no choice but to make extreme modifications in 
the political structure through the reform of the constitution and bureaucratic/institutional reform or 
decentralisation/regional autonomy law. Mayers (2005) asserts that these actors can exert emotional 
or behavioural impact by the success of their organisational goals. This may include the interest of 
political parties, communities, and social groups (Ibid: 3). Enforcement directs the behaviour of key 
actors towards the desired path of the interest groups to reduce the opportunistic behaviour; this term 
will be discussed in a later subsection. It also aims to distribute economic resources fairly and equitably 
(Williamson 2000: 601). In the end, all institutions ameliorate failures and bottlenecks that exist in the 
markets and among individuals to achieve expected economic growth, the kind of growth in favour of 
self-interest priorities. These priorities in most developing countries emphasise the will of the 
successive government.  
ii. Institutions Matter 
This economic phenomenon has created much controversy, for instance, in Glaeser’s (2004: 12) words: 
“The economic success of post-war East Asia has been a consequence of good-for-growth dictators, not 
of institutions constraining them”. Does this statement apply to Indonesia? Or is it the other way 
around? Rodrik and Subramanian (2003: 31) concluded that: “high-quality institutions are critical for 
growth, and that means the transition from a low-investment economy to a high-investment economy 
requires a hands-on government.” Djankov et al. (2003) further confer that to understand different 
prevailing “alternative capitalist systems in different countries requires a renewal of the institutional 
economics studies”. As underlined by Rodrik (2008), “each one of the common economic ends (growth, 
stabilisation, equity) can be achieved in several ways…” (I.e. government intervention, the rule of laws, 
and most importantly the variety of institutional forms) that succeed in advanced countries (Freeman 
2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). “What differs from one country to another lies in the institutional setting 
in which actors and organisations make their decision, act and interact” (Rodrik 2008). Therefore, it 
not only depends on market mechanisms that drive the economy but institutions (non-economic 
factors) also determine the success in resolving the problems of growth stagnation and encouraging 
market mechanisms (North 1989, 1990; Rodrik 2003; Przeworski 2004; and Acemoglu et al. 2005). This 
will further underlie the empirical analysis of this study.  
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For North, institutional regulations and norms of behaviour repeatedly shape interaction between 
humans (Lieberherr 2009: 4-6). The organisations and the individual behaviour reflect the structure of 
incentive rooted in society (Cassing 2000). New ideas and institutions are ushered by the tolerated 
rivalry between interest groups with dissimilar worldviews. However, institutions will alter only very 
gradually over time, due to the intricacies of institutional interdependence (Ibid: 5). According to 
North, “If the highest rate of return in an economy comes from piracy, the organisations will invest in 
skills and knowledge that will make them better pirates”. However, in order to build a strong, stable 
and fair economy, developing countries such as Indonesia who are built from different economic 
structures and always laden with theory cannot use existing generic theory, for instance, Harrod-
Domar’s growth model24, Rostow’s growth theory25, and Solow’s growth theory26 proposed by the 
advanced countries, as the insights gained from these theories are built with general assumptions and 
tend to persuade developing countries to imitate other more developed countries. Therefore, a theory 
is a country-specific context where developing countries are encouraged to formulate economic policy 
strategy from their own national settings including Indonesia. 
iii. Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost is an essential topic in the NIE and becomes a unit of analysis. Coase’s concept of 
transaction cost economics (TCE) basically delineates the firm-level institutional analysis. However, this 
study emphasised actor-centred and policy-based analysis somewhat inspired by the Weberian 
concept of transactional (bureaucratic) and transformational (charismatic) leadership (adapted from 
Nikezic et al. 2012: 285-296). Under Indonesian circumstances, the transacted policymaking process 
to a large degree persists27 after New Order (NO) under the patrimonial feature. This means that this 
study applies the logic of TCE to the problem of policy and political change and intervention. Coase 
introduces the term transaction costs, but Williamson was the one who tried to make transaction cost 
analysis more operational (Beckmann 2002: 5)—in this case, the cost of running the economic system 
by key policy actors.  
The varied interpretations of transaction costs originate from a few sources; for instance, Dorfman 
(1981) defines transaction cost as the cost to adapt to environmental changes including regime 
changes in carrying out economic reform. Moreover, the cost of seeking, gathering information and 
                                                          
24This theory is known to be the forerunner of the exogenous growth model. 
25This theory is known as economic growth theory which occurs in five phases: Traditional society, Preconditions 
for take-off, Take-off, Drive to maturity, and Age of High mass consumption. 
26This theory is also known as the Theory of Economic Growth which postulates the increase in Q (output) caused 
by 1) an increase in L (labour), but due to diminishing returns to scale there would be a reduction in Q/L or output 
per worker. 2) An increase in K (capital) which also increase in output and Q/L if the stock of capital rises. 3) an 
increase in A or in multifactor productivity resulted in the rise of Q/L or output per worker. 
27As studied by Crouch (1979). 
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processing the necessary information so that governance can run properly and in order is also 
proposed by Furubotn and Richter (2005) and Mburu et al. (2003: 59-73) to complement the definition. 
Regarding the political and economic transformation, the definition gives different incentives from 
every regime government such as in Indonesia in response to the reform process. As suggested by 
Williamson (1996):  
 “….ex-ante transaction cost derived from attempts to prevent transaction failures due to 
asset specificity and opportunism, including devising or drafting, negotiating, and 
protecting or safeguarding, and enforcing a contract or rule….” and arising from 
weaknesses in the contractual situation, while “…..ex-post transaction cost are the costs 
of altering contracts to correct ex-post misalignments, the costs of setting up and 
maintaining governance structures and the costs of bonding to guarantee contractual 
commitments……” (Ibid: 379).  
An institution is strongly influenced by the prevailing norms, values, and economic complexity so the 
institutional needs and forms will differ in time (one period of governance to another) and space (from 
one country to another). In a society that has high communal values such as Indonesia, practically there 
is no need for modern economic institutions such as those applied in countries in the West. Shared 
values in western society serve as part of the institution that automatically functions as self-regulation 
and ultimately can reduce transaction costs. Not until the end of the “Pancasila past in 1998” had 
Indonesia pursued “a serious imitation of the Western economic model” (Spranz et al. 2012: 464). 
Indonesia as a nation already has the sublime cultural values that can be used to encourage the 
improvements of social and economic norms, such as those listed in the five precepts of Pancasila, 
Indonesia’s national ideology and philosophical foundation. However, because of the experience at 
the NO era, which is limited to only the Pancasila on the theoretical level, but not on its 
implementation, there is scepticism among the public on the importance of the sublime values 
embodied in Pancasila to boost economic growth. Indonesian public sees culture as a set of values 
(Spranz et al. 2012: 470) to solve problems they encountered to maintain the group’s social viability in 
their internal and external environment. The five precepts in Pancasila include belief in one God that 
represents religious tolerance, justice and humanity, a unity that represents nationalism, democracy, 
social justice and solidarity. In relation to this, Spranz et al. (2012: 470) address Indonesian cultural 
determinants that can reduce transaction costs, including Indonesia’s Javanese culture and religious 
beliefs. In Williamson’s social theory, religious beliefs play a major role in the institutional analysis 
(Williamson 2000: 596) as a pervasive influence on economic performance in the long run (North 1991: 
111). This implies that if Pancasila can be enforced correctly, transaction costs occurring during the 
policymaking process can be reduced.   
Simply put, similarly, by adopting North’s suggestion, transaction cost is a cost for specifying and 
enforcing contracts or policy in this study underlying the exchange that by itself covers the cost of the 
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political and economic organisation; thus, covers the costs of negotiating, calculating, and imposing 
exchange (North 1991 in Klein 2000: 464).  
 Asymmetric information and Collective action  
NCE takes for granted zero ‘transaction cost’ and ‘perfect information’, whereas the main message is 
the need for rational agents to opt for a governance structure that minimises transaction cost borne 
by the political transaction. It relates to dealing with asymmetric information (imperfect information) 
that is plagued with collective action problems as the main variables in economic activity (Furubotn 
and Richter 2005:19).  
Asymmetric information; Transaction cost being costless is elusive and irrelevant, as not all economic 
actors can freely decide whether to enter or exit the market (in this regard, the investment market) 
and the market will not function perfectly without economic or political actors having enough 
information about the political economy environment and the transacted goods or services (Priyanto 
et al. 2013:14-27). The more imperfect the information, the higher the transaction costs issued by 
economic actors. This study refers to how political institutions (by which is meant the ‘rules of the 
game’ who in each political system define the procedures and processes through which public policy 
is made, i.e. authoritarian or democratic government) mitigate or reduce uncertainty (the degree of 
trustworthiness) included in transaction or administrative costs (Azfar 2012: 966). The broadly defined 
literature on transaction cost (Arvanitidis 2003) has put it as a serious cause of economic performance 
(North 1991), and evidently, transaction cost represents about 50 to 60% of the net national product 
of modern market economies (North 1990; Furubotn and Ritcher 2000). Moreover, transaction cost 
contributes to a greater portion of the total GDP of less developed economies (see Hagel and Singer 
1999). North (1990: 67) specifically emphasises that at times due to these high costs, no trade or 
exchange has taken place in third world economies compared to more advanced industrial economies 
(Similarly, see Williamson 1985 and Coase 1992). Therefore, some economists are convinced that 
transactions can go on if the required information exists and it needs the cost to collect it. 
Collective action problem is one of the political barriers to reform along with distributive conflicts and 
payoffs/incentive structure from successful reform (Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 156). However, the 
collective action includes the size, homogeneity and purpose of the policy actors that can be construed 
as key determinants of success (Kherallah and Kirsten 2001).  Therefore, as previously regarded as a 
useful tool (Mayers 2005; Ostrom 2005) especially for interest groups, Kherallah and Kirsten (2001: 11) 
suggests that institutions analyse how to overcome the free-rider issues and come up with cooperative 
solutions to reduce transaction costs. For instance, the management of natural resources and public 
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goods in Batam FTZ and Jakarta EPZ epitomise the logic of collective goods as asserted by Olson (1971) 
in the “The Logic of Collective Action” that:  
“If there is some quantity of a collective good that can be obtained at a cost sufficiently 
low in relation to its benefit that some one person in the relevant group would gain from 
providing that good all by himself, then there is some presumption that the collective good 
will be provided. The total gain would then be so large in relation to the total cost that 
someone individual’s share would exceed the total cost” (Ibid: 22 and 33). 
Therefore, such tools as suggested by Kherallah and Kirsten (2001) related to local institutional 
arrangements including customs and social conventions in, for example, the ‘Jakarta elites’ in chapter 
5 were bound to share their political interest and negotiate the development strategies based on the 
same cultural background of just a few influential people. Moreover, Nabli and Nugent (1989) and 
Ostrom et al. (1993: 220) have shown that those local conventions can overcome the collective action 
difficulties and help achieve efficiency since they motivate all policy actors in infrastructure 
development to keep transformation, coordination, and information costs down. Central to such an 
exercise is how to identify, explicate and mitigate the contractual hazards as Williamson (1996: 3) has 
suggested in the ex-ante and ex-post transaction cost above. 
iv. Path Dependence and Institutional Change 
North uses economic history to learn how a person or group in society is able to reduce transaction 
costs and how pre-existing institutions have, to a certain extent, empowered these groups in order to 
solve their collective action problem (Roland 2003: 10). However, Roland also stresses that the 
persistence of inefficient institutions not only necessarily resulted from collective action problems but 
in view of Acemoglu and Robinson’s work (2000, 2001, and 2003), governments in general face 
commitment problems. There is a lack of credible and intertemporal commitment from the government 
[derived from Spiller et al. (2003)] due to the typical non-existence of third-party enforcement (Bardhan 
2007) to control and maintain the contract agreement between various groups in society. The usual 
type that government in developing economies hold when they are in power is that they will use the 
power for their own best interest. Roland (2003) further asserts: 
“Thus, ruling elites who have vested interests in maintaining their power in societies with 
inefficient institutions may not agree to give up that power because the winners of 
institutional change may not be able to commit to compensation schemes for the losers. 
Inefficient institutions may, therefore, persist because of the combined effect of social 
conflict and lack of commitment” (Ibid: 10-11). 
Institutional transformation can be explained by tracing the institution’s incremental history and 
evolution. The study of the institutional evolution in history guides how the pre-existing institutions 
establish strong causal links and guide human activity in determining the possible significance of 
predictable patterns or only pure random historical events (Yeager 1999). Institutional change, 
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according to North (1990) and Ostrom (1990) is incremental and necessarily the consequence of pre-
existing institutions; they argue that any change occurs within the parameters of prior or existing 
institutions (path-dependent). Due to the difficulty in achieving the expected reform, through 
subjective thought, actors are faced with alternatives to opt for self-reinforcing or maintaining the 
positive feedback or increasing returns of institutions from the previous positive and viable feedback, 
both political and economic (North 2005b; Kirsten et al. 2009). Other actors will perpetuate the system 
for their own gains whenever they benefit from existing institutional frameworks (North 1990). For 
instance, elites’ capture in chapter 5 suggests that the NO’s patrimonial and clienteles feature persist 
and the common disadvantage of decentralisation was apparent through the appropriation and 
transfer of resources to interest groups in chapter 6 by Batam central and local elites.  
In politics, in addition to Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) assertion of ‘economic backwardness’, 
increasing returns of institutions are particularly strong due to the relatively short-sighted political 
institutions, the strong status quo bias built into political institutions (Henisz and Zelner 2004: 903), 
and the absence of competition as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism (Pierson 2004: 13). In effect, 
policy reversal becomes ever more difficult (Ibid: 21).  
In order to secure national interests, political institutions (authoritarian and democracy) adopt a series 
of policies and occasionally carry out bureaucratic restructuring—a concept of institutional reform to 
accommodate the political, social as well as an economic institution to better answer the complex and 
dynamic phenomenon of international relations (Wesley 2007: 5). For example, the decentralisation 
phases in the history of Indonesian rulers, the presidents have always been accustomed to the 
bureaucratic restructuring and cabinet reshuffling28 to support the regime’s neoliberal motives. These 
motives were associated with the merit of trade liberalisation, privatisation, and the accumulation of 
physical and human capital as elixirs of growth construed as the solution to the development problems 
(Soesastro and Basri 2005).  
Nevertheless, Indonesia’s political structure does not seem to have created a warm environment for a 
desirable and high-quality open market system, especially for long-term prosperity and welfare. 
Despite the rapid expansion of transnational trade, Indonesia still lags behind other countries vis-à-vis 
institutional weaknesses that pose a great challenge to stimulating foreign investors in the region. 
Their recent efforts at institutional reforms such as anti-corruption campaigns are not able to deter 
corruption as political and corporate strategy blends together and deeply contaminates trade policy 
formulation, for example, the evidence in the Jakarta EPZ in KBN in chapter 5. This was aptly theorised 
by Lambsdorff (2007: 218) that the “negative effects of, and extended opportunities for, unfettered 
                                                          
28Further detail elaborated in the next chapter. 
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competitive practices that lead to substantial increase in trade-related corruption”. Moberg (2013:4) 
may argue that institutions channel the self-centred actors’ behaviour to stimulate growth, but Glaeser 
et al. (2004) posit otherwise: “economic growth and human capital accumulation cause institutional 
improvement, rather than the other way around.” Thus, the Indonesian reforms provide a great 
challenge for standard political economic theories.  
According to North, the fundamental cause of economic growth is the low transaction costs. 
Institutions’ role in an economic transaction affects the behaviour of the related costs (North 1990). 
Some economists argue that economic growth could not be maintained in the long-run because it did 
not involve particular institutional factors (Burki and Perry 1997, 1998; Rodrik 2004; Acemoglu et al. 
2005). Institutions, mindful of being the ‘rules of the game’ in a society, are highly elusive. Indonesia 
and other emerging market economies’ underperformance was in part due to achieving economic 
growth by focusing their economic policy under mainstream NCE on production efficiency and price 
mechanism on one hand, while ignoring the behavioural assumptions, rules, and social norms on the 
other (Coase 2000; North 2000; Joskow 2008 as cited in Lieberherr 2009: 1 and Nhundu 2013: 61). 
Nevertheless, Rodrik (2000) argues that there are also potential risks of falling into a perpetual cycle 
of institutional change that entails no effect on growth if developing countries have embedded 
institutional norms (Rodrik 2000: 980).  
As explained above, agency or institutional change may occur at any level in response to experience, 
such as the AFC in 1998, the constitutional change and decentralisation reform in 1999 Indonesia. It 
will always turn towards more efficient institutional arrangements. The institutional change will be 
explained in further detail by drawing upon earlier theory provided by Hanisch and Schlüter (1999a). 
According to them, institutional change has three theoretical underpinnings: economic efficiency, 
distributional conflict theory, and public choice theory (Ibid: 9-12), the author simply wants to capture 
the essential thoughts of their seminal works as they offer more relevance to the present study. 
The institutional change based on economic efficiency has three main premises. The first premise was 
delivered by Hayek (1968), the main supporter of NCE who considers institutional change as 
‘unintended results of intentional action’. It is spontaneous, not accidental, and is the result of 
deliberate action. It stresses, in particular, the uncertainty within the process of change and the role 
of the cognitive limits of each interacting individual. Simply put, a person or group of people will not 
make an institution/rule when there is no impulse that demands such rules must exist. What Hayek 
meant by ‘spontaneous institutional change’ is that the momentum to create or modify institutions is 
spontaneous (unintentional). While the activities to make or to realise the institutions are deliberate 
(intentional) (Hanisch and Schlüter 1999a: 9-10, emphasis added). For example, the formulation of 
regional legislation on Jakarta reclamation or the legislature’s proposal to upgrade Batam’s status from 
37 
 
bonded zone to FTZ is a deliberate act, but the emergence of the need for those regulations to be 
issued was a spontaneous response to a developing situation. Chapter 5 and 6 will elaborate on 
Hanisch and Schluter’s (1999) argument in a more pragmatic way. 
The second premise conveyed among others by Demsetz and Alchian (1972) states that atomization 
and privatisation of property rights are directed to any institution changes in a system (Ibid: 9). “The 
driving forces behind this are described as external phenomena like technological change which create 
new cost-benefit relations, where the gains from internalising external effects into the property rights 
system offset the involved setup and enforcement cost” (Eggertson 1990 in Hanisch and Schlüter 1999a: 
10). This premise is much related to the cases that represent ways to reduce transaction costs, i.e. in 
chapter 4, the privatisation of SOEs by Megawati to stabilise the economy as her response to external 
pressure. Meanwhile, chapter 6 the Batam FTZ case which is related to atomization, where President 
Habibie directed the region towards modernisation and becoming a technological-based production 
zone so as to compete with Singapore rather than to complement their more advanced industrial base. 
The third premise is based on economic efficiency, among others, presented by Williamson (2000) with 
regards to dynamic movement of institutions in an effort to minimise transaction costs, and North 
(1990) concerning the changes in the transaction cost that affect the incentive structure or motivation 
of individuals in interacting with others, thus affect institutional change. For example, information, law 
enforcement, price, technology, etc. Changes in relative prices on factors of production would 
encourage parties involved in the transaction to negotiate in order to reach new agreements. Changes 
in the contractual agreement will be very difficult without modifying the rules of the game (Ibid). In 
addition, institutions are also not resistant to the changing tastes or preferences of the members of 
society or actors involved in the community. Such changes, as they are believed by North (1990), would 
threaten the existence of pre-existing institutions. If the actors felt that the existing institutions are no 
longer relevant to the existing development or environmental conditions, they would try to make 
institutional change more accommodating to the new environment. This is also related to Roland’s 
(2003) view of government’s lack of credible and intertemporal commitment. The loss of cultural 
values, norms, traditions, etc. of a community is an example of institutional change because of changes 
in environmental conditions, either through external influences of the socio-economic community or 
internal factors. For example, in the open market system, developing countries’ high market demand 
for labour-intensive industries, adequate infrastructure, and job opportunities are incentives for 
investors to gain access to cheap labour and natural resources. Therefore, a regional minimum wage 
and mineral extraction regulations as applied in several countries are viewed as inhibiting factors by 
investors seeking economic gain. Thus, investors’ practical institutional preferences will try to change, 
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repeal or ignore the regulation by way of informal or formal negotiation. As a recent study by Dick and 
Mulholland (2011) notes:  
“The state may be construed not just as a transactional space but as a political 
marketplace, in which access to authority and property rights to economic resources are 
traded in the process of elite contestation. Trading occurs most obviously through 
negotiation over the relevant formal and informal rules”. (Ibid in Aspinall and Klinken 
2011: 66) 
Correspondingly, when the Indonesian Foreign Investment Law No. 1/1967 was issued it was 
considered no longer relevant to current conditions due to its ineffectiveness; therefore, a new 
investment law in 2007 was imposed.  Another example of the actor’s institutional preference in the 
empirical case in Chapter 4 is the drastic change in the bureaucracy through the decentralisation or 
regional autonomy policy while chapter 5 discussed the Jakarta Governor’s idea for land reclamation 
through ambitiously expanding Jakarta EPZ into an SEZ to accommodate the growing population and 
economic activities. However, despite the ongoing conflicts, his ideas were justified to bring in subtle, 
yet far-reaching changes while disregarding the fishermen’s livelihoods. He deliberately undermined 
the legislative procedure and changed the regulation through bypassing the applicable law by informal 
means to favour big businesses. 
Although the stability of institutions is essential for increasing the investment and spurring economic 
growth, institutional changes have the same indispensable quality. The change of institutions raises 
the question of how that change might happen, how it happens and how to deal with it. Political 
economic factors are often the cause that determines the environment and degree of institutional 
change in diverse times and spaces. 
The second theory that explains the institutional change is distributional conflict theory presented by 
Knight (1992) and Levi (1988). This theory assumes that power asymmetries are visible in any social 
system. They have different interests and strengths and they are the source of conflict and responsible 
for the development of institutions. Every actor involved in the conflict will try to find a solution by 
harnessing their former power through changing the rules of the game (regulations). The main reason 
for the institutional change is to change the existing basic elements of ‘power structure’ and focus the 
attention on actors’ differences in ‘bargaining power’ (Knight 1992 in Hanisch and Schlüter 1999: 11). 
Actors who can control the power or have better power, for example, because they control the 
information, have political access, capital, etc. will control the changing process for the rules to favour 
their interests (Ibid).  
“The institutional system is pictured as the equilibrium result of repeated bargaining 
games between relevant actors. The basic elements of this ‘power structure’ are the fixed 
expectations regarding distribution, which the players had developed in repeated bargains 
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in the past. A process of institutional change is started as soon as the present beneficiaries 
of the power structure (the winners of previous games) can no longer effectively control 
the payoffs of others. This gives rise to new distributional expectations in society, 
weakening the existing power structure and fuelling new negotiations. As a result, a new 
equilibrium of power with its respective formal and informal institutions is established”. 
(Ibid) 
In this regard, institutional change is not to satisfy all the parties or to achieve the collective interests 
but the interests of those who have the power. The process of change can be intentional or a 
consequence of a strategy for the profit of actors who play it. Therefore, conflicts of interest are often 
found in the law-making process because of differences in the interests of each of the actors who play 
it, regardless of whether the new institutions are more efficient or not. As North suggests:  
“NIE is a powerful body of theory that relates power to contestation for resources and 
property rights through formal and informal rules and their legitimating ideology”. (North 
1990, 2005a in Aspinall and Klinken 2011: 66) 
For instance, the government’s policy option by embracing nationalist credentials in chapter 5 and 6 
clashes with interest groups who pursue rent for personal gain. What is important is how these new 
rules could benefit their group (Ibid: 12).  
The third institutional change theory according to Hanisch and Schlüter (1999) is the public choice 
theory developed by William Riker and Itai Sened. The focus lies on the role of the ruling elite as the 
main actor. It puts more emphasis on efficient production and property rights allocation and the main 
driving force is the augmentation of the elite’s potential utility. Therefore, this theory only regards the 
intentional change of institutions and formal institutions (constitution, legislation). The incentive 
structure for the elite and the objective is characterised by the hope of making tangible benefits by 
either maximising the state budget from the excess productivity through increased tax revenue (Levi 
1988), by increasing the probability of re-election (Sened 1997),or enhanced political support (Riker 
and Sened 1991; Sened 1997).  Chapter 5 illustrates how Jusuf Kalla’s political alliance established a 
patron-client relationship with the masses. As a result, it reduced the costs of doing business for all 
members.  
v. Bounded rationality and Opportunistic behaviour 
Because of market failure, alternative ‘market’ forms such as government interventions in developing 
countries, as a form of hierarchy in Williamson’s (1975) terms, must inevitably determine the 
appropriate growth frameworks or policies to reduce the income inequality and perpetuate welfare 
equality. Among the institutions that matter is ‘hierarchies’. Hierarchies in this respect serve as 
organisations or in this regard ‘the state’ to allocate mechanisms, mediate and economise transaction 
costs, not only private firms but also state bureaucracies (Arvanitidis 2003). The most sensible 
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application of this theory is the decentralisation or regional autonomy given by the state. Indonesia 
has undergone the big-bang decentralisation in 1999 after the crisis as discussed in chapter 4.  
Given the repercussions from opportunistic behaviour in market transactions, the state can eliminate 
risks of actors who subvert group goals for personal gain. It can also mediate differences and be 
monitored more easily than the market (Williamson 1975: 20-30). Opportunistic behaviour is a 
behaviour that seeks to achieve their own desires even by illegal means (Ostrom 1990). However, this 
theoretical judgement will be explored in detail in the empirical chapters. There was evidence of the 
state (principal) not able to control the opportunistic behaviour of the actors (agents) in chapters 5 
and 6 that needs further investigation. Given the possibilities of such behaviour to occur, as  Williamson 
(1985: 6) in Boston et al. (1996: 22-23a) suggests that a proposed policy dialogue, amidst an uncertain 
and complex environment, with government ex-ante action, might be a solution rather than place an 
immediate ex-post enforcement mechanism on the actual outcomes of transaction costs to settle 
conflicts occurred in the policy process; this will reduce the risks of a bounded rationality of actors in 
a governance structure that entails high transaction costs and large cognitive demands without 
resorting to the judicial system. Bounded rationality according to Herbert Simon (1947) denotes: 
“…’satisficing behaviour’…That is to say, the inherent limitations on decision-making 
encourage people to behave according to well-established routines, patterns and rules, to 
seek predictability and certainty in organised or structured environments, and to be highly 
selective in the range of information upon which they draw in making choices. As the 
complexity and uncertainty of a situation increase, the greater the limits imposed on 
individuals by their bounded rationality and the more likely it is that the transactions into 
which they enter will fail” (Ibid, quoted by Boston et al. 1996: 22-23). 
These individuals or actors according to Simon, subject to the above premises of high transaction costs 
and large cognitive demands, generally play games and utilise resources through political lobbying 
(access and use their legitimate rights) to control decisions and make choices based on evolving trial 
and error (Brousseau and Glachant 2008). 
There is always an incentive for individuals to behave divergently so the economic system cannot only 
be guided by the market. Therefore, it is imperative to use non-market institutions (the state) in order 
to protect the market from the endless ‘market-failure’ trap of the neoclassical paradigm by designing 
adequate ‘rules of the game’ in economic activity. Rules regulate how economic activity is organised, 
coordinated and implemented. Economic reform will only work effectively if the rules of the game are 
clearly defined and efficiently implemented. Without well-enforced rules, economic reform will result 
in chaos as was seen in the ex-Soviet Union. However, as is evident in Korea, state intervention was 
focused on the function of the state as a facilitator and regulator (Chibber in Ikhsan 2000: 10).  
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From the property rights aspect, first, state intervention is appropriate and justifiable if transaction 
cost can be reduced and reach the highest possible efficiency, under the condition of a large or 
unknown number of parties involved in a transaction. Consequently, the transaction cost will be high 
with the cost of negotiation or private arrangements. In effect, the entire transaction could be aborted 
and efficiency is only possible through interference from central government (Johnson 1994, 2000). As 
Chibber (2002) asserted, the Korean government built a successful coalition with the business class 
(Ibid: 29-32). Korean state sets formal rules as part of the institutional environment. Thus, the state is 
a unique organisation that develops and establishes formal rules through social and political processes 
and plays an important part in the transaction between state and business as part of the organisation.  
Second, when the transaction costs by means of the ‘market’ are higher than the ‘hierarchy’, 
government intervention is inevitable. In effect, this failed private agreement generates higher 
transaction costs. If there are impractical conflict resolutions by the market, issues of complicated 
bargaining process arise, thus state intervention is required to enforce the contract agreement as 
requested by the bargaining parties (Goldberg 1976 and Williamson 1975). “Transaction Costs are 
persistently so high that markets fail or do not exist, or where tendencies towards concentration, with 
resulting abuse of power ... in which government capacity to regulate monopoly is limited” (DFID 2000: 
5). Lai (1997: 201-202) remarks: “In this situation, ‘externalities’, ‘public goods’ and ‘monopolies’ may 
pose real problems, and government intervention may be necessary”. Coase (1959: 29) stated that as 
a practical matter, it may be preferable to impose government special regulation if the market 
becomes too costly to operate. The case in Batam FTZ will embody these environments despite central 
government’s neoliberal motives and withdrawal during decentralisation. 
vi. Logic of Appropriateness 
The rules or logic of appropriateness proposed by March and Olsen (2004) are also to a lesser extent 
the focus of this study in the democratic political orders context with formally organised political 
institutions. In this regard, “the role of rule-driven behaviour in life might illuminate thinking about 
political life”.  
“Democratic political system shapes and is shaped by the processing of information, 
institutional memories, and the codification of experience into rules…. Rules of 
appropriateness are followed because they are rightful, legitimate, expected, and natural. 
Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a 
political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its 
institutions... Embedded in a social collectivism, they do what they see as appropriate for 
themselves in a specific type of situation” (March and Olsen 2004: 2 and 18). 
Following the logic of appropriateness, March and Olsen suggest that the goal-oriented rational 
individuals and organisations have the main task in equating the right perspective on decision-making 
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and in synthesising the limits of rational decision. But their rational behaviour is oriented in avoiding 
inefficiency in a market competition where there is the assumption of self-interest individuals with 
differing rules, identity, situation, and action (Ibid).  
Decision-making following the logic of appropriateness is highly contextual. Its pattern is changing 
based on its adaptation to a historical event that involves collective imagining taking the form of 
strategic planning, training, vision, and leaders’ aspirations in the analysis, bargaining, patterns of 
imitation, and experience of trial-and-error in the institution (Scharm and Neisser 1977). It is informed 
by contextual rules and identity full of ambiguity, uncertainty, risk, limited attention, and essentially 
imperfect information. This manifested itself in Indonesia’s attempt to imitate the East Asian (EA) Tiger 
economies to boost its withering production capacity in the 1980s as discussed in the later subsection.  
vii. Political institutions, policymaking process and policy outcome  
In view of the above decision-making process, this study draws on the theoretical and methodological 
framework derived from Spiller et al. (2003) on Latin America where the argument of political 
institutions, policymaking process and policy outcome (PMP) has also emerged as a viable theme in 
institutional economics studies. 
This study analyses how political institutions influence policy outcomes. Thus, within the PMP, instead 
of being affected directly by institutions or rules of the game, policy outcomes are more susceptible to 
the key actors playing a fundamental role in the policymaking process—designing, approving, and 
implementing policies. The emphasis of this framework is on the way in which some characteristics of 
the political institutions prompt the country’s process of policymaking toward nearly cooperative 
intertemporal political transactions (Spiller et al. 2003: 3). Ultimately, the PMP is grounded in each 
country’s political process—including Indonesia’s decentralisation, as Spiller et al. put it: 
“….in turn, the political process is conditioned by the incentives and constraints faced by 
the key political actors. These, in turn, are shaped by the country’s political institutions, 
that is, by the rules of its political game. This is the reason for this project’s emphasis on 
understanding the way political institutions shape political incentives and behaviour, how 
political behaviour influences policymaking processes (and State capabilities), and how 
policymaking processes determine the properties of public policies”. (Ibid: 4-5). 
Furthermore, key veto players (individual or collective actors) in a political system with a different 
ideology, different degree of internal cohesion, and a different number of actors must come to an 
agreement to the policy change proposal. It is the way in which a country ceases the moment to change 
the established system, it is the exception rather than the rule (Williamson 2000 598). 
“These characteristics affect the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo (the ‘win 
set’ of the status quo). The size of that win set has specific consequences for policymaking: 
when it is very small, ‘policy stability’ obtains” (Spiller et al. 2003: 13). 
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Cox and McCubbins (2001) in Spiller et al. (2003) further suggest that: 
“The most important trade-offs in policymaking is the ability to change policy 
(‘decisiveness’) and the ability to commit to a given policy once it is enacted 
(‘resoluteness’). Different institutions (electoral rules, the number of chambers, legislative 
procedures, etc.) would map, through ‘separation of powers’ and ‘separation of purpose,’ 
into an effective number of veto players (à la Tsebelis). Countries with more veto players 
will be located closer to the resoluteness end along a decisiveness-resoluteness 
continuum. The dual notion of separation of power and separation of purpose is one 
explicit ‘micro foundation,’ or intermediate module, towards empirical implementation of 
the counting and characterization of veto actors. The effective number of vetoes increases 
when a polity has both many institutional veto points (separation of power) and political 
actors with diverse interests controlling those veto points (separation of purpose)” (Ibid: 
13) 
It implies that more separation of powers greatly affect the rise of varied transactions with varied 
governance needs; specifically, in Williamson (1983:519), these will be expressly recognised through 
the governments’ credible commitments carried out in support of coalitions and to support exchange, 
or credible threats appearing in the conflict and rivalry contexts. 
North, on the other hand, offers a more reasonable explanation that despite reaching a high-level 
credible commitment, transaction cost will also be much higher than mainstream NCE due to the 
higher cost of exchange in formulating institutional frameworks. 
“It should be stressed that creating an institutional environment that induces credible 
commitment entails the complex institutional framework of formal rules, informal 
constraints, and enforcement that together make possible low-cost transacting. This 
argument states that the players may devise an institutional framework to improve 
measurement and enforcement and therefore make a possible exchange, but the 
resultant transaction costs raise the costs of exchange above the neoclassical level” (North 
1990: 57).  
The role of credible commitment has also been further argued by Engerman and Sokoloff (2008), in 
that policy is flexible and elites may change the policy depending on how much it gives more benefit 
to the group compared to the constituents.  
“Credible commitment to acknowledge private property rights, whether in the interests 
of the elite or the majority of the population, is the classic example of the value of certainty 
about policy action. More generally, however, allowing some flexibility in institutions, such 
that they can be altered to allow private or public agents to take fuller advantage of new 
opportunities that arise as technology or the environment changes, would be expected to 
foster improved economic performance and more rapid growth” (Ibid: 125). 
From this perspective, the institutional change process is inevitably affected by the country’s political 
sphere. Even though there are effective political processes which offer no assurance to suitable 
reforms, the initial institutional change and improvement conditions nonetheless exist. In the 
Indonesian case, Boediono (2013) admits that policy outcome that becomes more intricate to design 
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and rules are difficult to implement since for much of the time after independence, the rules of the 
game are less explicit and the political processes are less established. 
To summarise the first part of the chapter, institutions do matter in economic reform and policy 
process especially SEZ as a policy instrument through varying nature, degree and intensity which 
explains the difference in the SEZ performance in a different time (period of governance) and space 
(country). Institutions influence actor’s behaviour and policy preference in decision making.  
The following subsection discusses the SEZ relevant literature and the possibilities of the influence of 
institutions to SEZ policymaking. 
B. SEZ relevant literature ‘the development rationale’ 
The previous subchapter focuses on why institutions matter in policymaking process, how the 
institutions have an effect on actors choice of policymaking and their actions toward the 
implementation process, and the effect of the institutions and actors behaviour on the policy outcome 
The literature also highlighted how and why Williamson’s (2000) framework of institutional constraints 
can modify the behaviour of key policy actors and therefore alter the effectiveness of the chosen 
policy. 
This subchapter centres on the SEZ policy development process, how and what ways the rules of the 
game changed, and the organisation, the actors and the human resources that are playing it in order 
to explain that institutions matter in the policy formulation process on SEZ. The first part explains SEZ 
definition and types, the second devoted to the SEZ importance from global literature and why it has 
become the second-best policy, and the third shows where and what ways institutions matter in the 
SEZ policy process. The fourth part summarised the subchapter. 
1. Understanding the definition and typologies of SEZ   
 
The term 'Special Economic Zone' (SEZ) has a broad meaning because it can be used to describe various 
types of commercial zones. The factories in Maquiladora, Mexico, and the whole city of Shenzhen are 
SEZs, although they have differences in structure and size. The term SEZ in the world today varies 
greatly and is much intersected with many other terms with neither have a standardised definition nor 
model. The term is also widely known as the modern iteration of the free commercial zone, which was 
first established in 1959 in Shannon, Ireland. Currently, at least more than 147 countries in the world 
developed this modern economic zone based on the survey conducted by the World Bank, ILO, and 







Although various types of free areas have existed in history for decades, it was only in 1970 that these 
areas were used as drivers of economic growth in developing countries. This policy develops especially 
in developing countries that change its policy of growth policy based on import substitution. In the 
1970s and 1980s, countries in Asia and Latin America began to shape these areas. This establishment 
is aimed at attracting labour-intensive industries in coastal areas. Furthermore, the area is transformed 
into a pivot region of drivers of economic growth through exports. The movement of the formation of 
this region accelerated in the 1990s where other countries tried to replicate areas that proved 
successful, such as some areas in Asia and Latin America. Looking at the establishment of these areas 
is based on the same reasons, many of these regions have the same key characteristics. This area was 
formed in isolated enclaves given government incentives and privileges. This area is often located in 
remote areas but close to the transportation hub. The area is designed to attract labour-intensive 
industries, the industries that are concentrated in the region are mostly textile, clothing, and 
electronics industries (Cling and Letilly 2001). 
The World Bank defines SEZs in all its forms comprises, at a minimum, as “geographically delimited 
areas administered by a single body, offering certain incentives to businesses which physically locate 
within the zone” (World Bank/Akinci and Crittle 2008: 2). In other words, SEZ is a zone where the 
government hopes to increase economic growth through increased exports and investment by 
providing various competitive advantages for entities that choose to be located within the zone. By 
this definition, some developing countries like Indonesia appointed a single body as a coordinating 
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agent29 to oversee the implementation of SEZs. The key SEZ policy actors will be defined in the 
following section. 
At least 66 different terms were discovered (World Bank 2008: 9) to describe what is generally known 
as SEZ around the world, including free trade zone (FTZ), bonded zone (BZ) or export processing zone 
(EPZ), maquiladora (known in Mexico, the Caribbean and most Latin American countries) etc. (Chen 
1995; Kusago and Tzannatos 1998). All refer to the presence of defined locations for export-import 
and investment promotion activities. 
Keep in mind that of the many kinds of literature that address this topic, the terms are used alternately 
with SEZ. Nevertheless, the names explain a slight difference that lies in the objectives as well as the 
expected outcomes of each zone. The Free Trade Zone, also known as the Free Commercial Zone, is 
the most widely located SEZ in the global port. This zone is designed to support trade, shipping and 
export by providing tax-free areas, and facilities such as storage, warehousing, etc. Singapore, for 
example, has six Free Trade Zones in its port area where goods can be stored and free of charge, and 
where customs procedures have been simplified for goods entering or passing through Singapore. The 
Export Processing Zone (EPZ), as the name suggests, is designed to promote and facilitate exports. In 
a typical EPZ, all zones are allocated to export-related companies. These zones may be referred to as 
Industrial Zones indicating that they are designed to promote industrial activities, both export and 
import. Lat Krabang Industrial Estate in Thailand is one of the new EPZ models. Finally, Freeport is a 
larger zone that accommodates all types of activities, contrary to the SEZ model that emphasizes only 
exports and other trade-related activities, or activities centred on manufacturing and production 
industries. Just like other SEZs, Freeport helps activities related to commerce or manufacturing 
activities, but Freeport can promote tourism, retail, allow people to stay permanently within the zone. 
The benefits and incentives provided in Freeport are more diverse. China is known for its success in 
creating multiple Freeport, such as Shenzhen SEZ. Meanwhile, Batam, located in Indonesia, a smaller 
SEZ compared to Shenzhen, has both FTZ and Freeport. 
Some scholars and organisations, such as the World Bank (1998, 2008), Ge (1999), Aggarwal (2006), 
Ishida (2009), Yeung et al. (2009), Murray (2010), and Cheesman (2012) use ‘Special Economic Zone’ 
as a generic term. It is a general designation to encompass a variety of SEZ regimes as it can generalise 
the dominant characteristics of them.  However, some policymakers either distinguish between these 
terms30 (World Bank 2008: 9) or adopt the term EPZ as a common expression that covers all variations, 
                                                          
29Indonesia appointed Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs as coordinator and the minister as chairman of 
SEZ National Council during the SBY administration in 2008 (Further discussion in chapter 5). 
30Many SEZs include EPZ industrial parks within them such as Shenzhen SEZ in China, the progress of information 
technology development centre in Bangalore, India, the progress of the port city of Pusan, the shipbuilding 
industry in Taegu as well as Industrial Zone in Masan Zone in the Republic of Korea and Kaohsiung SEZ in Taiwan. 
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remaining the most popular designation for this repeatable formula (Boyenge 2007). Nevertheless, 
these models are sufficiently different in the approach, investment requirements, and objectives. 
Regardless of the many differences, SEZs can be broadly defined as:  
“Demarcated geographic areas contained within a country’s national boundaries where 
the rules of business are different from those that prevail in the national territory. These 
differential rules principally deal with investment conditions, international trade and 
customs, taxation, and the regulatory environment;….more liberal from a policy 
perspective and more effective from an administrative perspective than that of the 
national territory” (Farole 2011: 23). 
2. SEZ importance from global literature 
There has been much diversity in the reform experience and record of growth performance especially 
SEZ programme in most of the major developing countries since 1970. The aspects that have significant 
roles in the reform include the successes and failures of the incremental reforms and the major policy 
turns in the macroeconomics and the sectors, both globally and domestically. This diversity reflected 
in the development levels of the region and its political/institutional structures, which adds to the 
fruitfulness of the study.  
In the NIE context, many agenda of reform phases are ex-post reactions to earlier reforms or existing 
unsolvable issues relating to further necessary steps. This should not be misunderstood as a reform 
blueprint already available at the beginning of the reforms, such as in China in 1970 (Knoth 2001: 39). 
In the last few decades, the emerging economies’ economic transition has generally been considered 
and discussed. However, the inward-looking industrial growth strategy (generally recognised as 
dirigisme) circa the 1970s to 1980s was greatly contested. After a prolonged phase of economic 
difficulties, Keynes productive capitalism31 was unable to resolve the simultaneous occurrence of 
economic stagnation marked by rising unemployment, persistent stagnation and rising inflation 
(stagflation), as well as the soaring global oil crisis of the 1970s.  
Furthermore, the 1970s oil price shocks and the rise in domestic labour costs have contributed to the 
inevitability of firms from developed countries discovering new ways of minimising manufacturing 
costs abroad mainly to developing countries while developing countries gain the advantage of 
receiving much-needed capital from foreign investors (Das 2012: 23-30). Nicola (2009) states that a 
mixture of foreign investment and domestic labour is estimated to escalate the domestic production 
value and contribute to a country’s economic growth. More importantly, foreign investors are assumed 
to contribute to the management techniques, technology transfer, product competition and in so 
                                                          




doing increase the modernisation speed and contribute to acquiring access to industrialised countries’ 
markets.  
In addition, with the rapid economic liberalisation in the globalisation era, the East Asian (EA) Tigers 
(World Bank refers to them as HPAEs/High-Performance Asian Economies) capture of export-led 
growth promotion (export-oriented industrialisation or EOI) poses challenges for developing 
economies wishing to use SEZs.  
“The rising labour costs in China and other EA countries as early adopters of SEZs provides 
an opportunity for other economies to become viable locations for global manufacturing 
activity, provided such countries are able to market themselves as attractive investment 
destinations” (Woolfrey 2012-Trade Related Capacity).  
Moreover, the driving forces for EA economies to favour export promotion increased international 
competition for FDI, fuelled by the desire to join global manufacturing, the end of the global trade for 
apparel products under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), and lately, weaker demand in traditional 
export markets (Farole 2011). During this phase, the political actors’ decision affect the process of 
reform in various ways. The pace of this transition varied but observing the past achievements and the 
optimistic effect of the EOI policy on the EA’s economic development, emerging countries across the 
globe began to imitate EA’s policy (Knoth 2000)32 as the EA became the benchmark of successful 
economic reform. Many emerging market economies including Indonesia have failed to imitate their 
success utilising the role of foreign investment to reduce poverty by providing jobs more effectively 
than what may have been created by the state or local firms. Indonesia ignored the fact that there are 
different institutional considerations behind successful economic reform between emerging market 
economies and the EA that should be considered (Stiglitz 2003: 113-121; Rodrik 2007: 153-183). 
Therefore, it is not “whether a country should accept FDI, but how to put it to use” (Latt 2007: 62). The 
discussion to follow explains the root of the institutional differences. 
Many developing countries after their independence first attempted inclusive industrial development 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) (for Indonesia it was the early 1970s) and infant industry 
protection programmes that substitute imported products with domestic products. ISI was considered 
costly and theoretically misguided (Khan 2000; Alauddin 2013). Furthermore, this strategy often 
created severe market distortions due to dependence on overvalued exchange rates, large 
bureaucracies to address international trade and rigorous import controls (Bruton 1998). Moreover, 
the economies of many newly independent developing countries were increasingly more centralised 
as various forms of state-led and socialist systems were embraced such as in India and Africa (Heilman 
                                                          
32Knoth (2000) asserts that the controversy on the correlation between economic development and export 
promotion still occurred although it has become the new development policy paradigm. 
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and Lucas 1997; Paul Dana 2000), not to mention Indonesia in the Old Order (Sukarno period before 
1967). This popular approach in the 1950s and 1960s also had restricted effect on these countries’ 
growth and a very insignificant increase in living standards (Economist Intelligence Unit 1979: 1). 
Government measures include company nationalisation and increased taxation. Moreover, the soaring 
oil price has allowed the government to implement a trading strategy that is more inward-looking to 
help economically weak domestic businesses through a various subsidised credit on agriculture 
industries and power generation, and other highly protectionist and interventionist policy measures. 
These measures are based on the logic of self-sufficiency of the importing country through the local 
industrialised production (Soesastro and Basri 2005; Widodo 2008). However, negative externalities 
such as rent-seeking behaviour may complicate the process of infant industry protection. Business 
society or private entrepreneurs constantly search for opportunities to generate profit through 
protection, corruption, other incentives, or legal loopholes. 
The so-called structuralist33 development model (Clements 1980) initially emerged as a challenge to 
monetarist ‘conventional wisdom’—the neoclassical model. The argument is that the state-led 
industrialisation in the neoclassical view has led to inflation through creating distortion in the market 
(Khan 2000; Alauddin 2013). However, this development model does not explain the extent to which 
many developing economies pursuing ISI strategy were unable to show any signs of catching up with 
the advanced economies; the prerequisite for catching-up are the levels of trade openness and 
protection to private property rights (Sachs and Warner 1995) and the “need for ‘Social 
Capabilities’, which is the ability to absorb new technology, attract capital and participate in global 
markets” (Abramovitz 1986). The developing economies, however, were unable to sustain the 
expected development in the long-run, i.e. Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, to a lesser 
extent Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Peru and other poorer countries such as the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, and Honduras) (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009: 256).  
Indonesia never determines or chooses any development strategy. Griffin (1999) implicitly expresses 
that Indonesia’s economic development policies in the NO era were not based on a clear, deliberate, 
and chosen strategy (Ibid). Along with Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia implemented ISI strategy but 
its growth is more widely supported by the agricultural-led sector and the export of primary products—
                                                          
33Structuralist thought evolved in the 1940s to early 1960s and assumes that developing countries are 
characterised by cultural, social and institutional constraints that prevent change and their resources tend to 
stagnate (supply of goods and services is inelastic). It tends to be more concerned with the management of 
quantity than price of goods. It is generally marked by failure; sometimes they reached the target but often 
through poor implementation and achievement. For example, the World Bank gave its first loan to countries 
outside Europe in 1948. At that time, many developing countries were already busy in some form of centralised 
economic planning. Important also to note that the structuralist ideas dominating in the early 1950s were 
accepted by western academic scholars in the early 1960s. 
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the bread and butter of most developing countries. The small value added compared to the high 
technology manufacturing products of the more developed countries has led to criticism largely 
accepted by developing countries in the late 1980s, directed at the abandonment of protection policies 
towards trade liberalisation. This departs from the fact that the implementation of liberalisation policy 
has a faster growth rate than countries that implement protection (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009: 257). 
Liberalisation relates to the reduction in tariffs and eliminating the import quota and other trade 
restrictions while opening trade to the international community. In general, there are two major 
effects: an increase in the amount of merchandise and changes in the nature of trade (Ibid: 258). The 
embodiment of liberalisation is the export orientation policy whereby EA Tiger countries achieved 
significant change. However, controversy arose as:  
“Trade liberalisation is sometimes illustrated as a two-edged sword since it can create 
opportunities as well as threats to the domestic economic development...The opening up 
of markets not only offers welcome opportunities for the development of exports but also 
provides a competitive environment for international and domestic markets. The benefits 
or losses from the opening up of the markets depend very much upon the readiness of all 
domestic economic agents (producers and consumers) as well as the government” 
(Widodo 2008: 162).  
Furthermore, the pattern of ISI in Indonesia only provides specific industries with protective trade 
barriers, generates more assembly industries, and high dependence on imports (Gie 1999). Hence, ISI 
policy failure has reduced the developing countries’ prospects to emulate the EA Tigers’ success story. 
Narula (2002: 11; 2003:1) has aptly identified the main causes of the failures, i.e. “the weakening role 
of the state; the unreasonable expectations for industrial development from the FDI liberalisation; 
unable to sustain the ability to efficiently absorb, internalise and utilise the knowledge potentially made 
available and developed elsewhere if they are to ‘catch-up’ (absorptive capacity); FDI and domestic 
capacity were not sequenced in tandem; unable to recognise the inertia of transition and coordination 
failures”. 
Some observers noted that EA countries’ outward-oriented policies and their potential for free trade 
were improving, but it was disputed since these countries are still implementing protection policies. 
Despite free trade policy often being heralded as a driver of growth and the positive connection 
between economic growth and the economic openness, evidence suggests that the policy had a low 
impact on the spectacular economic growth in these economies—i.e. export growth, FDI sector, and 
backward linkages to other parts of the domestic economy (Hirschman 1958; Edwards 1993). The key 
to the EA countries’ success was not only that they applied import restrictions, tariff policies, low-
interest loans, export subsidies, and government support in terms of research and development but 
also their unique institutional characteristics (Ibid).  
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NIE has brought an important shift in the development discourse. “....development should be redefined 
as economic growth plus appropriate institutional change; meaning institutional changes which 
facilitate further economic growth" (Toye 2003: 61). The rapid development of the four EA Tigers and 
the phenomenon of slow growth of the developing countries (Africa and Latin America) in the 1970s 
and 80s, the disappointing performance of the post-Communist transition, followed by the AFC were 
all rooted in institutions and redefining the economic development strategy.  
Indeed, there are some success stories in the history of economic integration of developing countries 
in regional and global markets. For example, the development of SEZs in China (Shenzhen, Guangzhou, 
Shanghai and Hong Kong), the information technology development centre in Bangalore-India, the port 
city of Pusan, and the shipbuilding industry in Taegu, South Korea. However, it should be highlighted 
that there are key explanatory factors behind the success story. First, the economic infrastructure can 
support and facilitate investment activities. Second, the government’s ideological value includes 
knowledge with a competent, corruption-free, and efficient bureaucracy. Third, the availability of 
skilled labour is high to support industrialisation. Fourth, the state’s persistent high intervention and 
economic readiness and ability to adopt technologies that produce high value-added goods are 
undisputed. Ironically, for Indonesia, those factors are still issues to be deciphered and colour the 
episodes of the economy. 
Unfortunately, Indonesia’s economy is not yet in a condition to be able to maximise the benefits and 
advantages of the integration agenda. State involvement generally takes different forms from 
administrative/regulatory controls, taxation or subsidies, provision of goods and services, participation 
in investment, and/or direct ownership (see, for example Rodrik 2008; Chang 2009; Lin and Monga 
2010; Capling and Low 2010; Wade 2012; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014). Although the foregoing insights 
on the neoliberal paradigm under the NCE approach seem to underemphasise the role of the state, it 
is not essentially applied to the formation of SEZ and investment. Albeit current literature on 
Indonesian SEZs highlights problems with externalities and strategic competitiveness, some central 
issues persist regarding the role of the state to find the most efficient strategy to achieve success with 
the policy platform in promoting trade and investment. Since liberalisation usually implies significant 
institutional changes, our framework of economic reform is useful for analysing the implementation 
of liberalisation under political transformation. Successive governments over the years are challenged 
on striking the right balance between designating the right location for the zone to eliminate regional 
inequality and the public and private collaboration to develop these zones. Heavy state intervention is 
crucial in overcoming these overarching problems associated with FDI inflows into the SEZ localities. 
Furthermore, Schrank (2001: 223) suggests that EPZs act as a shield for domestic firms from 
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competition in order not to expose them to the world market, which in Indonesia case further entails 
unsuccessful fundamental structural reforms at the central and local level.  
This raises another investigation as to how such a choice can be negotiated between the actors 
(political institutions, SEZ management, and business actors) while sustaining the successive 
government’s outdated rhetoric and short-sighted character. How did the ruling elite consolidate 
political power to form SEZ and investment policies as part of the reform strategy or vice versa? In 
view of Indonesia’s salient feature to maintain old institutions through patrimonialism and clientelism 
and by engaging in rent-seeking practices, these institutions neglect or constrain the capacity of 
democratic rulers to introduce the new SEZ policy. This is a unique experience in the intricacies of 
Indonesian political economy and has been under-researched.  
Some SEZ classic works by scholars oppose the positive effect the SEZ has on economic growth, i.e. 
Hamada (1974), Rodriguez (1976), Hamilton and Svensson (1982), and Warr (1989). Other scholars 
support the SEZ idea due to its divergent positive externalities, i.e. Miyagiwa (1986), Young and 
Miyagiwa (1987), Chaudhuri and Adhikari (1993), and Din (1994). Their reasoning is explored below. 
The most common macroeconomic theoretical perspective comes from wealth effects of SEZ in the 
context of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model by Hamada (1974). Hamada (1974) uses the standard two 
commodity model to affirm that in the absence of foreign direct investment (FDI), SEZs do not affect 
production if tariffs on final goods are removed; and the increase in FDI does not automatically improve 
the consumption but reduces national income in the developing country. He assumes that the host 
country’s comparative advantage on full employment distorts the consequences of SEZs in developing 
countries (Hazakis 2014: 89).  
Hamada’s theory was developed further by NCE economists Rodriguez (1976), Hamilton and Svensson 
(1982). Their studies suggest that SEZs in developing countries not only distort efficient resource 
allocation through dispossession of key national resources (welfare decreasing) but also introduce 
unfair competition practices between domestic entrepreneurs and multinational firms inside SEZs and 
impose high infrastructure costs (Warr 1989).  
“The conclusion of the aforementioned analysis is that in an internationalised trade 
environment the rationale in favour of special zones loses ground as the national 
economic conditions become favourable to entrepreneurship and the country fits its 
Hecksher-Ohlin comparative advantage” (Ibid).  
Young (1987) also ascertains that distortions can be worse if tariff reduction on intermediate goods 
and taxes on foreign capital—that attract resources from the surrounding domestic zones— remain in 
the domestic zones and eventually decrease welfare and host countries’ national income. To avoid 
such occurrence, Miyagiwa (1986) suggests the bigger role for the host government in formulating a 
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well-defined policy could mitigate economic distortions and promote welfare, i.e. through government 
subsidy that can promote industry diversification and export. Din (1994) however, does not assume 
any distortions from tariffs; instead, increases in FDI in the FTZ can generate higher national income 
under non-traded intermediate goods.  
Young and Miyagiwa (1987) use Harris-Todaro’s unemployment theory to postulate otherwise. They 
assert that FTZ unequivocally raises the value of national productivity in developing countries. It raises 
wealth and employment through tariff reductions on the sectoral basis that can “raise the wage in the 
non-unionized sectors which reduce the gap between this and the unionized wage and hence reduces 
the unemployment required to equalise expected wages in the unionised and the non-unionized sectors. 
As a result, the increase in the wages exceeds the reduction in the return paid to domestic capital plus 
the loss of tariff revenue at the current volume of imports” (Ibid: 403-4). However, the rigid wage 
structure in Indonesia creates another distortion. Moreover, in the context of high urban 
unemployment within SEZs, Chaudhuri and Adhikari (1993) state that it is not necessarily welfare 
improving despite the mobility of domestic capital that can expand FTZ between the rural and the 
urban sectors, and rural-urban migration is rational if it generates more income for urban than rural 
unemployment. 
In addition, there are other more contemporary theoretical studies supplementary to the above classic 
works, for example, by Madani (1999), the World Bank (2001), Engman et al. (2007), and Akermany 
(2009). According to Madani (1999), in the medium term, if trade liberalisation is not politically viable, 
an SEZ could be useful as a tool to introduce economic reform, facilitate transitions from import 
substitutions to free trade regime and move away from state intervention. World Bank (2001) and 
Akermany (2009) further complement Madani’s argument and posit that SEZs are touted as the 
second-best solution for trade policy after liberalising trade for the whole country. Engman et al. (2007: 
35) also confirmed the World Bank and Akermany perceive SEZs as the second-best solution since SEZ’s 
enclave nature only introduces extremely distortive political institutional environments compared to 
a countrywide liberalisation. It allows a country to maintain its existing economic policy in the general 
domestic environment on the one hand while there is no choice for regional competitiveness and as 
laboratories for experimentation on the other hand. It is regarded as part of economic reforms and a 
regional policy tool aimed at reducing unemployment in poor areas.  
Based on the empirical works of Seshadri (2011) and Stein (2008), SEZ policy starts losing ground due 
to the negative externalities it sadly contributes to developing countries’ economies. For example, the 
study on India by Seshadri (2011: 3) shows that there has been no obvious correlation between the 
establishment of EPZs and export growth, arguing that better explanation for export performance can 
be traced by a country’s trade liberalisation since the mid-1980s and economic reforms since 1991. 
54 
 
Furthermore, Stein (2008) draws criticism over the orthodox liberalisation approach from his research 
on Africa. He argues that an EPZ should not be a panacea to solve the multifaceted economic issues. 
The evidence suggests that there was no accurate design or incentives within an industrial policy 
framework in Africa that could: offer a conducive environment to spur investment, employment, 
foreign exchange, and backward linkages (Hirschman 1958) while increasing the technological 
spillovers to enhance Africa’s institutional transformation.  
In addition, Yabuuchi (2003) affirms that if intermediate goods are internationally traded, then FDI 
decreases the production of the intermediate good and increases unemployment. However, Gestrin 
(2001), Carcovic and Levine (2002), Ancharaz (2003), and Graham (2004) postulate that despite higher 
growth, knowledge spillover, and spurring technological know-how, there are implications of industrial 
competition between countries in the use of incentives to lure FDI.  
Correspondingly, Pouder and St. John (1996) illustrates that an SEZ is indicative of less innovation and 
a homogeneous macro culture. Consequently, instead of economic productivity, the economic agents 
have been exposed to an increasingly narrower variety of information resources and productive 
practices resulted in economic stagnation. Equally important, the incentive structure mechanisms to 
encourage industrial relocation constrains local entrepreneurs and accentuates unequal development 
progress within and between regions in developing countries such as Indonesia. This framework is later 
shown in chapter 5 of the KBN case in Jakarta as one of the weaknesses of SEZ policy when EPZ firms 
in KBN went bankrupt and were relocated to other more cost-efficient regions due to: first, the 2008 
GFC which led to the decrease in global demands, in particular from the US and European markets; 
second, issues of the leasehold licence rigidity from KBN. 
Although there are debates among practitioners, policymakers, and researchers as to whether SEZs 
can help escalate economic growth or to accelerate export-oriented investments in developing 
countries, SEZs have proliferated as major phenomenon particularly since the early 1980s (Madani 
1999; World Bank 2008). SEZ not be understood as the first best policy and based on the approach of 
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), there are the costs and benefits situation and welfare effect of reforms 
which depend on how individual countries perform their policy. For example, the considerations 
related to the host countries’ race to the bottom strategy through tax privileges, lower levels of wages 
and other streamlined legislations and facilities, which differs in some respects between 
developing/host country economies. 
SEZs in various countries usually offer preferential treatment not provided elsewhere in the country: 
simpler licensing procedures, better investor services, complete infrastructure, customs and tax 
treatment that are different from other parts in the country. SEZ also has its own authority which is 
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responsible for making decisions related to the area and the regional governing body responsible for 
the management of the area. In many countries, SEZ has a low-level legal foundation to provide legal 
certainty for an economic activity within the region. Many countries are successful in developing SEZ, 
but not a few also fail. China is among the most successful in SEZ development. Some of the reasons 
that led China to succeed in SEZ development include clear institutional framework, active involvement 
of local governments as key stakeholders, and the well-structured SEZ authority (governance 
structure). 
It is imperative to examine the theoretical literature and discover the academic debates on SEZ 
expected results (policy outcome) which have touched practically every single facade of their 
motivation, rationale, and structure. For the study purpose, policy and regulation are treated equally 
and used interchangeably and are defined as “ways and measures to overcome the specific 
development problems or to achieve specific development objectives by issuing a decision, strategy, 
planning and implementation in the field using specific instruments” (Adopted from Pal 1992, Dunn 
1994, and Hill 1997). The following subsections devoted to reviewing the SEZ policy literature. 
3. SEZ outcome literature 
Indonesia adopted an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy strategy in the 1980s. Indonesia 
has persisted in pursuing ill-advised economic policies, resulting in a widening economic inequality. 
During that period, Indonesia had been considered one of the eight Asian miracle countries from 1965 
to 1990, due to its economic growth, with Malaysia taking the lead on low relative inequality (Page 
1994: 239). Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has not been able to sustain long-term growth.  
Furthermore, amid Indonesia’s economic liberalisation in the 1980s with its export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) policy strategy, massive poverty alleviation was attributed in part to the 
implementation of the SEZ concept; the EOI policy with SEZ as an instrument showed vulnerability 
during the 1997AFC. The AFC quickly pulled Indonesia to a serious economic and monetary crisis and 
the Indonesian economy subsequently collapsed. 
The rapid development of the four Asian Tigers and the slow growth of the developing countries 
redefine the economic development strategy. NIE has brought an important shift in the development 
discourse. “.....development should be redefined as economic growth plus appropriate institutional 
change; meaning institutional changes which facilitate further economic growth” (Toye 2003: 61). 
SEZ policy being beneficial for development remains a subject of controversy. Its analytical rigour, 
pragmatic tenors and the flawed implementations of the SEZ scheme have led to the failure to achieve 
the SEZ objectives that mostly occur in developing economies, causing social and economic impacts. 
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Three major social issues were identified to cause detrimental effects, namely labour exploitation, 
forcible land acquisition, and environmental degradation. Meanwhile, despite SEZ proliferation, there 
is a significant economic loss from foreign investment and the export generation that contributes to 
the declining budget performance (state revenue) of the host country in general. In Indonesia, in 
Boediono’s (Ex-Vice President in SBY administration) view, the real practice of policymaking such as 
SEZ is often ultimately converging on making policies that can work through obtaining at least fifty per 
cent of the initial objectives with minimum negative effects (Boediono 2011). But, it has reinforced a 
widespread debate from activists and civil society groups, academics, policymakers and politicians on 
the SEZ impact on the growth and development in the Global South today not to mention Indonesia 
(Daeng 2008). Despite high levels of FDI, the SEZ policy has not managed to overcome the legacy of 
unexpectedly lagging regions or backwardness as illustrated in Indonesia’s rising inequality (see figure 
4.1 and table 4.1). They have brought to the fore the impacts of an SEZ to a host country’s socio-
economic circumstance. For example, the study by Fröbel et al. (1978) expostulates that state’s 
attempts to cut unemployment through supporting SEZs while preventing an extreme decline in living 
standards and working conditions are considered ineffective and only bring little chance of programme 
survival. Similarly, Aggarwal’s (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) study on the Indian SEZs argues that an SEZ has 
limited success in attracting investment and promoting exports and has critical and controversial 
elements of labour relations and employment. Indonesia’s experience on its SEZ coincides with these 
empirical arguments (more details in chapters 5 and 6). Another more recent study by Pratap (2012) 
points out the land grabbing issue in Indian SEZs. This evidence also took place in some regions in 
Indonesia with new SEZs being established in Tanjung Lesung, Tanjung Api-Api, and Bitung. However, 
other than the land acquisition law, the details of the land grab issue will not be considered. 
In the same vein, there are other studies such as Lang (2010) that stress the human rights violation in 
China, while Taguiwalo (2009) emphasises the resistance of women, land rights, resources, and 
livelihood struggles in India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Zhang (2008), Zeng and Eastin (2011), and 
He et al. (2013) assert the lack of environmental awareness among local governments and the 
deteriorating environmental quality in China. Despite changes in the environmental protection laws, 
China’s investment addiction through the development of SEZs has brought an inevitable erroneous 
belief. They tried to spur economic progress but at the price of harming people’s means of support (in 
terms of land grabbing and environmental deprivation). Ironically, as Knoth’s (2000) study has 
ascertained, these SEZs are being touted as the most far-reaching economic reforms since China began 
opening up in the 1980s.  
Furthermore, according to DeArmas and Sadni-Jallab (2002), even though there is an increase in FDI 
and export rates from SEZs, the employment rates were not significant in every developing country; 
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even jobs are only significant to small population countries i.e. Mauritius, Seychelles, and Jamaica not 
China, India or Indonesia. The availability of jobs in the zone cannot keep pace with the rapidly 
increasing population. Moreover, there is a tendency for an SEZ, being labour-intensive manufacturing, 
to be replaced with capital-intensive industry where the profit from return on investment (ROI) is much 
higher (Farole 2011). This will be determined by the role of host government in choosing the 
appropriate industry coupled with the political support surrounding the policy choice.  
According to Aggarwal (2005), SEZs should not be the only growth policy to pursue the aforesaid 
objectives. Based on some inclusive work not only in recent times but also earlier times (Warr 1987; 
Madani 1999; Jayanthakumaran 2003; Aggarwal 2005; Farole 2011), it has always been a puzzle 
(Moberg 2012) that some SEZs, regardless of their potential, have become nuisances on the economy 
(e.g. India, the Philippines, China, or even Indonesia). The failures in many existing traditional EPZs in 
some countries and the general SEZ are mainly due to the high cost of doing business. The alleged 
problems associated with excessive bureaucracy, poor management and weak policy coordination (the 
EPZs in Dakar, Senegal, and most developing countries), poor infrastructure include dire transportation 
facilities, unreliable energy, power and water supplies with high electricity costs (including those more 
recent SEZs in Sei Mangkei, Indonesia), lack of sufficient cheap labour (this has become a global issue 
today where China, India, and Indonesia have frequently faced labour demands for wage raise), and 
spatial issues of poorly selected location, too distant from the port and inaccessible from main trading 
routes (problems in Dakar, Senegal) (Cling and Letilly 2001: 22 in Farole and Akinci 2011: 261). The 
inappropriate infrastructure will cause congestion and other social problems and entail a significant 
decline in the export sector (World Bank Survey Reports-Akinci and Crittle 2008; Farole and Akinci 
2011). Other problems include unattractive tax incentives, unprofessional zone promotion, inadequate 
maintenance as well as excessive performance requirements (FIAS 2008: 5, 50).  
One of the main concerns in most SEZ countries including Indonesia is that many low-income host 
countries are caught in a trap (Gareev 2013), when income rises, the labour-intensive production 
competitiveness will erode before the host country is prepared to move to a more advanced 
production. The private sector is small and weak, whereas local producers can hardly compete with 
global giants in open markets. It is important to note that this has been a global issue in most Asian 
middle-income countries. Khan et al. (2012) conclude that increased competition in the labour-
intensive companies such as in Indonesia has not been effectively corresponding with the growing 
population (see chapter 4). 
Moreover, despite SEZs as effective means to attract FDI and serve to promote economic transition 
and liberalisation (Ge 1999: 20), according to Jenkins (1999: 41) in his study on India, economic 
liberalisation is all about staying in power. SEZ is conventionally a transformation process of some form 
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of state economic activity and referring to a policy choice or an instrument in order to stabilise the 
economy by promoting exports, generating employment, and attracting FDI; but it is contemporarily, 
a mechanism to preserve the ruling elite’s traditional rhetoric. Borrowing from Gellert (2010: 40), this 
study also incorporates the term ‘investment regime’ as a resilient political and economic regime of 
capital accumulation and growth that can withstand crises and last for years if not decades. In 
Indonesia, the SEZ platform is embedded in the investment regime which started when the Investment 
Law was issued in the new order and renewed in the reform and democratic order.  
Given these diverse levels of achievement and disappointment, SEZs have contributed to economic 
growth through rising GDP and FDI in some countries, while being utterly ineffective in other countries. 
This is used as the relevant measure for this study to discover the institutional perspectives underlying 
the research question. This study attempts to understand the institutional core of economic agents 
and political institutions’ interaction formulating new zone policy if some existing ones only succeed 
in the short term and fail in promoting positive contribution in the long-term. In this regard, it will 
entail analysing institutions and the political agenda. How do institutions affect SEZ key policy actors’ 
decision? Which institutions affect their decision and why do they vary?   
The relevant study that comes closest to our discussion is Knoth (2000) on Chinese SEZs. Despite 
Knoth’s study as economic dominant rather than a political view, his work corresponds to the present 
study, suggesting it is an inadequate simplification for China that the political decision maker is 
characterised by one purpose; thereby SEZ development cannot be understood as straightforward 
proposal implementation. The outcome from policymaking is an alternative result of an intricate 
negotiating process between key policy powers where the dispersal of power (decentralisation) often 
shifts during the transformation process toward a free market economy (Ibid: 8). However, rather than 
having a development policy transformed by the form of political structure, Knoth’s research reveals 
that “political arena is transformed by the development of new institutions (market economy policies) 
and the abolishment of old ones (command economy)”. Lai (2006) in Das (2013: 37) also claims that 
the Chinese economic success was largely an effect of patient efforts to strongly shape administrative, 
authorised and economic institutions, actively promote market players that supported the market 
economy or most importantly steadily discontinuing deep-rooted mechanisms of the command 
economy. While in Indonesia, the old institutions are represented by its patronage political culture. 
The Indonesian experience (as will be discussed in the case analyses of chapters 4, 5, and 6) is that they 
did not abolish its patronage political culture as the old institutional variable; instead, it embraced the 
practice throughout the reform and democratic order (RDO) with substantially, not slightly, distinct 
nuances. Instead of preserving the positive cultural condition, Indonesians prefer to work on the basis 
of self-interest individuals for personal benefits rather than a group or national interest. Meanwhile, 
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the Chinese people and government prefer to support their Chinese investors more than the foreign 
investors based on kinship ties to develop their SEZs under a favourable institutional environment 
where legal framework is not necessarily a big issue. Cultural proximity as one of China’s key success 
with the same language and culture made it possible for Chinese businessmen to overcome difficult 
times as experienced by Indonesia during the crisis and reform process (Knoth 2000).  
These are examples of why institutions matter in policy process which relates to Williamson’s first level 
on informal institutions that affect the success and failure of a policy due to actors’ rational behaviour 
in their policy decision. Meanwhile, the following subsection presents the experiences from China and 
India in their SEZ policy developments and try to draw lessons that can be learned in SEZ development 
in Indonesia with respect to the other institutional aspects of Williamson’s model (2000). 
China SEZ 
Beginning in 1978, China’s central government began implementing a series of economic reforms 
aimed at developing the country’s economy. The way in which the Chinese government pursues is to 
take bold action to ‘open’ its economy directly to foreign investment in order to raise the citizens’ 
standard of living. Without the certainty of the outcome of economic reforms, the Chinese government 
decided not to open the entire economy at once, but for certain segments and regions. Therefore, the 
Chinese authorities established four coastal cities as SEZs pilot projects for economic reform and the 
development of other industrial estates. Based on Zeng (2010), thus, the initial motivation of SEZ 
development in China was an experiment in carrying out reform and opening up the economy. The 
arrangements aimed at attracting foreign investment and technology (through joint venture 
arrangements), providing employment, utilizing domestic resources and imports, and supporting 
capital formation. Most of the output was intended for export to overseas markets; this underscores 
the role of SEZ as part of an export-oriented strategy that has previously been widely pursued by other 
Asian countries - Japan as the first. In 1980, the Chinese government opened four SEZ areas - covering 
all areas of the cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province; and fourth in Xiamen 
city in Fujian Province. They were coastal cities and chosen because of their proximity to major trading 
centres in East Asia, namely Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Four years later, the whole of Hainan 
province was designated as the fifth SEZ. Within these areas, industrial areas were also established 
which offered various facilities. This programme was considered quite effective in achieving the goals. 
The rapid developments for both export performance and the amount of investment especially were 
seen from Shenzhen SEZ as the main export area, while other areas look far below the performance of 
the city close to Hong Kong. This success prompted the Chinese government to open various other 
special areas on a smaller scale called the Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs). At 
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first, the area was still built in coastal areas, but in the 1990s, the Chinese government began to open 
the ETDZ in the hinterland, in the hope of developing other disadvantaged areas (Knoth 2000). 
To make SEZ an oasis for economic reform, the Chinese government offers preferential policies for the 
development of these areas. These policies include tax incentives such as tax holidays, foreign 
exchange transparency and flexibility for overseas companies to send profits back to home countries. 
It is also complemented by other fiscal incentives such as exemption from import duties for raw 
materials in the framework of exports, exemption of export taxes, even granting limited licenses to sell 
as products receiving such facilities in the domestic market. In addition to fiscal incentives, SEZ 
managers are also given the autonomy of economic policy and more political authority. They are 
allowed, for example, to develop city laws and regulations, including tariffs and local tax structures, as 
well as to fully manage the development within these zones. They are also allowed to give special 
treatment to foreign companies by offering cheaper land prices or production facilities. One important 
point in the success of this programme is the policy for the formation of a currently unknown labour 
market within China's communist economic system. Companies operating within SEZ are permitted to 
make applicable employment contracts for certain term limits, as well as to terminate the employment 
of employees who do not achieve specified performance. The enforced labour policy also allows 
companies to set wages and salaries according to the labour market situation. Each special industrial 
zone, whether within the SEZ or stand-alone areas as ETDZ is administered by a committee comprised 
of persons appointed by the provincial and local governments. The committee’s tasks include 
managing land, developing infrastructure, and conducting regional planning. In addition, the 
committee is also responsible for various public services such as security and hygiene, as well as 
ensuring the creation of good and profitable industrial relations for workers and investors (Knoth 
2000). 
India SEZ 
The SEZ in India has several different characteristics with SEZ in China. First, the SEZ was established at 
Kandla in 1965. In the period of three decades later six SEZs have been established in several regions. 
Unlike SEZ in many other Asian countries, SEZ in India is not intended to attract foreign investment, 
but rather as a means of providing facilities to domestic exporters from aggravating regulatory regimes 
in other regions and supporting import substitution programmes (Kundra 2000). After liberalizing the 
market in the early 1990s, the Government of India announced the launch of the SEZ programme in 
the country by modelling China SEZ in 2000 aimed at attracting foreign investment. After being ratified 
as a law in 2006, up to 2008 there were about 552 districts proposed as SEZ. As of March 2015, 416 
applications have been formally approved for development, while there are 202 areas showing SEZ 
operations. The main motivation of SEZ establishment is to attract private investment not only in 
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productive activities, but also in SEZ creation. In the previous policy the Indian government intervened 
to form and prepare the Export Development Zone by investing the necessary funds to develop 
infrastructure. In the new SEZ policy, the central government will only be responsible for broad policy 
frameworks as well as monitoring performance and implementation. The role of SEZ also became more 
widespread to stimulate economic activity not only limited to increase exports. One of the attractions 
of SEZ in India is the application of a single window system to facilitate the licensing and operational 
processes of companies operating in the region. In addition there is direction for minimum 
infrastructure that should be provided by the developer. There are also fiscal incentive packages 
designed to attract private investment. This includes exemptions on various taxes and duties. 
Commercial financing facilities are also provided by banks and other financial institutions. These 
facilities and incentives are not just for investors which operates within the SEZ, but also for regional 
developers. Although the performance of the SEZs in India is still far below China, in some aspects 
there is considerable progress (Kundra 2000). 
The lessons that can be learnt from the experiences of China and Indonesia can be drawn into a 


















Table 2.1  
 
Table 2.1 shows some of the characteristic differences between SEZ policies residing in India, China 
and Indonesia. Site selection is the first quite different aspect of the SEZ policy in the three countries. 
SEZ in China has focused on logistic facilitation, agglomeration and industrial cluster formation, as well 
as proximity to international markets where the location of SEZ is selected in the coastal area and very 
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close to the international hubs, like Hong Kong. Therefore, their SEZs are more located in urban areas 
with several industrial areas within it. This makes the management of China SEZ directly carried out by 
the same party with the city government, complete with various existing instruments. The 
management of industrial estate shall be submitted to the governing body. While in Indonesia and 
India, due to the relatively small area, SEZ is directly managed by business entities and administrators 
under local government. India does not have a specific policy on location and the location can be 
anywhere. While Indonesia, due to the objectives of equality, they prioritised developing the 
disadvantaged areas. Currently, after 2009 SEZ Law was announced, Indonesia pays more attention to 
the availability of natural resources as their location targets.  
In the prevailing policy issue, these countries also tend to apply different focus. SEZ in India emphasizes 
various fiscal incentives expected to attract investment. For SEZs in China, due to being an area for 
experimental reform of economic policy, the enforced regime of policy also differs from other regions 
in China, including employment, licensing, ownership, etc. (Ge 1999; Knoth 2000; Zeng 2010). In 
Indonesia, the focus of policy emphasised on fiscal and investment (non-fiscal) incentives. Different 
aspects can also be seen in policies for infrastructure development and territorial completeness. In 
China, the source of development financing is more determined by the government. Private 
participation is more a supporter of financing and implementing regional development, where the 
government plans and retains the authority. In India, SEZ development is left to the private sector for 
planning, financing and development, as well as in management. Indonesia plans to take a combination 
of both, where the development and management of the region are done by private or state-owned 
enterprises (BUMN/BUMD), while the central and regional governments develop supporting 
infrastructure. These differences also make a difference in performance and outcomes of their 
respective policies. As mentioned above, SEZ in China is very successful in inviting foreign investment, 
due to the nature of its policy facilitates the arrival of foreign investment, while SEZ in India, although 
not in terms of inviting foreign investors as their main concern, the ability to improve their export 
performance in accordance with the policy given by the government is worth taking into consideration. 
The discussion above points out that institutions do matter in which one institutions influence other 
institutions and not necessarily hinder each other. They can be linked to Williamson’s other 
institutional aspects. Williamson’s model can be applied with regard to the second until the fourth 
level. The second level considers formal institutions in the form of Chinese and Indian’s clear SEZ legal 
framework and the government political will. The third level involves the governance structure of both 
countries with respect to their clear SEZ organisational structure who organises and manages the SEZ, 
and the fourth level in the form of undisputed distribution of resources which include the clarity of 
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roles and responsibilities of their respected management bodies to allocate certain resources and 
locations.  
The final section concludes the chapter from the discussion of the two subchapters taking into account 
the institutional theory and SEZ literature studies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on institutional economics, their related concepts, and 
Williamson’s hierarchy of institutional constraints and argued that not only institutions matter on 
economic reform policy but on actor’s behaviour and action in their policy decision. By adopting a 
modified NIE approach linked with Williamson’s hierarchy of institutional constraint, this chapter 
demonstrates that NIE refers to studying the institutional change in the economic reform (SEZ policy) 
and extends the influence of institutions in the context of SEZ policymaking through Williamson’s 
institutional constraints. This chapter conceptualises how SEZ policies devised by the state and which 
types of institutional subjects are assumed and encouraged for the policymaking practices to 
concretely function. It can be a challenging driving force capable of generating changes in the overall 
political system. NIE can be thought of as enriching the view of, and is more than simply turning away 
from, NCE thought while emphasising the efficiency of the market mechanism without interference 
from the state in neoliberal ideology. Despite the impossibility of establishing a well-functioning 
market mechanism without a well-functioning state, borrowing from Chang and Nolan (1995) and 
Stiglitz (1999) in Chang (2001: 13) that— “market is a political construct”, this study perceived a causal 
logic that some institutional elements constrain the state (political actors and economic agents as SEZ 
policymakers) into making the market (SEZ policy) well-functioning causing the increased risk of 
frequent change in SEZ policy. Grounded in the NIE theory and literature and Williamson’s model, 
conventional studies claim that economic policy and the policymakers, by their very nature as formal 
constraints, reflect how one set of institutions modifies or radically restructures another set of 
institutions. Thus, this study will explore that the key policy actors create change in the existing 
development systems by their influence on incentive structure and transaction.  
From this perspective, the SEZs are conceived as an array of formal and informal institutions. They are 
administratively defined territories, conceptualised as dynamic entities, impacting relations and 
competitive and/or cooperative actions of economic agents, through vibrant and interconnected 
cognitive, regulative, and normative/organisational arrangements, based on a mixture of norms, 
practises, incentives, and procedures (North 2005a, Creskoff and Walkenhorst 2009, and Hazakis 
2014). Undermining the SEZ path dependency and evolution is likely denying the relations among 
arrangements and economic agents, causing SEZ’s low competitiveness and underperformance. This 
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marks the beginning of the leverage points to analyse how and why institutions affect SEZ policy 
process. 
One aspect to be considered is SEZ as the driving force for economic reform and investment 
promotion. However, although currently there have been many SEZs being developed in many 
developing countries, the performance has not brought significant contributions to a national 
economy especially in terms of investment. Even in Indonesia, the enthusiasm in investment in many 
SEZ types is still not well developed. One of the issues that arise in the literature is the unclear 
incentives promised in the SEZ development plan. Until now, the specificity of a specific area cannot 
be elaborated with the appropriate legal framework. The scheme of institutional relationships in SEZ 
management in the global practice also has not provided a guarantee of full support to the business 
world and company operations in SEZ. Difficulties in infrastructure development are also important 
constraints in the success of this programme. Business investment, including foreign investment, is the 
most important factor in improving a country’s economic performance. SEZ programme can be a 
catalyst to close the gap of economic policy that has not fully supported the business world.  
Due to this vital status of an SEZ to the economic growth, the author feels the importance of studying 
the institutional aspects that affect the SEZ underperformance. Most existing literature tended to 
study SEZs economic outcomes, the advantages and disadvantages they have contributed to a country 
and some have emphasised on the political nature of the SEZ development process. While the study 
on the institutions that influence the policymaking process by key policy actors is rare especially in 
Indonesia. This is the gap from the literature that this study tries to fill in which is to focus on analysing 
the institutional frameworks of SEZ policymaking process in the national and subnational levels.  
The next chapter elaborates the analytical framework built from the elements in the literature and 
explains the methodology being employed in the study to help answer how and why institutions affect 











Analytical Framework and Methodology 
This chapter presents the analytical framework gathered from the literature and describes the 
research methodology adopted in the study in more detail. The aim of this chapter is to give a full 
understanding of what approach the author uses to start the research and how to develop the study 
into meaningful research contribution. Subchapter 3.1 is devoted to elaborate the analytical 
framework, subchapter 3.2 presents the methodology including the study design and protocols, while 
subchapter 3.3 spells out the limitations of conducting the empirical work. The last subchapter is the 
conclusion.  
3.1. Analytical Framework 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, institution matters in policymaking and actor’s behaviour in making 
a decision. The relationship between institutions and policymaking, especially on SEZ policy, gleaned 
from the institutional theoretical literature is described in the analytical framework in figure 3.1 under 
the grey shaded area. The study tries to link NIE approach with the four levels of Williamson’s 
‘hierarchy of institutional constraints’ framework to analyse the SEZ policymaking by key policy actors 
in Indonesia. 
Based on the figure, institutions matter is shown by the green rectangle dashed line. Throughout this 
study, the author used Williamson’s (2000) as a guide to demonstrate the methods and insights of NIE 
and to guide the analytical process of this study. It involves elaborating the nature of each layer of the 
institutional hierarchy and their possible interrelation in influencing each other based on their co-
evolution. This framework describes the case of SEZ policy change, the so-called catalyst of economic 
reform. 
Williamson differentiates the constraints into four layers. The first layer focuses on ‘informal 
constraints’ or ‘informal institutions/rules’ where the existence has been integrated into a society. The 
second layer is ‘formal institutions’ focusing on the institutional environment regarding formal rules, 
bureaucracy etc. The third layer encompasses the governance structure, dealing with the system of 
rules and the actors who enforce, perform, and control the mechanism of rules, power relations, and 
transactions along the institutional structure. The fourth layer concerns how and why resources are 
allocated and optimised at, in this case, state and regional level. The purpose of combining different 
analytic layers is first, an attempt to study either structure or agency to control some of the obstacles 
in social science important for institutional development and economic performance. Secondly, it is an 
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attempt to ascribe causality from the first until the fourth layer of constraints to make clear sense of 
who are engaged in transactions either the executives or legislative (political institutions) that have an 
impact on other institutions (policies and their implementation) and how these institutions influence 
the way stakeholders use these policies. Third, it is an effort to ‘catch the logic’, commitments among 
and dynamic behaviour of the policy actors interrelating inside particular institutional situations, and 
thus being able to assess the future trends of SEZ policy to be credible and enforceable. Due to their 
nature as forms of coordination involving costs, the general challenge is dynamically interacting, both 
between and within, the four layers of analysis. 
Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework 
 
The institutional dynamics of the SEZ regime are explored in relation to political and economic 
contexts. The NIE approach as depicted in the literature applied to judge policymakers’ potential 
efficacy in the long-run by exposing the reasons why each successive regime has so far rendered the 
pre-existing SEZ policy dysfunctional. The NIE approach is reflected by the sectoral focus of Indonesia 
and the two different zones as empirical case studies (Jakarta EPZ and Batam FTZ). 
The study highlights SEZ policy as a fundamentally political issue as it regularly changed by the 
Indonesian incumbent regime not in terms of sustaining and developing the already established type 
of SEZ such as EPZ and FTZ (by raising the standards of industrial production)34, but rather in insisting 
on keeping the import tariffs down for specific commodities. The motive is to attract investors and 
compete with other FDI-oriented countries (race to the bottom strategy). Needless to say, these 
                                                          
34As will be discussed in the case studies presented in Chapter 5 and 6 
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uncertainties create high transaction costs. Generally, this prompted some economic agents to engage 
in rent-seeking activities with political institutions that manifest in various forms, i.e. corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (KKN in Indonesia) of the public officials entrusted with the responsibilities of 
policy approval to capture those valued returns or profits, and usually entails short-run economic 
growth instead of aiming at long-run economic outcomes. Rent-seeking activities in Indonesia emerged 
in the form of licensing through lobbying for politicians or government officials (Basri 1997). In 
addition, economic rents activity can also bring the implications of overinvestment in physical capital 
to justify licenses granted by government officials. For instance, the Masterplan for Acceleration and 
Expansion of Economic Development (abbreviated MP3EI) for the economic corridor has been known 
as the SBY government’s ambitious project to accelerate growth. However, its long-term objectives 
were hampered by KKN practices. It raises the fear that Indonesia will enter an ‘economic 
backwardness’, a model constructed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). They assert: 
“Government policies and institutions shape economic incentives, and via this channel, 
have a first-order impact on economic development. Why, then, do many societies adopt 
policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic 
backwardness? Perhaps, politically powerful groups (elites) are not in favour of economic 
growth. But why? It would appear that economic growth would provide more resources 
for these groups to take over or tax, increasing their economic returns. So, why don’t 
powerful groups always support economic development?” (Ibid: 115).  
The cases here mostly circled around the study of political rules (styles) and the mechanisms of strong 
captivating ideologies such as neoliberalism and nationalism. Thus, they serve as important ways to 
analyse the influence of institutional constraints on actors behaviour in SEZ policymaking; firstly, the 
government’s politics of economic reform policy, especially, how politics unfolds in SEZ policymaking 
circles, political connection between the successive regimes and internal pressures, and the wider 
political and external pressures; and secondly, the interaction of the regimes and the pressures 
towards their patterns of leadership, and the role and structure of external institutions which formed 
the process.  
To simplify the interrelation of each layer, the study divides Williamson’s framework into two thematic 
series with blue dashed horizontal line: first thematic series, informal institutions and formal 
institutions and second thematic series, the governance structure and resource allocation. The study 
then relates these layers with the interactions of the key policy actors in the policymaking process.  
Firstly, the study explores how informal institutions i.e. with entrenched cultural values and ideologies, 
coexist with formal institutions. The study reiterates first how RDO’s neoliberal choices reached the 
consensus in their respective ideologies to pursue a resource-based growth model such as an SEZ in 
chapter 4. The study then discusses how the polity gets the formal ‘rules of the game’ right in Jakarta 
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SEZ project in which the administration had to face challenges from political lobbies in Jakarta. The 
core argument put forward in chapter 5 has been that SEZ policymaking is potentially affected by the 
bureaucratic legacy of previous authoritarian rulers. This framework shows the inclusive informal 
institutions that were strongly influenced by the prevailing norms of behaviour, ideologies, and values 
of the new order (NO) under political economic complexity still coexist in the SEZ policymaking 
dynamics. Moreover, strong captivating ideologies such as neoliberalism and nationalism embedded 
in society since the old order continue to form the landscape of the state’s political economy in the 
recent open political system (path-dependence). There are actors from the NO who create a political 
culture that embodies institutions and generate the set of payoff structures or incentives to which 
policymakers respond. Under the unexpected transition from authoritarian to democratic, Indonesia 
saw that the same principal actors and parties or at least have the same characters as in the NO have 
been influenced or may influence the successive government. It implies that unless there is an effect 
on incentive, where the key policy actors control the changing process so the rules favour their 
interests, the SEZ system will by and large be resistant to change. The framework provides the nature 
of formal rules that tend to provide weak incentives for policymakers to design SEZ policies and reveals 
that more informal processes govern SEZ policymaking and shape the incentives that policymakers 
might have in requesting SEZ policy change. 
Secondly, regarding governance structure and resource allocation in chapter 6, the institutional change 
process focuses primarily on the role of the government; therefore, the efficient production and 
property rights allocation are emphasised with the augmentation of the government’s potential utility 
as the main driving force (Hanisch and Schlüter 1999a. 1999b). This framework depicts the SEZ 
initiatives in Batam that raises the awareness that it contains political agenda due to its intent, 
meaning, and execution process. The framework founds the significance of policy negotiation in 
supporting any endeavour at SEZ policy reform. The governance structure analysis has shown 
significant issues in the ‘play of the game’, including disparities in the dispersal of authorities and 
serious enforcement problems. The central and local authorities’ ability for collective action is one 
precondition to effective administration in Batam FTZ development. The policymaking in Batam’s 
development trajectory also exhibits the entrenched new order’s major political feature of 
patrimonialism, rent-seeking, and cultural norms. The resource allocation analysis has pointed out that 
principal-agent problems are related to the participation of internal members of the state as well as 
the performance of central government leaders and local officials in policy design. Though embracing 
government interventions as a dominant alternative to market failure, the framework shows that this 
theoretical judgement is inconclusive with the experience of Indonesia when the state (principal) was 
not able to control the opportunistic behaviour of the actors (agents) generating higher transaction 
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cost. Thus, rather than placing an immediate ex-post enforcement mechanism on the actual outcomes 
of transaction costs to settle conflicts occurred in the policy process, the government’s ex-ante action 
is needed to reduce the risks of bounded rationality of actors (Williamson 1985). In the RDO as Mayers 
(2005) asserts, these actors can exert emotional or behavioural impact by the success of the 
organisational goals such as in BIDA. They distribute economic resources fairly and equitably but only 
by the will of the successive government through ameliorating failures and bottlenecks that exist in 
the markets and among self-interest individuals in order to achieve expected economic growth.  
Thirdly, based on theoretical guidance, this framework reveals that the SEZ policymaking process and 
the political economy during the RDO regime are characterised by what might best be described as 
elite politics which produces conflicts causing higher uncertainties and transaction costs. It draws the 
individual threads together, explains how institutions in chapter 5 and 6 belong together and contrast 
each other.  
The main proposition as mentioned in chapter 1 gleaned from the figure can be explained as follows 
which helps the author frame the hypotheses: 
First, in SEZ policymaking, informal rules that constitute culture, norms of behaviour, nationalism and 
neoliberalism ideologies, patrimonial, rent-seeking, and traditional values of both productive and non-
productive nature, are not yet compatible in favour of formal rules. The study tries to analyse 
Indonesia’s cultural characteristics based on extant literature, i.e. culture of patrimonialism, patron-
client, small kings, and rent-seeking that lead to corruption in the forms of tribute or illegal 
reward/incentive (i.e. bribery) as an embedded culture from the previous order as the behavioural 
mindset of current bureaucratic actors.  
Countries in East and Southeast Asia have shown evidence of institutional and cultural importance in 
achieving progress and economic growth (Beeson 2004; UNDP 2004; Mubyarto 2005; Casson 2006; 
Streeten 2006). Theoretical (Casson 1993) and empirical studies (Gray 1996) suggest cultural 
characteristics generated from Hofstede’s cultural indicators (in forty countries) inherent in a society, 
in a region or country that have a deep influence on the performance of the economy by incorporating 
policy variables as an intervening variable. The relationship between culture and policy, namely the 
degree of cultural and legal constraints exist to inhibit the government to establish specific policies. 
From the research, it was found that a similar conclusion with previous research, namely that the 
Confucian Dynamism variables in East Asian countries have an important effect on growth. 
Indonesia is a perfect example of a multicultural country with diverse ethnicity and religion. Pre-
existing cultural factors can either support or constrain the applicable formal institutions, and the ways 
policy and politics can transform culture (Spranz et al. 2012: 460-1). Therefore, it is important to 
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understand culture as a significant factor in economic outcomes. The success of an economy also 
comes from the interplay between formal and informal institutions and the adoption of economic 
policies that can avoid institutional traps and loss of popular support (Ibid: 461). 
For example, informal practices put more emphasis on culture in the centralisation of power at the 
local village level as an effect of the decentralisation system. Besides nationalism, they are associated 
with the colonial legacy (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008) and local traditions (embedded in 
society), such as the KKSS case in chapter 5 (the South Sulawesi kinship communion which was built 
during the Dutch colonialism). KKSS practice has vague social accountability as there was evidence of 
political allegiance in KBN management and KKSS. These cultures were the basic rules by an interest 
group to mitigate the main problems they encountered to maintain the groups’ social viability in their 
internal and external environment (DiMaggio 1994: 596). The author further will examine whether 
transactional culture is still prominent in the policy process.  
Second, in the new order, property rights were not optimal in the bureaucratic level of SEZ 
policymaking process, therefore this study attempts to discover what and how property rights have 
influence policymaking from the transitional period of a centralist paradigm shift towards 
decentralisation. The instances of this level are the separately elected and de facto independent 
executive (the polity), legislative, judicial and hierarchical system or the methods of selecting the 
government (authoritarian or democracy), the establishment of bureaucratic functions made by the 
legislature to enforce the political system (Williamson 2000: 598). The executive’s power to impose 
formal rules on political, economic, and legal mechanisms including foreign investment facilitates 
institutional environment reforms (Joskow 2004: 10) — in this regard, SEZ and investment policy 
designs and practices. Although not in a deterministic manner, many cases of formal institutions are 
the evaluation result of informal institutions35. They stress the importance of ‘economics of property 
rights theories’ where the state as the rule of the game is often the level of analysis. Transaction costs 
and incentives in enforcing the formal rules are their focus.  
Due to the features of this level being partly the product of evolutionary processes, the purpose is to 
understand how the polity gets the formal ‘rules of the game’ right (Ibid). For example, relevant to the 
present study is the question of how the voting is arranged at the executive, legislative and judiciary 
level for SEZ and investment legislation and budget allocation procedures (Datta et al. 2011). Why and 
how the system of rules in the SEZ policymaking process has not yet given optimal function and why 
they lack clarity of functions. Since relationships between executive, legislative and judiciary 
                                                          
35Important perceptions on the effect of formal institutions to economic behaviour are seen in De Alessi (1980) 
and Eggertsson (1990). 
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government in developing states are not well-defined compared to developed states, the relative 
performance of their relationships, such as in Indonesia, would seem in a state of considerable flux. 
Third, this framework tries to validate that bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviours render 
contractual relationships to be unclear in SEZ policymaking process, resulting in increased transaction 
cost economics. It also tries to investigate the continuous and discontinuous SEZ bureaucratic policies 
that have shifted the pattern of abuse of power by a handful of people in public institutions. Not only 
does loyalty or political allegiance influence voicing dissatisfaction, but competition among institutions 
to some extent has a similar effect. In this level, a competition is not only in terms of competing for 
office and power among politicians and parties36 but also in choosing the right policy. Legal and 
regulatory frameworks and organisational structure are assessed in the process of competition 
whether in need of institutional change through overall reform (e.g. decentralisation laws as analysed 
in chapter 4) or in need of abandonment (exit from the competition). The patron-client relationship is 
related to this scheme. This kind of atmosphere entails that societal factors i.e. reciprocity in a quid 
pro quo bargaining process, affect transactions. Economic theory and transactions commonly avoid 
the effects of interaction by the values they hold. Some organisations may reject certain modes of 
transaction. But, reciprocity may change the nature of the transactions (Williamson 1975: 20-30). 
Other significant examples refer to the role of the state on contracts with investors, fiscal incentives 
and other provision arrangements and with bilateral-regional relations (SIJORI Singapore Johor Baru, 
Riau Islands regional agreement in Batam FTZ) or international organisations (WTO, WCO/World 
Customs Organisation, and ASEAN) on trade-related aspects with other countries. 
Fourth, this framework endeavours to uncover the complexity of problems (i.e. principal-agent 
problem’, ‘moral hazard problem’, and the ‘adverse selection problem’) in the SEZ policymaking 
process in terms of unclear authority (institutional environment) and unclear governance structure 
(institutional arrangement), unclear authority contract relation or lack of clarity of the principal-agent 
relationships which lead to uncertain structural incentives. Meanwhile, there is a slight difference in 
defining adverse selection problems with the moral hazard concept (Azfar 2006). Moral hazard lays 
emphasis on the unobservable agent’s action (‘hidden action’) whereas adverse selection refers to the 
circumstances where the value of the good or service being transacted cannot be observed by one 
party (‘hidden value’). “The classic example is the market for “lemons” (used cars) where the market 
may remain suboptimal because buyers do not trust sellers” (Ibid: 978). Chapter 5 and 6 illuminate both 
hidden action and hidden value problems. It is how in chapter 5 Jakarta governor cannot foresee the 
action behind Jakarta’s city council employees’ intention to oppose his pro-change policy nor in 
                                                          




chapter 6 the president unable to anticipate the chairman of BIDA’s involvement on a land dispute. 
Meanwhile, the hidden value of Jakarta Bay and land in Batam Island to be developed as an SEZ 
megaproject remains a controversy due to the agendas of both zone developer and management not 
being transparent. 
From the above discussion by tracing institutional evolution to guide causal link, it can be said that the 
NIE concepts in chapter 2 and Williamson’s model can be used to understand: (1) the complexity of 
sustainable management of SEZ policymaking process and at the same time the legal basis for issues 
that occur in the SEZ policymaking process in Indonesia, (2) the systematisation of rules which concerns 
issues of authority, organisation, administration, human resources, finance, hierarchical relations, 
supervision, planning and administration procedures. These understandings further trigger the intra-
elite rivalry, inter-factional tension, and interjurisdictional competition to occur. They will be analysed 
whether they create high transaction costs and serve as the root cause of the SEZ policy problem. 
3.2. Methodology 
1. Qualitative approach—The rationale 
The study adopts a largely qualitative research approach (Bogdan and Biklen 1998), characterised by a 
single country study, incorporating a case study design with multiple analysis strategies employing an 
interpretive method, analytic narrative methods, and content analysis. This study provides an in-depth 
understanding of socio-political phenomena (Yin 2014: 130) where policy debates and controversies 
by different regime periods lead to intra-elite rivalry, interjurisdictional competition, and inter-factional 
tension, and thus, higher uncertainty, higher transaction costs, and stagnant growth. The empirical 
case studies presented here show traces of process for policy interventions and well-suited to highlight 
the role that institutions play in determining behaviour. They put more stress on revealing the 
interactions and relations between Indonesia’s political institutions, the economic elites, and their 
vested interests. 
According to Creswell, case studies are qualitative research methods in which researchers explore and 
study a case or several cases that are bounded within a specific time span in detail, utilizing multiple 
sources of information and data collection method, such as observations, interviews, using sound 
recording and audio-visual materials, as well as research reports, and producing research reports 
based on selected topics (Creswell 2007: 73). 
According to Yin (1996), case studies are the most appropriate strategy to use if the form of the 
research question is ‘why’ (descriptive) and ‘how’ (explanation). Given the control of the SEZ 
development and its relation to the policymaking process (in Indonesia especially Jakarta and Batam), 
containing the structural (political economy) and institutional (historical) dimensions simultaneously, 
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so that both dimensions are revealed. The choice of case study strategy to be performed should 
incorporate both approaches political economy and institutional (history). According to Kartodirdjo 
(1992), the first approach would explain ‘why something happened’ (the social context of events), 
while the second describes ‘how the process occurs’ (sequence of events). 
Three types of the case study are known as follows: single-case study, collective or multiple case 
studies, and intrinsic case study. In the first type focuses on one case and then selects one other aspect 
as the issue. The second type focuses on one case but then takes some bounded cases to illustrate the 
issue of the research. There are times when variations are emphasized by the author in areas or topics 
in the same issue. Sometimes the author deliberately selects multiple cases in a single topic to show 
the varied perspective of the topic (Yin 2003). The third type focuses on the case study itself. This type 
is usually associated with the uniqueness of a case that is worth investigating. This study falls within 
the second type.  
There is an obvious weakness of a single country study compared with a large-N based country-study 
in the extent to which a robust theory can be derived from the generalised results (Das 2013: 335). 
However, understanding the deeper questions embedded in the unique intangible cultural as well as 
ideological context in one country set in a wider theoretical works remains suitable for one researcher 
as compared to a team of researchers (Ibid: 335).  
Additionally to the theoretical framework used in this study, in Ménard and Shirley’s (2011: 42) view:  
“NIE made substantial improvement using focused case studies and all the studies 
collected in Analytic Narratives (Bates et al. 1998). Despite the poor opinion that most 
mainstream economists have of case-studies, they have proven to be a valuable tool for 
understanding the rich details inherent in institutional analysis, especially when they are 
informed by theory and conducted with rigour”.  
Using the interpretive paradigm, I seek to uncover the phenomenon and explore the experience of the 
object of study. The interpretive approach departs from attempts to find an explanation of social or 
cultural events based on the perspective and experience of the person being studied. The interpretive 
approach is adopted from a practical orientation. In general, an interpretive approach is a social system 
that interprets actors’ behaviour directly observe in detail (Neuman 2009). Interpretive method views 
facts as an essential context and meaning inherent in the system of meaning, unique, and liquid to 
understand the social meaning. The facts are specific and contextual actions, neutral, not unbiased, 
and objective. It depends on people’s understanding in a social condition that encompasses 
ambiguities. Actors’ statements and behaviour may contain various interpretations and be interpreted 
in many ways (Neuman 2009). The basic idea is to understand the social situation of actors’ interaction 
with other stakeholders and their behaviour to make a decision. How political links between the central 
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and local government, the central, regional, and local parliaments, and other entities such as state-
owned enterprises or civil society organizations embark upon formulating a policy from the initial 
process of negotiation and formation, the journey of escorting the policy proposal, to delivering the 
policy when it is in force. The author had assumed that there is a different pattern of political links 
between one policy product to another in different time and space. To understand the initial variations 
of SEZ formation, the policy process journey until the policy is successfully issued, it needs a 
comparison of political links in the policy process. Moreover, since the focus of this research is the 
institutional constraints, it relates the impact of institutions on actors’ behaviour in policy decision. 
To add depth in the analysis such as comprehensiveness, generality, and breadth and to answer the 
why and how questions, the author uses the interpretive method to explain the causal mechanism 
accountable for the institutions to have an influence on SEZ policymaking in Indonesia. Causal 
mechanism connects causes and effects and is considered as one way to explain the phenomenon in 
the study of politics. When compared with other research methods, this case study method has the 
strength in the causal mechanism as it emphasizes on specific cases intensively so that the background 
and causes of the observed phenomenon can be known (Gerring 2004: 341). 
The case study is a thorough study of a unit that aims at generalizing larger units. Thus, case study 
methods are correctly understood as specific ways of determining cases, not just how to analyse cases 
or how to model causal relationships (Ibid). Given this method using case studies to examine a 
phenomenon, the resulting explanation must be more comprehensive (Gerring 2004: 346). Case 
studies can also be understood as a comprehensive data collection method, meaning that the data 
collected involves the whole chronology not to mention individual aspects. Examples can be seen in 
the scope of the politics which basically focuses more on historical evidence, including the actions and 
roles of the actors involved in the event or time period. The values and norms of those events can be 
used to predict the actions and perceptions of other actors over other time periods (Bennett and Elman 
2007: 171-2). 
To comprehend the connection between different layers of institutional constraints and policymaking 
process as well as uncover causality in social science, the author used analytic narratives as the 
empirical method. It is viewed to be the most powerful tools which refer to combining well-ordered 
theoretical assumptions (analytic) and dense historical picture (narrative). The author combined 
reviews of literature, documents, and archival materials with semi-structured and in-depth interviews 
with political and business actors, scholars, and independent entities. The author attempted to 
discover the “actor’s preferences and perceptions, the information they possess and their evaluation 
of alternatives, their expectations and strategies they adopt as well as the constraints that limit their 
action” (Bates et al. 1998).   
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In support of text-analysis in the analytic narratives approach, this study employs content analysis 
which adds knowledge through a thorough analysis of the content in media articles to gain more 
plausible information. Content analysis is usually used in qualitative research generally defined as a 
method that encompasses all analysis of the content text which refers to the conversation, writing, or 
drawing and used to define a specific logical method (Lasswell 1927). The content analysis is a 
technique to make meaningful and analytical conclusions by recognising the particular features of a 
message objectively, systematically, and generally (Holsti 1969). Objective means based on applicable 
procedures that produce similar conclusions if carried out by another researcher. Systematic means 
the content or category used is based on the consistently applied rules, including the selection process 
and coding of unbiased data. Generally means the discovery must include a theoretical reference. 
Information gained can be referred to other document attributes and has significant theoretical 
relevance. The author performs a ‘reading’ to discover the meaning embedded in the text. The author 
brings the subjective experience into the text. As it deepens the text, the author seeks to seep into the 
point of view that the text represents a whole context, and further develops a deep understanding of 
how parts of the text relate to the overall analysis. In other words, the true meaning is not easy or not 
noticeable; if you want to ‘capture’ the meaning, one has to do a detailed study of the text, ponder 
the various messages it carries, and look for relationships between the parts of the text. 
In content analysis, what is dissected is the message which highlights language and neutrality. 
However, the weakness of a content analysis is the subjectivity of the author. The content analysis 
method is very time and cost-efficient (Ibid) and the author can use a reliable source of mass media 
that has been assessed as representative and can convey the contents comprehensively without the 
need of respondent’s response which makes it a good methodological option. Coding sheets are used 
as a guide to the content analysis. There are a variety of data sources to be used in this method 
provided it has written text, but the main source is the mass media (Ibid). Within social science studies, 
content analysis is also used to examine the contents of the judicial opinions, statutory authority, or a 
specific policy (Bain 1983); how the statute/law or policy tends to take sides whether to be more pro-
government or pro-community, etc. 
2. Data Collection 
 Schedule and Research Stages  
Pre-research has been conducted since 2008 when the author came to Batam as a part of a team to 
observe and gather evidence on the inefficiency of customs procedures in the FTZ area. The official 
visit was intended to get an actual and comprehensive picture, as well as collect some up to date data 
related to the team survey plan. Using these pre-research data, a number of issues were addressed, 
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as well as the social and cultural profile and resources of the SEZ policy issue strongly support the 
preparation of research proposals, to the implementation of advanced research. There has been 
growing concern that Indonesia’s SEZ stagnant development was due to the unclear institutional 
frameworks.  
Based on the first visit, there were ongoing conflicts regarding the status of Batam Island. The conflict 
was mainly between the DPR (used interchangeably with parliament/legislative/House of 
Representative) and the President (central government) which then intrigued the author to embark on 
a planned research on the politics of general SEZ policy in the future. The opportunity to investigate 
these political dynamics as part of the issues of SEZ policymaking was opened when the author pursued 
the PhD degree to validate the conflict in Batam as one of the preliminary findings.  
Following the approval of the PhD proposal, the author succeeded in obtaining a systematic and ‘ideal’ 
draft guide form, which is considered to be operational throughout the field. A more intensive follow-
up study began in February 2013.  
The first stage involves an extensive review of the literature as secondary materials from various 
related institutions and literature studies both from the results of previous research, historical 
documents, and other writings relevant to the study. The literature reviewed include NIE theories and 
methodologies and its application to the political economy, SEZ evolution and development, 
investment policy development, economic reform and political transformation research, policy 
formulation processes, both country and policy specific field. 
The literature review was carried out after a systematic understanding of all the academic literature 
was available on the SEZ policymaking subject and the gathering of empirical evidence applies the 
political function of government based on the theoretical framework. The literature review was 
conducted after being accepted at the PhD programme but the topic and location of the study were 
the interest of the author since 2008 when having a series of observations on the FTZs in Batam. 
Specifically, the review was undertaken amongst the following aspects: (1) aspects of the regulatory 
framework, in which the study looked at the coherence of the regulatory framework related to SEZ 
development within the context of national regulatory and development planning regimes and in the 
regional autonomy (decentralisation) perspective (2) institutional aspects related to cooperation and 
the role played by the institutions involved in SEZ development and management, both government 
and private sector, (3) aspects of development in SEZ, including funding and infrastructure 
development and lessons learned from the historical experience of SEZ development from other 
countries as well as from within Indonesia, and (4) aspects of SEZ implementation, related to policies 
on fiscal and non-fiscal incentives offered to business actors in the region. 
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The datasets were generated, adopted, and compiled from business and company websites and online 
international agencies’ databases provided by the World Development Report-World Bank, IMF, OECD, 
ILO, UN-Comtrade database (UNCTAD), and Economist Intelligence Unit, as there is no better dataset 
with a unified methodology on economic performance in relation to SEZ and investment indicators and 
institutions available. The data covers the defined period under consideration according to its 
availability. Other vital documents and analysis were derived from local, national and international 
newspapers, archives, social media, and the national agencies database, i.e. Indonesia Statistics 
Agency (BPS); Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM); the Indonesian Central Bank (Bank 
Indonesia/BI); Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA); Ministry of Finance (MOF); Ministry 
of Trade (MOT); Ministry of Industry; Ministry of Public Works; Ministry of Transportation; National 
Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS); PT KBN database; and BIFZA (previously known as BIDA). 
At the second stage, primary materials (government and policy documents) as a substantial part of the 
research were obtained from local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reports, 
relevant institutions and non-profit organisations such as independent research institutes dedicated 
to analysing policy impact or think-tanks with different areas of expertise, which are difficult to find in 
the UK [i.e. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ)37, 
SMERU Research Institute38; Indonesia Rapid Development Appraisal (IRDA), and Centre for Reform on 
Economics (CORE)39]. The author obtained supporting documents from state unions and research 
institutes under the University of Indonesia, Brawijaya University, and University of Gajah Mada as well 
as international academic institutions in the UK and elsewhere who research specifically the 
Indonesian political economy (Japan-based Research Institute for Economics Trade and Industry/RIETI; 
Singapore-based ISEAS; Australia-based ANU; and US-based Cornell University). The author also 
accessed minutes of meetings, handbooks, speeches, memos and statutes from MPR (People’s 
Consultative Assembly) and DPR (House of Parliament) assemblies, conferences in Jakarta and Bali, 
and consultative meetings conducted by the SEZ National Council in Jakarta. They are a programmatic 
and qualitative feature and allow a more detailed institutional policy analysis of underlying concepts 
and activities. The author analysed official and legal documents from laws, government regulations, 
presidential decrees etc. that reflect more recent resource-based SEZ form and policy.  
                                                          
37Mainly addresses the global trade liberalisation issues with areas such as: World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA), and trade and investment policies. 
38The main task is to monitor the impact of 2008/09 global financial crisis in Indonesia—i.e. impact on 
manufacturing industry until August 2009 (November 2009).  
39Its main contribution is in conducting research in public and economic policies especially for the economic 
commission in the parliament.  
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The third stage of primary data collection involves direct interaction conducted with observation 
technique which refers to the observation back in 2008 and fieldwork in two phases in 2014-2015. 
During fieldwork, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), informal discussion with several parties related to the 
implementation of SEZ in Indonesia, semi-structured and in-depth interviews as well as data gained 
from free interviews with politicians, officials, and other informants who were met unintentionally or 
by chance, such as in between meetings and plenary sessions, and study visits to several SEZs around 
Jakarta were carried out (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Darlington and Scott 2002; Creswell 2003).  
The fieldwork in Jakarta was divided into two phases. The first phase was carried out in summer from 
July to August 2014 and the second phase from October 2014 to January 2015. I maintain a wide 
professional network as well as a number of potential hosts.  
 The fieldwork 
In the first phase facilitated by colleagues and the budget team from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
the author deliberately mapped informants through non-random (purposive and snowballing) 
techniques. The author visited the parliament building and a number of offices for preliminary 
observations, such as customs headquarters and branch offices in East and North Jakarta, Indonesian 
SEZ National Council (SESDENAS) head office and BKPM office. My professional ties at the MOF assisted 
me in the purposive sampling where a selection of potential informants in both case study areas was 
based on my professional judgment; for example, the competence they possess to represent the 
visions, policies, objectives and action plans of their organisation or institution. In addition, the 
snowballing technique was employed so that key gatekeepers from the CMEA, MOF, and BKPM who 
had actively promoted the new large-scale term of resource-based SEZ can help me identify the key 
informants at various government levels. Thus, the various aspects attempted to uncover this research 
require not only persistence and willingness in ‘enjoying the rigours of academic adventure’ while in 
the field which is very challenging and seemingly irregular, but also the academic sensitivity to observe 
the various behaviour of actors and a pile of documents and literature to be read. 
Hoping to find a subjective reality, during my second visit to Indonesia at early October 2014 until late 
January 2015, the author visited not only government offices for the second time but other sites: the 
parliament building, think-tank offices, Industrial Estate Association (HKI) office, and the University of 
Indonesia Institute of Management. On several occasions the author have also visited five SEZ sites 
(scattered industrial clusters) while conducting interviews located around Jakarta such as at the 
eastern part of Jakarta in Pulo Gadung, as well as areas on the northern coast of Jakarta near Tanjung 
Priok Port (such as Cakung and Marunda), SEZs in the surrounding districts of Cikarang in Bekasi and 
Tangerang to deepen data analysis and accuracy. Often the author had to take a ride with the 
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respondents’ vehicle or official vehicle from their respected offices to reach their office or EPZ 
locations, due to public transport did not serve the route or traffic was so jammed. As a result, more 
than expected, the field visit for almost four months, not only managed to bring the author together 
with some new key informants who have information more than they could give, even save some 
historical data related to the SEZ policy formulation process (which later gave its own colour for the 
diversity of data in the dissertation). It also provides an opportunity for the author to access some 
time-series data related Jakarta and Batam SEZ activities (along with their production values).  
Having built strong SEZ networking during the author’s professional career and prior communication 
with the author’s gatekeepers, the author conducted a mixture of focus group discussions (FGDs), face-
to-face semi-structured, in-depth, and indirect interviews (through emails and short messages), 
conversations, and discussion with 83 interviewees (Appendix 1) in parallel with the aforementioned 
archive work (review of literature): they are Indonesian active-duty planners, policymakers, politicians, 
councillors, former and retired officials dealing with or involved in any of the SEZ-type policy 
developments in Indonesia, journalists, researchers, think-tank executive directors and officials, and 
members of the aggregates sector in Jakarta EPZ and Batam FTZ. When the main informants could not 
be reached, to ensure quality and reliability, other informants with knowledge i.e. lower 
echelons/ranking officials or staff, were interviewed. The author discussed with a number of key 
informants who have extensive experience and knowledge on SEZ policy dynamics and the history of 
the SEZ in Indonesia, as well as visiting some sectoral institutions at the district and provincial levels 
concerned with the proposed study.  
Even though the interview questions were highly situational and adjusted slightly depending on the 
circumstance and response of the interviewee, the general scope of inquiry was focused on a number 
of areas based on the preliminary propositions and SEZ evolution. They were oriented towards 
answering questions on why and to what extent institutional change (SEZ policies embraced) and 
resistance to change (SEZ policies rejected) occurred by particular individuals and/or groups including 
the dynamics and tensions between all key policy actors and stakeholders. Interviewee responses 
complemented and enriched the secondary materials. The author used the prepared list of guided 
questions which particularly link the questions with their response to the key actors’ behaviour and 
policy preferences. The author links their responses to the theoretical framework and concepts built 
from NIE literature and uses Williamson’s institutional constraints model as a guide on how institutions 
have influenced their decisions. 
For nearly five months of field visits, the author managed to get a more up to date data on various 
problems related to the SEZ policy process and its institutional intricacies, to the collation of secondary 
data from various agencies and individuals who can support the research activities. The author also 
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collected various research details from field notes and interviews as well as media citations, which 
were very important in making data interpretation to deepening analysis, adding to the historical 
background of the emergence and continuity of the SEZ policymaking dynamics with quite deep and 
accurate analysis. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the dynamics of the field often ‘force’ the 
author not to use a drafted question guideline which was academically considered ‘ideal’, since it 
seems formal, ‘less flowing’ and does not make the respondent comfortable. Often, researchers also 
get communication barriers in conducting interviews, because not all respondents able to address the 
specific issue in a clear straight to the point way as most of the respondents come from Java who 
culturally has slower character than any other ethnics in the country. However, the author felt 
fortunate to have been born and being raised in a Javanese traditional family so as to ‘get a bit’ to 
grasp the meaning of body language and some simple phrases they say in the Javanese language so as 
to gain adequate understanding in a non-formal situation. Although it must be admitted, often the 
revealed meaning becomes biased because it loses its context.  
Guided by the circumstances in the field, researchers also began to understand, why at the time asking 
for interview becomes impossible due to lack of time, place, or opportunity. Not enough just to 
understand, the author was required to be adaptive and not easily let down, rushed to set an interview 
strategy or discussion with key informants directly in unusual places. The result is sometimes 
unexpected, can get rejected or received well and obtain greater opportunity to ‘catch the reality’. 
Such unexpected empirical realities often provide different aspects for micro-research like this.  
The data collection process continued during analysis and writing, and in particular regarding updating 
most relevant data from secondary sources through accessing media coverage of new legislation 
pertaining to the case studies until 2016. 
3. Data Processing 
Recording and transcribing an entire interview is important, as it provides a substantial text for detailed 
analysis. The interview records and notes were transcribed and translated into textual and digital data. 
Transcribing and translating interviews were managed in conjunction with other research methods. 
Not only it was costly, but also due to the nature of the topic being complex and sensitive, the author 
did not hire a transcriber or translator. After each interview, the author recorded all significant insights, 
read over the transcripts and wrote a summary of themes after three or four interviews to summarize 
the reflections (Bogdan and Biklin 1998).   
 Interpretive Phase 
After transcribing is completed the major step in analysing qualitative data was by performing 
classification, where the data speech obtained was then selected and coded according to the 
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phenomenon under study into meaningful categories. The author examined and generated the 
important data and information obtained through categories before generating keywords. This 
enabled the author to organise the “large numbers of textual speech and determine patterns that 
would be hard to perceive by just listening to an audio recording or reading a transcript” (Bogdan and 
Biklen 1998). This category was made as my starting point before going further into investigating the 
sensitive nature of other institutional constraints under different settings. 
During the coding process, the author carried out the editing process which is the process of examining 
the data and information obtained so errors and biases in research can be avoided, thus the validity of 
the data can be obtained. The author arranged all interview transcripts in chronological order based 
on date, respondents’ related affiliation and areas of concern. During undisturbed periods, the author 
read over all the data carefully. The author generated initial coding based on identified categories as 
the author read responses without worrying about different categories. The coding process works with 
regard to one of the study’s themes from the perspectives of the informant towards the SEZ policy 
formulation process. This technique guided the author to understand the problem underlying the 
mechanism of designing a policy and the final decision made by each regime government. The author 
labelled the related data and used “focused coding to eliminate, combine, or subdivide coding 
categories and look for repeating ideas and larger themes that connect codes. Repeating ideas are the 
same idea expressed by different respondents, while a theme is a larger topic that organizes or connects 
a group of repeating ideas” (Bogdan and Biklin 1998). The author creates final codes to between 30 
and 50 as suggested by Berkowitz (1997). After developing the coding category, the author creates a 
coding table based on the abbreviations and descriptions of each code. After the coding process, the 
author generated visual devices to guide the study such as diagrams, flowcharts, concept maps or 
matrices to illustrate themes or relationships (Berkowitz 1997). This step supported the analysis 
conjunctively with other secondary data collected by other means from literature and official 
documents, to support the confirmation of themes and stimulate the critical thinking on consideration 
of new relationships or explanations. To answer the research questions: 
1. What are the institutional intricacies surrounding the process of SEZ policymaking? 
2. How and why do institutions influence the behaviour of actors in SEZ policy decision? 
3. Which institutions affect the SEZ policy decision and why? 
The categories used in this study are: (1) the role of political institutions and economic agents in 
policymaking; (2) recovery from the AFC; (3) global trade competition; (4) the international investment 
campaign; (5) power relations in the SEZ institutional structure; (6) issues arising from the 
implementation of regional autonomy; (7) lobbying for economic reform; (8) lack of government 
incentives; (9) lobbying for the project sanctioned (approved project) and payoff or fiscal incentive 
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structures; (10) government policy inconsistency; and (11) the role of stakeholders in influencing 
government policymaking. Based on these identified categories, the author simplified the data by way 
of binding concepts into appropriate keywords of research problems, thus, the validity of the data can 
be obtained: role and function, institutional structure, reform process, the reason for the change, 
effectiveness, the significance of the change, autonomy, and programme implementation. These 
keywords symbolise the political landscape in which economic reforms take place or are being 
gridlocked and determine what obstructions and consequences these processes entail. 
Using Williamson’s (2000) framework as a guide, the author categorised the keywords into four 
themes: first, the entrenched values from the NO characterised by the patrimonial networks in the 
recent open political system; second, the economic reform policymaking process as a consequence of 
the AFC and Soeharto’s demise and the reform post open market system and diffusion of power; third, 
the systems of rules and legal framework and the actors who run the system and enforced the 
mechanism; fourth, policy outcome as a result of the failure of the governance structure. These four 
themes imprint the discussion in the analysis and findings chapters (see chapters 4, 5, and 6 for detail). 
4. Data analysis 
Given this research is done with a subjective approach, it takes the accountability mechanism of data 
validity or credibility to determine whether the research findings can be trusted or not on the issue of 
SEZ policy dynamics in Indonesia. The author attempts to achieve credibility since the author is an 
outsider who is not the same as the respondents40 who mostly were or still are engaged in the 
formulation and procedural context of SEZ policy. Fortunately, the author is quite familiar with the SEZ 
policy issue, which since 2008 has been involved in an observation for a number of professional and 
official duties although not in a research context. These circumstances have at least provided a fairly 
solid ‘access space’ for the author to approach a number of key informants, thus facilitating a more 
credible research. 
Initial analysis of the results of the literature studies, on academic texts that have a significant influence 
on SEZ policy practice with the results of primary data analysis, to become a simple draft, started in 
February 2013 until July 2014. While initial analysis of the results of the observation and 
documentation results are conducted directly during leisure when filling in spare time during summer 
in July-August 2014.  
The author performed the process of qualitative data analysis based on empirical findings and 
categorization of data conducted according to the formulation of research questions. The research 
                                                          
40The respondents only serve as data sources and do not have the authority to actualize all the potential that lies 
behind the phenomenon or reality being studied. 
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findings contain broad statements on the relationship between the numerous categories of data used 
to develop a conceptual understanding of reality thus facilitating various interpretation into 
meaningful explanation in the form of analytical descriptions.  
 Testing the Validity of Data 
The triangulation method was carried out by clarifying the data and information to enable cross-
referencing data derived from various information and sources and different ways of collecting data 
and following-up after fieldwork. The author re-assessed data sources through the same method to 
find links between the research results and the theory used in the research. These allowed the insights 
gained in the analysis to be tested for validity, reliability, completeness, and objectivity through a 
various degree of validity of the data source and data collection techniques. The method was done by 
comparing and/or contrasting observation with interview results, as well as the individual environment 
and perspectives with other peoples’ opinions and views (Cohen and Manion 2000).  
5. Ethical Issues 
The main ethical issues associated with conducting the qualitative elite interviews (Whiting 2008) 
during the fieldwork were informed consent and confidentiality. Therefore, the author played a neutral 
role by building a rapport with the informants. In the case of anonymity, interviewees were not named 
but only identified by their institutional affiliation (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 262). Only data acquired on 
record (during the interview itself) used in the thesis. Due to most informants refusing to be specifically 
mentioned, their informed consent is highly respected. Therefore, based on the author’s own 
professional judgment, their responses are quoted with full identity only when requested, otherwise 
anonymous.  
The author travelled to Indonesia as a researcher and initially avoided acting as a government official 
to avoid information bias. However, the author’s position as a researcher and government official 
forced the author to fully disclose the author’s identity to gain such access and address the author’s 
intention and study purpose to provide comfortability for the respondents as their wellbeing is the top 
priority (Hammick 1996, Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Details on the problems and limitations are 
elaborated in the final part of this chapter. Moreover, key gatekeepers who controlled access and 
made the final decision were willing to vouch for the author and the value of the research. They also 
acted as the author’s sponsors, i.e. deputy directors at CMEA, second line echelons in my agency, MOF 
directorates (of which one was promoted to lead the agency in 2015) and other contacts, i.e. friends 
and colleagues. Awareness of sensitive issues and potential conflicts of interest from elite and 
professional interviews were taken into consideration. In the event that access to Indonesia was not 
possible during the data gathering period, efforts were made via email communication with 
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informants. A greater focus was developed on the informants who have good knowledge and are 
directly engaged in the SEZ policymaking process.  
Even if the author was allowed to approach those people, there were still difficulties in gaining the 
practical information the author wishes to use in the research because of the sensitive nature of the 
topic whereby the author was questioning the policies the government undertook. To make up for the 
limitations of the interview the author used (auto)-biography, extant literature through media articles, 
and their personal information shown in official documents. Networks are important for extending the 
field for data gathering. 
Following Lilleker’s (2003) guidelines for elite interviews, from the first moment of contact, potential 
interviewees receive a succinct letter (via email) explaining the thesis (including details of the author’s 
supervisors and the funding body), why the author wish to interview them, the format of the interview, 
and how the data from the interview were used and stored. 
In the course of interviews except for informal discussion, informed consent was obtained from 
respondents. The informed consent document was prepared in English and Indonesian includes details 
about the research, how the interviews would be conducted and how the data would be used. 
Informants were allowed to withdraw their participation at any time.  
Data recording was undertaken through simultaneous note-taking where possible during the elite 
semi-structured and in-depth interview settings, informal discussions, and during the shorter, one-off 
interviews, where sensitive subjects are unlikely to arise by using interview devices, i.e. a tape-
recorder, camera, and field-notes, in addition to gaining additional documents from the respondents. 
The author asked whether the interviewee allows the author to record the interview (using the 
software on the laptop/netbook).  
Interviewees were allowed to view transcripts upon request and the author asked if they are happy 
for direct quotations to appear in the thesis. With regard to confidentiality, the name and any other 
personal details of the interviewee did not appear on any notes or transcripts (Polit and Beck 2006). 
Without the consent of the respondents, the author will not share the given information (Levine 
(1981).  
All data were coded. Each interviewee and their organisation were assigned an alias, making it difficult 
to identify individuals from the interview data. Therefore, the third parties that might be referred to 
in the interview remained anonymous and their identities and information encrypted (converted to a 
format that is password protected and unreadable to unauthorised users) and kept in a separate, 
secure location.  
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The final part, the author gave the respondent the option of allowing to be contacted if some questions 
need further information. This contact was made through text messages and personal email. Upon 
returning from fieldwork, the data was transferred to a University of Bristol computer. The data on the 
author’s laptop/netbook and encrypted USB stick was overwritten. 
6. Research Sites  
 
The study’s empirical design is informed by theory and secondary sources, but due to the scarcity of 
Indonesian SEZ academic research and published materials, the study relies on the primary sources 
analysis to clarify the findings carried out in the city of Jakarta and the surrounding districts (Figure 
3.2). Apart from funding, research manageability, and logistical limitations of time, Jakarta has been 
selected because of having lived and worked in the city for almost the author’s entire life. In addition, 
it is the location of the earliest and most progressive SEZ projects in Indonesia going back to the 1970s. 
It is also where the entire policymaking scheme of the empirical case studies (Jakarta EPZ and Batam 
FTZ) was decided and where the executive, legislative and judicial levels interact with other relevant 
bureaucratic units and stakeholders. Jakarta contains a significant central-regional-parliamentary 
connection. It is also where most international agencies operating in Indonesia are based (the World 
Bank and UN) as well as a number of Indonesian think-tanks, experts, and scholars.  





Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, resides along the northern side of West Java (in Java Island). It 
spreads over an area of more than 650km2 and has a population of over ten million (Statistics Indonesia 
2014). During the past 20 years it has played a significant role as 1) one of the major business and 
industrial centres in the Asia-Pacific developing region; 2) a centre of distribution for almost all parts 
of the country and has grown into the main gateway to Indonesia as it has been recognised as a trading 
partner for many cities worldwide; 3) a centre of national and multinational companies (MNCs), banks, 
and business services’ head and branch offices; 4) a centre of international connection and trading 
activities in Tanjung Priok Port due to being equipped with supporting infrastructure and facilities and 
accommodating other trading partners in the world market (UNU 1996). It is designated as a special 
territory (DKI), which means that it enjoys the same status as a province and is administered by a 
governor.  
By emphasizing the characteristics of policymaking of the political institutions such as the executive 
and legislative bodies at the central and local level (Jakarta and Batam) assumed to be the driving force 
for the operation of the SEZ policymaking, the author chose Jakarta  as the location is the main key to 
the SEZ operation, which also serves as the node for the SEZ development of the entire economy, as 
well as the liaison between central and local government in the investment related events. This study 
focuses on SEZ policy and its policymaking dynamics. 





Batam, Bintan and Karimun regencies (BBK) are parts of Riau archipelago province of Indonesia 
(hereafter Kepri or Kepulauan Riau or Riau archipelago)41 located south of the South China Sea and 
bordering Riau, Singapore, Malaysia, South Sumatera, Jambi and West Kalimantan provinces with an 
area of 25,181.071ha. In this study, the case analysis mainly focuses on Batam Island as its long 
historical relevance42 provides a fertile ground for FTZ development in Indonesia.  
Batam is a coastal area inhabited by 6,000 people, mostly fishermen, and geographically situated in 
the Malacca Strait—known to be one of the busiest for trade traffic in the world—adjacent to 
Singapore, and relatively in the middle of the Southeast Asia region. It is part of AFTA (ASEAN Free 
Trade Area) and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT). Batam Island has an area 
of 415km2 and is only 20km from Singapore (Figure 3.3) which makes the island an attractive site for 
Singaporean investors and Singapore-based multinational corporations (MNCs) (Colombijn 2003; Heng 
2006). 
7. Problems and Limitations 
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted on politicians (executive and legislative 
levels), business actors (represented by SOE managers and industrial association), academics 
(university and independent think tanks), SEZ management, and economic agents under direct 
president supervision) to provide a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of policymaking especially 
on SEZ and relevant policies from time to time. However, gaining access to undertake social research 
is often problematic. Slight difficulties arise when accessing the interviewees involved in SEZ 
policymaking as the research includes high-ranking officials, former politicians, and professionals. 
Although the author has repeatedly made initial observations over a considerable length of time 
around Batam in 2008, it must be admitted that conducting interviews directly on respondents is not 
an easy task. On various occasions, the author often gets a rejection, though a decent refusal and not 
a rough one, from a number of politicians and economic agents who are the target of the interview. 
According to one of the key informants who was also the guide on the visit, it seems that the person 
who refused subtly suspected the author as a ‘government apparatus’ (aparat pemerintah) who wants 
to extract information about his involvement with some of the policy formulation. While a number of 
other key informants answered a number of questions as necessary and did not necessarily refuse but 
not enthusiastically accept the presence of the author, making it inadequate for the preparation of a 
comprehensive study. These conditions have at least forced the author to undertake a number of 
                                                          
41Riau Archipelago province is a newly created province and the result of the Riau province disintegration 
established by Law No. 25/2002 on 25th October 2002 comprises the cities of Tanjung Pinang and Batam, the 
regencies of Bintan, Karimun, Natuna, Anambas Islands, and Lingga. 
42See Smith (1996) for further details. 
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unplanned approaches (i.e. informal networks) and adapt to situations and conditions on the field, 
often even willingly “waiting” to gain the right momentum.  
Gaining access to the parliament building was not easy but not too difficult as the author has a close 
connection with the budget planning team of the Ministry of Finance (trade sector) who attends a 
budget meeting at the parliament on a weekly basis. The team had encouraged the author to join and 
observe the situation for almost a month during summer before conducting fieldwork and approached 
the members of parliament (MPs) as the target of gathering information. However, after gaining 
access, to approach an MP the author have to wait in the hallway of the parliament building for a week 
and sometimes more.  
Various ways have been taken by the author to gather data and information from informants, but 
sometimes even though official letters or emails to the informants have been delivered and received, 
they did not respond. Other occasion occurred when even if succeeded in interviewing the informant, 
the information needed was not adequate.  
The author was very honoured and had the privilege to conduct an in-depth interview to a former Vice 
Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) from GOLKAR faction, as he has more than 
forty years’ experience as a politician and parliament member since Soeharto. Through a lightly warm 
discussion, he was not only willing to share information related to the history and political intrigues of 
the parliamentary sessions in devising legislation but was also convinced to arrange the time for the 
author to interview him directly. Finally the next day the author had an opportunity to interview him 
at his big private house; a research stage that not only drains energy but also requires immense 
patience. The respondent was also willing to suggest some people be interviewed and connect the 
author to them unofficially. 
In addition to conducting in-depth interviews, the author also conducted FGD with a number of 
informants mostly government figures who have a close connection to the policy formulation, some 
are still active and others have retired. FGDs were not conducted with rigorous techniques but are 
adapted to situations and conditions, which in this fieldwork two FGDs were in between meetings 
where more than one government institutions gathered without prior plans.  
In addition, the authors also conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants that have 
extensive and credible information related to the SEZ and economic reform programme. Discussion 
topics often do not focus on one thing, sometimes the topic is about culture and society, sometimes 
also about the history and personal life of the informants. While observation was done by following 
the production until export activities in Jakarta EPZs and the activities of formal and informal trade 
activities in Batam FTZs which was a manifestation of FTZ policy peculiarities in Batam Island. 
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Although it must be admitted, it is not easy for the author to be able to perform the total academic 
examination in the midst of ‘tight schedule’ between family and office jobs especially after the result 
of the oral examination was not successful. However, there are times when juggling between writing, 
office jobs, and family have created maturity in writing. The difficulties in the first writing attempt were 
trying to make an 80,000-words thesis as clear and coherent manner as possible which apparently did 
not touch the detailed context, while in the second attempt, the author had the opportunity to express 
the analysis result in more detail with a chance of writing up to the 100,000-words thesis.  
The obstacle of writing the revised thesis version which the author considers it as the crucial one was 
that being a government official in an around-the-clock office environment provides no room to 
develop in research writing instead the writing focused more on meeting and evaluation report 
materials and calculations of macroeconomic fundamentals with no opportunity to engage in a real 
research experience as in academic environment. 
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter brings together the literature review and outlines it to analyse the case study by 
employing the NIE theory and Williamson’s institutional constraints model. These theories 
comprehend the dimensions behind actors’ behaviour and policy preferences in making decisions 
under different circumstances for policymaking such as SEZ policy in Indonesia. The analytical 
framework offers Williamson’s model into effective purpose enabling the author to answer the 
research questions. 
This chapter also elaborates the methods used in the research using case study design as the most 
appropriate design capable to answer the complex and dynamic phenomenon given the simultaneous 
dimensions contained in the cases presented to be discovered, the political economy dimension 
(structural) and institutional dimension (historical) of the SEZ development and its relation to the 
policymaking process. This chapter presents the data gathering and research protocols to help address 
the research questions and test the hypotheses. 
The next chapter explores the style and mechanism of the successive regime’s policymaking by 
diagnosing the institutional framework based on Indonesian political economy historical context. The 
ways in which economic reform practice are planned and operated both meet the political institutions’ 
desired outcome which will be explored. The author aims to classify diverse levels of policy formulation 
constraints grounded by similar defining elements as Williamson’s institutional constraints model, i.e. 
purpose or initiatives, the frequency, and the types of constraints that make the SEZ policy 





The Indonesian Institutional Framework Diagnosing the 
Policymaking Process: Evidence from the Field 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the policymaking dynamics of Indonesia’s enduring economic and bureaucratic 
reform by the reform and democratic regimes (RDO). This chapter embodies the approaches used in 
the previous chapter: a case study, an analytical narrative, interpretive qualitative approach, and 
content analysis. Therefore, it seeks to explain the causal mechanisms generated by institutional 
influences on Indonesia’s policy formulation procedures. 
This chapter and the next two empirical chapters involve a mixture of primary and secondary data from 
reliable sources, i.e. personal observation and formal visits, semi-structured and in-depth interviews, 
FGDs, and the literature review from relevant periodicals, publications, official documents, 
reports/surveys, to media coverages. These methods guide me to answer the research questions and 
help me validate the hypotheses. Based on the first research question: What are the institutional 
intricacies surrounding the process of SEZ policymaking? This chapter analyses Indonesian institutional 
framework, especially how policy process has changed over time that yields to SEZ policy scheme. This 
chapter assesses the nature of political rulers that might shape SEZ development policy by relying 
primarily on the historical context of Indonesia’s rules and regulations. It marks the start of the key 
findings. This chapter is not merely descriptive in nature which describes the intricate policy 
development but it treats the SEZ phenomena in the case studies and the context of Indonesia 
institutional framework as intertwined (Yin 2004). 
This chapter examines the central proposition of this study based on the research questions in chapter 
1: The tendencies of institutional intricacies to occur within SEZ policymaking process are that: 1) 
informal institutions, both productive and non-productive, have not been compatible in support of 
formal institutions, 2) property rights are not yet optimal in the bureaucratic level of SEZ policymaking 
process during transitional period of centralist paradigm shift towards decentralisation, 3) continuous 
and discontinuous SEZ bureaucratic policies have shifted the pattern of abuse of power by a handful of 
people in public institutions hindering the clarity of contractual relation of the SEZ relevant authority, 
4) lack of clarity of the principal-agent relationships lead to uncertain structural incentives. 
The argument put forth in this chapter reveals that policy and institutions have been mutually 
influencing each other, entailing change or continuity of the status quo and contributing to the 
institutional arrangement where the government’s current policy decisions affect what options 
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become available in the future. Furthermore, the choice of policies and institutions and their 
implementation depend on the relevant political landscape and its importance is, in general, 
undisputed. This chapter also shows that despite the success of implementing economic development 
policies and programmes that have managed to restore macroeconomic stability for economic revival, 
institutional problems in the economic reform process remain.  
The chapter begins by analysing some of the salient features of Indonesia’s institutional environment 
and its macroeconomic fundamentals outlining the decentralisation and formal legislation process 
under different regime government that yields SEZ policy process since the Soeharto era. The 
subchapter to follow examines the changing face of the SEZ evolution, its complexities and challenges 
in the democratic order. Last subchapter summarized the results and findings.   
4.2. Institutional environment in Indonesia 
Indonesia, the former Dutch colony and the largest archipelagic state in the world consisting of 17,504 
islands, is rich in natural resources. Indonesia is a maritime country with an area of 93 thousand km2 
and the fourth longest coastline measuring a total length of 95,181 km (World Resource Institute 2001 
cited in Momaf 2007a). However, economic reform sixteen years after AFC and the important industry 
sectors operating at around 70% capacity (Chowdhury and Islam 2011:269) has not resulted in any 
breakthrough efforts in government policy to reduce the regional inequality. The apparent regional 
development disparities and stagnation of underdeveloped regions evident in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 
are the main reasons for the RDO’s intention to embrace FDI-oriented SEZs as vital development policy 
to mitigate rising inequality. Table 4.1 presents the share of Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) 
in six major islands in Indonesia since 1982. Figure 4.1 shows the industrial map of Indonesia in 2013 
between the western region (known as Kawasan Barat Indonesia or KBI) of Java and Sumatera islands 
compared to other major islands in the eastern region (known as Kawasan Timur Indonesia or KTI 
comprising of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku and Papua Islands). Regional 
inequality has not declined even though the regional autonomy (1999) has been running for more than 
a decade. These occurrences have shaped Indonesia’s institutions and character. The next section 






4.2.1. Socio-economic fundamentals shaping the Indonesian institutions 
Demographically, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country at 253.60 million. It is expected to 
rise to 306 million in 2030 and is, currently, the fifth largest labour force in the world (Statistics 
Indonesia/BPS 2014). Corresponding to the political-economic phases described in the following 
section, Indonesian GDP growth has been relatively strong over the past fifteen years since AFC. The 
annual growth performance year-on-year (YoY) since the Old Order in the 1950s until Reformasi era 
and Democratic order (RDO) is shown in Figure 4.2. However, the robust growth level will not support 
the country’s booming population (Swastoyo 2013-the Jakarta Globe) and for that reason, in the late 





Even though SEZ under the FDI industrial sectors has generated employment in recent years, Indonesia 
still had average unemployment rates of 6.14%43 from 1982 until 2015. The reduction in the 
unemployment rate has not had a significant impact on overall economic performance as it still 
hovered around 5.81% in the first quarter of 2015 from 5.94% in the third quarter of 2014 (BKPM 
2015).   
Moreover, Indonesia is still among the world’s most corrupt nations, ranked 107 out of 175 countries 
in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2014).44 The young Indonesian 
democracy after Soeharto’s authoritarian rule is still susceptible to political turbulence. The 
democratic consolidation until the reign of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was strongly depend on 
Indonesia’s economic development and performance.  
Culture and ideology play an important role in Indonesia’s economic performance (Casing 2000). 
Indonesia has a high level of heterogeneity and cultural differences. To address the issue of cohesion, 
the government has devised ‘Pancasila’ as its national philosophy and ideological base to stress 
universal justice and to standardise the language through a national motto ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ or 
‘Unity in Diversity’. Further to maintaining cohesion, in terms of ideological differences there is a 
debate that accesses to resources would be difficult for key policy actors in the great pluralist society 
if not properly accommodating both national and personal interest especially if the power of the 
executive has not been set clearly in Indonesia’s constitution (Percaya 2000: 5). This debate was driven 
by the need for a strong leader able to overcome the diversity which continues today.  
Although throughout Indonesian political history, the 1945 Constitution45 has granted the president 
head of the executive branch and emphasised that the executive always plays a central role as the 
most powerful and influential part of the state compared to other main arms of government (Ibid), 
Indonesian NO’s style and mechanisms portrayed more power than in the RDO period. Therefore, after 
the reform in 2001, Pancasila was strengthened and served as Indonesia’s enforcement mechanism 
not merely as an ideological term to oversee the course of power to be in sync with the guidelines of 
the constitution, one of which is realising the ideals of economic justice vis-à-vis reducing inequality. 
Pancasila is also at the top of Indonesia’s formal legislation and thus is used as the ground norm for 
the overall legal product and legislation procedure (Figure 4.3).  However, the high pluralist society has 
caused higher transaction costs borne by society. To address this issue in view of North (1991) and 
Williamson (2000), Pancasila offers a pervasive influence on economic performance in the long run 
                                                          
43Unemployment rates in 2005 reached a high record of 11.24% while in 1983 reached the lowest record of 2%. 
44For further reading Indonesia’s economic indicators, see Lloyd and Smith (2001), Bird (2001), and Dick (2003), 
as well as more recently Molnar and Lesher (2008), Chowdhury and Islam (2011), and van den Eng (2013).  
45Chapter 3 of the Constitution defines the authority of the President. 
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where it can reduce transaction costs during the policymaking process if enforced correctly. This will 
further be elaborated in the next section. 
Figure 4.3  
 
4.2.2. Indonesia SEZ Policy Political Economy in the New Order (NO) 
This section diagnoses the synoptic background of Indonesian political culture towards economic 
policy vis-à-vis SEZ and investment. Despite Indonesia’s long history of foreign occupation46 replacing 
the lengthy authority of Javanese Hinduism-Buddhism, feudalist dynasties, and Islamic kingdoms’, the 
institutional legacies (see Schwarz 1994; Ramage 1995 in Cassing 2000: 161) were incomparable to 
what was inherited by Soeharto and his cronies. However, under different institutional arrangements, 
the legacies of those historical events persist and to a certain degree are entrenched in today’s political 
and social spheres.  
Moreover, closer scrutiny, as Hadiz (2005) and Razo (2008) would suggest, reveals that growth under 
Soeharto as grounded on the special privileges and protection or market power he translated into 
rents awarded to the selected few elites around him. The privileges are the driving force of the regime’s 
success (Ibid). Under this predicament, informal institutions in the NO era and prevailing social norms 
were equally un-conducive and would have been difficult to develop otherwise, especially if the 
economic actors and NO government rely heavily on business greatly affecting the continuation of 
their political power. If a very high-profile business case was at stake, Soeharto himself or his inner-
circle was, by and large, the ultimate decision maker. Both find it in their best interest to fabricate 
development policies including but not limited to SEZ policy for rents with greater discretion and 
                                                          
46The longest was the Dutch colonialism in 1605 until 1942 when the Japanese arrived. 
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credibility. Soeharto was the apex of Indonesia’s policymaking and political structure (Crouch 1979 in 
Smith 1996: 9; Pepinsky 2012: 3). 
A former Vice Chairman of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) also a retired GOLKAR Party official 
during the NO and SBY era noted of how Soeharto have managed to adjust the governance structure 
(the arms of the executive power) at district level in order to pave the way for his allocation of 
resources at the local level if they do not follow Soeharto’s terms.  
“Society through local rulers such as sub-district heads and heads of villages were obliged 
to mobilise their funds and forces to succeed the course of Soeharto administration’s 
plan, such as providing the tools of transportation, energy, and willingness to always 
attend giant meetings, speeches/indoctrination and so on. In some occasions, there are 
many leaders of the regional administration tried to resist and emphasized violence and 
power more than law-based policies. At that time a governor could be replaced if he could 
not carry out the task of controlling his subordinates to fulfil the needs of the ruler or 
submit by the rule, then the regent could also be replaced.”  
The statement implies that during the authoritarian regime of NO when public demand for goods and 
services was complicated, Soeharto automatically functions as rule governing institutions, providing 
incentives to run the rules of the game and punish the violators of the rules.  
Hadiz (2005) aptly characterises the NO in at least three categories: first, a capitalist oligarchy able to 
dominate and, ‘instrumentally’ not just structurally, utilise the power of the state and its institutions 
along with their coercive strengths for their own benefit; second, the relation between the state and 
society characterised by systematic disorganisation of the civil society groups; thirdly, an extensive and 
complex system of patronage personified by Soeharto himself with the axis centred around Cendana47.  
This patronage system spreads and penetrates all levels of society from Jakarta, provincial, district, 
down to the village levels (Ibid: 253). To overcome the foregoing situation, Soeharto’s adoption of a 
laissez-faire approach, as Capling and Low (2010: 126-127) suggest, marked the beginning of the 
economic reform in the 1980s which greatly reduced the state’ role in the economy and increased the 
private sector’s scope. 
During the NO era, oil windfall allowed the government to transact a trading strategy that is more 
inward-looking (ISI strategy) and helps economically weak businesses through various subsidised 
credit. However, these reforms simply changed the monopoly of state-owned to private companies 
overseen by Soeharto and his cronies, for example using PERTAMINA, the only SOE in the oil and gas 
field, as the sole entity to develop Batam in the 1970s.  
                                                          
47Cendana is the road name of Soeharto’s residential address. 
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Further explanation from the former Vice Chairman of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) with 
more than thirty years’ experience serving as GOLKAR MP noted, 
“Speaking of Batam…well, the development of Batam city was strongly influenced by the 
dominant bureaucratic culture at the time, the new order bureaucratic culture was laden 
with corrupt, collusion and nepotism practices. The conglomerates and rulers of the 
Batam Authority should be the closest persons to Soeharto. An entrepreneur like Liem 
Sioe Liong could be said to be the most important business person…he was the principal 
initiator you know….” 
The respondent recounted that when Batam was still or under the previous body of Batam authority 
(it was known as BIDA now BIFZA) was chaired by different influential people and always changing. 
They were appointed by the president himself, such as Ibnu Sutowo, Sumarlin, Habibie and lastly 
Ismeth Abdullah.  
The study by World Bank reveals the intricate scheme that has affected Indonesia’s SEZ development 
budget (resource allocation for funding scheme) including the zone development programme for 
Batam; more than 30% according to estimates in two decades of NO rule disappeared which ultimately 
was appropriated for the benefit of individuals (World Bank 1998). Moreover, according to the 
respondent most of the output is then distributed to the devotees to sustain the regime’s political 
legitimacy. 
These events imply that during the NO period political patronage entrenched in the governance 
structure in order to secure the distribution of resources which according to the World Bank was much 
related to the budget allocation procedure. It also served to secure the power structure. 
The relationship between the government’s interventionist microeconomic policies and stable 
macroeconomic condition was not as distant as some scholars claimed; the latter facilitated the growth 
of the few oligarchs and conglomerates (capitalist class or business elites)—who were close to power—
that in turn provide resources to the political elites. In effect, the capitalist class’ dependence on the 
political elites helped guarantee their acceptance of the government’s policies which were not only 
interventionist but arguably inward-looking (Rock 1999 in Tijaja and Faisal 2014: 8). 
For example, researchers from CSIS (Center for Strategic Indonesian Studies) and IGJ (Institute for 
Global Justice) confirmed at length that: 
“The various preconditions of ‘economics’ of the New Order political economy are 
motivated by the following theses; first, giving top priority to the achievement of high 
economic growth targets, which in its interpretation and implementation are left to a 
number of special economic teams (Widjojo, CSIS, Sumarlin, and Habibie teams), 
technocratically placing the flow of Western and Japanese capital into the import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) and export promotion (EOS). Second, build a political 
setting that places the president, ABRI, bureaucracy and GOLKAR, as the creator of 
monolithic political stability to support the at-all-cost success of economic programmes. 
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Third, it placed a specific target of rice self-sufficiency by utilizing the wave of ‘green 
revolution’, as a basic buffer for the creation of political economic stability. Fourth, 
provide tariff and non-tariff facilities and protection to the big-business (conglomeration) 
group which is assumed to be the locomotive of economic growth. And fifth, choose rare 
political and military repression in the face of any obstacles, distractions and threats to all 
the economic and political instruments created”.  
These characteristics amplified when the key actors in Soeharto era changed in the course of his 
presidency, but the format of the change in developing Batam Island has never changed that much. As 
a former military and Commissioner of PERTAMINA, Ibnu Sutowo was the longest to be appointed the 
head of Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA). Other key actors have performed accordingly 
to serve Soeharto’s interest. However, their policy choices have induced susceptible economic 
foundation.  
The literature pointed out that, when Soeharto developed SEZs in the form of EPZs, FTZs, and KAPETs 
(the Integrated Economic Development Zone), the growing SEZs contribute very little to the transfer 
of technology because the ongoing industry is dominated by the non-manufacturing sector (mainly oil 
and gas), not to mention the other low value-added manufacturing garment and textile industries in 
most of the EPZs in the country, and natural resource extraction manufacturing investment in KAPET 
which started in 1996 (Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002; Aswicahyono and Maidir 2003; Wu 2007; Adam and 
Tisdell 2008; Widodo 2008; Vickers 2012). This means foreign investors dredge more raw material 
resources than developing a manufacturing industry. An increase in exports of primary products and 
exploitation of natural resources were also matters of concern.  
In terms of Jakarta EPZ as one of the case study to be investigated, the structure of the governing 
bodies is not the same as Batam FTZ. Jakarta EPZ is governed by SOEs appointed by the central 
government but reports only to the Minister of SOE. The central government at the time had 
positioned itself as the largest investor (SOEs) followed by non-indigenous entrepreneurs (Chinese 
ethnics) and indigenous entrepreneurs (SMEs) in third place (Berry and Levy 1994, 1999), while Batam 
FTZ is governed by an independent body appointed by the central government and reports directly to 
the president. PT Jakarta Industrial Estate Pulo Gadung (JIEP) was chosen as a pilot project for EPZ 
development in Indonesia located in North Jakarta. It further became an experimental basis to 
evaluate whether similar industrial zones should be built in other regions (Ministry of Trade).  
There has been a lack of quality support and resources from the public institutions and lack of 
accountability and professionalism from the industry associations for the SMEs to gain confidence. 
Meanwhile, the lack of flexibility and commitment has also led to the ineffectiveness of the SOEs in 
many respects. As suggested by Basri (2013), the GOI has been misguided by the thought that SOEs 
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are able to compete internationally when history suggests only a few crony conglomerates are able to 
withstand competition.  
As confirmed by the PT. KBN (the Jakarta EPZ governing body) managers that, 
“Policymakers in Jakarta at the time led by the Minister of Trade responded to 
international pressures on trade liberalisation and vigorously followed a trend of 
developing economic enclaves or industrial clusters to promote labour-intensive garment, 
textile, and footwear exports and inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI)”.  
Under the control of an SOE—PT (Persero) Bonded Warehouse Indonesia (BWI), simultaneously, an 
industrial zone (IZ) site was formed at the port sub-district of Jakarta nearby Tanjung Priok48 port (Warr 
1983: 29). Garment, textile, and footwear industries grew rapidly but mainly concentrated along the 
northern coast and East Jakarta. Despite growth promises uttered in the NO economic reform, the EPZ 
developments did not present grounds for optimism due to administrative problems. BWI, who 
supposedly was the sole agent for overseeing EPZs in Jakarta at the time and was expected to cover its 
administrative costs from direct charges, lacked the authority to negotiate between EPZ firms and the 
various government agencies. Instead, EPZ firms were required to deal directly not only with the 
Investment Coordination Board (BKPM) and other relevant ministries49 in addition to BWI but also with 
the port and customs authorities which caused higher transaction costs (Warr 1983: 35-6). Since then, 
the administrative cost has become essential in EPZ policymaking.  
Warr (1979, 1983, 1989) viewed EPZ as an enclave—despite not being entirely correct for some of the 
firms—as the most appropriate assumption for this thesis, but EPZ in Indonesia is viewed as a tenant 
of fully foreign-owned or domestic-owned firms, while PT. Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (KBN) as the 
main SOE actor in the case study Chapter 5 is treated as the enclave or, in this case, industrial zone 
(IZ). Figure 4.4 illustrates the enclave approach according to Warr (1989).  
Figure 4.4 
 
                                                          
48The main and largest seaport in Indonesia 
49Ministries of Trade, Finance, Industry, and Labour 
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Our attention thus focuses on the institutional elements that shape rulers and policymakers into 
deciding more SEZs be established under a variety of policy platforms.  
Warr (1983) sheds light on the externalities brought by the existing EPZs in the new order (NO) regime 
and suggested that the transaction costs incurred during their establishment, e.g. administration costs 
including unofficial levies accrued to only a handful of people led to unscrupulous trade and decreasing 
state revenue. This evidence has outweighed the benefits sought in the economic study, e.g. 
employment generation, foreign exchange earnings, and technology transfer (Ibid: 36).  
As a result, there have been large discrepancies in manufacturing and non-manufacturing foreign 
investment (FDI) in Indonesia and China and some ASEAN countries. Table 4.2 discloses the evidence 
where Japan and the United States (US) were the two most dominant FDI origins in 1997, prior to the 
AFC (Thomsen 1999). This situation is different from the neighbouring Asian countries (China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) which were dominated by manufacturing investment, 
especially electronics (Thomsen 1999).  
 
Evidently, from Figure 4.5 after the AFC, Indonesia experienced a drastic decline in the value of 
investments (FDI net inflows) while other ASEAN countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia were not so affected but did not experience economic improvement either (Thomsen 1999). 
It should be emphasised that Indonesia is not the only country for which a change in investor attitude 
can be seen, but it may be one of the most extreme. Investment in Indonesia has been discouraged by 








Jensen’s (2006) work coincides with the existing episode especially in the aftermath of the AFC. He 
suggests that approaching a more neoliberal ideology, the Indonesian government’s (GOI) agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides capital and conditions on future economic 
policies to help spur higher levels of policy stability to attract more FDI. The nature of the agreements 
becomes counterproductive when the arrangements to promote policy stability also promote policies 
that do not attract foreign investors or MNCs. The IMF conditions, by prescribing fiscal austerity and 
loans for Indonesian economic and bureaucratic reforms, have led to the decrease in public spending 
especially education and infrastructure, both of which are highly needed by the MNCs. IMF 
requirements increased unstable political and social conflict due to austerity policy prescriptions. It led 
to mounting levels of protest and unstable election process as Soeharto’s regime was ousted from 
office. The loans from the IMF and their conditionality increased policy stability but also instability as 
perceived by the MNCs, due to the effects these policies have on the Indonesian political economy. 
This study focused on the new developments of institutional constraints in two types of SEZ in the 
GOI’s effort to spur growth by attracting more FDI. First, the Jakarta EPZ policy process after the formal 
institutions were established where informal institution plays an important role in the process of policy 
implementation. Second, Batam FTZ policy process related to the governance structure that influences 
the allocation of resources vis-à-vis budget allocation and jurisdictions rather than investigating the 
initial process of both Jakarta EPZ and Batam FTZ formal policies. It focused on episodes of SEZ policy 
process at the subnational level to justify whether the hypothesis that institutions have influenced SEZ 
policymaking process at the subnational level can be accepted. Before moving to that direction, the 
next section elucidates the political economy of SEZ policy in the RDO to gain more understanding on 
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the context to which SEZ related formal institutions have evolved but have not yielded significant 
economic benefit. 
4.2.3. Indonesia SEZ Policy Political Economy in the Reform and Democratic Order (RDO) 
 the Habibie Period—The Beginning of Reform 
The Constitutional Reform  
This section elucidates what made constitutional amendment in the RDO so important that it put the 
parliamentary approval as the core element of the entire SEZ policy process. 1998 was the toughest 
year for Indonesian economic development as a result of the AFC. Marked by a political transition from 
authoritarian NO to democratic rule, known as the reform period, it was also known as the economic 
recovery phase from the AFC characterised by regular changes in the presidency in a relatively short 
time from B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, then Megawati Sukarnoputri.  
“The three presidencies each brought in some major reforms while attempting to balance 
opposing forces and maintain central political control” (Aspinall and Fealy 2003: 1-3).  
Within this period, on the governance front, the decentralisation and regional autonomy emerged on 
such a grand scale. Further impact of new decentralised regions or autonomy governance on SEZ is 
developed in the next chapters as two varied episodes of conflicts of interest between actors in the 
formulation of SEZ policies in Jakarta and Batam.  
After Soeharto’s demise in 1998, there was an amendment towards the UUD 1945, the Indonesian 
Constitution which was considered a fundamental change to anticipate misconduct in the practice of 
state administration. The practice of change itself was in accordance with the wishes of the founding 
fathers as articulated in Article 37 of the constitution that they refused to be trapped in the state 
administration unable to be used for the paradigm of checks and balances or horizontal accountability 
in creating good governance.  
This change also affects the relationship between the legislature (parliament/DPR) and the executive 
(president), i.e. in the process as well as the formation mechanism of the Law (Figure 4.6 and 4.8). In 
addition, the 1945 amendment also reinforces the functions of DPR, both fiscal and regulatory 
functions, as a control mechanism among state institutions. The reason for the reinforcement was that 
DPR as the people’s representative body ought to be the formal body to oversee the government in 
running the country. The legislative (DPR) and judicial oversight bodies (the Supreme Court/MA, 
Judicial Commission/KY, and Constitutional Commission/MK) have significant roles in assessing the 
effectiveness of the implementation of established regulations. If the established rules are not in 
accordance with the public interests, then it will be revised with a new adapted and pro-people rule. 
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In the Weberian notion of bureaucratic ideals, the formalised systems of control and surveillance by 
DPR and its elements over the executive or bureaucracies existed within an intricate context of checks 
and balances during the RDO. The amendment was to improve the existing institutional arrangements 
with the use of democratic procedures.  
Figure 4.6 
 
A remark by a former MP from Gerindra Party observed, 
“In the NO period, the 1945 Constitution has become a powerful political instrument 
for the development of authoritarianism and fosters collusion, corruption and 
nepotism (KKN) practices around the President’s power. Therefore, during the reform 
period following the end of Soeharto’s rule, the agenda for the amendment of the 
1945 Constitution becomes necessary. It is understandable that it is impossible to carry 
out political and economic reform without reforming the law. Legal reform is not 
possible without changing the constitution. The impact of the amendment (Article 20A 
of paragraph (1)) greatly affected the position and authority of the President and DPR 
as the legislative body; for instance, DPR has been given the righteous power to both 
establish and approve laws” 
Figure 4.6 illustrates which part of the change has affected the President and DPR’s position as the 
legislative bodies.  
After Soeharto’s resignation, political power was fragmented and opened up new authorities. At the 
central government level, the executive no longer has the exclusive power. Parliament became more 
dominant after they received Soeharto’s resignation. Despite DPR being the elected representative, 
the President holds the power of the executive in addition to holding the power to make laws as seen 
in Figure 4.7 which resulted in unequal relations between the President and DPR. The President can 
ignore the bill approved by both DPR and the President in the House of Representatives by not signing 
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the formal legislation, and the bill can be repealed. This has had implications in the SEZ policymaking 





Despite these formal institutional and constitutional reforms, there are no limits on the extent to which 
any political system, authoritarian or democratic state, can bind its successors. By way of informal 
practices such as lobbying to speed up the legitimate supremacy of the ruling powers, in the actual 
policymaking processes under different regimes, the next two empirical chapters consider the 
constitutional powers which refer to the power to pass a legislative agenda to the successive regime; 
and unsophisticated partisan powers refers to the president’s ability to influence the legislature 
through their party with regards to the share of seats of the ruling party.  
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Albeit fiscal decentralisation had been implemented since the early 1970s, the basic elements were 
never executed, and the fiscal policy has not attuned to local needs and preferences. This condition 
has inhibited the industrial development planning and policy consistency which is still inherently 
carried out through a top-down approach. Therefore, the strengthening of domestic business actors 
also appeared to be stagnant. According to Rodrik (1997, 2004), the changes in policy and rules have 
not led to changes in the quality of institutions and the institutional changes have affected the ability 
of private entrepreneurs to utilise political connections to obtain rent-seeking opportunities.  
In an interview, an official from the Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD) noted, 
“There were massive discursive practices in early 2000 through decentralisation which 
created unclear property rights (national laws and regulations). Indonesia experienced 
weakening capacity to perform its functions while government policies were running 
partially and overlapping in various dimensions”.  
This includes the case of changing the governance structure of FTZ in Batam in Chapter 6 which 
resulted in territorial or jurisdictional complexity. Interjurisdictional competition arose due to the 
unclear distribution of roles and responsibilities between Batam authority (BIDA) and Batam City 
government (Pemkot Batam). 
On the economic front, economic development was stumbling, greeted by great political euphoria 
where during the NO era Indonesians were deprived of their freedom. There was also an enormous 
increase of nationalism euphoria built up by Sukarno. On taking office, Habibie faced the challenges of 
economic freefall as GDP fell by 20% per year. The rupiah exchange rate against the dollar rose two-
fold from Rp8,000.00 in May of 1998 to Rp16,000.00 in mid-June with inflation close to 100%. 
Indonesian state debt had matured at the time while private debt was paid by the state as a condition 
of the loan from the IMF. It has been reported that the Indonesian debt increased to US$70.9 billion 
(US$20 billion alone was from private commercial debt).  
However, domestic risks that were increasingly posing threats to the Indonesian economy post AFC 
with the persistent legal uncertainty and unclear authority to stabilise the economic policy deterred 
investors from returning to Indonesia. Domestic economies were territorially fragmented, managed 
individually, not integrated, and economic stagnation gradually and steadily took place. This condition 
was compounded by the fact that no political party has any firm direction related to the 
implementation of the economic nationalism they are keen to support. Corruption scandals and 
violence in East Timor further hampered the recovery process. This indicates Habibie’s one-year seven-
month term brought minor progress in the withering economy. There were no signs of FDI increasing 
at the beginning of the transition period as investors were expecting strong financial security and 
institutional capacity associated with a stable political, macroeconomic, and pro-investor policy 
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climate. The political situation was still erratic and unconducive although Habibie had slightly improved 
the economic chaos left by the NO regime (Anwar 2003 in Soesastro et al. 2003: 75). Not until 2001 
after the democratisation process began to show signs of certainty did the FDI situation in Indonesia 
begin to improve when the GOI convinced the financiers that FDI would be advantageous as it offers 
adequate facilities and support for the implementation of good governance (Ibid). 
The expiration of the NO regime in 1998 did not mean the end of economic liberalisation in Indonesia. 
Prior to his demise, in order to attract investors and increase exports, Soeharto decreed Batam Bonded 
Zone to be released from any types of taxes. In its 1997 letter of intent (LOI) to the IMF, the GOI 
(government of Indonesia) promised to liberalise the investment regime by phasing out tariffs, but 
Habibie’s brief presidency was overly preoccupied in dealing with urgent matters such as the efforts in 
stabilising the economic performance, especially in terms of macroeconomic indicators in order to 
restore foreign investor confidence (Hill et al. 2008). However, the IMF and Indonesia’s post-crisis 
recovery programme was meaningless in strengthening the national industry and overall economic 
importance. Indonesia was more exposed to capital flight than China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh where 
most FDI companies moved away to these three Asian economies due to improved FDI attraction 
competitiveness. Then, the GOI made a more powerful gesture in their liberalisation agenda and took 
some measures to increase FDI inflows. These measures embodied the comprehensive legal and 
regulatory framework colouring their discordant effect on state sovereignty. In 1999 the government 
issued rules that allow foreign shareholding up to 99% in the banking sector and in October, the rupiah 
managed to strengthen to around 8,000 against the US dollar and inflation fell dramatically. In 
addition, some key non-oil exports began to show signs of recovery (Ibid: 471). 
Habibie’s sudden rise to power was considered a bittersweet victory for the pro-democracy movement 
due to the assumption that Habibie is the right hand of the former regime. His tenure in the early 
Reformasi had yet to perform any strong economic manoeuvres. His policies were prioritised to control 
the political stability while during the NO, Habibie was not too vocal in supporting his political views 
except his support for the NO (Jan Luiten 2012: 401). The middle-income population were unable to 
afford all the basic needs and this led to the poverty rate soaring to 27% (Hofman et al. 2004: 54). 
Nevertheless, Habibie succeeded in conducting a parliamentary election in mid-1999. He realised that 
restoring the country’s economy offers greater opportunity for him to win the public’s trust to be re-
elected in the coming election (Boediono 2002: 387). 
The Institutional Reform 
Upon assuming the presidency, political development began to unfold and Habibie was also grappled 
with economic challenges. On the political front, two important issues were raised: 1) the 
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institutionalisation of democratisation as previously discussed through the constitutional reform, and 
2) decentralisation (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 197-200). The democratisation process induced various 
institutional changes raised at the national level and a system of power dispersed and shared by the 
president, political parties, and parliament. The democratisation aimed at an open and transparent 
governance system with strong rule of law.  
Moreover, according to Pratikno (1999), these decentralisation laws as formal institutions are used 
mainly for two purposes, first, to satisfy all regions by providing a high-level political participation at 
the regionals. This is manifested by ‘political decentralisation’ from the central government to the 
regional government and provides political opportunity and satisfaction to local society to enjoy the 
main symbols of local democracy (e.g. election of regional heads); second, to satisfy the ‘rebellion’ 
resource-rich areas by providing greater access to the pleasure of natural resources in their respective 
areas. 
Evidence from the literature suggests that between the divisions of authority with the division of 
affairs, there is clearly a fundamental difference. In juridical context, authority is defined as the right 
and power of the government to determine or make policy in the framework of governance, while the 
meaning of government affairs is the content of the authority itself. The pattern developed by Law No. 
22/1999 is the division of authority between the government and the regions (provincial authority) 
determined by the government authority. Meanwhile, the authority of the Regency/municipality is an 
authority that does not include the government authority and the provincial authority. In this context, 
Law No. 22/1999 does not allow the central government to intervene in matters which have been the 
authority of provinces, regencies and municipalities. The province may not interfere in the affairs of 
the Regency/city. 
In this period, the KPPOD official explicated that: 
“Indonesia’s democratic infancy was very costly due to its search for an effort to 
implement real democratic identity. In this regard, political groups were given a greater 
role in contributing ideas in policymaking in ways that every citizen is assumed to be more 
involved in the political decision-making. These changes include the formulation and 
issuance of new legal frameworks (laws and regulations to be in accordance to the new 
corrected UUD 1945 constitution) and institutions in all spheres”. 
Habibie’s team was also confronted with a greater challenge in the drastic institutional shift known as 
the ‘big bang decentralisation’ (The World Bank 2008). Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government and 
Law No. 25/1999 on Financial Balance between the Central and Regional Government were enacted 
to replace the previous decentralisation law created by the authoritarian regime Soeharto the Law No. 
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5/1974. The new policies were defined as the transfer of administrative and budgetary authority50 
from central to provincial government (Inada in Shimomura 2003: 158). Some experts mentioned this 
stage as the first phase of a major institutional reform (Mungkasa 2013). 
However, over time, these laws have created new issues related to, for example, the coordination 
between the province and district level autonomous regions, and the difficulty of monitoring the 
autonomous region. The economic power after the decentralisation programme was changing the 
locus of patron-client to regions. The Habibie administration was hampered by the intertwined politics 
at the time leaving only some of the oligarchs to survive. The path-dependent nature which considered 
something as not new to the regional autonomy system in contemporary Indonesia also arose in two 
aspects. First, it recalled concerns of ‘small-kings’ to emerge as a substitute for one king (a local leader) 
in an area that tends to ignore the value of ethics in politics. It is the new form of political 
democratisation in Indonesia, where the presence of new actors such as regional parliament, a multi-
party system (as opposed to only three political parties in the Soeharto era), and second, the interest 
groups have shaped the face of Indonesian politics to become very fluid and difficult to predict 
(Rohdehwold 1995; Hill et al. 2008).  
It is fair to consider two aspects of the rise of these ‘small-kings’ as very similar to the behaviour of the 
NO regime by having an affair with businessmen as well as playing a central development project. 
Clientelism and rent-seeking practices are rampant when the election event occurs, where the 
campaign fund of the candidates of regional heads’ pair is supported by the businessmen, and if they 
win, all development projects will be controlled by the businessmen. Chapter 6 describes this situation.  
As Umam (2011) points out that:  
“The existence of an economic monopoly supported by the oligarchic regime means that 
the design of our regional autonomy is still weak”  
Although the phenomenon cannot be used to generalise the regional autonomy situation in Indonesia, 
because there are also many other areas that excel because of regional autonomy such as Kutai Timur 
and Tangerang regions (only 10% of the autonomy regions show signs of improvement based on the 
Annual Evaluation Result by the Ministry of Home Affairs since 2001). Findings suggest corruption in 
Indonesia is much more regional than central. The fact that there are 57 heads of regions who become 
suspects of corruption in the period 2008-2012 is real which suggest that the democracy that prospers 
as the paradigm of regional autonomy has failed (Jati 2012: 769). 
                                                          
50Regulatory and fiscal accountability in Pepinsky’s (2012) term. 
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A literature by Hidayat (2003) revealed the high transaction cost from the decentralisation policy. This 
is also supported by the result from a focus group discussion with KPPOD, the National Development 
Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), and an official from Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA) 
which is relevant to the proposed SEZ policy in Jakarta and Batam. The result sums up as follows: 
“At least there were two aspects that encourage the need for revision of Law No. 22/1999 
and Law No. 25/1999, namely, 
First, the central government never seriously gave autonomy rights to the local 
government. The lack of seriousness could be seen from the central government’s neglect 
of old legislation that was not in line with the new autonomy law. In fact, there were 
hundreds of Government Regulations, Presidential Decrees and various other regulations 
must be adapted to the new regional autonomy framework. The absence of a new 
implementation rule that supports democratic regional autonomy made the two laws 
concerning regional autonomy sterile and ineffective. While at the local level, its absence 
had generated confusion. 
Secondly, decentralisation had inflated uncontrollable spirits among some of the elite in 
the region, gave rise to very strong regional sentiments. The term ‘sons of the soil’ arose 
everywhere representing regional sentiments manifested through a kind of necessity that 
the top seat of government in the region must be occupied by the original figures of the 
region concerned. This was certainly not something to be desired let alone be the goal of 
implementing regional autonomy. However, the phenomenon of ‘sons of the soil’ was so 
burdensome in various regions including Batam Island. 
In addition, there were potential problems, such as (i) the occurrence of conflicts of 
authority such as Ports51, Forestry, Investment, Batam Authority52, and many others; (ii) 
Regional Institutions augmented, groupings of improper task, high organisational costs, 
operating costs and neglected infrastructure; (iii) recruitment, coaching and personnel 
dispatched and promotion not based on competence and professionalism but kinship or 
cultural similarities, regional approaches were prioritised; (iv) neglected organisational 
facilities and infrastructure, unoptimized information technology; (v) development and 
service management have not undergone fundamental reform; (vi) in exploring local 
revenue sources (PAD) there have also been excesses, among others, the increase in PAD 
which has resulted in high economic costs, regional dependence to the general budget 
                                                          
51 Chapter 5 mentions this issue on the Jakarta provincial government’s proposal to build Jakarta port SEZ. 
52 This issue is related to chapter 6 
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allocation (DAU) that kill local creativity and other unoptimized legal revenues; (vii) 
minimum standards of service that have not been formulated properly; and (viii) the DPRD 
in the (new) representative system became very powerful, the Regional Head (executive) 
was held hostage by the Responsibility Report”. 
Meanwhile supported by Kausar (2000) and Tamin (2012) in relations to how the local governments 
attempt to reduce transaction costs through their decision to develop a location into an SEZ which was 
much related to their fiscal capacity. 
“Fiscal capacity is an important and strategic issue because in the future local 
governments are expected to reduce and even release their dependency over the central 
government’s DAU. It should be understood that due to the level of financial dependence 
has an inverse relation with the level of PAD, so to reduce the financial dependence the 
local government must design and establish various schemes of increasing PAD. In 
general, PAD improvement schemes include: 
• Intensification and extension of local levies in the form of taxes or user charges. 
• Exploration of natural resources 
• Scheme of capital formation or regional investment through fundraising or attracting 
investors. 
Of the three options of this policy, it seems that the scheme of attracting investors is 
the most sustainable option and has a useful multiplier effect, i.e. job creation, one of 
which is seen in the SEZ policy. The first choice, intensification and extensification of 
local levies, either directly or indirectly, will result in a high-cost economy that leads to 
inflationary pressure, while the second option, especially if the available resources are 
non-renewable, will be hit on the issue of sustainability”. 
Findings suggest from the document and literature review that the improvement of Law No. 5/1974 
into Law No. 22/1999 was mere, 1) adjustment of the provisions in the Law No. 22/1999 with the 1945 
Constitution, the Legislative Assembly (DPR) Decree, and the Decree of the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR), and 2) the harmonization of laws and regulations in political field and other laws. 
Moreover, these improvements to the provisions in the Law No. 22/1999 caused some problems of 
incomplete substance and double interpretations as analysed in detail below. 
Although these legislations were new, there has been a criticism of the Law No. 22 and 25/1999, among 
others, on the one hand according to Haris (2001), (i) the ambivalence of the province as an 
autonomous region and administrative area; (ii) natural resource-rich bias; (iii) there is no 
constitutional mechanism for the community to participate in overseeing the course of local 
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government so that opportunities for the re-emergence of widespread misuse of power in the region 
are wide open. On the other hand, Hoessein (2002) and Suwandi (2001) describe the inconsistency 
between chapters in the legislation (Hardjosoekarto, 2008). 
BAPPENAS official with respect to the study by Hoessein (2002) on the fundamental changes of the 
decentralisation or regional autonomy legislation explained at length: 
“It was a radical or drastic change and not a gradual change that yields to emerging 
conflicts, crisis, and shocks that accompany the reforms but outweigh the previous series 
of reforms.   
Classified as big bang approach, these types of bureaucratic reform can be seen from the 
shift of a number of local government models and paradigms that occur as follows: 
(i) Structural efficiency models emphasized at the efficiency and uniformity of local 
governance are abandoned and embraced by local democracy models emphasized at the 
value of democracy and diversity in local governance; 
(ii) Along with the shift in the model there has also been a shift from primarily 
deconcentration to the pre-eminence of decentralisation; 
(iii) There has been pruning and slimming of the organizational structure in order to shift 
the hierarchical and swollen organizational model to a flat and slim organizational model; 
(iv) The relationship between Dati II (Regency) and Dati I (Province) develops from being 
formerly dependent and subordinate and currently being independent and coordinate. 
The relationship pattern is created as a consequence of the change from the integrated 
prefectural system which is only partially at the provincial level. The embodiment of the 
integrated prefectural system in the province with the dual role of the Governor as Head 
of Province (KDH) and the Government Representative is intended to reintegrate 
autonomous regions that basically has the characteristics of separation; 
(v) the distribution of government affairs to the autonomous regions originally embraced 
by ultra-vires doctrine53 by detailing the affairs of the autonomous regional government 
shall be replaced by a general competence or open end arrangement detailing the 
functions of governance that are the competence of the Government and Province; 
(vi) The government control over autonomous regions initially inclined to coercive shifts 
to persuasive in order for discretion and the initiatives of autonomous regions to be more 
channelled. Consequently, the Government’s preventive and repressive control over Local 
policy is now only repressively; 
(vii) In the autonomous region finances, there was a shift from prioritizing specific grants 
to block grants; 
(viii) The concept of Regional Government originally covers KDH and DPRD according to 
Law no. 5/1974 now the concept refers only to the KDH and the Regional subordinates, 
while the DPRD is outside the Regional Government. KDH which was initially 
unaccountable to DPRD is now created accountable; 
(ix) The relationship between the Government and the autonomous regions during Law 
no. 5/1974 is unidirectional from top to bottom replaced with a reciprocal relationship 
model”. 
                                                          
53A term defined as ‘beyond the powers’ or without any authority. 
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A former MP from the GOLKAR faction during Habibie administration recounted that: 
“Decentralisation during Habibie’s tenure had the main goal of preventing any centralised 
power to a handful of people believed to always embark on corruptive practices. 
Additionally, through decentralisation as a major component of democratisation reform, 
the regional autonomy laws as the epitome of institutional change at the sub-national 
level changed the landscape of the decision-making process and gave more power to 
governors (KDH/Dati I), heads of districts/regions (Bupati/Dati II) and mayors 
(Walikota/Dati II)”. 
On the other hand, negative impacts also occur among others (i) a lot of leakages (corruption) and 
inefficient and effective budgetary usage; (ii) exposure to potential uproar caused by regional 
unpreparedness and incompleteness of regulatory design to implement the decentralisation process, 
in the form of decentralisation of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) which contradicts the spirit 
of regional autonomy. If the previous character of KKN is more vertical with the above institutions take 
the largest part, then since the era of autonomy KKN character is more horizontal with every line of 
government (regional) organizers take the same part. This then led to the autonomy of the region itself 
and is actually a double-edged knife that encourages the occurrence of political oligarchic by the local 
elite which also encourages the occurrence of political clientelism practices and the re-emergence of 
regional rebellion against the central government (Umam 2011). 
Another example, local governments try to increase local revenue due to their over-oriented PAD. The 
problem was, the increase in PAD coupled with duplicative policies was very burdensome to society 
and economic actors in particular. Most of the local regulations were considered to be the cause of 
the high-cost economy so as not to support efforts to improve the business climate in Indonesia, 
whether in the form of taxes, levies and non-fiscal charges. In this case, of course, the local government 
has acted as rent-seeker (Sari et al. 2012). 
Regardless of the debate about the positive and negative impacts of regional autonomy, at least 
various groups believe that there are many positive aspects of the implementation of the concept of 
regional autonomy in Indonesia, including (i) the increasing level of independence and regional 
capacity in managing regional economic development, areas that are more concerned with bottom-up 
planning, enhancing partnerships with various stakeholders; (ii) significant economic developments, 
marked by increases in Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), per capita income, economic growth, 
and improved intermediary function of commercial banks.  
While the results of the Indonesia Rapid Development Appraisal (IRDA) in 2002 study show that 
decentralisation has succeeded in promoting three important conditions, namely (i) increasing 
113 
 
awareness and respect for community participation in the political process at the local level; (ii) local 
government apparatuses have a stronger commitment to service delivery and feel the pressure of the 
community to improve the quality of public services; and (iii) local governments work together and 
share information to solve the problems they face together. Nevertheless, SMERU (2002) revealed the 
fact that many areas impose new levies that have the potential to hamper the investment climate and 
the passion of local businesses (Utomo 2010). 
Several governments around the world including Indonesia have adopted decentralisation and 
regional autonomy policies. Empirical results indicate that the success of decentralisation has 
increased the efficacies of bureaucratic institutions, and has successfully accommodated from the 
pressure of political forces. In contrast, the lack of decentralisation and regional autonomy have 
threatened economic and political stability and disrupted the provision of public services (Bird and 
Vaillancourt, 1998, Ter-Minassian, 1997; World Bank, 2000; Shah, 2003).  
Based on this opinion, this study analyses the impact of the decentralisation and regional autonomy 
to the SEZ policy success and failure in Indonesia and the way it unfolds. Since the decentralisation law 
was enacted, there was the development of a new conflict represented by the presence of regional 
arrogance (in the name of autonomy or decentralisation dealing with the central government on behalf 
of centralization). The possible implications of this institutional constraint represented by the series of 
conflicts are reflected in the empirical chapters 5 and 6. For example, the drama between two FTZ 
governing bodies in Batam, one who gained full autonomy to oversee the region after decentralisation 
and one who represents the central government. It is characterised by the uncertainty of the rules of 
the game that resulted in a high-cost economy in particular in the provision of public services and 
regional economic development through the FTZ concept.  
 Wahid Period 
Continuing the leadership baton, Abdurrahman Wahid, chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the 
country’s largest Islam organisation, and Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Islamic National 
Awakening Party (PKB), was elected as the fourth president in October 1999. At the start of his 
leadership, with the holding of democratic elections, the situation stabilised. Despite having a deft 
political touch and gaining a likely stable social condition, the economic aspect at the time was under 
scrutiny. The Wahid administration could not ensure a firmer grasp of the economy. It happened due 
to instability in the cabinet (McLeod 2000: 5 in Jan Luiten 2012: 419). Wahid failed to manage the 
cabinet and the economy, both of which are indicators of a successful leader for their political 
compromise. This can be understood from the frequent reshuffles in the cabinet during his reign and 
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assigning a family member as a minister. Nepotism once again was practised in his period as stated by 
The Economist:  
“Some suspect their dismissals formed part of a deal to shore up political support for Mr 
Wahid in the diffuse coalition he heads. It has not helped that he has appointed his 
unqualified brother to a job in an important bank-restructuring agency” (18 May 2000).  
When it came to policymaking, Wahid used the same manipulative tactics. He not only brought societal 
figures such as civic leaders and academics to his cabinet, to create a system of checks and balances 
among the various factions in Wahid’s ‘rainbow coalition’, but he also appointed empowered group of 
ministers that came from military offices and members of political parties (Bresnan 2005: 173). 
Unfortunately, it did not seem to work as expected with investors due to his narrow political and 
economic base (Chew 2000-Japan Times). In effect, due to few reformers, there was a lack of cohesion 
within the cabinet and instability in the economic condition. Investors’ legitimate concerns were that 
not only was Wahid lacking the knowledge of economic management ….” his economic ministers were 
at loggerheads with each other and with him, adding to the policy disharmony; and that his political 
aims are interfering with economic policymaking” (The Economist-18 May 2000; Kellerman 2004).  
Nevertheless, to gain full control, Wahid managed to reduce the military’s political role. But it led to 
the loss of military support and incapability of his administration to survive the leadership role. 
Furthermore, he was unable to address issues of regional conflicts plagued by violence such as 
continued social unrest nuanced by the disintegration and racist movements54. This led to military 
withdrawal from efforts to help settle or resolve the outbursts, resulting in the undermining of his 
presidency (Gorjão in Soesastro et al. 2003: 13).      
Wahid’s political exercise was regarded as signifying a dramatic shift to nationalist ideals by investors. 
However, the real performance of Wahid’s regime—i.e. prioritising his frequent and eclectic overseas 
travels to as many countries as possible within each trip—have been largely contrary to Sukarno’s 
nationalism he so highly inspired. For example, with regards to the development of SEZ, Wahid had 
been delaying the fiscal incentives (VAT and Luxury Sales Tax) for investors in Batam in early 2000 and 
re-establishing the Law on FTZ No. 1/2000 in order to solve the lack of political will on the side of the 
legislative body (DPR) at the time as discussed in Chapter 6.  
However, a year later, on 23 July 2001, he managed to freeze the legislative authority of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) and House of Representatives (DPR) by issuing a decree to counter the 
allegation from the members of parliament (MPs). He also decreed to freeze GOLKAR as he feared 
                                                          
54For example, Aceh insurgency, Maluku conflict, and Central Kalimantan ethnic strife, not to mention the more 
frequent labour demonstrations that reflect their increasing dissatisfaction of the domestic economic condition, 
as well as greater political elite contention. 
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GOLKAR’s political influence would threaten to overturn his position (Liputan 6 News—24th July 2001). 
He returned the legitimate role of the MPR/DPR to the people as the highest sovereign power.  
This conflict of authority not only showed his lack of credible commitment to the people but was 
construed as illegitimate and a sign of his authoritative rule. However, while ineffective in stabilising 
both the politics and the economy, he was replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of 
Sukarno) who had previously served as his popular Vice President.  
 Megawati Period 
In 2001, the MPR held a special session to address the freezing of MPR/DPR and GOLKAR’S role by 
Wahid. Subsequently, Megawati officially led Indonesia despite her long engagement in the political 
arena when she served as an MP, chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDI-P), and 
long before, a student activist in Indonesian National Student Movement or GMNI55 (Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia).  
Unlike Wahid, Megawati did not show her sense of nationalism that her late father had proudly 
displayed due to public and international pressures for urgent economic recovery. Her emphasis on 
development led her to reiterate her commitment to fulfilling the constitutional mandate in the 
Preamble of the 1945 Constitution where it clearly states that the Indonesian government should 
contribute to the shaping of “a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, and 
equitably shared prosperity” (Anwar 2003: 77). In doing so, she put pragmatic economic needs over 
her nationalist pride and prestige—contrary to Sukarno’s belief—and further tried to secure support 
for territorial integrity and forge closer regional cooperation with ASEAN counterparts by her travels 
to those countries. She aimed at convincing the ASEAN leaders of her ability to overcome the deep-
rooted common problems such as terrorist threats, secessionist movements, and continuing economic 
crisis. It was understood as a necessary action for the continuing viability of the organisation and it 
signalled the regional association’s centrality in her foreign policy approach (Ibid: 81). Shortly after 
assuming the presidency, in August 2001, Megawati fulfilled a promise she had with her constituencies 
at Aceh and Papua provinces through Laws which granted Aceh and Papua special privileges and 
became Special Autonomy provinces by consecutively issued Laws No. 18/2001 on Special Autonomy 
of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam Province and No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy of Papua Province. 
Subsequently the regional autonomy snowball rolled and entered the second phase (the first phase 
was the first decentralisation law No. 22/1999) marked by passing a new Labour Law No. 13/2003 as 
                                                          
55GMNI was born with intrinsic identity as an organisation of cadres and struggles based on the teachings of 
Sukarno to realise the Socio Nationalism, Socio Democracy, and belief in the one and only God to build Indonesia 
Nation and Character Building (http://www.gmni.or.id/). 
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a further form of assurance and incentive to foreign investors that Indonesia was committed to 
maintaining the low wage levels56 and thus would provide greater profit margins for private companies 
in their production cost (Daeng 2008: 89). Three other attributable laws were created relating to the 
State finance namely, Law No. 17/2003 on State Finance, Law No. 1/2004 on State Treasury, and Law 
No. 15/2004 regarding Audit of State Financial Management and Accountability. 
She did not stop there, Hertzmark (2007) stated that: 
“In November 2001, Megawati immediately launched Law No. 22/2001 regarding Oil and 
Gas giving more concern to the domination of foreign oil companies over state-owned 
PERTAMINA by facilitating more extensive exploitation. The foreign companies also 
dominated the upstream to the downstream (retail trade) end of the production chain”.  
In addition, Megawati made some concrete yet controversial steps in the context of rebuilding 
Indonesia’s economy which had collapsed after AFC hit most countries in Southeast Asia. The first step 
shortly after taking office was to embark upon relatively expansive macroeconomic policies to recover 
the state budget deficit that was falling apart post-crisis and had an impact on the people’s basic needs. 
She further aimed at improving the regional autonomy and growth of per capita income. Like the 
growing paradigms in the current administration, the measure to rescue the state budget deficit was 
by cutting subsidies as the fastest option due to the state revenue not being maximised. The Megawati 
government was also opting for short-term policies that were expected to quickly stabilise the 
economic situation that was undergoing a process of rebuilding, such as the reduction of subsidies to 
strategic sectors like fuel, electricity, telecommunications, etc.  
In the political context, most people are aware that the government’s actions do not provide any 
impact other than a form of state failure in fulfilling the basic needs of society. As conferred by former 
GOLKAR party official, 
“The logic used by Megawati’s government at the time…even today…in the economic 
context was considered very irrational. Arguably, it was a modest attempt to create a 
wider gap. Their systemic impact led to more fundamental problems with society’s 
purchasing power, as well as affecting the psychology of the people longing for a leader 
who truly embodied the mandate that they offer to the state”.  
A literature by Kawamura in Kasuya 2013: 174-186 supported these comments by referring Megawati’s 
action with her strategic policy decision which drove public sentiments, as follows: 
“The increased tariff rates on energy (fuel and electricity) and telecommunications would 
represent a fatal decision for the long-term economy, especially for the domestic-scale 
economy. Public sentiments emerged based on the result of an actual analysis made by 
previous scholars that the increased tariff rates had eroded the microeconomic. Lacking 
careful consideration, this ill-advised policy was contrary to Megawati’s well-known 
                                                          
56One of the ‘race to the bottom’ characteristics 
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“wong cilik” ideology—the pioneer of Indonesian grassroots society. The reduction of the 
public sectors subsidy had ultimately reduced the level of market demand of the lower-
class society. Further, it generated a higher gap between macro entrepreneurs and the 
lower-class society whose everyday basic needs continued to skyrocket”.  
Even more controversially, Megawati introduced SOE privatisation and trade liberalisation as her 
stabilisation measures. The policy was due to external pressures, particularly from the IMF and the 
World Bank when Megawati restored normal dealings with the IFIs and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and also lobbied to request Indonesia’s debt rescheduling of US$5.8 billion at the 3rd Paris Club meeting 
in 2000 (Anwar in Soesastro et al. 2003: 74). Her LOI reaffirmed the GOI’s commitment to remove any 
remaining distortions in trade structure and circumvent any introduction of new trade barriers to 
maintain a neoliberal trade regime, which also refers to the ideological legitimacy set forth by Soeharto 
since the 1980s. 
As remarked at length by a former official at the Ministry of Trade that: 
“Many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the days of the NO until RDO were 
unprofitable even though market fundamentalism economists often occupied important 
posts in Indonesian economic policy, for example, Boediono, who created controversy. 
When Boediono was the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, the micro-climate in 
Indonesia was not growing due to the gap between the macro and micro sector, while 
leading the Central Bank (BI), he took extreme measures in response to the crisis. Extreme 
policies such as a free foreign exchange regime and allowing interest rates to determine 
market forces were taken which embodied patterns advocated by the market 
fundamentalists. These policies demonstrated a very destructive and mechanical model”. 
Mechanical means that the market moved like a pendulum swing that was driven without the control 
(the principal) and without the perpetrator (the agent) of the state. The benchmarks of economic well-
being according to the order of market fundamentalism are a foreign direct investment (FDI) and loans. 
Before providing loans, the loan agents monitor the macroeconomic policies of a country and should 
be investor-friendly which means running the liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation policies 
while downsizing the role played by the state as a regulator in the market. 
The media also expressed their concern and supported the view that: 
“Megawati’s pragmatist policymaking was not much different from the NO not only in 
dealing with loans but on overall economic policy. The only excuse was that she simply 
continued the agreements made by the previous administration through the loan 
agreement ties. In addition, the consideration to privatise the SOEs was to seek 
funding by securing the loan and foreign investor support to cover the state budget 
deficit. Clearly, Megawati inherited a chaotic economic condition due to the AFC. In 
the period from 1991 to 2001, the GOI made fourteen ill-judged attempts to privatise 
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the SOEs and twelve SOEs were successfully privatised. Megawati expressed her 
reason that the programme was to prevent leakage of the state budget, the monopoly 
of certain business conglomerates, and that the programme was a continuation from 
the previous regime” (Detik News—31st May 2011).  
For example, IMF exerted pressure to release INDOSAT (A State-Owned Telecommunication 
Company). Based on the LOI with the IMF in 1997, there was an obligation for INDOSAT to release its 
subsidiaries totalling approximately thirty firms. In this case, the state as the last gate to foreign 
intervention failed to carry out its political sovereignty. The political atmosphere heated up when SOEs’ 
high-rank officials were forced to confront the Chairman of the MPR. Harsh criticism came from various 
elements, in particular, by one of the reformists from the National Mandate Party (PAN), Mr Amien 
Rais and the National Awakening Party (PKB) faction that opposed the decision to sell assets belonging 
to the country. The analysis of the current political context was by no means simply repeating the 
political map in the NO regime. In the Megawati era, everything was seen as the result of the echoes 
of democracy—fairly new in the ears of the society. Thus, the democratic principles of accountability 
and transparency were being intensified at various administrative levels (Anwar in Soesastro et al. 
2003: 83).  
Although the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as a form of third-party enforcement 
mechanism was established, there was no concrete breakthrough. Indonesian development was highly 
affected at the time by the circles of oligarchs and bourgeois who were involved specifically in shaping 
the KPK as a vehicle for their personal interest to secure their economic supremacy. Their perpetuation 
was a form of affirmation against the extensive anti-corruption campaign prevalent in a country in 
transition to a democracy (Klinken 2009, 2011).  
In the final year of her rule in 2004, Megawati made another drastic move. First, she validated a 
regulation amending the Forestry Law of 199957, which gave mining companies—mostly overseen and 
owned by foreign affiliates—the right to exploit protected forest areas. This policy was broadly 
rejected by Indonesian civil society, in particular by social movement activists58. Second, the various 
experiences and lessons encountered during the 5 years of implementation of regional autonomy in 
October 2004, her government issued a new policy on regional autonomy with the enactment of Law 
No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance and Law No. 33/2004 on Financial Balance between Central and 
Local Government. The spirit contained in the laws was intended to carry out one of the main agendas 
of reform in the national budgeting system under the decentralisation policy by reducing the negative 
                                                          
57Government Regulation in lieu of Law (Perpu) No. 1/2004 concerning the amendment of Forestry Law 
58Approximately eleven non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and eighty individuals from various regions 
requested a judicial review to the Constitutional Court (MK) to annul the Law No. 19/2004 on the Stipulation of 
Perpu No. 1/2004 on the Amendment Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry became Law (Daeng 2010 13). 
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impacts of previous legislation. These laws were made to clarify the rules regarding the authority of 
monitoring local government performance and local budget approval by the central and regional 
parliaments that seemed to overlap under the 1945 Constitution (Lindsey 2008: 148). The law 
substantially changed some paradigms and is respectively revisions to improve the Law No. 22/1999 
and Law No. 25/1999. This stage is referred to as the third phase (Mungkasa 2013). One of them is 
decentralisation and deconcentration is seen as something continuum (sequential) and not 
dichotomous (divided). In the formation of regions, Law No. 32/2004 also regulates administrative, 
technical, and physical requirements of the territory. It is intended that the formation of regions can 
ensure optimal service delivery. 
Megawati’s style of policymaking, therefore, entailed a more pragmatic and utilitarian approach over 
national sentiments and emphasised development over independence, more importantly from 
overdependence on foreign investors and loans. 
The Perils of Stagnation 
Ultimately, these events have influenced the economic performance, especially in the manufacturing 
industry and export sector. During the reform order, Indonesian industrial development tended to 
stagnate (Tomsa 2010; Fealy 2011).  
An official from the Ministry of Industry observed, 
“Industry is one of the indicators of progress in a country. A country will be more 
developed if a larger share of the industry contributes to the national economy. Currently, 
the world is in the globalization era, global economic activity has been restructuring which 
affected domestic economic activity including industry. Addressing such changes, the 
industry is required to adapt (cope), among others, to make flexible institutional changes. 
The interests of the industry in addition to being flexible should operate efficiently to 
create profit. With such advantages, the existence of the industry will be sustained”. 
However, the fact that the industrial performance at the time did not meet the Ministry of Industry’s 
expectation is revealed in Table 4.3. Indonesian exports did not change from being raw materials even 
up until the end of the SBY period. Compared to neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia 
still relied largely on exports of primary products with a share of 31.1%, compared to Malaysia with 
only 13.3% (which like Indonesia also has extensive natural resources). Poor conditions are also evident 
in the manufacturing industry, where the proportion of low-end technology products such as textiles, 
footwear, and low-end electronics or so-called ‘footloose industry’ SEZs were highest compared to 
other countries. Indonesia recorded a score of 18.1% for this component. Indonesia is far behind the 
industrialisation of Singapore which was able to record up to 96.2% in terms of manufacturing 
exports—largely contributed by the export of technology-intensive industries such as machinery and 
transport equipment (70.1% share of total exports) (Hausmann et al. 2006). 
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Theories suggest, SEZ should create a cluster of industrial production activities which help the economy 
boost economic growth performance, but this evidence tells otherwise. 
Table 4.3  
 
Based on the above data, the evidence suggests that until 2004 Indonesia had not escaped from the 
structure of ‘peripheral capitalism’. The reliance on primary products to support manufacturing 
production as well as for exports trapped Indonesia in being more dependent on the international 
market where foreign multinationals as capital owners hold the global dominant economic power. 
Indonesia is vulnerable as a peripheral capitalist state due to its reassertion of the NO leadership as 
the colonial legacy was characterised by the damage caused by economic depression and war. Alavi 
(1982) suggested that this placed its leaders in a bizarre situation: “their economic policies especially 
tended to delegitimize the regime, but to maintain a political structure in which they could pursue their 
economic interest required political legitimacy”. 
In the same year, on the back of Indonesia’s serious leadership credential issue, SBY won the 
presidential election. His administration proved itself enthusiastic about attracting foreign capital but 
the promotion was mostly hampered by the issues of inadequate infrastructure, land acquisition, 
labour issues as well as the completion of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) regulations. 
 SBY First Term (2004-2009) – The Rise of The Democratic Order  
 
The next tenure led by SBY was construed as an ex-post governance to ‘get the institutional support 
right’ due to the lessons learned from previous administrations. He gained unprecedented popularity 
and defeated Megawati in the direct presidential elections in 2004. Despite the president enjoying the 
mandate as a popular independent leader, the parliament (DPR) was and still the only authorised entity 
to hold regulatory and fiscal accountability to approve the passage of legislation and budget. DPR 
acquired strong bargaining power on the lobbying for voting arrangements in the drafting of the 
budget and legislation as well as an enforcement mechanism for the questioning of public officials 
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(executive powers) over matters of public accountability. This was also evident in the formal 
independence of the judiciary. It only underlines the need for serious measures to finalise changes to 
the constitution. It represents how the polity gets the formal ‘rules of the game’ right.  
“Christianto Wibisono argues that parliament has become ‘a monster’ that has no 
compunction about squeezing the executive, a view that is widely shared among Jakarta’s 
political elite” (Dick and Mulholland in Aspinall and Klinken 2011: 75).  
SBY’s presidency experienced both achievements and shortcomings. Compared to previous presidents, 
under his leadership, President SBY recorded the highest number of cabinet reshuffles59. Moreover, in 
terms of community development, SBY later either formed or re-enforced several symbolic reform 
agencies under his direct supervision to assist him in an anti-corruption campaign, among others re-
enforcing KPK’s task to eradicate corruption, the Inspectorate General, and the Supreme Audit Board 
(BPK), while the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) was divided into regions 
(Buehler: The Diplomat-5th February 2013).  
Moreover, despite the administration was good at planning concealed under pro-poor rhetoric and 
unenthusiastic support, SBY was destroyed in the implementation and supervision. This was evident 
when corruption continued and the bureaucracy remained completely unreformed. Once again 
Indonesia’s elites, oligarchs, and bourgeois utilised their political influence to safeguard their individual 
interests to gain financial benefit and keep the judiciary in a shambles (Ibid) (Kompas—26th June 2008). 
In Stiglitz’s words (Project Syndicate—15th June 2015) “financial markets tend to induce short-sighted 
politicians to loosen today’s budget constraints or to lend to flagrantly corrupt governments”.  
In SBY’s first period (2004-2009), Indonesia’s economic development began to improve with the 
gradual withdrawal of the budget subsidies of petroleum and gas which had been a burden to the 
government. Although FDI performance was unstable between 2004—2006 as shown in figure 4.9, the 
government handed over the price of goods to the market mechanism where the domestic economic 






                                                          
59There was no change of ministers in the Megawati era while when led by Wahid there were more than five 
ministers replaced (Tempo—11th April 2013). 
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Figure 4.9 FDI net inflows (2004-2014) 
 
Economically it indicated an improvement, however, there were still many Indonesians who lived in 
poverty; with rising unemployment, the rupiah exchange rate still hovered around 9,000 per US$1, 
purchasing power was relatively low, and the corruption level was still in the top five countries in the 
world (Corruption Perception Index from the Transparency International), etc.  
Roots of the institutional intricacy in SEZ programme 
Based on the interviews to some researchers conducted at the IGJ office, there are several relevant 
formal institutions to attract foreign investors which yield SEZ policy to be formulated, such as Natural 
Resource Management Law (PSDA), Energy Law, Minerals and Coal Law, Electricity Law, Investment 
Law (UUPM), and Land Acquisition Law. The culmination of the SBY government’s pro-foreign capital 
measure was the new Investment Law they put before parliament in 2007.  
IGJ researcher noted that: 
“While the NO regime applied the economic liberalisation by opening foreign investment, 
the SBY-Jusuf Kalla (JK) regime enhanced it through the passing of the new Investment 
Law No. 25/2007. This policy put foreign investment, domestic investment, small-medium 
enterprises (SMEs), and the people’s economic sector in the atmosphere of free 
competition in extracting resources and market share”.  
The implication is obvious: huge foreign capital will dominate, while the domestic capital and small 
economy will gradually lose from external competition due to their lack of skills and industrial strength.  
IGJ researcher further exclaimed, 
“The adoption of this principle into Indonesian Investment Law is considered subversion 
to the 1945 Constitution, which mandates the state to protect Indonesians’ welfare. The 
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equal treatment for domestic and foreign investment is to serve the interests of 
developed regions, especially the US, the European Union, and Japan”.  
A literature by Daeng (2008) and (2010) supported this opinion. 
“The government attempted to put investment issues into trade issues. The investment 
law superseded the long-standing legacy of investment policies from the new order, they 
are the Law No. 1/1967 on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Law No. 6/1968 on 
Domestic Direct Investment (DDI). However, the new investment policy was valued as 
disadvantageous to the interests of the people and the country not only it weakened state 
accountability for meeting Indonesian basic needs, but all FDI-related economic sectors 
by encouraging more land grabbing and violence in civil societies”.  
There was growing public disenchantment with the incumbent regime after public opinion polls. In 
effect, they showed at least 70 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), mass organisations, and judicial 
reviews responses to the Constitutional Court that backed withdrawing the law. Moreover, the new 
Investment Law enshrined principles of equal treatment for foreigners into domestic law that 
consequently removed all obstacles for foreign-based transnational (TNC) and MNC to gain more 
control over natural and economic resources in Indonesia. These powerful TNCs and MNCs were given 
a free reign to crowd out smaller and weaker domestic companies (Daeng 2008: 216-263).  
Through the Investment Law, which allotted a substantial amount of land to foreign investors, the 
democratic regime continued to expect more capital accumulation. According to SBY, every year 
Indonesia needs foreign investment amounting to US$2,000 trillion, of which Japan is expected to fill 
half of the needs and the rest from other countries (Seputar Indonesia News 2009). The president’s 
statement marked further Indonesian openness to foreign investment that can play a leading role in 
boosting economic development and labour expansion. It contains a challenge for the Japanese—as 
the foreign entrepreneurs with the highest contribution of inward FDI since the NO—to take advantage 
of the investment opportunities provided by the government. 
In support of the new Investment Law and the plan to set up an economic corridor prior to the upgrade 
of Batam’s status in becoming an FTZ, the SBY government through the parliament enacted the new 
Spatial Planning Law No. 26/2007 as a replacement for the earlier Law of 1992 in parallel with the 
decentralisation programme of RDO. This law authorised the local government to draft their own 
formal rules, especially in spatial arrangement and development plans accordingly.   
The SBY-JK regime believed that the economic nationalism is not enough to boost economic 
development in the country. Foreign investment can lead to industrialisation and as a key driving force 
for economic growth based on exports, which is to encourage agro-processing industry for exports. 
Indonesia’s exports and the SEZ developments are still too dominated by labour-intensive industry, 
even though there were several initiatives have been taken to advance the industrialisation and 
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infrastructure. However, Indonesia overly relying on primary commodity exports shows that the 
industrial sector is stagnant.  
As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, this study will show that over time, Jakarta 
consolidated its authority over primary commodities, i.e. timber, coal mining and other minerals, and 
palm oil licences by moving against those district and provincial governments in commodity based-SEZ 
policies, which contradicts the earlier regional autonomy legislation (McCarthy in Aspinall and Klinken 
2011: 103). The Jakarta government had been allowing the neoliberal system to flourish without 
deepening the industrial structure in the domestic market. There was a high dependence on foreign 
capital and exploitation within the ‘forest zone’. Consequently, the foreign capital in these SEZs can 
easily move abroad, whereas almost no domestic entrepreneur is able to replace this position resulting 
in the termination or drastic decline in the flow of exports, foreign exchange, and employment. 
The policy choice to place domestic and foreign investment under a single regime shows a complete 
lack of recognition of the more positive correlation between prosperity and domestic investment and 
development of nationally-owned industries. The failure to protect national interests was creating a 
distinct imbalance, which goes a long way to explaining why increases in investment are not reflected 
in a corresponding increase in the welfare of the people. If we look at the BI report in 2004, it showed 
that 80% of growth came from the consumer sector. Investment only accounted for 16% and the 
remaining 4% were exported. The development of national industry has not departed from the 
development of production bases. The lack of capacity of Indonesia’s production base is reflected in 
new production capacity reaching 70% of the installed capacity. That is still 30% idle (idle-capacity). 
This is exacerbated by the increasing destruction of the corporate sector of the textile industry (Textile 
and Textile Products) as a result of the invasion of Chinese textile products and the elimination of the 
Multi-Fibre Association (MFA) system. 
Another disturbing point is when a statement given by one of SBY-JK’s well-known technocrats, former 
member of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, and former Minister of 
Trade, Mari Pangestu in the signing of Agreement on Trade in Goods between ASEAN members and 
China in November 200460, appeared to correlate with the issue of imported raw materials (Ministry 
of Trade website). Paradoxically, she looked positively on the Indonesia-China trade deficit, where the 
increase in Indonesian imports is mainly driven by the need for raw material components and 
                                                          
60After two years of negotiations it was finally agreed upon. 
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supplementary materials rather than to fulfil the demand for consumer products (Booth 2009). Her 
statement raised some debate among most of the nationalist groups61.  
Consequently, the GOI were faced with a dilemma whereby on the one hand the import of these 
components is necessary for the national industry, but on the other this fact also shows the weakness 
of the supporting industry structure and the inter-linkage industry in Indonesia which is not able to 
meet the backward linkage industry and should be met from other countries. Ironically, Indonesia has 
imported cheap raw material products from China which is actually a latecomer in terms of 
industrialisation. In just a short time, through its SEZs, China has created its own supporting industries 
that not only empower the domestic business sector but also ensure the availability of cheap raw 
materials and the country’s new source of competitiveness other than cheap labour. 
The SBY period was a watershed in modern democratic history (Aspinall et al. 2015). SBY “was not only 
the first Indonesian president to be directly elected but also the first to be democratically re-elected” 
(Ibid: 5). It generally meets the basic democratic procedural criteria (Mainwaring 1989) to provide 
protection for all citizens on the rights to vote and be voted, guarantee traditional civil liberties without 
any pressure, and guarantee their security. Political parties flourished with 42 participating in the 2004 
presidential election which then increased competitive elections. The election system also embodies 
the principal route to political office (Aspinall et al. 2015: 3). Freedom of speech for all citizens to 
express their opinions either through mass media or demonstrations was framed by a more flexible 
applicable law. None of which applied to the NO regime. “Moreover, the stability of those new rules 
suggests, in Higley’s (2006) terminology, a new elite consensus that imposes limits on the extent of the 
conflict and allows for effective cooperation to mutual benefit” (Ibid). 
“Since the collapse of the New Order, the government has missed almost every 
opportunity to turn its economic boom into a positive force for all Indonesians. Serious 
and comprehensive reforms of Indonesia’s political institutions have been anathema to 
the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government and most of the president’s political 
appointees almost from day one in their decade-long reign” (Buehler: The Diplomat-5 
February 2013). 
The high incidence of corruption in the SBY period is not so different from in Soeharto’s regime: 
corruption increasingly dispersed, no longer confined to the centre of power, because of governance 
problems remaining high. Thus, the issue of governance always coheres with the life of the nation, 
with merely a different nuance. To that end, it is necessary to refer to the pattern of business and 
politics today as a form of accumulation of corruption from the previous events in the NO. Hadiz (2005: 
                                                          
61President SBY’s macroeconomic stabilisation programme from 2004 to 2009 was mainly driven by technocrat 
groups such as Finance Minister, Sri Mulyani and the Governor of the Indonesian Central Bank (BI), Boediono. 
Meanwhile, nationalist groups scarcely left a trace after Habibie’s period in office. 
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244) suggests that the politico-business capitalist oligarchy within new political frameworks in the 
democratic order restructured their economic power to retain the deep-rooted state-business elite 
relations from the NO. The situation demonstrates that patrimonial relations, entrenched in the NO, 
were still noteworthy in the Reformasi period (Webber 2006: 2). It provides a general understanding 
of politics, economics and society of the transition effect from an authoritarian to a democratic regime 
(Robison 2012: 5-12).  
SBY came to office after the much turbulent transition. His government managed to hold Indonesia’s 
macroeconomic stability to a steady 5.6% annual growth rate and supporters view his presidency as a 
decade of remarkable political stability (Ibid). His period of democratic consolidation, against all odds, 
had succeeded amid the global financial crisis in 2008-09 (see Figure 3.2). He had impeccable 
credentials for the job of leading Indonesia toward a new egalitarian state. But critics view that other 
aspects of his rule have been the subject of controversy and a decade of missed opportunities and 
stagnation. Evidence suggests that political bargaining by clientelism persisted where political elites 
influenced the political process in the palace’s governing circle to create policies in their favour (Ibid). 
This is something that has become a tradition of Indonesian rulers. The reason is none other than these 
actors are the legacy of previous orders. Rent-seeking by elites persists in manipulating state 
bureaucracy from the lowest governance level.  
In the history of Indonesian politics, it appears that the roots of corruption have been the entrenched 
rent-seeking practice since the pre-independence era. The political elites in the parliament 
systematically used their power to influence the budget planning decision-making. Although it has 
been reconfigured, their behaviour remained. Moreover, the trend indicates a few MPs have business 
backgrounds and to illustrate this intricacy chapter 6 shows the power struggle of Batam’s governing 
bodies between BIDA and Pemkot Batam which was backed by the intricate relations of politico-
business. Such configuration became the state’s ‘parasite’, especially in terms of public funds 
management; therefore, the initiative to society’s welfare was just a mere expression. It implies that 
the big political issue is that the parliament has extensively transformed from an ideal form of House 
of Representatives to a House of Rent-seekers in buying their way to state power.  
Before his first term ended, SBY enacted the SEZ Law No. 39/2009 in order to build a well-structured 
governance which able to overcome the industrial, investment, and export stagnation as well as the 
actors’ partial network of coordination in the SEZ development trajectories. This marked for another 





 SBY’s second term (2010-2014) 
  
As mentioned in chapter 1, this study focuses on the new form of SEZ developed in the RDO era. During 
SBY’s second tenure, the GOI sought to resolve the formidable industrialisation stagnation, to increase 
investor confidence and to ensure an economically sustainable future, therefore, the GOI embarked 
on implementing its largest national economic development plan through a Master Plan for 
Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI) for the period of 2011 to 
2025. This long-term mega project was launched on 27th May 2011 with the spirit of ‘Not Business as 
Usual’ as the tagline.  
SBY’s administration convened a restricted cabinet meeting on 30th December 2010 attempting to 
address the increasingly challenging investment promotion. He instructed to further accelerate and 
expand the economy in order to propagate Indonesian competitiveness from the rest of the world so 
as to align with the developed countries. This form of economic reform was oriented to nurture labour-
absorbing capacity of the manufacturing sector and increase FDI through debottlenecking, ailing 
infrastructures and other investment-related services that were lacking. Strategic zone development 
was his most primary attention to materialise his goals, one of which was the new form of SEZ. 
The Changing Face of SEZ 
The new form of SEZ under the Law No. 39/2009 is a resource-based SEZ scheme highly dependent on 
extracting and exploiting Indonesia’s natural resources which is desperately needed in the country, for 
instance Batam FTZ and Palu SEZ for minerals and coal mining, Tanjung Api-Api for rubber industry, Sei 
Mangkei and Maloy Batuta SEZ for the crude palm oil (CPO) processing industry. Therefore, the state’s 
driving forces of Indonesian SEZ development are: taking the role to utilise regions which are not 
owned by the central or local government who more often work mechanistically, more project-
oriented and short-term-oriented; to prevent a greater backwash of natural resources occurring with 
the introduction of economic corridors as doors to facilitate upstream product marketing; and to 
develop a logistics system to facilitate distribution of commodities in supporting the upstream-
downstream development. 
The leap towards Indonesian economic transformation requires collaboration from key actors and 
stakeholder involvement in the SEZ-MP3EI financing between the central and local government, state 
and local-owned enterprises, to foreign and private sectors. This takes place through numerous 
financial schemes for achieving Indonesia Incorporated (BAPPENAS 2014); for example, Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) or joint venture scheme, state (APBN) and APBD budgetary (local budget) allocation, 
or loan schemes (from the World Bank and other financial institutions or foreign counterparts). The 
overall regional development is a division of a more dominant role in the development realisation. In 
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figure 4.10, the underdeveloped regions require greater financial injections from the government such 
as the KAPET, while FTZ and SEZ in MP3EI requires a greater private role to fund the construction of 
infrastructure and supporting facilities. While the GOI’s role, in this case, is more on providing special 
incentives (fiscal and non-fiscal) that are attractive to the private sectors especially investors. The fiscal 
incentives include investment allowance, tax holiday, import and excise tax exemptions etc. While non-
fiscal incentives include one-stop services on the bureaucratic formalities on land, labour, and licensing 
and other services required to increase investors confident. 
Figure 4.10 
  
The 210-page MP3EI document published by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA) 
includes the principles of the MP3EI megaproject and its conceptual and technical explanations on how 
the project is run and tries to convince the community to support this gigantic project.  
Taking the view of the Secretary of the SEZ National Council and his staffs in an interview at their head 
office explained with full confidence that: 
“The MP3EI project tries to overcome all obstacles in national development planning and 
of course this mega project is to accelerate development with an obsession to achieve 
high, inclusive and sustainable growth rates. As President Yudhoyono constantly said in 
his speech that Indonesia as a country in the midst of increasingly tight global competition, 
its position is increasingly taken into account and geographically located in the new centre 
of world economic gravity. President Yudhoyono feels confident to ensure that Indonesia 
will no longer be a world economic power and enter the ranks of developed countries. 
And the MP3EI giant project is the right reason to pick Indonesia into a big player country 
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in the global economy. This can be seen from the activities of Indonesia in regional and 
global forums such as the ASEAN Economic Community (MEA) 2015, G-20, APEC, WTO, 
and so on”. 
This optimism is relevant to Indonesia having the four basic capital i.e. demographic bonus which 
ensures Indonesia has a qualified human resources capacity, ability to manage natural resources that 
have added value, geographical formation of Indonesia in the epicentre of the world economy, and 
the world’s largest democracy. The MP3EI plan seems to reflect the idea of the Greater Mekong 
Corridor (Ishida 2009) and Kenya’s Master Plan Study for Kenyan Industrial Development (JICA 2007). 
The primary goal of MP3EI is to pave the way for an industrialised economy and to support the 
domestic economy to move up the global value chain. Through this master plan, government-led 
investment initiatives were said could deepen industries’ downstream connections by improving the 
infrastructure development to help industries become more competitive and trade more fluidly. 
However, according to Daeng (2010) and Basri (2013), MP3EI has more than meets the eye as criticism 
arose from various dimensions. Despite the collective effort from every aspect of society, the MP3EI 
model is outdated and unrealistic as it has downplayed and excluded the role played by cooperatives, 
academic institutions, and society.  
“It is very unfortunate that MP3EI has downplayed the participation of significant actors 
and limit the development involvement only to the bureaucratic and the business world. 
Cooperatives, universities and research institutions, non-governmental organisations and 
the community were excluded. It is no exaggeration to say that the society in the concept 
of MP3EI is an object of development, not the subject” (Basri 2013). 
This view was supported by the authors from IGJ who commented at length,  
“The awkwardness of this megaproject lies in the development policy formulation which 
does not involve every component of the nation. Stakeholders in this large MP3EI project 
do not involve civil society, and only involve the central government, local government, 
and SOEs (BUMN), local state companies (BUMD), and private sector (both domestic and 
foreign companies) to achieve Indonesia Incorporated. Likewise, the legislature is also 
responsible for rolling out the various legislation that paved the way for MP3EI and other 
investment flows. 
The same applies to the application of SEZ as an integral part of the single MP3EI system. 
The main problem of SEZ as an agglomeration zone is reaping a number of cases of seizure 
of space and often the country is in a prolonged agrarian conflict, as well as the basic 
changes in the geospatial level of development and marginalization of the ecological 
rights of society, thus creating social exclusion. In addition, the issue of space makes the 
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movement more limited due to the privatization of space. The case is encountered in 
Merauke (Eastern part of Indonesia) and some other zoning. Instead of being integrated, 
the reality is the disintegration of social and cultural space. Not to mention the issue of 
population migration explosion which is a serious problem in every zone programme. The 
explosion of social migration adds to social problems such as the loss of employment, 
social vulnerability and radical impoverishment. In the case of automated employment, 
the outsourcing system becomes a prerequisite for the successful economic development 
of zoning. What is also important is the capital flow and loan scheme, public-private 
partnerships, and other financing sources that add to the debt burden of the state.  
Open-ended regionalization makes the Indonesian government only distracted and 
outward-looking and ignores the essentials of development such as economic sovereignty 
based on independence and sovereign economic ethics appeared to be a constraining 
factor in the framework of open regionalization. The government is afraid of losing face 
abroad and is embarrassed if left behind and MP3EI is the justification for Indonesia’s 
backwardness in development-especially the acceleration of economic growth. The 
growth determinism in the MP3EI megaproject requires the strengthening of Human 
Resources capacity to succeed smooth MP3EI roads with research findings, national 
innovation systems and national education systems prepared to generate productive 
human resources as drivers of economic growth--education by design--to create value-
added and capitalization of science and technology leads to increased productivity and 
profitability of economic growth”. 
According to BAPPENAS (2014), public pressure and civil society in Indonesia since the demise of new 
order have forced some elements of government to make changes and adopt a new paradigm. The 
government can implement policies, but the process of designing and making policy should involve the 
public. The public in this respect covers a wide range of elements of the community, including the 
general public, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations, private sectors, higher education 
or academics, leading religious figures, and other community leaders. Ideally, all these parties should 
be involved in the policymaking process before it is formally approved by the government.  
Therefore, in a discussion with a panel of scholars, government officials and members of the local 
legislative bodies (November 25th, 2014): 
“There has been growing concerns that often the government considers that the 
representation of the general public has been facilitated in the people's representative 
body (the House of Representative of Parliament in the central and local region). But 
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because of public dissatisfaction over the performance, morale and effectiveness of these 
legislative bodies, there is growing pressure to engage with the wider community where 
there is indeed more adequate representation and it does not have to be formal”.  
In this respect, the possibility of this kind of actors’ behaviour is also seen in the next chapter where 
KKSS as a kinship-based organisation had influenced KBN leaders over the decision and political 
affiliation. 
SEZ as one of MP3EI’s main products (See Figure 4.11) and the manifestation of the new Indonesian 
Investment Act No. 25/2007 also expected to increase investment or business by lowering production 
and transport costs in resource-based localities, foreign exchange earnings, and use of local resources, 
services, and capital to increase exports and spur economic growth. Therefore, other policies are 
needed to cover the principal criteria for selecting the SEZ area that meets the requirements. To 
approve policies required by the regions, the government provides institutions that have international 
standards for organising the investment services.  
However, scepticism still came from Basri (2013) who argues that the tagline represented misguided 
thought after considering SOEs that joined the PPP scheme will gain much advantage. He also argues 
that throughout Indonesian history, SOEs have been unable to compete globally except for a few 
conglomerates run by pervasive crony capitalists62 from the NO period (Ibid: Survey and analytical 
report 2013).  
Figure 4.11 
 
In order to further strengthen the legal frameworks of the 2005 and 2006 Presidential Decrees on Land 
Procurement, the government enacted further powerful regulatory mechanisms for land acquisition 
                                                          
62Kang (2002) and Krueger (2002) 
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in 2012. The new mechanism regulated the implementation of the law and support the Investment 
Law, not to mention to resolve the issues of compensation and justice while eliminating barriers to 
infrastructure development (Ponggawa 2012).  
“These regulations will provide necessary, fair and better compensation, i.e. money and 
land, resettlement, stock ownership, and/or other forms as agreed with the affected 
parties. It gives legal certainty in the planning, preparation, and execution where the 
previous decrees failed to provide an adequate solution (Ibid).  
As supported by the BAPPENAS and CMEA officials, the GOI claimed, 
“The Investment Law, Spatial Planning Law, and Land Procurement Law would accelerate 
infrastructure development to achieve sustainable economic growth and equitable 
development”.  
Moreover, they were expected to improve the ease of doing business and regain investor confidence 
(Wulandari 2012). Further literature suggests, these types of formal institutions ultimately enhance 
the Indonesian investment climate (Molnar and Lesher 2008) assisted by the decentralisation 
programme (Bird et al. 2008; Basri and Hill 2009). 
However, based on the discussion carried out in the field with researchers from IGJ on the laws, 
“those so-called legal frameworks are more likely to create an institutional environment 
that failed to deliver growth prospects particularly on the following grounds: it is 
increasingly difficult for the workers and peasants to gain access to capital and economic 
resources, it legitimises the accumulation by dispossession of people’s land to serve a 
handful of rich people and the interests of MNCs by providing greater opportunities for 
investors to take control”.  
The finding suggests, the GOI has been attempting to sustain their neoliberal ideology through these 
legislations which show how the GOI embraced the decentralisation policy not as a mere formal rule 
to guide the state towards the context of good governance but under the pretext that these rules could 
accelerate the national economy. 
Borrowing Rodrik’s (2000) argument, there are potential risks of falling into a perpetual cycle of 
institutional change, through new legislation, that entails no effect on growth if Indonesia has 
embedded institutional norms. The GOI has shown its weakness by only focusing their economic policy 
under mainstream NCE on production efficiency and price mechanism to achieve economic growth 
and ignore the social norms. 
Furthermore, during SBY’s democratic government, Indonesia experienced symptoms of de-
industrialisation (Gobel 2009). As shown in Table 4.4, the growth performance of the tradable sectors 
especially manufacturing sector was often very small and below the average national economic growth 
from 2005 to 2012 as compared to non-tradable sectors which grew more rapidly (Thee 2012: 129). 
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Indonesia’s growth performance increased from 4.6% in 2005 to 5.73% in 2012 but plummeted 
significantly in 2009 against the backdrop of the SBY-Boediono administration and the second year of 
the global financial and economic crisis. On the one hand, other tradable sectors such as the mining 
sector unexpectedly declined and even had an opposite experience in 2009 when they achieved their 
highest performance. The primary sector, on the other hand, had a slight increase from the period. 
Meanwhile, the non-tradable sectors such as tertiary services sector (generally capital intensive, do 
not absorb much labour, and depend on domestic market) appear very dynamic with growth far above 
the average national economic growth. Nevertheless, trading, hotel and restaurant sectors as well as 
the financial, leasing and business sectors had a similar experience to the manufacturing sector during 
the 2009 occurrences and plunged to levels of great concern. Their growth performances had a slight 
increase or tended to stagnate in 2012 (Hill 2009: 9 in Thee 2012: 9). 
Table 4.4 
 
An official from BKPM with more than twenty years’ experience remarked that: 
“Attracting foreign investors is not limited to doing whatever it takes to ensure capital 
inflow. It requires appropriate investment policies that strike a balance between providing 
profitable business opportunities for foreign investors and devising restrictions and 
obligations for these investors to ensure sufficient returns to the nation. Appropriate laws 
must be established to ensure that investment growth goes hand in hand with increased 
prosperity. The Indonesian economy until the first quarter of 2013 has shown the ability 
to withstand external shocks although pressures to the economy increased from external 
and domestic factors. However, to keep the performance going will much depend on the 
national economic policy structure which to some extent includes the investment and SEZ 
policy”.  
Domestically, political and social uncertainties and supply-side contraction may jeopardize Indonesia’s 
development forecasts. SBY-Boediono, who have claimed to be pro-growth, pro-job, pro-poor, and 
pro-environment since 2004, drew world attention and compliments for their ability to bring Indonesia 
among the top twenty most preferred investment destinations for investors (reaching 17th in the 
ranking) and 4th prospective host economy for 2013-2015 (UNCTAD 2013 survey).  
A former MP of PPP faction, now Secretary General in one of the SBY cabinet stated that:  
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“Given that the Indonesian economy does not rely too much on exports to western 
countries, which had been first affected by the unexpected AFC calamity, it was not so 
affected by the 2008 global recession with the high-interest rates of the US. However, the 
Middle East amplified geopolitical conflict, in addition to the economic slowdown in 
China, the decreasing price of commodities, and the decrease in demand from the US and 
European market for garment industry products from the EPZs may affect Indonesia’s 
growth potential; therefore, the Indonesian government has promised higher return to 
foreign investors through varied scheme of SEZ policies”.  
Jensen’s (2006) study, for example, has revealed the busy FDI traffic in developing countries is due to 
the host country policy being formulated according to the interests of MNCs and political elites. Jensen 
(2006) aptly discussed the inflows of foreign capital into the country by raising the question of why 
certain countries are attractive to foreign investors, i.e. China and Vietnam SEZs, and other countries 
are not, i.e. Bangladesh and Indonesian SEZs. In his opinion, the factors supporting the success of the 
competition in gaining foreign investment are not to lower taxes (race to the bottom) (Scherrer and 
Greven 2001; Kucera 2002; Jauch 2002; Jensen 2006; Jansen and Lee 2007), instead of dealing with the 
country’s political factors. The political factor is the political perception of the economic policies and 
conditions in the future.  
A prevalence of extensive incentive schemes and special treatment for large investors, in particular, 
foreign actors, in the new Investment Law No. 25/2007 points to the predominance of supra-natural 
power intervention in its drafting. As noted in the NO period, MNCs are well-known for using 
developed countries’ governments (for example, Japan and the US) and international financial 
agencies (for example, IMF and the World Bank) to intervene in their interests. Several parties 
especially NGOs assess that the small target of economic growth by the SBY regime in 2010 of around 
6% per annum will not address the unemployment and poverty issues significantly despite large inflows 
of foreign funds to Indonesia.  
Despite Indonesian GDP annual growth performance until 2012 surpassing some major Asian ‘FDI-
receiving’ countries such as South Korea, India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (excluding China and 
the Philippines) (Figure 4.12), the signs of vulnerability were occurring in 2010. Anwar Nasution, 
Professor of the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (2010) warns that Indonesia’s debt 
performance and policy structure show signs of economic volatility and the GOI must take advantage 
of the globalisation opportunities for the benefit of the national economy. He asserts that one of the 
foreign dependency’s negative impacts after the AFC has been the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) 
(Nasution 2010). Based on the survey by Kompas News in 2010, Indonesia’s economic growth in 2010 
was the lowest among those Asian countries and the GDP growth of 6.2% in 2010 demonstrates less 




Figure 4.12 GDP Annual Growth Performance until 2012 
 
Therefore, following years of recording around 6% annual growth (Figure 4.12), Indonesia has no 
excuse for complacency and needs to organise and shape its policy transformation to resume the 
positive trajectory in the years ahead in the face of the looming economic slowdown (Nasution 2010). 
The rates between 2004 and 2014 were a ‘blessing in disguise’, as the “inconvenient fact that 
Indonesia’s economy is mainly driven by a commodity boom fuelled by China’s appetite for raw 
materials and global demand for biofuels” resulted in Indonesia’s rising inflation rate and staggering 
imports (Buehler in the Diplomat 2013; Kompas News 2010).  
Over the past decade, Indonesia’s stable economy and respectable growth can be attributed to factors 
such as: first, the significant increase in foreign capital inflow especially the manufacturing sector by 
large MNCs with FDI surging to a record $23 billion in 2012 (i.e. Japanese Toyota and Nissan and French 
cosmetics L’oreal) (Wignaraja in-the-East Asia Forum 2013). Nevertheless, the amount of foreign 
capital inflow during the crisis in 2008-2010 was dominated by ‘hot money’ (speculative and short-
term portfolio investment) (Ramli 2007). It raised fears of a ‘bubble economy’ (Kompas News 2010; 
Reuters 2010) and endangered the fragile economic growth if foreign investors had any reason such 
as political and security instability to take their capital abroad. According to Bosworth and Collins 
(1999), portfolio capital inflows appear to have no discernible impact on investment. They suggest FDI 
generates large increases in domestic savings with no negative implications for the external balance 
compared to loans. Although the programme to encourage investment is always a top priority, the 
implementation in the past was responded to with a very monetarist policy approach by creating 
stability in trying to bring down inflation, maintaining a stable exchange rate, and so forth (Ramli 2007). 
If there are other measures, such measures are simply associated with administrative and bureaucratic 
routines. Finally, the only realisation is an increase in the more speculative and short-term portfolio 
investment, while investment in the real sector decreases. Second, the high rate of thriving middle-
class consumption (around 60 per cent of GDP), like China although not in terms of comprehensive 
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economic structure, which can be attributed to the buoyant domestic consumption of 120 million 
people. Third, there is high demand from China and India for coal, oil, and palm oil as Indonesia’s main 
natural commodities (Wignaraja in the East Asia Forum 2013).  
However, in relations to the SEZ policy development, findings suggest that another path-dependent 
nature had occurred in relation to the SEZ Law which overlapped into two governing sectors. The 
overlapping regulation occurred based on past experience in the previous administrations and order 
under the regional autonomy platform. The summary of various sources from document reviews to 
interviews conducted at BAPPENAS and KPPOD revealed that: 
“Taking into account the experience of the implementation of regional autonomy can be 
categorized several major issues that need attention, such as the overlapping sectoral and 
decentralised regulations on the implementation of regional autonomy. Based on a study 
by the Directorate of Regional Autonomy for BAPPENAS (2011), there are 87 sectoral 
regulations governing 31 matters delegated to local governments. At least 29 areas of 
affairs are overlapping. Two sectors concerning the Spatial Planning and Investment 
govern the same regulation on SEZ (Law No. 39/2009)” 
To describe some of the regulations delegated to local governments related to SEZ Law as shown in 
Table 4.5, it indicates that SEZ Law inside the red rectangle is delegated to local governments under 






















Some factors are suspected to be the cause of overlapping sectoral regulations, such as (i) 
disagreements between the law and its implementing regulations; (ii) conflicting central government 
policies; (iii) clashes between the authority of government agencies due to the non-systematic division 
of authority; (iv) the difference between legislation and jurisprudence and the Circular Letter of the 
Supreme Court (Directorate of Regional Autonomy, 2011). 
Figure 4.13 
 
From the figure 4.13 above, regional development policies such as the zone development programmes 
(FTZ, EPZ, KAPET, and SEZ) continue to use planning from the technocratic process of BAPPENAS to 
calculate sources and formulate development objectives and procedures to achieve the development 
process.  
In view of the study by the Indonesia Institute of Science (LIPI) in 2012 that the inclusion of BAPPENAS 
in the process to address efforts to involve community participation in the development policymaking 
process. However, criticism of the lack of community participation in development planning has not 
yet been addressed with changes to existing social and institutional structures. There is indeed a 
change of actors and their roles in development planning. However, the participation of the 
community remains minimal due to the participation space has not been fully opened.  
Findings from the view above and reviews of various literature suggest that limiting the role of 
BAPPENAS in development planning does not change the technocratic approach to participatory. The 
development plan, in fact, shifts even more to a political approach. This is mainly due to the strength 
of parliament, which is driven more by the political interests of the party. In implementing the budget 
function, for example, both the DPR and the DPRD are more guided by political logic than the 
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rationality of the policies or the aspirations of the people. The elites, with their transactional politics, 
have hijacked the agenda of increasing community participation in development. The development 
process itself is not always done formally when the local government implements various 
interconnected policies, programmes or projects. The most logical source of policy or monitoring 
strategy lies with the regional assemblies (DPRD) that set the guidelines for local governments in their 
implementation.  
The Role of the Local legislature or Local Parliament (DPRD) 
Some scholars characterise the legislative body (DPR including DPRD) with at least three functions: 
First, the legislative function, in which the DPRD as the representative of the people accommodates 
and seeks to realize the aspirations and interests of the people through local regulations and to create 
checks and balances. Secondly, the budgeting function of the DPRD has the authority to determine 
local budget (APBD). Third, the controlling function, which is obliged to assess executive performance 
in order to create a clean government administration from KKN practices (Hadna 2004 Jati 2012 
Aritenang 2012 Mungkasa 2013).  
According to the interview with a researcher from BAPPENAS,  
“The relationship between the Regional Government (such as the Jakarta Provincial 
Government/Governor and Kepri Governor in Batam) and the Regional People’s 
Legislative Assembly (DPRD) is equal, stands in partnership. Equal means that among the 
local government institutions have the same position and parallel, meaning not mutually 
supervisory. The issue here is that DPRD being the third-party enforcement to create 
order in the political institutions is prone to political conflicts of interest as they perform 
not only has the role as the legislative but also as the judicative (to control the mechanism 
of government in a good governance context)”. 
The judiciary branch in Indonesia is basically the duty of the Supreme Court (MA), Judicial Commission 
(KY), and Constitutional Court) (MK), see Figures 4.5 and 4.7. 
Based on these three functions, the dynamics of the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature since Law no. 22/1999 was enacted can be traced. During the NO regime, the stigma 
attached to the DPRD in the legislative function was only as a "stamp" of all policies made by the 
executive. The function of legislation here ought to be interpreted as the process of formulation of 
regional regulations since the planning, designing, forming and even post-establishment activities, 
namely implementation, enforcement, evaluation, and verification.  
Furthermore, there are two fundamental findings of the legislative function of the DPRD that have 
implications for its relationship with the executive, as confirmed by KPPOD and BAPPENAS,  
“Both are the capacity of DPRD members to make their policies and commitments to 
public issues in the output of the resulting policies. From all IRDA research areas, it was 
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found that the policy in the form of local regulations set by the DPRD was mostly on the 
initiative and made by the executive. The DPRD merely discusses and sets the proposed 
executive draft or bill (Rancangan Peraturan Daerah/Raperda) such as the case in chapter 
5 on the Marunda port SEZ reclamation conflict. Even if there are proposals from the 
legislature, the proposal normally to regulate matters related to their own function, i.e. 
the DPRD Code of Conduct”.  
During the study, no evidence has yet been found not even IRDA research where the DPRD is able to 
draft local regulations directly concerned with the people, for example, regional economic problems, 
as well as basic needs such as education and health, and poverty alleviation. The weakness of the 
DPRD’s capacity in drafting the Raperda made a great dependence on the executive role in drafting 
the draft regulation. This case embodied in the empirical chapter 5 when DPRD failed to pass the 
Raperda Zoning for the reclamation of Jakarta SEZ. 
In many areas, the role of the executive is strongly supported by the strong leadership of the head of 
regions such as the Regent (Bupati) or Mayor (Walikota). Thus, the dominance of the executive role in 
the formulation of policy substance is still considerable and this pattern of relationships has not 
changed much since the previous centralized order.  
In addition to capacity issues, linking the literature research and KPPOD’ statement, that: 
“DPRDs are also faced with the issue of their low commitment to the public interest. This 
can be seen from the number of DPRD products in the form of local regulations are still 
more oriented to the interests of the government rather than the public interest63. For 
example, the first scheme of Perda (local legislation) on the issuance of over 140 alcoholic 
beverage licences and the second scheme on Batam’s tourism sector to open the 
amusement and gaming centre with total disregard to the public’s dissatisfaction in 
chapter 5. This increase is indeed on the proposal of the executive”.  
From this example, it can be concluded that there is a matter of commitment which is still low both 
from the executive and legislative in allocating budget for the public interest. To relate the study on 
SEZ policy formulation with DPRD’s role, findings suggest that DPRDs play a more important role of 
bureaucracy than in voicing the aspirations of the community. The bureaucracy ultimately benefits 
from the weak DPRD commitment to the public interest.  
There are arguments that could explain why a commitment to the public interest is low, especially as 
an example of a case in Jakarta and Batam SEZ cases. Local investment is one of the major contributors 
in PAD. Generally, within a year it was targeted to contribute a certain percentage to the local treasury. 
In the meantime, there is a central policy that regulates the operational cost of supporting the Head 
of Region and its representatives as well as DPRD activities which is determined based on the PAD 
                                                          
63Similar findings were also obtained from the results of the 2002 Governance and Decentralisation Survey (GDS) 
which concluded that there are a number of different types of local regulations that are more oriented to the 
interests of the government (see Dwiyanto, Agus, et al., 2003) in the book Reform of Governance and Regional 
Autonomy, PSKK UGM ). 
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classification. The bigger the PAD, the budget for activities for head/regional representatives and DPRD 
is greater64. This motivation is thought to be one of the driving forces of the DPRD and executives to 
conduct informal ways (informal lobbies, networks, negotiations, meeting) in an effort to raise as much 
PAD as possible. In addition, other reason which undermines DPRD’s commitment such as the lack of 
a clear relationship between DPRD members as party representatives and their constituents. 
Meanwhile, not much different from the function of legislation, the budgeting function also still faces 
fundamental problems.  
Former Vice Chairman of the MPR exposed at length that: 
“The process of drafting the APBD as the output of this function is entirely the design of 
the executive. Not many DPRD members are knowledgeable and have sufficient 
knowledge about the systematics of APBD, the origins of income and how to allocate it in 
local expenditures. Knowledge about this is absolutely known by the executive because 
budgeting does require certain skills not necessarily owned by DPRD members who 
unfortunately this cannot be fulfilled by the council due to weak human resource capacity. 
What the DPRD has in this budgeting function is the will to question the size of the budget 
allocated for each planned project and activity.  
Data in a number of areas indicates a serious effort by the DPRD to discuss the budget on 
any project and activity proposed by the executive. The general way is to call the relevant 
local government offices that have the project plan and the activities. Arguments 
sometimes occur between the two to indicate how important the project or activity 
should be funded by certain rupiah. Although in terms of domination, the executive is still 
the dominant institution. There is also the initiative of the board to propose a project plan 
and activities that in their view is very essential. The types of proposals that come from 
members of the council are generally partisan (biased) due to it carries the mission of a 
particular party. In such a position the executive is generally incapable of rejecting 
proposals coming from members of the council, especially proposals from the dominant 
party in the DPRD. But sometimes it raises debate among the factions within the DPRD 
itself, especially when the proposal is suspected of carrying a particular party mission.  
There are a number of cases where this proposal is ultimately determined by voting. 
Important to observe in this budgeting function that this role is given to the Executive 
                                                          
64As mentioned in the Government Regulation No.109/2000 on the Financial Position of Regional Head and 
Deputy Regional Head especially Article 9; and PP No.110/2000 on the Financial Position of the Regional People's 
Legislative Assembly especially article 14. 
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Budget Team and the Legislative Budget Committee. It is highly probable that so far these 
two institutions have been the final determinants of the size of the budget for each 
project and activities budgeted in APBD. Lobbies between the executive and legislative as 
well as from other stakeholder groups concerned with the budget are allegedly passed 
through these two institutions. Although there is a plenary session, it is suspected there 
has been a very strong screening process in both institutions”.  
Findings in a number of areas indicate the existence of informal institutions have influenced the 
institutional arrangements (formal legislation of budget allocation) through non-transparent criteria 
for the reasoning of the size of the budget allocated to each project and activity, as revealed by IRDA 
(2003) and stated by KPPOD official, 
“Let alone the people who want to know it, the local government agencies or agencies 
that receive budget allocations often do not know for sure why the DPRD and the 
bureaucratic elite budget projects and activities with a certain amount of rupiahs. The 
game to hide the board budget into the executive budget is another example of how non-
transparent this budgeting process is. Thus, if traced the extent of the authority possessed 
by both institutions has actually cut off the chain of the participative budgeting process. 
One function of the board that is quite successful is the supervisory function. The success, 
among others, is shown when the process of preparation of APBD and the accountability 
report (LPJ) Head of Region. Although some cases still show a lack of transparency in APBD 
preparation, there are a number of facts in some other areas that show the courage of 
DPRD members to carry out supervisory functions. They dare to reveal the possibility of 
the practice of deviation from the budgeting process. Not only in APBD but the form of 
monitoring process often taken place during the LPJ Head of Region. LPJ is often used as 
an arena to bring down the regional head because it is considered unable to perform the 
mandate given by the people”.  
A response from the former member of PDI party who resigned after Megawati was elected president 
remarked further explanation at length which is supported by Hadna (2004), a researcher for IRDA and 
the Center for Population and Policy Studies, Gadjah Mada University.   
“Unfortunately the response to this oversight function is often negative because what 
happens then is the process of bargaining power in exchange for materials to smooth LPJ 
revenues. In spite of such bad practices, at least surveillance has forced the executives to 
do the job as well as possible. The method used in carrying out supervisory function are 
formal and informal. Formal methods are conducted through development coordination 
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meetings and also through meetings on performance evaluations for each local 
government agency.  In addition to the two forms of the meeting, the DPRD also seeks to 
establish a hearing commission as part of the data collection process. This method is felt 
rather rigid, therefore informal methods are considered more effective and efficient in 
capturing the information that develops in the community. Informal methods commonly 
used by members of the council include dialogue and meetings with community 
members, making unannounced field visits, either separately or cooperatively by 
members of the parliament. Sometimes it is also done by some people from the political 
parties in which the council members come from, establishing good interaction with the 
people in the region, especially during the recess. Another informal method is to use mass 
media to collect various information or accommodate aspirations to obtain feedback 
about the implementation of a programme. Interactive programmes on radio and 
television are also used and all of these are effective arenas for conveying suggestions, 
criticisms, aspirations or complaints about various policies and specific project 
implementation like you said such as the SEZ policy”.  
In the various IRDA research areas there is a tendency that recently evolved:  
The DPRD has started to hold special sessions open to the general public both with regard to APBD and 
the making of local regulations. As society is increasingly enthusiastic to listen to executive 
performance accountability reports, the steps taken by the DPRD are to organize public hearings and 
conduct field visits directly to prove the contents of the accountability report (LPJ). Although the 
supervisory function has been quite positive, the IRDA’s results indicate a disagreement about the 
range or intensity of oversight that should be done by the DPRD. In addition, until now there has been 
no consistent policy that can be used as guidance by the DPRD in implementing this supervisory 
function. For the executive, the DPRD should only monitor the implementation of priority programmes 
at the policy level, and not to the technical level. However, the opinions of these bureaucrats are not 
acceptable to legislators, they require that their oversight should include both levels of policy, as well 
as on their technical implementation.  
Another obvious disadvantage of this oversight function is that it is still partisan and not yet patterned 
as an effective form of institutional oversight. The partisan and unpredictable nature of this is not 
separated from the DPRD as a forum of meetings between political parties. This can be seen from the 
more functioning fraction than the commission in carrying out supervisory functions. Each faction 
carries its own party mission so that supervision is done more on behalf of the party rather than the 
commission as a board fitting whose member cross-party.  
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The implications of this weakness often make it difficult for the executive because of the possibility of 
spontaneous reaction of faction members who may not necessarily be the official political stance of 
the council. Inter-factional tensions among council members (MPs) may occur during this event and 
despite all the inherent weaknesses in the oversight function of the board, at least this function has 
encouraged the executive to show the best performance. Now they are not only directly highlighted 
by the public but also by MPs who can at any time criticize the executive’s performance. The magnitude 
of this oversight function is often understood as a form of superiority of the executive board and this 
is much different than the conditions under the NO regime.  
4.3. The Development of New Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
4.3.1. Institutional Aspects: Inter-Related Cooperation Concept  
The concept of SEZ development is thought-provoking, considering the development of this area is a 
breakthrough that can optimize geo-economics and geostrategic advantages owned by Indonesia as 
one of global production base. The development of SEZ which is focused on five main corridors namely 
Java Main Beach, East Coast of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua is also expected to be the 
centre of economic activity that can encourage the market based on the specification of excellence of 
each region. Therefore, there must be a balance between central, provincial and district governments 
in the process of development. This means that the division of tasks and authorities between the three 
units of government should be clearly divided for efficient cooperation in order to solve problems 
associated to the SEZ formation.  
The Secretary of the SEZ National Council and his Operations Manager gave their comments regarding 
the division of roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in the SEZ development as follows: 
“In line with regional autonomy, the tasks and authorities of local governments are much greater, while 
the government is tasked to facilitate and support the development of SEZs in the regions. SEZ 
development efforts are the joint responsibility of central and local governments (provincial and 
district/city governments). The central government has a facilitative function in both regulation and 
financing issues, while local governments have the function of implementing SEZ development and 
development in their region. In addition to the facilities and facilities provided, the specificity of SEZ is 
also characterized by the large role of local government. The central government only establishes its 
norms, standards, guidelines and manuals (NSPM), while the region has a role to prepare the land and 
its infrastructure. Although the portion of government authority is much larger in SEZ development, 
the centre also still has a strategic role. The central government, through the relevant ministries, has 
the authority to regulate, coordinate and provide direction for regions whose territories are designated 
as SEZ. Therefore, it is necessary to balance the implementation of functions between the central, 
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provincial and district governments, so that SEZ development is not hampered. However, as a major 
project capable of significantly influencing regional and national development, the involvement of 
central, provincial and district governments makes the problems more complex.  
As a result, the authority of both central and local governments often overlaps as shown in the next 
empirical chapters. Therefore, it needs an intensive communication between the parties involved to 
avoid the growth of their respective basic tasks. The synergy between stakeholders is needed, where 
cooperation relationships are not only prioritized in an effort to meet the requirements but also must 
be prioritized on solving problems that occur in the development of this area”. 
There are four key institutions that have different duties and authorities at each level of government: 
the National Council, the Zone Council, the Administrator, and the SEZ Operators (Managing Enterprise 
Agency). Figure 4.14 shows the relationship between the four institutions.  
Figure 4.14 
 
At the national level, the SEZ development programme is under the responsibility of the SEZ National 
Council. The National Council of SEZ is chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. The 
duties of the council are to set general policies and strategic measures for SEZ development at the 
national level. This includes reviewing and recommending SEZ status. This Council is also tasked with 
resolving strategic issues in SEZ implementation, management and development. To this end, the 
council reserves the right to seek the explanation of other institutions at the regional and regional 
levels. Meanwhile, at the provincial level, the key institution of SEZ is called the Zone Council, chaired 
by the Governor. The duties of the Zone (Regional) Council, among others, establish the SEZ 
Administrator, supervise, control, evaluate and coordinate the implementation of the tasks of the SEZ 
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Administrator in the case of One Stop Service (PTSP) and SEZ operations, and submit the SEZ 
management report to the National Council every year. 
Furthermore, the specific management in each SEZ shall be run by the SEZ Administrator and the SEZ 
Operators (Managing Enterprise Agency). The tasks of the SEZ Administrator are to carry out the 
granting of business license and other permits required by the Business Actors operating in SEZ, 
supervising and controlling the operation of SEZ, and periodically and incidentally submitting the SEZ 
operationalization report to the Zone Council. The SEZ Administrator has obtained delegation or 
delegation of licensing authority from the central and local government, as well as related 
ministries/agencies at the central level. SEZ Administrator is appointed as the executor of PTSP in SEZ 
region. 
Meanwhile, the conduct of business activities in SEZ shall be carried out by the SEZ Operators. If the 
SEZ Administrator focuses more on administrative matters and permits, the SEZ Operators focuses 
more on the development and commercial aspects of SEZ management. The SEZ Operator (in Batam, 
the managing body is called BIDA, while in Jakarta EPZ is managed by an SOE called KBN) is responsible 
for making the SEZ blueprint development plan, promoting to investors, distributing/selling lots in SEZ 
to investors, carrying out infrastructure development in the region as well as utility distribution, and 
managing SEZ for commercial aspects. 
4.3.2. SEZ Formal Institutions  
Through document reviews, there are at least 13 (thirteen) legal bases of SEZ have been in force. The 
details of the legal bases are:  
(1) Article 5 paragraph (1), Article 20, Article 27 paragraph (2), and Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;  
(2) Law No. 25/2007 regarding Investment (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2007 
Number 67, Supplement to State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4724);  
(3) Law No. 26/2007 on Spatial Planning;  
(4) Law No. 39/2009 on Special Economic Zones (SEZ);  
(5) Government Regulation No. 26/2008 concerning RTRWN;  
(6) Government Regulation No. 24/2009 on Industrial Estate;  
(7) Government Regulation (PP) No. 2/2011 concerning SEZ Operation; it is one of the two main 
platforms of the SEZ regulatory system besides the SEZ Law No. 39/2009. This PP contains a 
more detailed description, especially regarding the institutional and management aspects of 
SEZ 
(8) Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 28/2008 on National Industrial Policy;  
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(9) Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia (Perpres) No. 33/2010 Concerning the 
National Council and the Zone Council (National Council is a council established at the national 
level to organize SEZ);  
(10) Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 8/2010 concerning the SEZ Council;  
(11) Regulation of the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs as the Chairman of the National 
Council for SEZs, No. PER-06/M.EKON/08/2010 on the disciplinary proceedings and procedures 
for the decision-making of the National Council of SEZs;  
(12) Regulation of the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (CMEA) as the Chairman of the 
National Council for Special Economic Zones, No. PER-07/M.EKON/08/2010 on the 
Organization and Working Procedures of the Secretariat of the National Council for Special 
Economic Zones. One fundamental point of the SEZ programme initiative is the establishment 
of a special area given by the central government, but proposals must come from local 
authorities. In order to be granted the status of SEZ, a region must first be proposed to the 
National Council of SEZ, and;   
(13) Decree of the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs as Chairman of the National Council 
of SEZ No. Kep-10/M.Ekon/03/2011 on Amendment to Decree of the Coordinating Minister 
for Economic Affairs as Chairman of the National Council of Special Economic Zones No. Kep-
40/M. Ekon/08/2010 on the Executing Team of the National Council for SEZs.  
During the process of research, there are eight locations have been set as SEZs but only two have been 
in operation, they are Tanjung Lesung SEZ in Banten and Sei Mangkei SEZ in Medan, North Sumatera. 
Until now, the main legal foundation for the implementation of SEZ in Indonesia is Law No. 39/2009 
and Government Regulation (PP) no. 100/2012 (as revised by Government Regulation No. 2/2011).  
The Law No. 39/2009 on SEZ, among others, regulates the functions, forms of SEZ, SEZ proposing 
criteria, SEZ formation mechanism, institutional aspects of SEZ, and facilities offered in SEZ. Among the 
contents are: (1) Special Economic Zone, hereinafter referred to as SEZ, is a region with certain limits 
within the jurisdiction of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia set to perform economic 
functions and obtain certain facilities; (2) affirmed the definition of Zone, National Council, Regional 
Council, Administrator, Business Entity, Business Actor; (3) SEZ shall be developed through the 
preparation of areas that have geo-economic and geostrategic advantages and serve to accommodate 
industrial activities, exports, imports and other economic activities that have high economic value and 
international competitiveness; (4) SEZ consists of one or more Zones: a. export processing; b. logistics; 
c. industry; d. technology development; e. tourism; f. energy; and/or g. other economies; (5) Inside an 
SEZ, support facilities and housing for workers can be built; (6) In each SEZ shall be provided location 
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for micro, small, medium enterprises (SMEs), and cooperatives, either as Business Actor or as a 
supporter of company activity within the SEZ; 
The four criteria given by Law No. 39/2009 for the location to be proposed as an SEZ are: 1) in 
accordance to the Regional Spatial Plan (RTRW) and not use and interfere with the protected areas, 2) 
gain full support of the provincial government, as well as the relevant district/city government, 3) the 
position is close to an international trade or shipping lane or located in an area with natural resources 
potential, and 4) the proposal has clear territorial boundaries. 
Giving SEZ status can be based on suggestions from various related parties, namely: Business 
Enterprise, both private and state-owned enterprises (BUMN) and regional-owned enterprises 
(BUMD), with the support from the local government concerned. The proposal may also be promoted 
by district/municipality governments. In addition, the provincial government may also be the main 
supporter of the proposal. 
After all relevant documents are collected, the SEZ National Council will issue a decision within 45 days 
whether the region is designated as SEZ or not. The determination of a region as an SEZ is officially 
based on a Government Regulation. After an official region is designated as SEZ, the government 
provides a maximum of three years until the SEZ is ready to operate. To support all activities within 
the area, each SEZ consists of one or more of the following zones: (1) export processing, (2) logistics, 
(3) industry, (4) technology development, (5) tourism, (6) energy, (7) and other economies. The 
determination of the main zones in an SEZ will be adjusted to the potentials owned by the SEZ region. 
In addition, in the SEZ will also be provided support facilities and locations for SMEs (Secretariat of SEZ 
National Council document). 
Evidence indicates that the separation of powers among key institutions determines the success of SEZ 
programme. Therefore, to support local government’s commitment, both central and local 
government must delegate some of the SEZ development authority issues to the SEZ management 
body. The SEZ management body is associated with a one-stop-service organization to design and 
effectuate SEZ authority under one command. The challenge is that it opens up a new opportunity for 
rent-seeking between SEZ authority and local government as well as a local government with local 
businesses who represent local investors. For example, in chapter 5 where the Jakarta provincial 
government (JPG) as the sole authority who oversees the Jakarta EPZ collaborated with local private 
sectors represented by the appointed SOEs to bypass the bureaucratic formalities in order to reach 





4.3.3. New challenges and trends 
Although a new type of SEZ continues to be introduced around the world, the recent SEZ type is quite 
different from the SEZs during the first major development waves. These changes have a significant 
impact on countries, such as Indonesia, planning to develop these new zones in the coming years. The 
number of countries implementing SEZ grew rapidly in the early 2000s, reaching 130 countries in 2006, 
up from just 112 countries in 2002 (Singa-Boyenge, 2007). Over the same period, China has doubled 
the number of people employed in its Export Processing Zone (EPZ). This success makes China has a 
large percentage of contribution to the growth of SEZ in the world. Another noteworthy difference 
regarding zones built over the past 15 years is that a large proportion of the SEZs is privately owned, 
developed, and operated. In 2008, 62% of SEZs located in developing countries were developed and 
operated by private parties (Akinci and Crittle 2008). Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme is a 
method where the role of the state is significant in providing infrastructure to incentivize private 
parties to invest in SEZ development is also becoming increasingly popular. Both these trends have 
succeeded in significantly reducing the costs required by governments to create new zones.  
Furthermore, in a study conducted in 2008, the World Bank found that privately operated zones have 
a higher success tendency than government-operated zones. The growth of SEZs in the world has 
reduced the additional benefits that arise as a result of the creation of new zones. The fact that many 
countries have a goal to increase their exports simultaneously has led to a phenomenon called ‘fallacy 
of composition’ which, first, the availability of world supply for exports exceeds the world demand for 
imports (especially since many countries try to become net exporters) and secondly, growth in export 
offerings has lowered the prices of exported goods that have been used by countries to improve their 
economic growth (Millberg and Amengual 2008).  
Findings indicate that this change is exacerbated by the fact that, after the 2008 financial crisis, imports 
from the United States and Europe declined, indicating that these two markets could no longer be used 
as drivers of global demand. This is followed by several zones that apply the traditional SEZ model such 
as EPZ, which focuses specifically on exports, to move to the SEZ model that allows them to expand 
the types of activities undertaken within the zone while refining the high value-added activities in the 
global production chain. However, findings further suggest, it also often causes activities in the zone 
to become less labour-intensive and have an impact on job creation. Although SEZs established at the 
start of development can be designed to take advantage of the underutilization of a country’s 
competitive advantage (such as relatively low labour costs) if they can offer greater competitive 
advantage than already been given elsewhere. Farole and Akinchi (2011) also said that location, 
effectiveness to the design programme, and sustainable management, are criteria of whether or not 





This chapter examined the context that history has on policymaking and showed a prolonged 
institutional change since the NO era until the RDO era where the neoliberal ideology and practices 
through various institutional framework influence each other in various ways. It verifies the central 
proposition put forth in chapter 1 and brings together the verification of key findings as follows: 
First, the choice of policies and institutions and their implementation depend on the relevant political 
landscape and its importance is, in general, undisputed. The contemporary SEZ policy platform as the 
key policy actor’s choice of economic reform was generally a mechanism to preserve the ruling elite’s 
traditional rhetoric. As opined by Jenkins (1999: 41) economic liberalisation is all about staying power. 
The SEZ policy practised by Indonesian rulers has deviated from its conventional objective to stabilise 
the economy by promoting exports, generating employment, and attracting FDI. SEZ policy platform is 
embedded in the investment regime to stay in the course of neoliberal ideology. It is argued that policy 
and institutions have been mutually influencing each other, entailing change or continuity of the status 
quo and contributing to the institutional arrangement where the government’s current policy decisions 
affect what options become available in the future. 
Second, findings indicate despite the success of implementing economic development policies and 
programmes that have managed to restore macroeconomic stability for economic revival, institutional 
problems in the economic reform process remain. 
Third, the broad-spectrum of democratic political transitions and decentralisation in Indonesia have 
led to postponements in the economic recovery effort due to the wide-ranging transaction costs 
associated with the actor’s adaptation to the decentralisation policy as a form of the new governance 
structure. 
Did the RDO era as opposed to the new order, with more popular democratic practices and built-in 
checks and balances produce greater material prosperity? In answering this question, several points 
identified as follows: 
First, the basic Indonesian economic structure was devoted to serving foreign capital. As stated by Dick 
et al. (2002), Brown (2003), and Wood (2005) the workings of the various inheritances from colonial 
regulations in Indonesia created a weak national economy. Economic performance is not an 
instantaneous event (North 1990). The history of Indonesia’s legal system is a vital element affecting 
Indonesia’s institutional environment and influence the varied performance of the economy. By 
impeding the emergence of institutions convenient for growth, Indonesia has imported institutions 
not adapted to local environments and cultures but adapted to extracting rent for their benefit. Under 
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these circumstances, the chapter argued that Indonesia’s institutional features emanate from the long-
term institutional change and have influenced actors’ preferences and behaviour in making decisions. 
Second, changes in the political-economic system in Indonesia with the reform in 1998 has affected 
policymaking process in which key policy actors adjust to improving the state efficiency, capacity, and 
public accountability in order to align with the ongoing democratisation process. The Indonesian 
government has done its best to confront and overcome the AFC. One of their efforts is the design of 
economic reform policies. In the RDO, the information transaction on the resource allocation was given 
to the market. The changing political system becomes more intense and the economy becomes more 
integrated with the global economy, consequently, these changes affect SEZ policy and policymaking.  
Third, the chapter was able to trace the formal institutions relevant to the SEZ policy process from legal 
frameworks to the political institutions who run the system. It also traces the informal practices that 
influence the process as well as the legal framework and the chosen institutions to formulate the 
policy. However, the specific context of how informal institutions influence formal institutions and how 
governance structure influences the resource allocation of SEZ in a variety of ways was not specifically 
discussed which the next empirical chapters will delve into.  
Fourth, the capacity to define and compete with new institutional rules such as the decentralisation 
policy in the era of economic reform yields new prospects for rent-seeking. Political actors will try to 
seek solutions to the conflict they are involved in by harnessing their power and changing the rules of 
the game (regulations). The main reasons for the institutional change in every ruling elite are changing 
the existing basic elements of the ‘power structure’ and focusing the attention on actor’s differences 
for ‘bargaining power’. Actors who are able to control power can control the process of institutional 
change for the rules to favour their interests.  
The next chapter explores the first thematic series of Williamson’ institutional constraints on how 
formal and informal institutions influence the SEZ policymaking in Indonesia. The political entity has 
an interesting link with the economic agents and their contested interests between informal rules and 
formal rules whereby informal rules have an influence in formulating formal rules, especially in the SEZ 
and investment policy context. Informal rules can be a useful vehicle for the ruling elite to strengthen 
their political power through the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) case but render SEZ programme to be 







The Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions in Jakarta SEZ  
 
5.1. Introduction 
While chapter four mostly elucidate the institutional context where SEZ policy process sets out in 
Indonesia, this chapter analyses episodes from different sources of persistent problems caused by the 
first thematic series of Williamson’s (2000) informal and formal institutions respectively. The chapter 
attempts to answer parts of the second and third research questions; How and why do institutions 
influence the behaviour of actors in SEZ policy decision? And, which institutions affect the SEZ policy 
decision and why? 
In order to answer the research questions, the chapter attempts to verify whether the first research 
hypothesis actually occurs and can be applied to generalise the findings or otherwise annul the 
hypothesis; Informal institutions have a very strong influence on the functionalities of formal 
institutions in the SEZ policy process and actors’ institutional preference at the local government level 
tends to use informal practices more than formal practices during the SEZ implementation level rather 
than the formulation level due to the policy has been established and running and the actors’ cultural 
and ideological beliefs are developed at the implementation level. 
The central argument of this chapter lies in the SEZ development initiatives under economic reform. 
The chapter argues that setting up new formal institution on SEZ or new legal framework posed risks 
whereby the interest groups were cautious and took informal measures to bring influence on the 
formal ‘rules of the game’. New SEZ initiatives were introduced but the policy process by actors at the 
execution level contains different ideological interpretations, applications, and significant 
administrative discretion.  
This chapter is divided into three subchapters: after the introduction, the second subchapter explores 
the characteristics of the industrial zone, in particular, the type of SEZ created under the management 
of SOEs. The third subchapter explores the chronology of more contemporary debates and dynamics 
of cases in the SEZ policy process under pro-market and diffusion of power where entrenched values 
from the NO characterised by the patrimonial networks still impede the formal rules of the game in 
the recent open political system. The last subchapter concludes the chapter by putting all the excerpts 
of the cases together. 
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5.2. The industrial zone and EPZ development-setting up the actors ‘who’ are affected by 
informal rules 
The previous chapter argued that policy and institutions have been mutually influencing each other, 
entailing change or continuity of the status quo and contributing to the institutional arrangement 
where the government’s current policy decisions affect what options become available in the future. 
The following section discusses the role of actors in the SEZ policymaking and at which point 
institutions influence their decision. 
5.2.1. PT. KBN Profile and Role 
PT (Persero) Nusantara Bonded Zone or KBN is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and the sole 
government representative agency who accommodates the zone facilities in North Jakarta regarded 
as the administrator of the zone based on a presidential decree (see figure 3.1 in chapter 3). As an SOE, 
KBN was established as a result of merger and liquidation of some underperformed SOEs in the 
country. Under Government Regulation No. 23/1986, the merger was carried out between two small 
SOEs, PT Bonded Warehouse Indonesia and PT Sasana Bandha and was named KBN. In 1990 through 
Government Regulation No. 31/1990, PT. Pusat Perkayuan Marunda (Persero) or Marunda Timber 
Centre Corporations (MTC) was liquidated and merged with KBN. Subsequently, KBN shareholders 
consisted of 88.74% state ownership and 11.26% owned by the provincial government. In 1994 
through Government Regulation No. 38/1994 the shareholders received other proceeds by liquidating 
underperforming SOEs, PT. Pengelola Kawasan Berikat Indonesia (PKBI) or Indonesia Corporation for 
Bonded Area Management into KBN (Ibid).  
KBN’s core business in managing the bonded zone status in the integrated industrial zone and 
accommodating EPZ firms and other general non-export and non-bonded zone industries offers 
attractive rates for business and investment (KBN website 2014). For example, logistics services include 
freight business, mechanical and documents (forwarding), warehousing services and their respective 
utilities (power and water supplies, communications and the internet, waste and security 
management).  
The role of KBN as an independent entity 
Based on KBN’s record, prior to becoming the sole agent to accommodate the facilities, KBN had 
already managed to become a pilot project for export industry development. In the period of 1986 to 
1996, when the neoliberal consensus began to unfold, the government set a variety of economic 
deregulation and reform packages (Appendix 3) including the merits of FDI and non-oil commodity 
exports. All agencies associated with KBN development policy delegated their authority to KBN 
management to play a major role as a Zone Incubator free from government intervention. All the 
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interests of the investors related to the government were held by KBN. This engendered an elevation 
of investors’ confidence to invest in KBN and consequently the investors contributed to high average 
annual income (KBN Business Performance Record).  
Nevertheless, post-1996, to protect domestic industry and ameliorate the export competitiveness in 
the global market, the government decided to improve trade efficiency by aligning a timely supply of 
raw materials from domestic industry and making available promotional tools to support the 
marketing. Hence, streamlined bureaucratic customs, excise and taxation procedures were required. 
The enactment of the Government Regulation (PP) No. 33/1996 that placed the EPZ as a financial 
instrument resulted in the enactment of a wide range of tax and import duties imposed and EPZ was 
simply a foreign exchange earner. Subsequently, the amount of investment led to a significant decline 
in KBN’s annual income.  
Due to the declining income, KBN was assigned to take part in the fight to obtain public funding. The 
central government passed on some challenging responsibilities to the provincial government who 
governed the SOE, by making KBN as a liaison for EPZ firms. The first issue here is that the trace of the 
informal institution in the form of rent-seeking between the central government and KBN can be seen 
from the way the president Soeharto chose his SOE minister in order to get the most financial benefit 
from KBN’s profits. 
Assigned responsibilities to KBN caused the Jakarta provincial government (JPG) through KBN to enter 
an interjurisdictional competition among line ministries where KBN managers not only fought to obtain 
public funding for IZ-related infrastructure, share expropriation, domestic and foreign private 
investment but also gained profit through their tenants (EPZs) who bought raw materials from their 
subsidiary firms without supporting a long-term national industry structure (one of the cause of 
Indonesia’s weak economic and financial foundation).  
PT KBN—in which the firm has an important part to play in Jakarta’s economy—based on evidence 
from the regional autonomy watch (KPPOD) report (2000), is one of the most stagnant EPZ zone 
developers65 where the local parliament (DPRD) has come to play a subordinate role after the 
executive branch.  
A former GOLKAR MP recounted in an interview: 
“On KBN’s establishment, President Soeharto set the agenda for almost all legislation due 
to it wielding most of the political power. The majority of DPRD members were pro-
Soeharto from GOLKAR party and had a powerful influence on the legislative ideas of the 
government”. 
                                                          
65Others are PT JIEP, PT SIER and generally other SOEs in Java 
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Evidence from interviews (KPPOD, KADIN, and MP from PPP party faction) and media reviews (Media 
Indonesia and Bisnis Indonesia) indicates that not only during the new order (NO), even during the 
reform and democratic order (RDO) there has been structural changes at KBN and also other SOE such 
as the Jakarta Industrial Estate Pulo Gadung/JIEP. KBN and JIEP’s corporate structure evolved 
significantly over the past decade changing the authorised and unauthorised elites which also paved 
the way for rent seekers. Other major elites also often experience reshuffling, especially both the 
executive (relevant cabinet ministers where KBN as an SOE is under their direct control) and local 
parliament (DPRD, which has had more political sway in SEZ policymaking since Habibie until the SBY 
presidency). 
Until the early 2000s when the big bang decentralisation system was implemented, the elites’ 
landscape in Indonesia had undergone another major shift especially when SBY came to power. The 
central government’s elite role was strengthened. Since the direct elections in 2004, Jakarta governors 
and DPRD have become more influential in this regard. Basically, there were in practice two elites: 
first, the President who mostly bounded to the literal power he could place on SEZ policy; and second, 
which is manifested in this chapter, the Jakarta governors who held situational elite roles.  
To confirm the evidence found during interviews and media reviews on the main obstacles of 
developing an EPZ, the author interviewed a couple more people, they are the former director of the 
Indonesian Customs office and former KBN administrator.  
“As you know, we performed really well in the export sector especially manufacturing 
sector before the crisis, but then the AFC occurred and our economic and financial 
fundamentals were weak. This was because one of the obstacles during my time serving 
the customs office was instead of exporting goods overseas, some EPZ companies had 
chosen to sell their products locally in return for short-term profit margins which the 
bureaucracy and the actors involved are less complicated….of course as long as they 
maintain a good and a well-coordinated relationship with the right officials.”  
To validate the response stated by the respondents, the author has taken the relevant data from the 
Centre for Strategic International Studies report (2015) derived from the World Development 
Indicators as shown in figure 5.1 below. The export-based promotion industrialisation strategy was 
quite successful in increasing the role of the manufacturing industry, attracting foreign investment, 
and increasing export revenues, at least before the 1997/98 AFC. The development policy of EPZ 
corresponds to a period of rapid growth in investment and exports in Indonesia, especially in the 
manufacturing sector. Figure 5.1 shows that this strategy succeeded in boosting the growth of 
Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, reflected in the rapid increase in the value-added ratio of the 
manufacturing sector, from 11.94% in 1982 to 26.79% in 1997. In addition, the export structure also 
reflected something similar. The growth of the manufacturing sector is mainly due to a significant 
increase in investment, both domestic and foreign, in the export-oriented sectors, especially the export 
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of labour-intensive and resource intensives. The growth of manufacturing exports grew significantly, 
contributing more than 50% of Indonesia’s total exports in 1996, compared to only 4% in 1965. 
Nationally, this policy encouraged Indonesian exports from contributing only 19.49% to GDP in 1986, 
up to 27.86% of GDP. Meanwhile, net inflows of foreign direct investment also experienced a 
significant increase since the turn of export promotion strategy, from 0.25% to GDP in 1984 to its pre-
crisis peak of 2.72% to GDP in 1996. 
Most of the imports in EPZ used to bring in goods that can support the process of producing export 
goods. These goods may be in the form of raw materials or capital goods/machinery or equipment 
supporting the production process. In 2008, the total value of imports in EPZ accounted for about 18% 
of total national imports, as well as 24% of total national non-oil and gas imports. This figure is quite 
large when considering the relatively small amount of industry and area of EPZ on a national scale. 
Nevertheless, in the last seven years, a steady and significant decrease in the contribution of EPZ 
imports occurred. By the end of 2014, imports in EPZ accounted for only 12% of total national imports 
and 18% of total national non-oil and gas imports. This indicates a decrease in the central role of EPZ 
in encouraging export production activities.  
Figure 5.1 
 
Such outcomes, however, are not surprising as Stiglitz (2002) notes trade liberalisation has been about 
cheap imports flooding the markets. These distortions in the domestic economy also destroyed 
domestic producers and resulted in stagnating industrial production and ultimately the perpetual lag 
of income behind inflation levels. Public finance for manufacturing industries also decreased when 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) came to office and signs of the de-industrialisation tendency 
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emerged after the Soeharto regime. This study focuses on the new development of EPZ during the 
transition from the SBY regime to Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, to confirm the issue of informal 
connections that constraint the production of formal rules and cause EPZ performance to be 
ineffective are explained in the next section. 
To provide policy certainty to investors, it was assumed that the basic idea of the previous legislation 
on EPZ (PP No. 22/1986) was more affluent and could be applied to the basic legislation to upgrade 
KBN status into an SEZ. According to KBN’s Senior Manager,  
“…. policy certainty is a very important issue when it involves attracting investment. 
History has shown that KBN’s performance was better when inflows of FDI was high. 
Central and local government as agents of change should have a common vision to 
designate KBN as an investment destination. Therefore, collaboration in its development 
and applying the right policies are highly needed”. 
Even though there are not many EPZ firms currently in operation, KBN status has been a subject of 
controversy for many years as it has more political and economic value than any other zone developer 
and management in the country—not only because it is located in the capital city where its closeness 
to power has raised much attention, but also its status as an SOE has put more pressure on public 
accountability for high-quality performance. 
Findings suggest that formal institutions were generally acknowledged until it was hampered by 
internal political interest coupled with the central government’s chance to pit local government and 
SOEs—with prolonged tensions over state resources—against one another by opening profiteering, 
rent-seeking, and political patronage opportunities at the local level to prosper.  
Informal institutions, in the SEZ policy dealings, are often overlooked as powerful tools for economic 
efficiency or distort resource allocation (Phelps 2007; Maramis 2012). This, in turn, leads to the effect 
of informal institutions as a complement to business transformation but not necessarily constrain the 
enactment of formal policy. 
5.3. Informal Institutions in a New Alliance for Institutional Change: A Network of 
Connections 
Like most industrial zones (IZs) in the world, IZ in Indonesia is a specific area in the customs jurisdiction 
and authorised by the state to support industrial infrastructure for EPZ firms (foreign or domestic 
investors) and to boost export-oriented processing industries. The government provides other facilities 
as special incentives such as exemption from import duties and other levies. Foreign investors in IZs 
are generally granted some rights for constructing production sites in these zones (WTO 2006: 57). GOI 
also provides incentives for foreign nationals including five years 100% foreign ownership and 95% 
ownership afterwards of their businesses. Other incentives include the duty exemption on 
158 
 
components and materials for manufacturing purposes, provided 100% of production is exported 
(Ibid).  
To take advantage of business opportunities in the IZ, domestic and foreign investors must register 
with the Investment Coordination Board (BKPM) and offer to establish business projects in the IZs 
including the issuing an investment license. EPZ firms are obliged to export at least two-thirds of their 
production, excluding components. Components are allowed not more than 50% the value of export 
to enter the domestic market (WTO 2006: 57).  
However, as pointed by the former director of the Indonesian Customs office and former KBN 
administrator in the previous section, evidence suggests that despite a number of entrepreneurs in 
EPZ have enjoyed various fiscal facilities provided by the government, there were some EPZ companies 
not export-oriented by using low export market demand as an excuse and used this scheme to gain 
instant earnings authorities with the intention of avoiding customs duties. Instead of export, they sold 
more of their products in the domestic market. The practice was not in accordance with the motivation 
of EPZ development and also harm the government and other industries in the country. As regulated 
by the Minister of Finance Regulation No. 255/2011, employers in the EPZ must export at least 75% of 
the production, and only a maximum of 25% may be sold in the domestic market (although this rule is 
relaxed in 2013 to be at least 50% production in EPZ that must be exported, due to weakening export 
market). As a consequence, there were more than 30% export earnings lost by the unscrupulous 
behaviour of the actors involved (the executives represented by the agencies under the Ministry of 
Finance i.e. customs office, the EPZ administrator (in this case KBN) as the representative of the 
Ministry of SOE, the legislative branch of DPRD, and the business actors represented by the EPZ firms. 
Further confirmation on the evidence, through a focus group discussion (FGD) with KBN managers and 
their staffs, and the representatives of the EPZ firms, the author with prudence and no intention of 
judging or making the respondents feel accused of doing the same, asked the respondents the reasons 
for the possibility of some illegal practices, i.e. selling export products into the country without the 
permission of the relevant authorities have occurred in the past. The response was that the price of 
imported raw materials used in production has increased annually. As surveyed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2008) “A drawback on duties and surcharges is available on imports into the 
Indonesian customs territory that is subsequently shipped to EPZ firms for later export”.  
Additional comments from the respondents further noted, 
“Therefore, when we raised the export prices of finished goods, export demand was 
decreasing, while operational costs including labour costs also increased. EPZ companies 
were unable to cover the costs incurred from production so they took other ways by 
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selling the goods into domestic market with more potential for substantial profit. 
Sometimes they coordinate with some officers in the field using informal means to 
achieve their goals (refers to the implementation level). These practices, in the end, have 
either one of the consequences such as first, the possibility of the number of investors in 
the industrial sites decreased due to the corruptive practices have forced them to deal 
with legal issues resulted in high transaction cost and second, the possibility of investors 
to increase due to they prefer to use informal methods to deal with the bureaucratic 
cumbersome and high production cost.” 
These findings indicate that the possibility of higher transaction costs incurred due to the informal 
institutions (informal dealings and unofficial negotiations which led to unofficial levies) influence the 
formal institutions in the NO era to divert the applicable law during the implementation of SEZ still 
persist in the RDO. It suggests that the study by Warr (1983) on the externalities brought by the existing 
EPZs in NO regime still applies to today’s SEZ policy development.   
5.3.1. The Insignificant Performance and The Decreasing role of the state—the rise of new actors  
Based on the KBN’s document review, KBN has two main objectives as stated in the amendment in the 
company mission and none of their objectives or duties involves dealing with potential investors. Their 
objectives are: to strengthen the business position to increase the benefits to stakeholders and 
shareholders and to participate in supporting the national logistics system. Related to these objectives, 
KBN has embarked upon the provision of inclusive infrastructure facilities in the form of ready-made 
property for lease (standard factory building rental and land-lease systems), total logistics system (TLS) 
services—container depot into the integrated supply and value chain—, other port services and 
amenities such as health centre in all business units.  
However, with the enactment of the Regional Autonomy Law Number 22/1999 as a manifestation of 
a one-stop service (OSS) scheme, the KBN Board of Directors (BODs) was given full authority to sign a 
Letter of Investment—a licencing approval by the Jakarta Governor through decree No. 800/2002. The 
delegation of authority means another decreasing role of government to intervene in the market, 
which was previously represented by BKPM.  
Although there was a gradual decrease in the number of investors after the 1997/8 AFC and 2008/9 
global financial crisis (GFC), since 2013, KBN has maintained stability in EPZ firms to 306 investors with 
a total employment of 640 foreigners and 100,000 Indonesian workers not affected by the overall EPZ 
performance to national export as drawn in the figure 5.2 below. In Cakung alone—one of the sub-
districts in North Jakarta, there are 94 firms mostly foreign investment in the garment industry (KBN 
Annual Record). A total of 200 firms in KBN is in labour-intensive sectors, such as garments, shoes, 
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bags, and wigs (Ministry of Industry 2014). Of that number, 150 firms come from South Korea, Taiwan, 
and China. Currently, almost all EPZ firms in KBN class 80% of workers as outsourced and only 20% 
have permanent employee status (Berita Satu News 10th August 2015).  
Figure 5.2 
 
Institutional Change of the Corporate Strategy—A blessing in disguise 
 The Blessing 
In 2012, KBN performance under Sattar Taba leadership—the CEO who has cultural ties with the Vice 
President at the time, recorded Rp14 billion66 profit and in 2013 managed to increase the profit to 
Rp267.14 billion, growing 1,808% after years of significant losses and development stagnation as seen 
in EPZs overall export performance in figure 5.3 where it tends to slope downwards over time. In 
addition, KBN successfully contributed Rp602.44 billion in revenue in 2013. The position of the balance 
sheet at the end of 2013 stood at Rp1.26 trillion (KBN Financial Record; Indopos News—23rd May 2015).  
In 2014, the firm’s business pattern was also transformed from previously a 70% lease and 30% 
management to portfolio management of 80% and lease of 20%. The prime characteristics of this 
restructuring were to change KBN as one of Indonesia’s business clusters and its business pattern, as 
stated in the amendment of the firm’s articles of association followed by the revised mission and 
vision. The transformation also changed the corporate’s rules of the game as determined by the 
shareholders and administered by the KBN directors. Various new projects were introduced as will be 
elaborated in the next section. The changes in business patterns and the implementation of various 
projects were guided by the principles of good corporate governance (GCG).  
                                                          









2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EPZ Share to National Export (%)
Source: Author's adaptation based on Indonesian Customs Administration database (2014)
161 
 
Throughout 2014, KBN achieved good performance. Assets of the company until the end of December 
2014 amounted to Rp1.711 trillion, a rise of 20% over the previous year, with a net profit of Rp263.84 
billion (BUMN Track 15th December 2014). Paradoxically, the corporate’s high performance has not 
been able to contribute significantly to Jakarta’s export performance67. In addition, sentiments and 
expectations of the new SEZ and investment policies also affect the prospects of investment, notably 
from FDI, which requires certainty.  
The increased foreign investment was expected to anticipate the ASEAN single market in 2015 (ASEAN 
Economic Community or AEC) to open investment opportunities as shown in figure 5.3, especially in 
the services sector. However, the data suggests insignificant results. Moreover, the strong inflows of 
foreign capital in the AEC which ideally support increased investment performance in Jakarta, but due 
to the insufficient production capacity in most of Jakarta’s EPZ manufacturing industries has caused 
insignificant demand from the global market.  
Figure 5.3 
  
Furthermore, competitiveness between Jakarta and other regions requires the state to intervene in 
the acceleration of the industrial sector’s structural transformation and strengthening of enablers68. 
Other forms of state intervention include a fiscal incentive which also plays a vital role in supporting 
both FDI and domestic investment, especially for export-oriented and the global supply chain. Until 
recently, the state’s initiatives and efforts to ameliorate competitiveness have not been able to align 
                                                          
67In effect, national export also decreased, see Figure 4.7. 
68Enablers is the success supporting factors in Jakarta, such as individual, organisational, and technology towards 
knowledge sharing as instruments of change from resource-based competitiveness to knowledge-based 
competitiveness (Bank Indonesia analysis on Jakarta’s Regional Economic and Financial performance 2014). 
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with competitors in the ASEAN region (Figure 5.3) and has been outperformed in terms of cost and 
time of export as displayed in figure 5.4. Particularly, the relatively low capacity of innovation and 




 The Disguise—leading to the upsurge of actor’s informal institutional preference 
Nonetheless, Sattar Taba boasted about the fact that there is no firm like KBN that can raise nearly 
2,000% profit in 2013 and improve corporate performance. He asserted that the improved 
performance was not limited to KBN as a firm but also an attempt to support government programmes 
especially those related to EPZ’s logistics flow as part of the supply chain (Tribun Makassar—27th 
September 2012; KBN Report 26th May 2015). But under close scrutiny, upon assuming the duty as 
CEO, Sattar had built trust in himself, the business, and the company’s shareholders rather than the 
government and the public at large.  
Citing Warr (1983)69,  
“KBN’s goals adhered to the capitalist ideology of ‘maximising shareholder value’ by 
reaping the net gain from the existence of the firms; thus, apparently disregarding the 
interests of the firms themselves” (Ibid: 38).  
In view of Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) ‘economic backwardness’, KBN is more likely to block 
development as the political stakes are higher. 
Further evidence from KPPOD response noted, 
“KBN did not cater for the EPZ investors’ needs and ignored the neoliberalist economic 
objectives. This was evident through scores of complaints and claim cases from the 
                                                          
69Borrowing Warr (1983: 38), during the NO regime the condition at the time was not much different with what 
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tenants with regard to the rigidity of time to lease the factory buildings and properties in 
the zone”.  
Other instances of KBN’s setbacks as viewed from the media found: 
“High court prosecutions on behalf of 100 EPZ firms against KBN must be dealt with in the 
past three years following KBN’s arbitrary action to reject the renewal of their factory 
leaseholds unless the new and higher lease rate is paid70 and other conditions are met.” 
(Sindo News—12th June 2013; Berita Satu News—16th January 2016).  
From Institute for Global Justice’s report (2011) also confirms, 
“There has been evidence of land rent enjoyed by the elites. Other matter that has yet to 
be addressed by KBN and EPZ firms since the previous CEO is in relation to the escalation 
of labour movements that demand better labour prosperity. When the law of labour is 
deemed no longer appropriate, the government will resort to a new law that minimises 
transaction costs. Yet, the irony is that the law is deliberately changed to favour investors 
rather than Labour's welfare”.  
Additional information regarding Sattar Taba from an anonymous interview revealed, 
“Sattar was and still is an active member of a civil society organisation called Kerukunan 
Kekeluargaan Sulawesi Selatan (KKSS)71—a communion of ‘Putra Daerah’ or ‘son of the 
soil’ from South Sulawesi province—where he and other South Sulawesi-born influential 
people72 are currently devoting. It was apparent that by his dedication to the communion, 
he has gained trust from business, politics, and government communities and further has 
the power to retain order. It seems like his achievements were obtained through kinship 
with the group rather than meritocracy”.  
Through media reviews, interesting to note that: 
“Allegiance and solidarity of KKSS members were in part due to a statement from one of 
the former leaders in the country and reiterated by the Ministry of Agriculture who 
explains that KKSS was understood as a national asset. The members have become 
potentially connected by political allegiance and business proposition” (KBN editorial 13th 
November 2014; Fajar Daily—28th March 2015) 
Findings suggest that not only informal institutions matter (informal practices and political allegiance) 
but the presence of power (new actors i.e. KKSS members) greatly affect the established EPZ formal 
                                                          
70It refers to the appraisal of the land rental value through the Tax Object Value (NJOP) in 2011 approximately 
Rp1.5 million/m2. 
71KKSS as a regional indigenous organisation goes a long way since colonial era when it was inspired by the growth 
of ethnic-based youth organisations such as Jong Java (the most popular and dominated the social order), Jong 
Sumatera and Jong Kalimantan that served as a training ground for future leaders of the nation based on love of 
the homeland since Dutch colonialism in early 1900. The youth organisation from Sulawesi was known as Jong 
Celebes that brought together young students from Celebes or Sulawesi. The purpose and goal were to 
strengthen the unity of the brotherhood (Hernanda 2013; News Phinisi website). 
72To name a few, former President Habibie, former Minister of SOEs in Habibie’s cabinet Tanri Abeng; Said Didu, 
former Secretary of SOE Minister in SBY cabinet (being professionally qualified in the mining sector, he held four 
vital positions as: Expert Staff for Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), Commissioner of two 
strategic SOEs in mining and plantation sectors (PT Bukit Asam and PTPN IV since 2008), and Chief of National 
Smelter Study Team. It has driven him to be a strong candidate for Director General of Mineral and Coal), and 
current Vice President Jusuf Kalla (known to be an influential businessman and politician).  
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institutions in its implementation level. What institutional factors exacerbate the informal-formal 
institution’s influence the behaviour of actors? The next section elucidates the emerging issues. 
5.4. The First Informal-Formal Institutional Complexity 
The presence of new power also affects the city of Jakarta as a whole due to the status and position of 
Jakarta as the most developed city. Jakarta has a vital role as the centre for political, economic and 
territorial control. Ginsburg (1976) in Evers (2002: 5) argues that the concentration of various 
institutions in the Southeast Asian cities leads to the increased degree of the capital city’s primacy. 
With its high population, large port, central government offices, business centres, social and cultural 
centre, and a prime location for industrial production, Jakarta and other capital cities often serve as 
independent trading cities (éntrepot), a node point of international trade routes (Chong 1976 in Evers 
2002: 44-46). Jakarta meets the criteria and the requirements to have an SEZ, as has been mandated 
in Investment Law No. 25/2007 and SEZ Law No. 39/2009 where special provisions in customs, 
taxation, licencing, immigration and employment are enacted.  
In mid-2010, as a form of state intervention to revitalise the economy which is part of the government’s 
economic reform programme, Jakarta Provincial Government (JPG) has proposed Marunda sub-district 
in KBN (see figure 5.1) as the next SEZ and converted or upgraded the already built KBN industrial zone 
into an SEZ under one piece of legislation. The JPG planned to build a 500 metres long strategic land 
as an SEZ in the coastal areas of Tanjung Priok Port and reside along the shoreline of Marunda starting 
from Cakung Drain to Blencong River (Susanto 2012; Wardhono 2013) (see figure 5.1). 
The JPG has insisted to intervene in order to improve KBN’s performance in accordance with the plan 
for the SOE revitalisation from 2005 to 2009. The vision and mission of SOE were focused on developing 
corporate competitiveness and resilience in the global market and high innovation to meet the 
expectations of stakeholders. Therefore, to boost JPG’s goal, a healthy and lucrative KBN in terms of 
generating a significant contribution to the state and the public at the time was highly needed (in the 
form of taxes, optimised income and other contributions).  
Nevertheless, interesting information gathered from the field suggests that the proposed Marunda 
Port SEZ was a measure taken by the JPG to dictate the established SEZ formal rules (rules of the game) 
through informal practices. Based on the interview with former Staff of SEZ National Council as well as 
former director of BKPM, it was JPG’s informal policy measure to boost public support for the 
upcoming regional election in 2009. Additional information, from the media reviews and IGJ 
researcher, the scenarios launched by the JPG indicated strong determination to act and be appointed 
as the only institution who has the full rights to plan, carry out, and utilise the facility for their own 
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interest disregard the public interest. It was by their concerted effort through informal negotiations 
and lobbies the formal rules took effect.  
According to World Bank survey (2000), the JPG’s idea appeared to have performed a functionalist 
approach ensuring the institutions to systematically support JPG policy by assuring the public that the 
new formal institution will prioritise their needs to increase economic efficiency (Dutraive 2009).  
In theory, based on Stiglitz’s (2001) assertion, the evidence points to the institutions that help promote 
actor’s status of power, their vested interests and rents rather than to promote efficiency. In support 
of the view, North’s (2005) proposition also relates to the above issue that: 
“Through ideological or cultural beliefs, political institutions dictate the rules of the game 
to define economic institutions”.  
The Marunda SEZ proposal has been included in the international port map where imported goods can 
be transported directly to Jakarta without transit through Singapore. Marunda SEZ was set to remodel 
the existing labour-intensive comparative advantage into a competitive advantage. The government 
planned to facilitate a number of barges that serve to distribute containers to and from large vessels 
that were not able to dock at a depth of fewer than 18 metres73. Marunda zone development was 
intended to also explore several infrastructure improvements, which include the availability of power 
supply, water and waste management. But the concept of zone development has yet to find the 
appropriate mode of capitalisation or funding.  
Through document reviews and interviews with KBN managers, Bapennas official, former budget 
policy staff in the parliament, the following paragraphs elucidate further the background of the 
Marunda SEZ project.  
KBN (state-owned private sector) was appointed to carry out a joint venture (Public-Private 
Partnership or PPP) with non-state private sectors to finance the zone development. JPG used the 
study by the Jakarta SEZ project team (2010) led by a political economist from the University of 
Indonesia, Dorojatun Koentjorojakti74 joined by the Assistant Governor for the economic sector which 
the result stated that the SEZ development as a regional logistics centre will require approximate 
funding of US$2 billion which did not include human resource development, IT improvement, and 
other supporting infrastructure, i.e. the construction of Cikarang—Tanjung Priok toll road. 
                                                          
73As studied by ADB, Trace, Frielink and Hew (2009) in Toccheto et al. (2014: 31) discover that in addition to the 
ailing infrastructure and poor management system, Indonesia has not been able to address the depth problem 
of its ports which bigger ships for trading purpose cannot pass.  
74Although he was graduated from Berkeley, but his economic approaches were more nationalistic in nature 
(Mallarangeng 2002 in Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005:47). 
166 
 
The first step the JPG did was to speed up the toll road construction and provide a number of 
residential flats used as port workers housing facilities estimated to employ 1 million people and 
expected to contribute revenue to the provincial government in two or three years. The JPG expected 
that the value of the provincial government’s shares in KBN would reach 38% in 2010/2011 and in the 
next two years become the majority shareholder.  
In 2011, the proposal was approved by the regional parliament (DPRD) and the governor (then Fauzi 
Bowo) and the port named after the previous governor Ali Sadikin Logistics Centre to be completed by 
2015. The JPG hoped the regional development of Marunda as an SEZ with all the facilities, fiscal and 
non-fiscal incentives, the readiness of human resources, and adequate infrastructure will be able to 
accelerate the entry of investors on an ongoing basis and ultimately absorb labour in addition to 
improving the national economy. 
With the two scenarios of KBN’s pre-existing capital (budget) condition as well as mandate given by 
the JPG as justification to further develop an SEZ, KBN attempted to reposition the business into a 
Logistics Centre which not merely served as a special investment zone but other businesses that 
require cooperation and support from logistics and shipper firms to support the supply management 
network and third-party services in terms of inventory management, inspection, labelling, packaging, 
barcoding, and ordering. Therefore, the pressure of utilising the value added obtained from the logistic 
activity centre (VAL) was high as it can induce good attraction for investors. VAL services in the logistics 
chain encompass more of its existing roles and functions today and the opportunity to be pursued by 
KBN and continued in the future prompted the need for a better logistic centre behind the port area. 
In a separate interview, KBN managers and BAPPENAS observed, 
“The technical hitches at the time were that KBN had no port of its own to support the 
logistic centre. KBN’s dependence on Tanjung Priok port was less lucrative due to severe 
congestion in Tanjung Priok and this condition was well known among shippers. On the 
other hand, the waterfront at Marunda could be developed into an SEZ port to answer 
the concept of SEZ logistic centre development. The target markets of Marunda Port SEZ 
will include domestic short distance (inter-island) as well as international trade”.  
Findings suggest, the analysis result for Marunda Port SEZ to be developed as a dry port facility might 
reach a common understanding among all key actors including stakeholders involved (See Figure 5.5) 
given the high projection of trade traffic congestion and logistics performance index in the World 
Bank’s survey (2014) in figure 5.6, as well as vessels characteristics and visits if such an SEZ failed to be 
built. Congestion and other social problems entail a significant decline in the export sector (World Bank 
Survey Reports-Akinci and Crittle 2008; Farole and Akinci 2011).  
As Susanto (2008) and Wardhono (2013) further confirmed, 
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“Tanjung Priok port has exceeded the capacity to accommodate the logistics of exports 
and imports from a number of countries. Therefore, an international port SEZ 
development plan was put forth to be formulated and enforced inside Marunda to 






 Marunda port SEZ was planned to be developed alongside Tanjung Priok on two accounts, first, their 
respective development plan, so that both ports are comparable in terms of service capacity; second, 
because of the growing industry in KBN not only for garment-textile-related but also waterfront-
related industries or oil-based industries such as crude palm oil (CPO) processing and other follow-up 
industries (cooking oil industry), biodiesel industries, concrete industries, etc.  
As remarked by one of the KBN Managers, 
“The scenario for Marunda Port SEZ operation with the services capacity it provides and 
supported by an Industrial Zone at the rear is that it will be able to take over the market 
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share in the future, especially industries of raw material and industrial products both of 
which are in KBN Industrial Zone”.  
The joint project between KBN, central and provincial government will change the rules for budgetary 
allocations to secure funds amounting to Rp400 billion from the Government Capital Share Ownership 
of Jakarta’s 2011 APBD budget (Berita Satu News—5th December 2012). KBN claimed that the governor 
responded positively to the project, but the plan did not materialise, instead, there were interruptions 
in the process. The following paragraphs further discuss the specific interruptions. 
MP from a PDIP political party faction recounted,  
“There was intense pressure from both sides when a PDIP politician and member of 
Jakarta DPRD at B Commission had asked Fauzi Bowo to urge the central government 
to continue this project and insisted that the project will be taken over by West Java 
province if not promptly given the official license. 
According to various sources including the media and a former secretary of the Indonesian Industrial 
Estate Association (HKI): 
“The delay in the construction of Marunda Port SEZ was due to the issues of interests in 
the central government. Fauzi Bowo was running for the second round for governor 
nominated by Democrat Party led by SBY. Ahead of the gubernatorial election in 2012, 
there was a conflict of various political interests between two sides, Fauzi Bowo from 
Democrat Party and Jokowi from Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) that led 
to the postponement of the Marunda SEZ project”.  
Azis’s (2000; 2008; 2009)75 and Rosser’s (2004)76 conjectures do much to present the circumstance that 
Indonesian economic liberalisation and decentralisation, particularly the case of Jakarta, has 
demonstrated an unsurprising, more continuous and radical quality of rulers to remain in power.  
As pointed out in chapter 4, one of the DPRD’s main function is to determine the local budget, 
however, in relation to utilising the APBD budget funding, more information was gathered through the 
media that: 
“Under intense compulsion from both sides, although financing for the SEZ had finally 
been approved and allocated from the Jakarta 2011 APBD, the budget was never spent as 
KBN did not gain an official license as a form of approval from the governor until the 
gubernatorial election in 2012” (the Jakarta Globe 2014) 
The budgetary allocations for the SEZ project exhibited how sectoral spending priorities were evolving 
in the DPRD. It appeared the conflict between DPRD and the Governor arose when the Marunda port 
SEZ was first proposed by JPG through two scenarios, as previously discussed, was not formalised into 
formal rules. 
                                                          
75See chapter 2 and 3. 
76See chapter 3 and 4. 
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There were rumours that the delay was due to a matter of naming the SEZ which back then was still 
up for deliberation at the provincial level and district level in North Jakarta in June 2011. This caused 
the proposed name to not be ratified by the DPRD. The most likely candidate was Ali Sadikin77 Logistic 
Centre, named after a former Jakarta governor from 1966 to 1977, who was well-known for his heavy-
handed urban reform.  
During separate interviews, the authors from IGJ remarked, 
“Naming was just an excuse to divert attention and stall the process until the upcoming 
election. A conflict of interest due to other proposed projects and change of leadership 
evolved at the state level”. 
Even though the governor and DPRD had approved the Marunda Port to be set up as an SEZ in 2011, 
the process to build an SEZ by the Jakarta provincial government has taken longer than expected.  
Divided Sovereignty in the Port and Logistics Management 
The media coverage stated: 
“The strategic coastal area for SEZ has largely been under the management of PT Karya 
Citra Nusantara (KCN), a subsidiary firm of KBN. KCN was built in 2005 as a joint venture 
(PPP) between KBN and PT Karya Teknik Utama (KTU), whose core business is in the 
harbour management and as a majority shareholder resulted in KBN’s trivial voting rights 
to be able to continue the SEZ project plan. KTU has 85% ownership shares in KCN while 
KBN only 15% as stipulated in the Notarial Deed on February 2006 (Pelita editorial 22nd 
December 2015). KCN port in Marunda is a public port as stipulated in the decree of the 
Minister of Transportation No. KP 401/2011 and is granted the licence to develop and 
manage the port area in Marunda. KCN is the deepest port in Marunda with 6 metres of 
low water spring (LWS) to 7 metres LWS with a 700-metre length and 15-metre width” 
(Bisnis Indonesia—9th April 2013). 
KCN began its operation in September 2012, a month before Jokowi came to office as the next Jakarta 
governor. After seven months of operation, there were problems between KBN and KCN which 
impeded the plan to set up an SEZ. The problem was due to a plan to take over KTU’s shares by JPG. A 
leading figure in the United Development Party (PPP/Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) argues that this 
plan would have an adverse effect on the city’s investment image, therefore he suggested, it would be 
wise to cooperate or to purchase the shares in an open bidding.  
According to the MP, he commented that:  
“Jakarta provincial government to explore the possibility of cooperation with the private 
sector (KCN) who has control over the proposed SEZ land, by noting that Jakarta provincial 
government as the lead agency should have the majority of shares or purchase the shares” 
(during first meeting). 
                                                          
77He was an ex-military economic nationalist along with other generals in Soeharto period, Ibnu Sutowo and Ali 
Murtopo, whose economic approaches were more nationalistic in nature. With the beginning of the oil boom in 
the mid-70s, they were the contending group against neoliberal technocrats from Berkeley. 
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While a former DPRD member in PDIP faction in a separate occasion recounted that: 
“In the parliament (DPR) commission meeting, the KBN case was briefly mentioned. 
However, the executives (relevant ministries and the governor) have not been clear and 
transparent in disclosing the many problems facing the Jakarta provincial government in 
the plan to build an SEZ in Marunda. Consequently, it raised much controversy and 
augmented uncertainty for investors. The process became longer than expected since 
there was an alleged information concerning other business proposition that had already 
been premeditated involving some powerful people”.  
To confirm, the author conducted an interview to search for other perspectives and information from 
KBN managers and Port Authority in a separate interview:  
“The insoluble situation was that KCN who control most of the harbour land had carried 
out licence application procedure for port development to the provincial government and 
awaited approval of the Marunda Port development master plan. It was said that the 
official licence has not been issued by the provincial government, but what they defined 
as investment principle licence or ‘ijin prinsip’78 has been issued to KCN. The issue was 
further complicated as the executives (governor office and relevant line ministries) have 
also not been transparent in providing in-depth information regarding KBN’s status to DPR 
and DPRD at the APBD meeting. Local governments should be open and not cover the issue 
because land is a sensitive issue”. 
Further, the key parts of discussion which were briefly reviewed in the DPR meeting held in Senayan, 
Jakarta in 2013 were as follows: 
“First, the council revealed that KBN has yet to disentangle the residential land acquisition 
issue and the budget of approximately Rp175 billion has not been allocated to KBN from 
the Government Capital Share Ownership of the provincial government. Second, the 
problem was that the port development projects in Marunda had a time limit. So if it is 
overdue, the project proposition will be nullified, as the provincial government has been 
delaying in issuing the licence”. 
The media also commented a follows: 
“The problem has not reached common ground, even though KCN has been in operation 
for over a year; KBN had committed to obstructing the activities of KCN port from 21st 
March until 4th April 2013 by means of blocking the access to the port by KBN security 
guards and fire engine units. In effect, to normalise and maintain the flow of trade 
commodities in accordance with the instruction of the Director General of Sea 
Transportation, Ministry of Transportation, as many as five vessels loaded with coal and 
CPO were forced to navigate their loading and unloading cargo activities to Tanjung Priok 
port and six other vessels to a number of other ports79“(Berita Trans News—7th April 2013).  
                                                          
78‘Ijin prinsip’ is a compulsory licensing required by any person or legal entity who wish to apply for the utilisation 
of public space for any large-scale businesses. 
79As many as eight public and private ports are currently in operation in North Jakarta including KCN Port and 
another port is set to be built as Marunda Centre. However, only four ports are recognised of having been 
engaged in loading/unloading activities: Nusantara Fishery and Kepulauan Seribu Transport Pier, Muara Baru 
Fishery Quay, Sunda Kelapa Wharf, and Ancol Marina Pier. But none of which has the adequate capacity to 
accommodate logistics shipping vessels in terms of depth, port or quay length, land area, and the vessel’s weight. 
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Rumours surfaced among the high-level elites that the closure of the port access road by KBN was due 
to the political tug of war and conflict of interest between the Ministry of Transportation and Ministry 
of SOEs, which was further denied by a former official of the Ministry of Transportation in an interview. 
“Actually, it is not a conflict of interest between us and the SOE, but rather an issue of 
coordination which is not synchronised”.  
Marunda Port at stake 
Between the end of 2012 and mid-2014, there were a variety of management tactics and mechanisms 
in the face of voting hazards from KBN’s joint-venture partners (KTU and KCN) whereby KBN was highly 
unlikely to win all negotiation opportunities. As political hazards also augmented especially ahead of 
the presidential election in 2014, all SOEs encountered an increasing tension of opportunistic 
behaviour from the DPR and DPRD in the voting arrangement. 
Instead of the legislative monitor the work of the executive as stated in the constitution, findings 
suggest that there is a reversed situation where the executive branch (the Minister of SOE) rebukes 
the legislative branch (the MPs in DPR/parliament and DPRD/local parliament). The story that unfolds 
was that high profile KTU and KCN controversy and political backroom negotiations of the budget and 
joint-ventures caught the Minister of SOE’s attention in the SBY cabinet, Dahlan Iskan, in late 2012.  
Based on media coverage and document reviews,  
“Individual MPs garnered for themselves a larger fraction of the strategic SOEs’ revenues. 
The political atmosphere heated up when the relationship between Parliamentary 
Commission VII and Dahlan Iskan was in a state of contention. The conflict stemmed from 
Dahlan forwarding the first circular letter issued by Cabinet Secretary, Dipo Alam, which 
in Dipo’s earlier letter requested state officials not to practise any collusion with the 
parliament (DPR), regional parliament (DPRD), and partners or related stakeholders 
regarding state budget (APBN)”.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the information gathered from the Former Vice Chairman of the MPR, the 
high possibility of the executive and legislative budget team to determine the size of the APBN budget.  
Lobbies between the executive and legislative as well as from other stakeholder groups concerned 
with the budget are allegedly passed through these two institutions, but evidence suggests the types 
of budget and joint venture proposals that come from the MPs appeared to have carried the mission 
of a particular party. In such a position the executive is generally incapable of rejecting proposals 
coming from MPs and to deal with ongoing conflicts, informal measures were used (collusion) as the 
last resort.  
172 
 
In the circular letter—that had copies submitted to the President, Vice President, Chief of 
UKP480 (Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and Control), and the Minister of Home 
Affairs— the Cabinet Secretary had revealed that an amount from the ‘unofficial’ state 
budget was transferred to regions from 2005 until 2013 to accelerate and expand the 
development projects throughout the archipelago. However, after the circular letter was 
issued, Dahlan complained to Dipo via a text message about the remaining MPs who still 
asked for shares from the SOEs’ approved projects and profits. Subsequently, Dahlan’s 
circular letter stated banning all subsidiaries of SOEs if any collusion was committed as it 
would induce policy interference on SOEs’ projects.  
As stated in Tempo editorials 25th October 2012 Dahlan Iskan told the media the reason behind his 
action: 
“This has something to do with the Cabinet Secretary Dipo Alam who issued the first 
circular letter to ministries including the Ministry of SOEs. The Circular Letter No. 
542/Seskab/IX/2012 contains 2013-2014 budget escorting to prevent collusion practices, 
whose contents should not be any conspiracy with the parliament”. 
Further document reviews find that Dahlan had issued twelve prohibitions contained in a copy of the 
Minister of SOE regulation No PER-04/MBU 2012 on the Administrative Code of Ethics dated 9th April 
2012. The major prohibitions were: to be discriminating in duty; to be administrators and members of 
political parties; participate as an executor or attend the election campaign of the president and vice 
president and head of regional or members of legislative elections; misuse of authority; misuse of data 
or ministry information; eliminate state assets and state/ministry documents; misuse of assets and 
documents belonging to the state/ministry; use the ministry’s facilities other than in the interests of 
the ministry; receive and offer bribes; participate in the SOE Initial Public Offering (IPO) Buying in the 
IPO programme; and conduct any business propositions with SOEs.  
A statement by Democrat Party politician in the media stated:  
“Dahlan’s performance during the SBY era was fast, precise and yielded measurable 
results; among others, by breaking the gridlock of bureaucracy and streamlining the 
bloated management ranks where many directors and managers did not perform their 
duty properly and merely spent budget for their personal salaries. He streamlined budget 
endorsement, refreshed the target partners, and replaced the SOE Board of Directors 
(BODs) with competent professionals.  
SOE is a jungle of bureaucracy, where politicians play. Do you still remember how the MPs 
were on fire with Dahlan’s action in replacing the BOD in the SOEs? Yes, it happens 
because the Directors were intertwined by political interests and that the SOE is the 
                                                          
80UKP4 stands for Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan. 
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politicians’ and political party’s piggy bank for funding. Dahlan’s duty seems to get 
heavier” (Sorot News—25th October 2012) 
There were very strong political overtones in the SOEs and various political interests actively played, 
which ultimately led to SOE being exploited by politicians. The company elites and officials also tended 
to enjoy the acquired funds. Moreover, most of the existing SOEs became ill-managed and this fact 
persists throughout the history of SOEs in the country.  
According to one of the former researcher in IGJ,  
“SOEs generally feel the importance of the contribution to a political party for future 
benefits and ‘political investment’ they will gain as a reward in the form of business 
opportunities, ease of obtaining contracts, access to information on government projects, 
and share expropriation. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that political salesmanship 
through businessmen who approached DPR or DPRD was part of investment for benefits 
and was nurtured prior and at the time of the elections”.  
5.5. The Continued Informal-Formal Institutional Arrangement-Contradiction to KKSS 
ideology  
This subchapter explains the problems of formal institutional change (in the KBN’s business 
transformation), where informal institutions of privilege and power of the JPG (political allegiance and 
KKSS affiliation) have hampered the development of new formal institutions to support KBN’s 
development in the implementation of the applicable law by setting up an SEZ. 
In contradiction to the circular letter passed by the SOE Minister, Sattar’s reputation (KBN CEO) is a 
vital instrument for KBN’s businesses to make private deals through an informal method such as 
kinship-based systems. The path-dependent nature of reputation system is always changing to address 
the flaws of formal rules, while kinship systems, such as KKSS businessmen and politicians, are based 
on familial ties and cultural commonalities, i.e. ethnicity and religion. KKSS originated from a social 
democratic faction and an independent group with uncertain political affiliation. It can persuade MPs 
of a party to depart from its initial intention and accede to a commitment of working within the group’s 
democratic setup. 
Although Sattar and other influential members of KKSS were reported to take the initiative in practising 
the principle of public accountability to answer to the citizenry of their respective affiliations, the 
nature of it was far from eradicating rent-seeking opportunities as neoliberals expected. Rather, their 
seemingly pro-public attitudes and direct communication with the KKSS circles of power 
complemented their predacious practices.  
Unlike in the democratic era of SBY, in the New Order era, Pancasila and UUD were taken into serious 
consideration as a useful mechanism for maintaining the existing social order through full government 
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control (Aspinall et al. 2015). They fashioned the Pancasila guidelines to favour their interest and 
maintain their political hegemony (Ibid: 13) so that no other kinship-based societal organisation would 
be able to flourish. The government instilled the teachings of unity through various systems such as 
education, government agencies, military training facilities, and SOEs to build new alliances 
entrenched in every facet of society. They were recruited to build connections whereby many informal 
institutions emerged within business communities devised in a frequently complex and 
multidimensional manner to reduce transaction costs such as writing business agreements, searching 
for trustworthy partners, and enforcing mutually beneficial exchange aimed at maintaining profitable 
relationships and standing among peers (Ibid: 111).  
Much literature on post-Soeharto Indonesia has emphasised the ‘continuity’ of the politico-business 
alliance which is still evident today thus constitutes business societies that often not transparent to 
firms and individuals. They were identified and excluded for behaving poorly unless they had familial 
or kinship and business affiliation (Crouch 2010; Hadiz 2010; Aspinall and Klinken 2011; Aspinall and 
Mietzner 2014; Aspinall et al. 2015). However, in this case, KKSS or any other societal organisation in 
democratic order is granted the freedom to express their own ideologies and flourish. However, they 
cannot escape from parliamentary control as political institutions mobilise their presence for rent-
seeking through vote-buying which tie the group members together. KBN objectives were aimed at 
consolidating Sattar’s reputation and KKSS’s frequent meetings with influencers which allowed Jusuf 
Kalla (JK), the former vice president (in the SBY administration) and current vice president (in the 
Jokowi administration) to establish a patron-client relationship with the masses. As a result, it reduced 
the costs of doing business for all members (Ibid: 110-1). 
North uses economic history to learn how a person or group in society can reduce transaction costs 
and how pre-existing institutions have, to a certain extent, empowered these groups in order to 
unravel their collective action problem (Roland 2003: 10). To employ North’s (1991: 111) theory of 
transaction costs, the gradual change in frequency of informal institutions such as culture in DiMaggio 
(1994) has a persistent impact upon the economic character in the long-run; the logic of 
appropriateness developed by March and Olsen (2004) will help to understand the influence of trade 
lobby emphasising bargaining power for instance from the South Sulawesi traditional concepts. KKSS 
has been promoting South Sulawesi’s potential to foreign investors. This organisation recently 
organised a 2015 Bugis Makassar merchant (PSBM) meeting, which was centred on Takalar, Sulawesi 
to promote the investment potential of the region as an SEZ and integrated industrial zone (KAPET). 
Their informal approach perceptibly embodies the existence of informal institutions associated with 
the legacy and traditions (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008) of the founding fathers embedded in 
society that can impact on the applicable formal rules. 
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The KBN issue with KCN was further mediated by the head of Tanjung Priok Port Authority with the 
central government overseeing the situation. To clarify the responses, the author approached a source 
from the Ministry of SOEs and Indonesian Logistics and Forwarders Association (ALFI) who considered 
that: 
“The KCN port was one of the most important ports. The closure of the port was 
problematized to gain attention from the central government that there was a problem 
between KBN, KCN, and KTU and should be resolved. The closure would not have 
happened if the central government had interfered in the PPP contract agreement 
between the three parties in the first place. The parties should rectify the situation 
internally without having to close the port”.  
Tanjung Priok Port Authority has stated that the closure of access to KCN port by KBN was due to the 
unresolved land compensation issue; as the land (where the access road was located) was under KBN’s 
ownership. The issue raised in the media was that KBN demanded a contribution from the port 
operational income for every vessel docked at the port oversaw by KCN to compensate the cost of 
road maintenance in Marunda engendered by the passing of trucks.  
“The news on the closure of access road was an effort to gain public’s attention that in 
order to keep the roads in good working order and protect the zone road environment 
from damage due to the passing through coal carrier and CPO trucks, every year we have 
to spend a huge amount of maintenance cost for roads and have absolutely no interest to 
continue blocking the flow of goods in KCN Port Marunda” as stated by KBN source 
(Pelindo Marine 12 April 2013). 
KCN port maximising profits from the open market regime was the epitome of an opportunistic alliance 
(Williamson 1975, 1985) between the state-led development policies and the neoliberal agenda of less 
state intervention through the opening of business opportunities to the private sector in managing 
ports as regulated in the Sea Voyage Law. In addition, because of its readiness, KCN port became a 
stopover port for vessels that serve as coastal shipping or so-called short-sea shipping, a new 
government programme aimed at transporting goods and services by means of sea transport along 
the coastline of Java Island and other islands—a concept laid down by the Coordinating Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (CMEA) and regulated under the Ministry of Transportation.  
However, the concept was not supported by KBN and the blockage of the KCN port was ongoing for 
two weeks and had an impact on the high-cost economy for logistics and transport activities; this 
prompted the officials from Directorate General of Sea Transportation under the supervision of 
Ministry of Transportation to authorise Marunda Harbour Master and Port Authority (KSOP) in 
coordination with Tanjung Priok Port Authority as mediator.  
As stated by the official from Sea Transportation: 
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“The activity of closing and operating public ports was under the authority of Ministry of 
Transportation, so the blockage activity in Marunda Port violated the provisions of Law 
No. 17/2008”. 
The media reported that: 
“Former Secretary of the Ministry of SOEs, Said Didu at the time, assessed that the dispute 
between KBN and port operator KCN was due to the decisions agreed upon by old 
management not being approved by the new management. Said believed the government 
must be stringent on the contract enforcement mechanism against port management, 
especially the firm’s policy conformity. He considered the main aspect that needed to be 
moderated was the issue of shareholders who manage the KCN port in Marunda (Bisnis 
News).  
Williamson’s approach (1995) is also found in the dispute when the project was highly politicised with 
Marunda port SEZ proposal as a leverage point. KBN has the advantage as an SOE under the Jakarta 
provincial government (JPG) and Jokowi as governor, whose CEO has built good connections as a 
member of KKSS (now chairman since 2014) with highly influential people, particularly, with the 
current vice president, JK (Jusuf Kalla). The KKSS organisation needs to leverage its key resources in 
order to deal with the port management situation without resorting to a legal framework in a judicial 
system as an enforcement mechanism (Williamson 1995: 6). This suggests that the KKSS and JK’s 
institutionalisation process is resorting to a type of informal means to strengthen their institutional 
capacity and achieve their organisation and national goals. 
Based on reviews of literature, legal documents, as well as media reviews, evidence suggests that the 
relationship formed between JK and KBN CEO produced a very durable political base. Their social 
relations beyond the business and political sphere has also made every negotiation possible and was 
attributed to the 2014 presidential election of which JK was pairing with Jokowi. With the assumed 
authority of Jokowi as governor in 2012, with no ideological resemblance between JK from GOLKAR 
and Jokowi from PDIP, KBN elites and JK started approaching each other prior to the 2014 presidential 
election in order to achieve their personal agendas and seek personal favours such as unravel land 
ownership issues, guarantee projects in local government schemes, etc. The candidate elected to run 
the government (as in Jokowi’s exceptional promotion and JK’s second time as vice president), will 
always bear the burden of serving the elites and political parties (JK from GOLKAR and Jokowi’s 
coalition parties) that have helped them answer the problem. At the same time, businesses in the SOE 
and political elites in the parliament who have been ‘planted’ a ‘donation’ to the governor or president 
in return for ‘share’ will always collect a reward when they make important decisions.  
Thus, in such situations, it is not surprising that the policy process was not able to answer the demands 
of the constituencies. According to Basri (2013), so far Indonesia adheres to a system where no one 
political party can propose its own candidate for president and vice president unless the potential 
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winning party, such as PDIP which gained the most votes, embraces other parties in order to nominate 
their strong candidate. It is a strategy, arguably, for a party as political ruling elite in a democracy to 
win the tickets of established parties to participate in the competition and aim to win the presidential 
election; all such manoeuvres of coalition or electoral alliance are legitimate for a greater good. It is, 
however, important to note that a critical part in the interest group’s attempt for the legitimate statute 
is winning elections.  
The media coverage further commented that: 
“The election result was supposed to have been forged to support the election of JK to 
the vice presidency chair. JK had successfully forged electoral alliances with promoters in 
the Jokowi-JK constituency in Jakarta when KBN facilitated their electoral campaign 
attended by 37,400 workers from five labour unions81 (Rakyat Merdeka—27th June 2014). 
The declaration of support from the unions for candidate number two (as opposed to 
number one, Prabowo-Hatta) was taking place in the KBN yard in Cakung and it was in 
North Jakarta alone while other districts had far more constituents. In the campaigns, 
established parties succeeded in co-opting many labour activists who are pure 
opportunists and sincere ones as volunteers. However, when all attempts to build a 
network of support from the higher level failed and new laws not in support of the labour 
were made, good activists turned to their mainstream parties. This was the case with one 
labour union leader who turned to his labour companions to bring all labour groups and 
unions under the same roof by establishing an independent labour party opposing the 
new regime82 (CNN Indonesia—30th April 2015; BBC Indonesia—1st May 2015). The labour 
revolutionaries on behalf of the underprivileged proved to be impractical ideologues that 
had no idea how to fight for negotiation (Rakyat Merdeka—27th June 2014).  
The comments suggest public interest was neglected through political misrepresentation and the 
government’s poor accountability. The debates about SEZ that arose in the KBN as a strategic SOE in 
SBY’s second term, as the clear views of Basri (2013)83 and Daeng (2008)84 were more than just an 
                                                          
81Regional Labour Alliance (ABK) declared itself to join the People’s Freedom Alliance (ARM) in order to win the 
candidates of President and Vice-Presidential, Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. As stated by the ABK coordinator, there 
are five unions that joined ARM: Indonesian Prosperity Labour Union (SBSI), the National Workers Union (SPN), 
Indonesian Labour Union Federation (FSBI), Highway Transportation Workers Union (SPTJR), and Graha Sarana 
Duta Workers Union (SPGSD).  
82In the 2014 presidential election, there were two groups who were indeed in an opposing position. The All 
Indonesian Workers Union Confederation (KSPSI) who supported Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, while Confederation of 
Indonesian Labour Union (KSPI) raised their voices to vote Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa (CNN Indonesia—30th April 
2015). 
83See chapter 3 subchapter 2.2. 
84In chapters 1 to 3 
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argument over the Jokowi party’s covert objectives and JK’s embedded societal mobilisation. Problems 
that occur in this case are not just corrupt political elite, but also the poor political representation. 
Nevertheless, political representation is not only a hallmark of politics and democracy in Indonesia. 
Other countries belonging to the category of new democratic states are also experiencing a common 
problem in terms of political representation. Generally, this problem occurs due to democracy only 
being understood as a ceremonial event instead of policy participation of the public that reflects the 
political activities of everyday life.  
 KBN-KTU at Peace—KCN Port Development Continued 
In a market economy, the role of the state is central to negotiating a failed private agreement, public 
and private interests, etc. (Goldberg 1976 and Williamson 1976). The issues of complicated bargaining 
process caused higher transaction costs. Thus, state intervention is needed to ensure the contract 
agreement is completed and enforced as requested by the bargaining parties (Goldberg 1976 and 
Williamson 1976) as seen in the JPG’s effort to intervene in the KBN’s company performance to spur 
local development. KCN port construction in Marunda continued after KBN, KTU, and KCN were set to 
negotiate and had collectively made a deal over infrastructure development. A peace agreement was 
signed by the CEO of KBN, Sattar Taba and CEO of KTU, Wardono Asnim in mid-2013 (Bisnis News—
26th June 2013).  
Some important points were built around the agenda of the agreement related to the synergy of two 
shareholders, the endorsement of changes in capital, and shares carried out by the public accounting 
firm to report the new composition of share ownership. Another original, more substantive policies as 
subjects of negotiation during the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders (EGM) in KBN were 
to prioritise the corporate structure, specifically, the composition of BODs and commissioners. It was 
officially determined that KBN and KTU ownership shares in the PPP (joint venture) were disseminated 
respectively by 50% from the previous composition of 85% of KCN and 15% of KBN (See Figure 5.7). 
Sattar was optimistic that the firms will rise because there will be two major forces cooperating with 
each other to share in the development of the port (BUMN magazine—29th December 2014). “We 
have reconciled and agreed at the EGM in the determination of share ownership between KBN and KTU 










In addition, in the KCN’s General Meeting of Shareholders (or AGM), the changes in the firm’s articles 
of association (AD/ART) and corporate structure were scheduled and confirmed. Of four directors in 
KCN, two directors came from KBN and from KTU respectively. Commissioners also consisted of two 
from KBN and two from KTU. These new adjustments accelerated once the top executive was passed 
from SBY-Boediono to Jokowi-JK in October 2014.  
Findings suggest, prefigured as an icon of businessmen and politicians, JK took it upon himself to 
promote the changing face of North Jakarta port to gain more popular support while sustaining his 
business order in port management with the assistance of the kinship-based SOE, KBN. Only by virtue 
of JK’s electoral victory instead of the coercive method that KBN claimed to represent the public 
interest.  
There was a preliminary doubt concerning JK’s capacity to such action, as stated in the publicised 
editorials, among others, CNN Indonesia, Lensa Berita News, and Konfrontasi Daily:  
“Although not immediately after he succeeded Prabowo-Hatta, the news exhibits the 
trace of his business empire which has long been involved in the seaport management 
sector; in his first vice presidency duty back in 2009 he intervened in the decision made 
by SOE Minister, Sofyan Djalil, who is currently Head of National Development Planning 
Agency (BAPPENAS) in the appointment of the CEO of Pelindo II (a state-owned port 
authority under the Ministry of Transportation). Moreover, the CEO’s business partner 
was the family of JK and a close friend since college while the son in law of the CEO owns 
almost half the share of the company that belongs to the vice president’s family”. 
The EGM and AD/ART documents generally stated that both parties—KBN and KTU—would remain to 
play an important part in the port development and management. This is rather superficial, mainly due 
to the unclear KBN intention whether they could attract investment while simultaneously lead a state-
owned public firm. Consequently, they performed risky programme which caused uncertainty among 
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shareholders and prospective EPZ investors on the government’s real objectives to either maximise 
shareholder value or procure EPZ investor satisfaction over their (KBN) services. This EGM 
announcement was perhaps the only plausible official clarification of the policy evolution that the KBN 
delivered throughout Sattar’s leadership.  
In a focus group discussion with KBN managers, EPZ firms, and KCN port operators—3rd December 
2014 
“KBN’s managerial experience and KTU’s great strategy have equally helped develop the 
port sector, warehousing sites, and logistics system to attract investors into doing 
business. The presence of the KCN port in Marunda was intended to help relieve 
congestion at Tanjung Priok Port managed by PT Pelindo II. As a fellow SOE, KBN and 
Pelindo II have worked together in improving services to the public. The port in Marunda 
supports Tanjung Priok Port in domestic shipping for raw materials from upstream 
industries in other regions in the archipelago and to reduce the vessel dwelling time and 
cost. KCN performance has continued to rise after KBN and KTU reached an agreement 
after the ongoing dispute since 2012".  
Based on the company website and a media report: 
“Despite the policy to build KBN Port as an SEZ not materialising, since the re-operation 
of KCN Port in Marunda, KCN Port has recorded a significant rise in performance with 
assets worth up to Rp1,078 trillion in December 2014; whereas, in the previous year, the 
assets of KCN were only Rp15.3 billion. There is an increase of 3,437% due to the 
completion of the port construction. KCN recorded a net profit of Rp27.8 billion in 2014, 
up from the previous year by Rp8.02 billion. The number of ships that docked along the 
1,000-metre long port reached 1,200 vessels in 2013. Most of the vessels carried bulk 
cargo such as grain, wheat, maize, and fertiliser as well as sand, coal, and offshore vessels 
in cooperation with PT PERTAMINA” (KBN website; Indonesia Shipping Line).  
Furthermore, the presence of the number of other ports along the northern coast and West Java has 
increased. The growing number of ports resulted in the significant decrease of port services in Tanjung 
Priok, especially the volume of dry bulk cargo, liquid bulk and general cargo (BUMN website 21st April 
2015).  
Indonesia Shipping Line journalist observed that: 
“The density of Tanjung Priok port had started to decrease since the KCN Port had been 
in operation. A number of bulk cargos from coal and CPO have been regularly carrying out 
their loading and unloading in KCN port which has since its establishment declared itself 
a Tanjung Priok supporter. However, KCN Port today not only serves as a companion but 
it has become a competitor based on the fact that the cargo owners tend to choose KCN 
Port over Tanjung Priok Port. It was due to much easier and faster bureaucracy, resulting 
in swift import and export procedures as well as being congestion free. In terms of 
transaction cost, KCN Port is able to economise the operational and production costs”.  
Port management has long been a bone of contention among political and business elites. However, 
much remains to be seen concerning the provincial government’s (JPG) ambition and motives to 
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deliver port services in the name of public or private interests by maximising value for shareholder’s 
profit to sustain their group’s status quo. This evidence will be revealed in the next section in a formal 
feasibility study from an independent consultant in the second formal-informal controversy.  
After KBN reconciled the dispute with KCN, JPG was still searching for ways to formulate an SEZ concept 
and designate Marunda as the centre of economic activity and an international port. An alliance that 
includes the majority of SEZ port developers tends to exercise political force for establishing policies 
on port development which allow the supporters to anchor a greater portion of a higher company 
profit. Independent groups or civil society organisations (CSOs) and IGJ tend to condemn democracy 
and economic growth more than political parties in influencing policy due to their vague political 
affiliations.  
To sum up, in an event of bureaucratic culture and political investment, in Sattar’s case, informal 
institutions, in general, collide with formal institutions in the SEZ policymaking process and 
bureaucratic politics. This was evidently the case with Sattar’s recruitment to hold the corporate 
position as CEO in KBN, having much to do with his personal affiliation to KKSS (intricate and well-
insulated oligarchs) rather than his meritocratic recruitment. His meritocracy did not lead to 
organisational effectiveness but his loyalty and patrimonial relations did. Sattar’s role shaped the 
relationship between effective bureaucratic forms of administration and economic goals, but his own 
distinct agenda setting of decision-making procedures complement the formal institutions (market-
based institutions).  
This initial conspiracy reveals the ways in which the public sector interacts with the private sector (KBN) 
and civil society (KKSS) to produce port services. These include issues such as accountability, the 
government’s capacity to manage complex contract relationships and partnerships, financial 
transparency and in particular, the performance of non-state actors on the merits of port management 
service delivery arrangements involving KBN and KKSS actors.  
In spite of the fact that the intricate relation between business and politics in the KBN case is not a 
new phenomenon, NIE practically differentiates formal and informal institutions (Williamson 1985: 
519; North 1990) where informal institutions or norms of behaviour from the side of KBN along with 
their political connections with elites under the basis of KKSS influence the formulation and application 
of the applicable KBN formal rules. 
5.6. The Second Formal-Informal Institutional Controversy 
Following KBN’s intention, the political holiness of a pro-neoliberal capitalist alternative economic 
model was recreated and the policy restructuring labelled as necessary instead of fundamental 
adjustments. KBN is an asset that able to contribute to local revenues and spur economic growth in 
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the surrounding areas, but its utilisation rate in 2013 was below 70%. Higher utilisation can be achieved 
if the zone’s land and buildings are optimally used by investors for industrial activities not only for 
office administration, but the problem is that KBN management prefers to collect general tenancy 
rather than to make sufficient use of the lands and buildings in the bonded area for long-term 
investment.   
KBN’s financial record shows that between 2009-2014 industrial difficulties increased phenomenally. 
In an interview on a separate occasion, the policy advisors from Indonesian Chamber of Commerce 
(KADIN) and the former secretary of the Industrial Estate Association (HKI) explained: 
“Many EPZ firms went bankrupt or were relocated to other more cost efficient regions 
due to: first, the 2008 GFC which led to the decrease in global demands, in particular from 
the US and European markets (Figure 5.2); second, issues of the leasehold licence rigidity 
from KBN. The decelerating rate of exports led to the industrial disputes between a labour 
union and EPZ firms concerning the inability of EPZ firms to pay the labour’s minimum 
wage as decreed by the Minister of Manpower. The wage policy was subject to annual 
change as needed depending on the inflation rate. The firms were forced to take 
necessary measures for efficiencies such as labour discharge and upsurge labour 
outsourcing, whereas the rigidity of land and property lease meant the firms were unable 
to complete their production unless leasehold renewal had been made in advance. These 
issues also led to the KBN’s undesirable performance of low-income and state revenue. 
Although there were investors who closed down or reduced the size of the leased 
property, there were other new EPZ investors/firms as tenants, but the income from the 
lease was insufficient to cover the maintenance of the KBN site. This was noticeably 
detrimental to KBN’s financial structure considering property maintenance requires high 
costs. Without KBN revenue, it will only serve as a cost centre”.  
While conducting on-site observation, the author witnessed some unexpected events i.e. labour 
movements on the streets inside the harbour area and its surroundings including KBN on a daily basis. 
These events have been going on for years prior to the GFC causing acute labour agitation demanding 
improved welfare and increased wages (outside the Ministry of Manpower North Jakarta office and 
North Jakarta DPRD office 8th-11th December 2014). The ailing infrastructures of KBN added to the 
unlikely performance. KBN is generally a quiet place, not many activities beyond the site’s periphery; 
however, unlike Tanjung Priok and Cakung, KBN Marunda was not as the author had expected as there 




Fragmented Political Power Emanating from Pervasive Coexistence of Informal and Formal 
Institutions  
By 2012, an institutional change among Jakarta elites just started—that their previous political moves 
were not efficient and needed a change in the pattern of leadership. However, the pattern was unclear 
which caused severe ambiguity. Jokowi as governor of PDIP adheres to the traditional PDIP slogan that 
grassroots society’s welfare is the prime concern while capitalists are the class enemies who need to 
be destroyed; and yet his vice governor at the time, Ahok (a Chinese Indonesian known by his 
Indonesian name Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) found an excuse for inviting them to the city. The argument 
that Jokowi-Ahok supposedly shared the same vision arose from the current conditions where they 
were bound to be contingent on private investors; however, in principle, they were in opposite 
directions. They consider that they no longer need private investors when they can reach a common 
vision to mobilise public support into gaining national power. The finding suggests that Jokowi-Ahok 
was unprepared to admit the importance of private investors in Jakarta’s economy. Therefore, rather 
than they compete with the private sector, the pair ought to search for alternatives of revitalising their 
responsibilities and ideas for effective cooperation. Principally, they sought to make a situation which 
accommodates the revolutionary pro-poor party at the core (conforming to SBY’s motto) and yet 
remains pro-industry. This reflects a total absence of ideological certainty (either neoliberalism or 
nationalism) and political sincerity. 
 The land reclamation episode 
After settling the dispute with KTU, various attempts were raised by KBN to continue the SEZ port 
project under different schemes, even though very few of these schemes were ever put into action 
due to a turf war between port management. By 21st August 2013, other schemes had been put in 
place. KBN under the authority of the Jakarta provincial government (JPG) planned a new project in 
Marunda by constructing an integrated logistics port to develop an industrial zone in the C4 block 
through land reclamation. It will cover an area of 600ha or three kilometres on the Marunda coastline 
to overcome port density. It will serve as an industrial centre, container storage area as well as other 
industrial facilities.  
Operations Manager of KBN Marunda recounted the history of reclamation in North Jakarta area to 
have a clear picture that the idea of a reclamation on Marunda was not the first in the area: 
“Reclamation in Jakarta Bay is not the first time. In the 1980s, PT Harapan Indah reclaimed 
about 400 meters of Pluit Beach area to build luxury housing Pantai Mutiara. In 1981, PT 
Pembangunan Jaya Ancol reclaimed north of the Ancol area for recreation and industry. 
In the 1990s, Kapok mangrove forest was converted to become a luxurious residential 
area of Pantai Indah Kapuk. While in 1995, reclamation in Jakarta Bay was done again to 
build an industry of Bonded Zone Area. This is the fourth reclamation plan which reaped 
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much debate…. some say this reclamation disrupt the Muara Karang power plant system. 
Only in those days, freedom of expression is not like now. No one dared to speak out loud 
(He was referring to the days of the new order)”. 
Editorials from Tempo magazine (2nd September 2014), stated that the estimated investment value for 
the reclamation project reached Rp10.9 trillion in 2013/14 to optimise the EPZ utilisation and 
implement the appropriate strategies in order to attract investors. In addition, to anticipate congestion 
outside the dock, a 5-kilometre bridge was planned to be built from Tanjung Priok port. The bridge will 
be in cooperation with Pelindo II and Jasamarga (two state-owned road and bridge facilitators under 
the Ministry of Transportation). KBN has invited Chinese contractors and Singapore consultants to do 
the job, but on the 1st September 2014, the scheme was cancelled due to reasons unspecified. Some 
say due to unqualified spatial planning, others say the provincial government had another initiative to 
build an airport off the coast of Jakarta Bay. In the end, the reclamation of Marunda port did not 
materialise and instead KBN will develop a new dock for coastal shipping. The dock will have an area 
of approximately 1,400 square metres with a budget of a Rp1.1 trillion. However, Ahok requested KBN 
to review the reclamation sketch. Ahok said the reassessment was necessary in order for the port 
construction project not to be halted due to conflicting projects.  
Interesting evidence from the document review on one of the consultants hired to carry out a 
feasibility study on Marunda Port SEZ revealed that the JPG took upon themselves to be the only 
institution who carries the role and responsibility as well as the privilege to carry out business dealings 
with the third-party. Findings indicate that formal institutions in the form of statutes render SEZ project 
protocols to pose a great risk of offering the JPG some type of control points and opens up 
opportunities for rent-seeking. The statutes stated that the Marunda SEZ should follow procedures as 
stated below:  
1. Being a part of the government policy in the arrangement of National Harbour System 
(SPN); 
2. Being a part of the Integrated Ports Development Project at Jakarta Bay (JICA); 
3. Implementing the Roles and Functions of the local governments according to the Trust 
it holds: a) Law no. 17/2008 on Shipping [Chapter VII]; b) Law no. 32/2004 on Regional 
Autonomy; c) Law no. 9/2007 on the Capital City; d) Law no. 39/2009 on Special 
Economic Zones; e) Law no. 26/2007 on Spatial Planning; f) Presidential Instruction 
no. 5/2005 on the Empowerment of the National Shipping Industry with emphasis on 
the implementation of the Cabotage85 system; g) Government Regulation (PP) No. 
61/2009 on Ports; h) Government Regulation (PP) no. 26/2008 concerning Spatial 
Planning in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi areas; 
4. Ministry of Transportation has launched the port authority (OP) of Tanjung Priok, 
which carries out the functions of regulating, controlling and supervising urbane 
commercial port activities;  
                                                          
85“Carriage of cargo between two points within a country by a vessel or vehicle registered in another country” 
(Business dictionary website) 
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5. OP Tanjung Priok consists of 2 Technical Implementation Units: 1. Port Authority 
Office (OP), 2. Local port authority (Syahbandar) Office, and 3. Port Operator Unit 
Office.  
6. Development of Marunda Port SEZ if done in an integrated manner will need to have 
a business entity in the seaport field within the scope of the Jakarta Provincial 
Government (JPG). This business entity will be integrated with PT (Persero) Pelindo II, 
as a business entity from the Ministry of Transportation.  
7. Cooperation with shipping lines is clearly one of the keys that later cannot be 
negotiable for the success of the development of this port or Marunda Port SEZ. 
Development of Legal Aspects - Scenario 1 
Scenario 1: New Port (Marunda Port SEZ)  
1. The SEZ will require further legal frameworks: a) the location of the port 
establishment is determined by the Governor; b) the maritime action of the Governor 
announced officially that the JPG will build a port for the benefit of the cooperation 
with all parties; c) The Minister of Transportation establishes the hierarchy and port 
functions. Approval will be determined by alignment with the National Harbour 
System;  
2. The Governor (or JPG) is the Port Authority (based on Law No. 17/2008 on Shipping) 
and the Area Administrator (based Law No. 39/2009 on SEZ); 
3. As the initiator, all legal authority is filed by and given to the Port Authority, via 
Tanjung Priok Port Authority; 
4. As an initiator, the JPG obtains the ‘privileges’ in entering into concession cooperation 
with the Port Authority. 
Development of Legal Aspects - Scenario 2 
Scenario 2: Development of Marunda Port SEZ (existing)  
1. Being part of a Special Port, Marunda has obtained a license issued by the Director 
General of Sea Transportation;  
2. JPG’s position as the initiator prepares a master plan which will be submitted and 
received by the port administrator of Marunda Port (as the representative office of 
Tanjung Priok Port Authority); 
3. As the initiator, the JPG have the ‘privileges’ in entering into concession cooperation 
with the Port Authority. 
Development of Legal Aspects - Scenario 3 
Scenario 3: Development of Marunda Terminal at Tanjung Priok Port (Existing)  
1. Being part of Tanjung Priok Port (existing). No need for location approval if the master 
plan already existed; 
2. The position of DKI Provincial Government is the initiator, by preparing this master 
plan as the material to revised the existing master plan of Tanjung Priok port; 
3. As the initiator, the JPG have the ‘privileges’ in entering into concession cooperation 
with the Port Authority. 
Findings suggest, as can be seen by the three scenarios, the JPG have the ‘privileges’ in entering into 
concession cooperation with the Port Authority which means that JPG do have ambition and motives 
to deliver port services in the name of public or private interests by maximising value for shareholder’s 
profit to sustain their group’s status quo. 
186 
 
As predicted, from the media coverage which stated that: 
“Ahok offered another scheme which was in parallel with the KBN’s aforesaid intention. 
He controversially announced to carry out land reclamation of seventeen islands off the 
coast of North Jakarta and proposed to set up an SEZ and airport on one of the islands, 
named O island at DPRD (city council) on 13th August 2013 (See Figure 5.8). The new 
project was also set to build utilities i.e. steam power plant and the logistics development 
to support Tanjung Priok port. The initial plan before the reclamation plan was to build an 
overpass from Kalibaru Port to Marunda Port at the end of 2014 at a cost estimated at 
Rp5 trillion” (Berita Satu—13th August 2013).  
Rather than building an overpass, the provincial government (JPG) managed to instil a belief in the 
DPRD members and central government that the reclaimed islands will be built at low-cost and will 
attract profit and investors’ attention.  
Figure 5.8 
 
A document analysis revealed that of the seventeen islands, the provincial government will reclaim 
three islands to be used as an SEZ in North Jakarta owned by PT Pembangunan Jaya and PT Jakarta 
Propertindo (Jakpro) as Jakarta’s regional-owned enterprises (ROEs) to store logistics-related exports 
and imports. Detik News also reported that the reclamation of three islands for SEZ on 1500ha of land 
has been offered in collaboration with PT Pelindo II as its partner (7th April 2016).  
Based on Tempo News coverage (2nd September 2014), nonetheless, further discussion was needed 
between the provincial government and the Ministry of SOEs as the shareowner of PT Pelindo II to 
ensure the islands’ ownership portion. Ahok had suggested that if the port authority (Pelindo II) asks 
for some shares in the SEZ, the provincial government would also ask for shares in the port ownership. 
The underwater access road in between each island will shorten the logistics transport and develop a 
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new city on the northern coast. This ‘New Tanjung Priok’ was said to be a huge project with a water 
depth reaching 20 metres, much deeper than Singapore at only 16 metres. In addition to the three 
reclaimed islands, some parts around 400ha in front of Marunda coast will be reclaimed and be built 
as an SEZ. It will serve as a place where people can work with exceptional comfort.  
Subsequently, not until 14th August 2014 was an MOU on Marunda dock signed between Jakarta 
Governor, Jokowi and Director General of Sea Transportation, Ministry of Transportation. This MoU 
aims to maximise synergy between the central and provincial government in order to improve the city 
master plan developed in accordance with North Jakarta’s spatial plan, but little did Jokowi know that 
this event would cause the opening of a ‘can of worms’ related to Jakarta’s northern coastal 
development project. Vested interests related to the strategic location of North Jakarta has turned 
public-oriented to profit-oriented as 40% of its territories are used as industrial areas and there are 
more than 5,000 listed companies domiciled in North Jakarta, which is hard to control (Ibid).  
The new dock was highly needed by Jakarta, due to Tanjung Priok Port as the biggest seaport in 
Indonesia having the lowest productivity among neighbouring countries (Figure 5.9). It has exceeded 
its capacity often resulting in substantial inefficiency of dwelling time86, loading and unloading time. 
The construction of the new dock would reduce the burden of Tanjung Priok port by 30 to 40% and 
decrease the dwelling time to three days. KBN was appointed as the executor of the 8 to 9-metre-deep 
dock construction project in the Marunda area in order for the provincial government as the leading 
shareholder to oversee the project (Indonesian Customs Marunda branch office). 
Figure 5.9 
 
                                                          
86To note, the dwelling time at Tanjung Priok Port is currently five days. Meanwhile, as a comparison, in Singapore 
only takes two days. 
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After long bureaucratic inefficiency, Ahok’s SEZ reclamation proposal was finally made operational 
without the involvement of KBN. Instead, the project was implemented as a collaboration between PT 
Jakpro, PT Pelindo II, and other private-owned domestic companies.  
Lack of an Ideological Consensus 
Based on media coverage and comments from experts, politicians, and academics at the time, the 
speed and radical nature of Ahok’s reforms brought Jakarta praise amongst observers and instilled 
public interest in SEZ and investment matters, but also evoked resistance among Indonesia’s economic 
elites who felt that their vested interests were increasingly threatened. Ironically, while in the process 
of writing this thesis, Ahok’s reclamation plan was being criticised by the public, within his coalition 
party PDIP, both inside and outside DPR and DPRD, by technocrats, policymakers, subaltern groups, at 
public meetings in the sub-districts and towns of Jakarta such as CSOs, the Indonesian Traditional 
Fishermen Union (Kesatuan Nelayan Tradisional Indonesia), and marine activists. There were multiple 
accusations from a moral disloyalty of the PDIP nationalist (which was not only built by PDIP’s founders 
notably Megawati and her brother Guruh Sukarnoputra but also what Sukarno’s principle stood for), 
the illegal phase of policymaking frameworks, until the emotional outbursts accusing Ahok of selling 
out Jakarta to capitalists and disregarding the people.  
The discussion of each allegation as follows: 
First, on assuming power as Jakarta Governor, Ahok must answer some accusations raised within his 
coalition party PDIP87. One PDIP politician said Ahok was not in favour of the ‘pro-wong cilik’ grassroots 
society but pro-entrepreneurs. However, the advocates of the reclamation including Jokowi—as 
president-elect—claim that the project is a step to address the housing needs and land saturations. 
The new reclamation land will be able to form an engineered-island to prevent flooding, increase 
coastal area investment, develop an integrated residential area, overcome the problem of road 
congestion, and increase public space. 
Jokowi refused to acknowledge that the new dock construction project was a part of his campaign in 
realising his vision and mission as president in the maritime sector as had been predetermined since 
mid-2013. Jokowi stated that the construction is necessary to improve Marunda’s management, 
support national logistics distribution, increase the loading and unloading process, and ease the cost 
burden. It eventually will forestall the public’s negative reaction on the impact of increased price 
                                                          
87Due to ideological differences, Ahok’s political affiliation had changed three times. After GOLKAR party (2008-
2012), he was a member of Gerindra party (2012-2014) and coalesced with PDIP when he became governor, and 




towards the overall national economy. The plan for setting up a port facility is to use the Build on 
Transfer (BOT) investment arrangement (Ibid).  
As someone who is socially derived from the local capitalist class, Ahok has a primary interest in 
creating a local governance able to support the capital mobility in Jakarta. However, these efforts 
collided with and must encounter political realities dominated by local interests who plunder public 
resources for personal gain. The collision is then the basis of the conflict of interest between Ahok with 
the old political forces entrenched in Jakarta. Here then the conflict between Ahok versus DPRD is 
perceived in a way different from the way it is in reality because the displayed representation in a 
conflict of interest that seemed clear is that Ahok is pro-change and against corrupt MPs in DPRD. But 
we need to be more observant in seeing the conflict that gave rise to this illusion. Conflicts that arise 
were not only against the corrupt MPs in DPRD but rather towards Ahok’s response upon failing to 
discipline his own government bureaucracy.  
Second, a number of Ahok’s controversial policies beg the question of the legality aspect as they were 
not in-sync with the existing regulations. It was feared that, according to a source, rules governing laws 
and higher regulations that were allegedly infringed by Ahok to carry out Jakarta development 
programmes could entail a bad precedent for local governance, especially for the heads of the other 
regions, that confiscates the power of legislation, MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) decrees, as 
well as presidential regulations (See Figure 4.7 in the previous chapter).  
Based on interview through email with former DPRD member: 
“They (the heads of regions and governors) will also search what rules could be violated 
as was carried out to accelerate development or what they think it's best for the region by 
ignoring the higher rules. According to the rules, a Head of the region should, of course, 
be creative by making policies for the region’s economic growth. However, in principle, 
must not violate the rules or norms of laws above it. I admit that Ahok’s performance was 
very good by his creativity, but if the ethics of a leader is unguarded it will be aimless. He 
was acting as if he was able to change the rules of the game and untouchable by things 
related to it”. 
Ahok’s pro-capitalist intention was also challenged by allegations of bribery on the part of DPRD 
regarding the reclamation licence (Tempo News—3rd April 2016). The chairman of the Gerindra Party 
faction (Great Indonesia Movement Party) of Jakarta DPRD who refused to discuss the draft (bill) on 
the Zoning of Coastal Areas and Small Islands (Raperda Zoning) states that the spread of bribery 
allegations had been practised in the regulation plan.  
"There are indications regional MPs were bribed. The alleged bribe perpetrator was the 
developers who received shares to develop one of the reclaimed islands. The money 
disbursed to the MPs was Rp5 billion”.  
190 
 
However, the chairman of the DPRD Regional Legislation denied bribery had taken place in the 
discussion of the regulation plan. He argued that the issue of bribery was out of place if associated 
with the reclamation where the reclamation of seventeen islands was explicitly arranged in detail 
within the Pantura (north coast) Bill or Raperda Pantura, while the Raperda Zoning clearly regulates 
the designation of 110 islands north of Jakarta. His argument was confirmed by Head of Jakarta 
Regional Development Planning, that both bills serve as a legal basis of reclamation and are 
complementary and interrelated. Two such bills enhanced the previous regulation (the Governor 
Regulation No. 121/2012 concerning Spatial Arrangement on Reclamation).  
Third, in spite of growth promises articulated in Ahok’s alternative to pro-capitalist development 
addiction, Jakarta Bay development did not present grounds for optimism due to the reclamation 
licence issued by the governor having likewise drawn resistance from a number of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). A number of NGOs explained the harm it will cause to the ecosystem of 
mangrove and seagrass around the reclamation area eliminate the function of mangroves to withstand 
abrasion and intrusion of sea water and damage the coastal areas’ ecosystem. The reclamation 
allegedly was wrapped with vested interests and only benefitted the investors, oligarchs, and middle-
income class, while the environment feasibility study licencing issued by WALHI (an Indonesian 
environmental non-governmental organisation) was vulnerable to manipulation. The Minister of 
Maritime and Fisheries (KKP), Susi Pudjiastuti, who was among those opposing the plan, laments the 
research and development agency (Balitbang) study and argues that it could lead to environmental 
degradation (Balitbang Study on Jakarta Bay Reclamation Project 2015; Bisnis Keuangan Kompas—16th 
September 2015). Moreover, CNN Indonesia reported that the fishermen are the biggest victims and 
the reclamation scheme is said to increase marine environment degradation and ruin the upstream 
and downstream fisheries industries around Marunda. Consequently, the fishery sector of Jakarta Bay 
would never realise its full potential to meet the needs of Jakarta’s fish consumption and food 
processing industries (Ibid). 
The following figure illustrates how the reclamation procedure works in practice which opens up 
opportunities for informal means to develop, especially such as bribery to overcome the cumbersome 
bureaucracy as having been practised by Ahok before. There are a number of requirements must be 
fulfilled and documents to be submitted by the port operator in order to gain a licence. These 
requirements involve a number of relevant authorities in the process including the Minister, for 
reclamation in the main and subsidiary ports; The Provincial/Regional Government, for reclamation in 
the territorial waters of the Regional Feeder Port; and The Regent or Mayor (Bupati/Walikota), for 
reclamation in the Local Feeding Ports area. The technical requirements, include: the description of 
the purpose and objectives of the reclamation activities; the location and geographic coordinates of 
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the area to be reclaimed; the initial depth measurement (pre-dredge sounding chart) of the location 
to be reclaimed; and the results of an environmental impact assessment study or in accordance with 
applicable regulations. The port operator also needs to submit some kind of assurance through a 
formal declaration that the reclamation work will be performed by a company that has a business 
license and has the ability and competence to undertake reclamation. Other documents related to 
recommendations from a number of authorities to be included in the application process, such as from 
the local Port Authority (syahbandar) to coordinate with the local Navigation District Office on the 
safety aspect of the voyage after receiving consideration from the Head of the local Navigation District 
Office; the Port Authority or Port Operator Unit from the local port to be in conformity with the Port 
Master Plan for reclamation work within the Work Area and the Port Environment Area or from a 
regent/mayor to be in conformity with the general spatial plan of the district/municipality concerned 
for reclamation work in the special terminal waters area. 
Based on the application, the Director General of Sea Transportation shall conduct research on the 
requirements of the application for reclamation license within 14 (fourteen) working days from the 
receipt of the complete application. In the event that the requirements have been fulfilled, the 
Director-General shall convey the results of the research to the Minister. Based on the research results 
conducted by the Director-General, the Minister shall within a period of no more 7 (seven) days issue 
a reclamation license. The formal institutions used as legal bases are among others, Ministry of 
Transportation Regulation (Permenhub) No. 52 of 2011 on Excavation and Reclamation and 
Government Regulation No 61 of 2009 (PP). 
A reclamation licence at the provincial/regional level was issued by the Minister of Transportation to 
the provincial government via SOEs. The staff of the Governor Team to Development Acceleration 
(TGUPP) stated that: 
“Prior to the issuance, provincial government must undergo phases in which different 
bureaucratic agencies are involved in the process. The procedure not only involves 
Ministry of Transportation as the leading executing agency on the reclamation 
construction but other line ministries and governing bodies such as Ministry of Public 
Works who authorised the approval to be in accordance with the Spatial Planning Law of 
sea reclamation, Coordinating Body of National Spatial Planning, National Board of 
Disaster Management, and Ministry of Environment and Forestry” (see Figure 5.10 to 









The Politics of Duality 
The SEZ port project has brought an inevitable erroneous belief of trying to increase Jakarta’s global 
competitiveness and economic resilience thus subjecting the fishermen to implicit pressure tactics 
(Tempo News—12th November 2015). Its upstream industry, the Muara Angke fish market is within 
27km, whereas the industrial customers in Greater Jakarta are at a mean distance of 35km away.  
An interview with IGJ researcher remarked, 
“The old SEZ map has changed...The premises of out-dated SEZ sites were transferred to 
authorised developers to construct port facilities, theme parks, housing properties, roads 
and bridges etc. The government evicted fishermen’s fishing spots although through many 
resistance”.  
Even so, a source in the DPRD office in an interview conferred that the SEZ project is being touted as 
the most far-reaching economic reform since Jakarta was led by Ali Sadikin in the 1960s and 70s. As a 
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former businessman, Ahok was too fearsome to be defied. As long as there is an ideologue like him 
controlling both sides of the aisle, legislative compromise is out of the question. Even Jokowi never 
had any objections to every step that Ahok and his ensemble made to secure Jakarta development 
financing from the private sectors including the SEZ reclamation project. To apply Tsebelis’s (2002) 
argument in Spiller et al. (2003)88 and Tsebelis (1995) in Henisz (2002) quoted in Hoffmann (2010)89 on 
veto players that individual or collective actors in a political system with different ideology, degree of 
internal cohesion, and number of actors were forced to agree to the proposed change in order to 
change policies (Hoffmann 2010: 59),  
“These characteristics affect the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo (the ‘win 
set’ of the status quo). The size of that win set has specific consequences for policymaking: 
when it is very small, ‘policy stability’ obtains” (Spiller et al. 2003: 13).  
Jokowi’s tacit support was due to Ahok’s sincerity on not tolerating any forms of corruption in his 
governing circle. However, the opposition exposed it was an empty rhetoric90. On the contrary, Ahok 
had apparently praised Jokowi as a slow decision maker as reported in a Tempo News exclusive 
interview with the Vice Governor. However, Ahok argued Jokowi's indecisiveness has a strategy and a 
reason. "He believes it's the best way, that is his prerogative and he is entitled to do so. I accept it as 
his deputy". Ahok also assesses Jokowi as not so timely. Jokowi too often went ‘blusukan91’ therefore 
it was difficult to figure out his time correctly (Tempo News—13th January 2014). Jokowi and Ahok 
created power domination in every aspect through public networks and Jokowi gave Ahok’s ensemble 
a new space to propagate. 
Indonesia is seen as a country where business-government-bureaucracy connections are closely 
related to informal norms and embedded rent-seeking (Jütting et al. 2007: 122-3), including legislation 
under the Ministry of SOE and Ministry of Transportation. For example, a source from PDIP said, 
ministers who issue a policy for the sake of personal and group gains still persist, but take shelter under 
the Work Programme of SBY-Jusuf Kalla in 2004-2009 or SBY-Boediono in 2009-2014. According to the 
source, the politico-business relations of the MPs and cabinet ministers also persist in Jokowi’s 
presidency, which threatens the failure of the Nawacita and Trisakti92 programme (Interview—12th 
November 2014).  
                                                          
88See Chapter 2 section 2.4.3. 
89See Chapter 2 subchapter 2.2. 
90Rhetorical officials who are full of hypocrisy still entrenched in the provincial government office and DPRD until 
today. 
91Known since 2012 for Jokowi’s impromptu visits to observe field conditions directly prior to gubernatorial 
election as part of his campaign and prioritise field work rather than sitting in his office. 
92Nawacita and Trisakti are concepts initiated by the coalition parties supporting the present Jokowi government. 
The concept was created as a basis of performance monitoring and evaluation of the ministers. 
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These allegations of criminal or corrupt behaviour increase the quite heavy burden of the president to 
address the issue where they may not result in legal convictions; instead, the cabinet ministers are 
only censured for their unscrupulous performance and being unable to work in accordance with the 
Nawacita and Trisakti platforms (Merdeka—29th November 2015). Under the condition of no legal 
measures such as courts and impartial watchdogs, economic matter in Indonesia or any developing 
country rests largely on informal rules (Jütting et al. 2007: 114). As stated by Azis (2002), “Rules and 
regulations may have been well established under the prevailing conditions of a society, but at the 
same time are rendered ineffective if their acceptance and enforcement are weak” (Ibid: 4).  
The last episode of this chapter lies in the action taken by Ahok which he, buoyed by an increasing 
popularity as an uncompromised governor, ambitiously trying to realise Jakarta’s reform trajectory as 
a tourism-business-art-culinary-based city to compete globally, especially ahead of the AEC 2015, by 
bypassing the bureaucratic formalities, which in his opinion was inefficient and costly,—though it is 
the correct policy procedure—and even placing under compulsion whoever stands in his way.  
Theoretically, adopting North (1990, 2005a) and Azis (2009), Ahok used the informal method as a tool 
to reduce not only transaction cost but the uncertainty caused by bureaucratic inefficiencies through 
bypassing it for the success of the SEZ project. Moreover, borrowing Hadiz (2005), Ahok’s behaviour 
resembles the informal characteristics in the NO period where “a capitalist oligarchy able to dominate 
and, ‘instrumentally’ not just structurally, utilise the power of the state and its institutions along with 
their coercive strengths for their own benefit. Thus, institutional constraints (by this it means 
informally) influence Ahok’s behaviour in making decisions by denying the proper formal institution.  
JPG’s commitment towards developing Marunda should be supported by all ranks of the local 
government or institutions to upgrade KBN’s status to an SEZ. However, according to a member of the 
management board of KBN, for the last ten years, there has been sectoral arrogance and overlapping 
authority as a result of central government intervention towards the implementation of the policy. It 
has resulted in bureaucratic inefficiencies contrary to the study by Di Maggio and Powell (1983: 147) 
who argued that the structure and functions of an organization are measured by its efficiency. 
In short, illegitimacy turns out to be a problem for lobbying under an intricate relation of formal and 
informal institutions. The competition was also seen as a way informal institution serves to redistribute 
power, status and wealth. The stakes are context-specific which largely depend on the success or 
failure of each successive president. Their programmes are their political contract and mandate of the 
coalition parties that serve as indicators of targets to be imposed on each minister. It is the epitome of 
‘credible commitment’ as argued by Spiller et al. (2003) among alliances of the legal system and access 
to financial markets. It also involves designing reciprocal actions for relationship safeguarding or 
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protecting from corrupt bureaucrats (Dick and Mulholland in Aspinall and Klinken 2011: 65). When the 
state is unable to enforce legislated sanction, Dick and Mulholland further suggest:  
“A useful perspective on the state is, therefore, that of a transactional space in which the 
rules of the political system are constantly being tested and renegotiated. The state may 
not work in accordance with the constitutional and legislative façade but the informal rules 
of the game, however, inscrutable to outsiders, help to maintain and enrich the often 
fractious power elite” (Ibid: 65). 
This also means monitoring and evaluation, as noted by a senior researcher in the Centre of Reform 
on Economics (CORE): 
"Indonesian presidents in the reform era are viewed as walking among robbers and 
swimming with sharks. And all this time, mafia was allowed to survive while the presidents 
were only able to address the issues slowly. The burden for the political affiliations was in 
terms of ideology and made sure their work programme and strategy were enforced. We 
understand a lot of ministers who embraced the president’s work programme as an 
argument, but we will be horrified when observing the debt on behalf of the government’s 
programme". 
The same can be said to be linked to the performance of the political parties (Merdeka—29th November 
2015). Despite democratisation allowing political activists to found the party and thus expect they 
would serve constituents on a certain ideological basis, in the end, it was the interests of the politicians 
who are served.  
A survey on the progress of democratisation in Indonesia presented that 81% of respondents 
considered that political parties have poor performance in carrying out their duty to grapple important 
issues concerning the interests of the people (Priyono et al. 2007: 68). Not only does the regional 
parliament (DPRD) pass local ordinances and vote to generally exert some control over appointments 
to administrative positions, but also Ahok’s seemingly pro-people projects and circle of power are 












This chapter examines the first thematic series of Williamson’s institutional constraints that formal and 
informal institutions have influenced SEZ policymaking process, This chapter also highlights the 
daunting array of conflicts of interest among elites and relevant interest groups, their transactions, 
culture, and dynamics, in particular, the inadequate and often confused allocation of property rights 
from the state to the market in a democratised governance after decentralisation. However, there is a 
significant issue on incentive structure represented by the provincial government (bureaucratic world) 
and the market (business world) represented by public and private-owned domestic enterprises as 
well as an apparent concern of the state regarding market failure.  
Through SEZ policy formulation schemes, findings indicate that informal institutions play an important 
role in the SEZ policy formulation through the intention of opposing parties and interest groups in SEZ 
port management and development procedures which vividly contain contrasting ideologies, with 
some tacit support from the state. Further findings suggest the political measures pursued by the 
business leaders enhanced by the additional dimension of informal rules that were useful tools for the 
business and ruling elites to gain control of Jakarta but render ineffective to support SEZ development. 
It was characterised by central and local political leaders who complement and constrain 
simultaneously the formal rules that govern the SEZ policy processes as it slowly occurred to business 
elites and relevant stakeholders to strengthen their status quo. In other words, these findings confirm 
the first hypothesis stated in chapter 1 and the introduction of this chapter.   
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Through micro-level dynamics, evidence shows that localised political variables can thwart institutional 
change initiatives, therefore, it argues that the downsizing role of the state between 2009 and 2014 
directs to more than an upsurge of increasing dissatisfaction over state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) 
mishandling of the port management and the reclamation construction episodes. Further evidence 
indicates that the inclusive informal institutions that were strongly influenced by the prevailing norms 
of behaviour, nationalist ideologies, and traditional values under political economic complexity that 
coexist with formal ‘rules of the game’ have resulted in both durable (in the case of PT KBN or Kawasan 
Berikat Nusantara industrial zone) and fragile (in the case of Jakarta Bay SEZ reclamation project) 
institutional change in highly distinct contextual bases from one ruler under different political settings 



































The Governance Structure and Allocation of Resources: The 
Political Discretion of Batam Free Trade Zone 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter succinctly revealed three institutional issues in the first thematic series that 
surfaced. First, it considered informal institutions to play significant roles in the implementation 
process of SEZ applicable formal regulations; second, it discovered that informal institutions in SEZ 
policymaking are critical elements of socio-political significances; third, the degree and method of 
influence varied at each political setting in the Jakarta SEZ projects.  
In the context of institutional change, this chapter elaborates what the experiences of Batam Island 
development tell us about the SEZ policymaking processes and political economy and continues the 
investigation on two other institutional determinants in the second thematic series of Williamson’s 
institutional constraint: the influence of governance structure to resource allocation and vice versa. 
This chapter aims to comprehend how different forms of power are transacted in the structure of 
governance. The central focus is mainly on the actors and their associating bodies who run the 
governance system—as a constraint to the enforcement of rules and legal frameworks—as well as the 
actors who control and enforce the policy process mechanisms (the play of the game). It also focuses 
on understanding the behavioural aspects of actors who set the allocation of resources to minimise 
transaction costs.  
The analysis is framed by and answers parts of the second and third research questions: 1) how and 
why do institutions influence the behaviour of actors in SEZ policy decision? 2) Which institutions affect 
the SEZ policy decision and why? The analysis corresponds to the second hypothesis that Bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behaviours emanates when actor’s action unable to settle conflicts 
occurred in the policy process and the problems of principal-agent, moral hazard, and adverse selection 
in SEZ governance structure at the central government level render contractual relationships to be 
unclear in SEZ policymaking process at the local government level. 
The Batam FTZ policy formulation determines whether incumbent political and economic elites have 
designed and exerted the appropriate policies and budget they promised to the constituencies and the 
citizens at large. Batam’s development trajectory has induced scholars93 to examine its political 
                                                          
93See for example, Smith—ANU/Australia 1996; Resosudarmo et al. 2002; O’Rourke 2003; Phelps 2004; Anas et 
al.—CSIS 2006; Latt 2007; Burmansyah-IGJ 2008; Kuroiwa—IDE JETRO/Japan 2009; Erb and Sulistiyanto—
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economy; however, the literature on the deeper institutional approach has not been observed by the 
policy directive as well as institutional debates around SEZs in Indonesia. Nevertheless, their insights 
have enriched the author’s views and understanding surrounding Batam FTZ’s contemporary debate 
and the effects of change the institutional arrangements have on decentralised governance and vice 
versa, more importantly, policy delivery provision. As well as having visited the region in 2008 and 
2011, references were gained along with interviews with officials in the database located agencies, 
collections of national archives and media coverage in Jakarta in parallel with the cases in the preceding 
chapter. This chapter, therefore, brings this underlying, yet continuous, conflict of interest in the FTZ 
project into the spotlight. 
The chapter argues, first, that Batam FTZ institutional change with the new autonomy laws 
complemented by resumed industrialisation of and migration to Batam, the strongly controlled and 
enclaved-based of Batam development was slightly weakened by the two governing bodies of BIDA 
and Batam city government (Pemkot Batam) with functional overlaps and no single synchronised 
policy. Second, after the RDO and the above-protracted conflicts, the disputes concerning the 
executive and legislative bodies after Batam being designated an FTZ is a combination of various 
obstacles to an efficient and coordinated regulatory approach that have already taken place. 
Therefore, bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviours of the key policy actors render policy 
formulation to be unclear in SEZ policymaking process, resulting in increased transaction cost. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first subchapter highlights the introductory part including the 
general features of Batam. The second subchapter revisits the FTZ policy development during NO in 
the pre-regional autonomy era of 1999. The third to fifth subchapters elucidate the governance reform 
post-regional autonomy policy, which contains three periodizations of FTZ policy formation. This is to 
understand the contemporary SEZ problems and discusses the argued impacts of regional autonomy 
on FTZ policy processes based on existing empirical evidence. For instance, regulations application with 
overlapping regulatory authorities, limited coordination between national and subnational 
governments, and inconsistent policy interpretation by government officials that led to confusion, 
delays, slow decision-making processes and, eventually rent-seeking and KKN. The sixth subchapter 
concludes the chapter.  
6.2. Batam Free Trade Zone institutional capacity 
When Indonesia had the means—though not the appetite—Batam FTZ was developed to transplant or 
replicate FTZ elements elsewhere under the auspices of the authoritarian Soeharto administration. FTZ 
                                                          
ISEAS/Singapore 2009; Wong and Ng 2009; Bunnell et al. 2011; Choi 2007, 2008 and 2011; Evaquarta 2012; and 
Damuri et al.—CSIS 2015.  
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and SEZ in Indonesia can be distinguished by their focus on exports; however, the regulations and 
investment incentives are equally applicable. Unlike SEZs, equipment, materials, and particularly fiscal 
incentives94 within FTZ are exempted without a time limit95 until the goods are exported or transported 
into the Indonesian market or customs territory (Indonesian Customs website; EU-Indonesia Business 
Network 2015). Further data concerning Batam FTZ’s economic indicators and relative performance 
are presented in Appendix 4. According to the World Trade Organisation (2012), FTZs can be defined 
as: 
“….geographically distinct areas located near seaports and airports, where imported goods 
may be stored, repacked or processed, free from the imposition of import duties, VAT, 
sales tax on luxury goods and excise tax. Import and export documentation is simpler than 
for regular imports….” 
Viewed from the aspects of geopolitical and geostrategic advantage, the Indonesian government was 
not immediately aware of Batam’s importance as one of the pillars of the national economy. Today, it 
is a seemingly thriving manufacturing, industrial and tourism area with several other islands in its 
vicinity—which have also become part of a special zone development. It was once a sparsely populated 
island of subsistence farmers and fishermen, but being in a relatively strategic location, the area of 
Batam developed quite rapidly before being officially chosen as an FTZ after its status as Entrepόt 
Particulier96, Bonded Warehouse97, Export Processing Zone (EPZ), and Bonded Zone Plus. For the case 
analysis, instead of EPZ, this chapter is devoted to analysing a similar term, Bonded Zone (BZ), as it was 
commonly the term used in Batam. Furthermore, Batam as an FDI enclave is considered unique, due 
to it being a product of a centrally-planned unitary postcolonial state and a hybrid experimental model 
of industrialisation strategy between Indonesia and Singapore’s social order (Phelps 2004; Anas et al. 
2006). Batam at the time had sufficient room for economic activities such as investment and industrial 
production consisting primarily of garments and electronics supported by the availability of labour, 
both from Batam Island and the surrounding islands in Riau and Sumatra. However, the benefit from 
significant employment absorption was not realised until 1977 when the new 10.5ha of the zone was 
                                                          
94Import and export duties, income tax (PPh), value added tax (VAT or PPN), sales tax on luxury goods (PPnBM), 
and sales tax on imported capital goods (PPBM). 
95Although the fiscal incentives are without time limits, the FTZ service in Batam based on the law is set for a 70-
year lease-time. 
96An export-orientated production entrepôts or EPTEs consist of buildings or areas of manufacturing companies 
with fiscal incentives governed by Minister of Finance Regulation No. 855/1993 (as amended). Goods may be 
exempted from tariffs and VAT after entering EPTE to be re-exported. EPTEs may divert their products up to 25% 
(by volume) to Indonesian customs territories, where they are subject to normal procedures and customs duties 
(Indonesian Customs website cited 22nd February 2015). 
97A customs-controlled building, warehouse or other secured area managed by either the state or private firm in 
which dutiable imported goods may be stored, manipulated, or undergo manufacturing operations for export 
without payment of duty or until the duty owed is paid for domestic market (Indonesian Customs website cited 
22nd February 2015). 
201 
 
occupied by four firms and four standard factory buildings (WTO 2012). The GOI (in this case central 
and regional government) further developed areas for manufacturing industry entirely for exported 
products initially at Batam Island (in Riau Province) as the first FTZ. By virtue of Batam’s potential 
natural resources, it has attracted many foreign investors mainly from Singapore. It was also Batam’s 
commercial viability and spatial proximity to Singapore for why it was chosen to be an inclusive 
development rather than just a regional area development. Batam is separated from Singapore by a 
busy international shipping lane, one of the main international trade routes connecting East Asia, 
Western America, the Middle East, and Europe. The central government (CG) took advantage of this 
proximity to develop a labour-intensive manufacturing where Singapore started to lose its 
competitiveness (OECD 1999). Batam’s strategic position in relation to Singapore’s ‘excessive growth’ 
is one of the main motives the GOI singled out this area for development and Singapore’s 
manufacturing base, where companies can lower manufacturing costs and access the infrastructure 
facilities; for example, air and sea transport and ports, logistics networks, and international financial 
centres (Yeoh et al. 2004; Wong and Ng 2009).  
FTZ was proposed to help promote cross-border trade by reducing obstacles imposed by bureaucratic 
rules and formalities. Nevertheless, findings suggest that Batam has some selected institutional issues 
in its development concerning bureaucratic formalities and jurisdictional tension, centrally and locally 






























6.3. Revisiting Batam FTZ Policy Transformation in the New Order: Looking Back and Taking 
Stock 
Figure 6.1  
   
This subchapter discusses the background episode of Batam FTZ development during the new order 
(NO) to present a clear understanding of why and how Batam development always been a place of 
contention between key FTZ policy actors until recent. 
Batam’s ambitious project began in 1968 in the post-oil crisis when Soeharto undertook neoliberal 
reforms for the first time and singled out the exploitation of natural resources, in particular, oil and 
gas (Sari 1998: 4; Burmansyah in Daeng 2008: 216-263). An oil-based state-owned enterprise (SOE), 
PERTAMINA, used Batam as its base for logistics and operations and hence, it became Batam’s source 
of funding for development. This subsection discusses the structure of governance who runs the 
system and control the mechanism of development in Batam. 
Based on document and literature review on Batam’s early development, three key players have been 
identified who served as economic advisers in Soeharto’s highly centralised regime who were closely 
attached to him and competed for his favouritism in the Batam policy directives. First, the typical 
technocrats—“who adopted liberal economic policies and promoted liberalisation of finance, trade and 
foreign investment while trying to be free from political intervention and from domestic political 
struggles” (Inada in Shimomura 2003: 149). Second, nationalists (i.e. an ex-military and senior 
technologist, Ibnu Sutowo, and young technologist Habibie)—“stemmed from the desire to transform 
the economy from one focusing on low-value-added industrial production to a technologically 
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advanced industrial economy. To achieve this, the Indonesian government normally pursued strong 
intervention and trade protection policies in the country’s domestic and international economic 
activities” (Chandra 2008 in Chandra 2011: 3). And third, his cronies or rent-seekers (the Chinese 
businessmen and kinship ties) that centred in a patronage network and had an influence on the 
decision making. This kind of patron-client relationship consistently supplemented the competition in 
the policymaking process. 
Based on the identification of key players above, it can be inferred that competition between key 
players was present in devising a policy to be presented to Soeharto, but Smith (1996) suggests their 
competition in winning a project endorsement was relatively neutralised by Soeharto as the dominant 
institution and ultimate power during the 1980s (maybe until 1993) and thus, the political competition 
was very low and interference virtually non-existent. The policymaking processes were also generally 
insulated from other non-state actors apart from the cronies.  
Other scholars such as McCulloch in Brömmelhörster and Paes 2003 supports other findings by Smith 
(1996) that there are several essential features which tell us about the political economy of FTZ 
policymaking during NO. However, it should be noted that Batam’s developments were not identical 
to national developments although they were carried out in parallel. The first feature is the absence 
of key political economic structures. Instead of infiltrating Indonesian politics during NO, the role of 
the military was more prominent as an ‘economic actor’ when Ibnu Sutowo not only led the sole 
agency for Batam development known as BIDA (Batam Industrial Development Authority) but also led 
PERTAMINA—the leading SOE for oil exploration. He appeared politically confined and marginal, not 
merely dealing with Batam’s internal security but significant business and investment matters with 
complete disregard for the presence of Batam city government (Pemkot Batam). BIDA served as the 
central government’s professional representative with managers appointed based on their industrial 
and technical expertise (mostly technocrats), while Pemkot Batam as the industrial zone administrative 
body ideologically served as the government’s executive branch. 
The second feature, from before the 1970s until after 1993, were the conflicts between technocrats 
and the nationalists from military-dominant Ibnu Sutowo or technocrats and the technologist-
dominant Habibie, or with other cronies in winning Soeharto’s policy approval. However, despite basic 
power structure and balance shifting from technocrats, technologists, and the cronies (families and 
rent-seekers), the conflicts were less noticeable. The reasons were twofold: 1) Batam and Kepri were 
relatively isolated from the rest of the economy and unlikely to be disruptive as a source of conflict to 
the whole national policy issues and consideration; 2) There was an absence of established and 
powerful business and vested interests affected by technocratic policies. This was partly the cause of 
the less visible conflict between technocrats and the cronies.  
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The third feature, Batam’s location on the Indonesian geographic periphery was more exposed to 
external pressure and foreign influence than other Indonesian regions. Despite foreign government 
presence in Batam—i.e. Kuwait which depended on oil refinery throughout Batam’s development 
process, Japan who had influence in Batam’s development plan, or the modest influence in knowledge 
and international practices from the US and European multinationals—, Singapore was the only 
country who played a major role in influencing Indonesia’s policymakers in Batam’s development and 
therefore, other foreign presence may not reflect Batam’s true importance (Smith 1996). 
Evidence from the features above and the key milestones in table 6.1 suggests, Batam FTZ 
policymaking, in general, was characterised as having a strong tendency of the NO political economy. 
Not until 1996—1998 did ambiguity and uncertainty become typical. Elite politics epitomised most of 
Batam’s political economy as in Jakarta. Mainstream research findings were palpable with the features 
of intra-elite political rivalries and patronage networks combined with patrimonialism that persist in 
the absence of legislative power. The persistence and ascendency of patrimonial politics suggest that 
the main features of policymaking were centralised, organised and systemic. Therefore, the 
concentration of power was very high.  
The managers of Batam Authority in Jakarta representative office recounted, 
“Those days….the low dispersion of political force and institutional capacity caused 
governance issues. Unsurprisingly, corruption was ingrained in the power elite. The 
effective governance still produced no adequate checks or balances, and this 
transformed into a crisis in 1998”.  
In effect, the mechanisms that had once provided a credible commitment to the constituencies and 
the public disappeared with that breakdown, thereby convincing Indonesian local regions that 
secession was the only viable alternative as mentioned in chapter 4 during the days of decentralisation 
or regional autonomy. Further on this issue will be discussed in the next section. 
Following years of institutional change marked by the enactment of the decentralisation law, the 
development of Batam into an FTZ was hampered not only by the interjurisdictional competition 
between BIDA and Pemkot Batam but intra-elite rivalries between neoliberalists/technocrats and 
nationalists/technologists that have arisen since the establishment of BIDA in 1973. These tensions 
centred on Ibnu Sutowo who was both BIDA’s chairman and technologist. The magnitude of the former 
conflict was overlooked when Pemkot Batam or more precisely the Riau subnational government had 
not been delegated to represent the CG in overseeing Batam’s economic development. BIDA served 
as the CG’s means to maintain power over Batam. This phenomenon is also associated to ‘power 
structure’ and ‘bargaining power’ where actors with more control over power will control the changing 
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process for the rules to favour their interests (Knight 1992 in Hanisch and Schlüter 1999). More on the 
issue of power and bargaining process is evident in the later subchapters. 
Media coverage by Detik Finance (12th February 2014) reported: 
“It was not until 1984 that the centralistic NO power took it upon themselves to 
provide a theoretical justification to delegate various functions of the autonomous 
government such as planning and implementation of local development projects to 
the regional government. Meanwhile, the latter tension stemmed from Ibnu Sutowo’s 
intention to change Batam into an industrialised region second to Singapore through 
PERTAMINA’s corporate agenda”.  
However, based on Smith’s study (1996: 62-3), PERTAMINA’s activities received criticism from the 
technocrats in BAPPENAS and other economic ministers, because its plans were not in accordance with 
the technocrats’ development formula. Confusion arose within Soeharto’s Batam circle of power when 
the authority of BIDA as an autonomous body and PERTAMINA as an SOE shared the same leader, 
where PERTAMINA Board of Commissioners and BAPPENAS’s technocrats were the same people. 
Moreover, Wong and Ng (2009: 4-5) reveal, the BIDA supremacy over Pemkot Batam continued 
through the leadership of a technocrat, JB Sumarlin (1976—1978) and a young technologist, BJ Habibie 
(1978—1998). BIDA’s leadership baton was passed to Habibie’s younger brother, an ex-navy captain, 
JE Habibie from March until July 1998. His short leadership was attributable to his concern over his 
brother’s KKN (corruption) involvement which could put BJ Habibie in the public spotlight after 
assuming vice presidency. Moreover, Indonesia was on the verge of economic collapse where the 
central and regional government including Batam experienced the worst investment climate. Despite 
the continuous efforts to develop Batam’s lacklustre economic growth, the area’s performance 
steadily worsened with the onset of the AFC. However, Batam’s importance and status were not 
diminished despite the fall of the NO regime. In fact, Batam became an icon for the congregation of 
ASEAN and gained international support for trade and investment to jumpstart the economic recovery 
after the crisis.  
In support of the views above, more recent studies by Albintani et al. (2010), Evaquarta (2012), and 
CSIS (2015) confirmed that: 
“Prior to the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis (AFC), Batam’s performance was growing 
rapidly and this period was also known as the ‘Advanced Infrastructure and Investment 
Development’ period. Habibie’s successful high-technology platform and 
infrastructure plans during his foothold as Minister of Research and Technology as well 
as chairman of BIDA98, along with Soeharto’s strong faith in him, led Habibie to become 
                                                          
98Notably, the position of Chief Executive of BIDA was filled by former Presidential assistants. 
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the next Vice President in March 1998. There were three reasons for the appointment: 
first, Soeharto felt a need to avow more influence on Batam and Indonesian 
development in general; second, it was an honour to his meritocratic achievements; 
and third, in many instances he had complete control over developments and as a 
technologist was largely unaffected by technocratic interference (apart from Berkeley-
graduated economists like Radius Prawiro and Ginandjar Kartasasmita who had closer 
politico-business connections with Soeharto and Habibie). Habibie continued to 
perpetuate strict control over the investment permitted and his involvement lasted 
twenty years until 1998”.  
Habibie’s intentions raised some debates on the merits of challenging the wisdom of conventional 
development theory, in particular by initially exploiting the existing comparative advantage, namely 
labour-intensive manufactured goods in developing countries like Indonesia. Batam Island’s major 
irony is that neoliberal experience so far suggests that trade liberalisation and deregulation simply 
freed market forces to direct export-oriented industries more along the economic development route 
of Indonesia’s low-tech and cheap labour. Habibie was adamant to lead Batam and Indonesia, in 
general, to climb up the high-technology industry ladder by conditioning the regulations with the help 
of his team and family members. The doubt ascended as to whether there was a preordained role for 
Indonesia in the international division of labour and whether Habibie would be able to promote 
Indonesia’s position given that the success of his goals was being hindered by the continuation of 
selective resources (such as formal institutions, bureaucratic structures, and political representation).  
More on the document review that after JE Habibie, the BIDA leadership was entrusted to Ismeth 
Abdullah, who was the Executing Administrator of Export Support Board—a national body established 
by the GOI and the World Bank—from October 1989 to July 1998, to provide technical assistance in 
production, marketing, and expertise to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) for export commodities. 
He successfully brought the programme to benefit more than 1,000 SMEs. His most important 
contribution to several associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) was to bring some 
balance to the leadership in the public and private sectors. After his appointment, he placed greater 
attention on the welfare of Batam residents and the improvement of the investment climate by 
augmenting Batam’s competitiveness as a prospective regional industrial centre. However, what 
remains as a controversy was Ismeth’s role as a CG representative in the following territorial game.  
The fall of the NO and the implementation of decentralisation or regional autonomy laws have 
provided new opportunities for local elites such as Ismeth Abdullah to strengthen and consolidate the 
scope of their influence. For example, the context of a very complex power struggle and social and 
political restructuring were articulated through the language of ethnic and religious politics (van 
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Klinken 2007: 579). Finally, in September 2002, in an effort to empower the Malay identity, Kepri broke 
away from Riau mainland and became a separate province which stimulated the inclusion of Batam as 
part of Kepri. However, it took nearly two years to witness formal implementation.  
Interview with one of BIFZA (was BIDA, used interchangeably) managers at Jakarta office remarked: 
“The rapid development of Batam became one of the factors in the formation of Riau 
Islands Province (Kepri). Establishment of Riau Islands to make some areas of Riau 
Islands, especially around Batam Island into a grey area associated with the 
implementation of customs policies. To support and prevent the creation of the grey 
areas of the government through Law No. 44 of 2007 on the enactment of Government 
Regulation No. 1 of 2007 on the Amendment of Law No.36 of 2000 on Free Trade Zone 
and Free Ports into Law stipulates the criteria of specially treated areas. Through the 
legal basis, the government issued Government Regulation no. 46, 47 and 48 in 2007 
that make Batam Island, Bintan and Karimun as free area and free port or in other 
words Riau Archipelago region specified as an area with the concept of free trade 
zone”. 
After a heated debate and intense lobbying that went on for almost six years, a new province Kepri 
was officially created on 1st July 2004 when Ismeth, the chairman of BIDA, was appointed as acting 
governor (Jakarta Post—21st May 2003). 
Further information from the BIFZA managers: 
“After his success in creating a conducive business climate in Batam, President 
Megawati promoted Ismeth Abdullah as the first Acting Governor of Indonesia’s 32nd 
newly created province of Kepri (Riau Archipelago or Kepulauan Riau) on 1st July 2004. 
He developed a striking and grounded idea called “Building Batam: For the People and 
With the People”. This new social development concept provided the opportunity for 
non-economic sectors to grow, such as decent education, religion, culture, and 
security sectors”.  
According to Smith (1996) and Albintani (2010) on Ismeth’s leadership background: 
“Ismeth’s influence was apparent when he was awarded the Social and Cultural Award 
by the Malay community to indicate that Kepri’s social reality had undergone 
significant progress. His aim was not simply to build Batam’s resilience and 
steadfastness and prioritise the process of development by improving the welfare of 
its people but to gain trust from his constituency to maintain his status quo ahead of 
Pilkada (regional election) in 2005. Ismeth was selected as the first Governor of Kepri 
as part of his meritocratic achievement and his experience in leading BIDA. Further, he 
was also elected as a member of BIDA Advisory Board in 2005 by the Coordinating 
Minister for the Economy (CMEA) on behalf of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY). He became the outsider99 who managed to establish his position over Batam’s 
power circle of Putra Daerah (sons of the soil)”. 
Despite some countries succeeding in their SEZs under the decentralisation programme not to mention 
the cultural proximity in chapter 2 that plays a key role in the success of the SEZ platform, such as China 
                                                          
99Ismeth Abdullah was not originally from Riau and has no Malay blood, instead he was born in West Java. 
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(Knoth 2000), compounded by a series of factors, Indonesia failed to reach the desired policy outcome 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999; Azfar and McGuire 2002). These factors, to employ Williamson’s 
(1996) analysis and Hayek’s (1945) assertion, include information asymmetry. The more imperfect the 
information, the higher the transaction costs issued by economic actors.  
A former BIDA representative in Jakarta recounted that  
“When I was appointed to serve as the Secretary of the Head of BIDA, the members 
were ordered to regularly make frequent informal field visits to the villages due to the 
risk of losing the competition to gain community support from the Batam City 
government. The Head of BIDA admitted that their methods outperformed BIDA’s in 
many ways as they mostly come from the rural areas” 
In view of the above response and Williamson’s analysis, the argument put forth is subnational 
governments in a decentralised regime are considered to have better information and are seen as 
close to local populations than the CG through their informal arrangements. Hence, Batam subnational 
governments are better informed to respond to the variations in public demand for goods and services 
in an FTZ area and tend to disintegrate from the core government control. Behind the façade, Ismeth’s 
hidden action, in Azfar’s (2006) term due to asymmetric information engendered a principal-agent, 
moral hazard, and adverse selection problems which also embodies the fourth layer of Williamson’s 
institutional constraint. However, it is difficult to distinguish which problems are associated with the 
principal and the agent if the role of each individual is unclear. To illustrate, in the Indonesian case, 
Pepinsky (2012: 8) argues that the accountability structure in the RDO has shifted from the strict 
bureaucracy of the NO. Therefore, it is unlikely to identify a specific principal-agent relationship 
because accountability is a dynamic process that moves either up or down the government level. 
Information gathered from the editorials sums up this point:  
“He was found to have an early interest in making money. In 2004, during his 
temporary role in BIDA (2004-2005), he was allegedly involved in a procurement 
project by deploying the direct appointment of a private company in issuing public 
tenders for supply contracts which normally requires the procuring authority if the 
procurement value exceeds a certain threshold. He was accused of directing and 
ordering his subordinates to enter the project cost into the government’s additional 
budget (ABT or Anggaran Belanja Tambahan) as it was not initially budgeted. 
However, not until the end of his mandate as Kepri Governor in August 2010 was he 
proven guilty and sentenced to two years in prison and a penalty of Rp100 million” 
(Tempo and Viva News—23rd August 2010).  
This period accentuated Indonesian rulers who, under compulsion, aimed at minimising transaction 
costs borne by political transactions through regional autonomy policy. However, it is not the best way 
to conduct such reform, instead, it caused higher transaction cost and uncertainties despite most 
common theoretical arguments for decentralisation having justified its presence, for example, in Azfar 
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et al. (1999: 2), Ostrom et al. (1993), and Azis’s (2000) term that decentralisation able to improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation as well as the best mechanism to retain order and reduce uncertainty.  
The events from the above and the following discussion are summarised in table 6.1 of Batam’s key 
milestones and figure 6.1 of Batam’s FTZ transformation. The next subchapter focuses attention on 
the institutional arrangements to integrate organizations and institutions. The institutional 
arrangement is the arrangement of relationships between actors governing the way these actors can 
work together and/or compete in a contract or transaction and the main purpose of the contract is to 
reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). It is where the findings take place. 
6.4. Looking Ahead to the Governance Reform under Polarised Power Period (1998—
2004): Get the Formal Rules of the Game (Institutional Environment) Right but 
Governance Structures (Institutional Arrangement) Wrong 
When Habibie100 became president in the wake of AFC, political economic turbulence hit Indonesia; 
long-awaited freedom of expression and policy perspectives were the order of the day. Therefore, due 
to this unexpected event and his short rule, Habibie’s policymaking over Batam FTZ development was 
regarded as inconclusive as he had left his position as the dominant policymaker on the island after 
being elected as Vice President. However, to probe some of the unexplored implications of Habibie’s 
leadership set forth in chapter 4, this subchapter provides a clear vision of his policymaking style and 
mechanism and the key actors before turning to Wahid.  
In view of the study by Inada in Shimomura (2003: 151), Habibie’s period was challenged by the rise of 
nationalist social movements, who demanded devolution of power from central to local government 
and gained a firm foothold. Economic policy in general and the neoliberal policy in particular, i.e. Batam 
FTZ policy, fell into confusion. The first step for economic reform was filling the core economic 
ministerial posts previously were occupied by politicians and people with different backgrounds who 
were vulnerable to domestic pressure from interest groups. Habibie appointed some capable 
economists, Ginandjar Kartasasmita as a senior economic minister and Boediono as Minister of 
Finance. Old technocrats as economic advisers still existed. Habibie leveraged these men as they 
played a key role in negotiations with the IMF and had built very good connections with the leading 
international donor community (Schwarz 2008: 373). However, under the conditions required by the 
IMF, technocrats lacked the power and influence in domestic policymaking to promote radical 
economic reforms.  
                                                          
100More detailed information on technologist versus technocrats concerns in Habibie period, see Amir (2007a, 
2007b, and 2008)  
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Further Shiraishi (2006: 46) study suggests, the technocrats courted the support of other elites due to 
desperately needing to revive their political and economic effectiveness when the presidential trust 
was no longer enough. Technocrats were inevitably in touch with other key players—which were 
diffused into many political parties and interest groups in Indonesia’s political economy—but faced a 
lot of difficulties coordinating among these actors. However, the elusiveness arose when implementing 
their policy decisions conflicted with these actors and, in particular, through frequent meetings with 
leading politicians and various parliamentary commissions, Indonesian Chamber of Commerce 
(KADIN), influential businessmen and foreign investors’ representatives.  
Inada in Shimomura (2003: 152) and Shiraishi (2006: 33) further explored, the technocrats also 
frequently met with the new generation of academics, leading economists and prominent intellectuals 
i.e. Sri Mulyani Indrawati, NGOs and the media as well as foreign governments and international 
agencies in order to gain public support for their proposed reforms. They began to increase their 
influence in the economic policy design.  
According to Aspinall and Fealy (2003: 9), the rising social unrest and demands from local authorities 
prompted Habibie’s administration to issue a drastic constitutional shift known as ‘big-bang’ 
decentralisation policy. Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal 
arrangements between central and local government were issued. Subsequently, Law No. 53/1999 
was promulgated, changing Batam from only a sub-district under Kepri district to an autonomous and 
self-governing region with functions and authority from the decentralisation policy (Wong and Ng 
2009; Damuri et al. 2015). Accordingly, BAPPENAS lost its control over Batam’s development and 
budgetary power where prior to the regional autonomy policy, Batam had been totally controlled by 
Jakarta as their special project through the BIDA.  
The devolution of authority through regional autonomy led to removing obstacles on Batam FTZ policy 
decision-making, and public acceptability of policy decisions. Moreover, it facilitated collective action 
and cooperation when in fact Indonesia had lost all policy cohesion and credibility of its economic 
policy decisions due to Habibie’s incapacity to provide strong leadership in coordinating the segmented 
policymakers and to produce coherent economic policies vis-à-vis FTZ policy. 
The revival of the withering economic performance was coloured by the intricate institutional 
settlement that changed course detrimentally towards high levels of political disintegration and 
economic contestation. Not only intense but contrary to NO, the turf war emerged between political 
parties. The inter-factional tension between the executive and legislative appeared to colour the policy 
design to gain access to state power. Under low economic growth, patrons were unable to enforce 
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order over their various factions, especially when the low growth resulted in a low opportunity for 
payoffs. 
This verifies other assumptions made by Knight (1992) and Levi (1988), that power asymmetries among 
actors are visible with different interests and strengths especially in times of crisis. The actors are the 
source of and involved in the conflict and responsible for the development of institutions, thus will try 
to find a solution by harnessing the power that they had by changing the formal regulations and 
changing the existing ‘power structure’ while focusing the attention on actor differences in ‘bargaining 
power’ (Knight 1992 in Hanisch and Schlüter 1999: 11). Actors who can control the power because they 
control the information or have political access, capital, etc., will control the changing process so the 
rules favour their interests (Ibid). 
6.4.1. 1999—2002: The First Series of the Conflicts of Interest, the first growing impact of 
governance structure towards resource allocation. The changing players of the game 
After Habibie was forced to step down by DPR (the parliament) from the presidency, remembered as 
a time of chaos101, President Wahid continued the agonising and convoluted journey of drafting the 
rules of the game on Batam with the absolute bypassing and decreasing number of technocrats, except 
the old ones, and the outright disregard of institutional bulwark BAPPENAS (Shiraishi 2006: 46). One 
important aspect as an indicator of economic movements was that decentralised economic 
development turned optimism into pessimism when inter-factional tension among political institutions 
arose. This is what is meant by ex-ante expectations again not able to be proved ex-post which 
corresponds to decentralisation that spelt out the conditions for the devolution of political authority 
and posed problems rather than caused a positive outcome. Therefore, very few of the Batam FTZ 
policy plans were ever put into action. 
On the one hand, the executives under the recommendation of what was left in Wahid’s economic 
team published two important policy and bureaucratic initiatives to encourage Batam investment 
which contradicts each other in terms of political will. The most interesting example, one that aptly 
demonstrates Wahid’s unstable commitment was the delay of the incentive structures i.e. VAT and 
Luxury Sales Tax in early 2000. Meanwhile, the other initiative was re-establishing the Law on FTZ No. 
1/2000 in order to address the severe deficiency of political will particularly at the legislative level, 
which typically takes too long to officially pass FTZ formal rules.  
When the author came to Batam in 2008 as a part of a team to observe and gather evidence on the 
inefficiency of customs procedures in the FTZ area, there has been growing concern that Batam’s 
                                                          
101The period was known when the cabinet members were constantly dismissed or replaced, or chose to resign 
and his presidency lasted from October 1999 until his impeachment in July 2001.  
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stagnant development was due to the ongoing conflicts regarding the status of Batam Island. The 
conflict was mainly between the DPR and the President (central government) which then intrigued the 
author to embark on a planned research on the politics of FTZ status in the future. The opportunity to 
investigate these political dynamics as part of the issues of Batam FTZ policymaking was opened when 
the author pursued the PhD degree to validate the conflict as one of the preliminary findings. 
Based on Detik Finance report (9 June 2005) and further confirmation from former BIDA representative 
in Jakarta, a comprehensive overview of the inter-factional tension in the Batam FTZ government’s 
policy practices and sums up the points made above is explicated as follows: 
“After three months, in order to anticipate the unconducive investment climate and 
frequent policy changes at the time, the central government launched Law No. 36/2000 
to ratify Perppu No. 1/2000 as a valid and feasible law when, traditionally, it took a long 
time to produce FTZ Laws due to the governance gridlocks in the evaluation process and 
political intervention from the DPR. 
One amendment warranted attention in Article 2 of Law No. 36/2000 which was used as 
a legal basis by the central and local executive branch to prepare FTZ legislations not only 
for Batam region but also Bintan and Karimun regions. The article states that:  
“The borders of Free Trade Zone and Free Port of both lands and waters are defined by 
the Government Regulation on the Establishment of Free Trade Zones and Free Ports”.  
In addition, the provision in Article 3 was also amended as follows:  
“The Free Trade Zones and Free Ports as referred to in Article 2, are open to activities in 
the economic sphere, including to trade, maritime, industry, transportation, banking, 
tourism, and other sectors as specified in the Government Regulation on the 
Establishment of Free Trade Zones and Free Ports”.  
On the other hand, following the FTZ legislation, on 1st May 2001, the DPR used their 
legislative power to propose an FTZ Bill to designate Batam as an official FTZ. Lacking trust 
and confidence, Wahid’s administration did not immediately follow-up the initiative. 
Instead, the bill from the Batam commission in DPR was virtually negated by the central 
government who endeavoured to extend all of Batam Island to a Bonded Zone Plus in 
2005102”.  
The outcome was an early gridlock or the phase of the political ambiguity of both executive and 
legislative power who recommended similar resource allocation that spilt over into the realm of 
policymaking and again met with a similar problem. The conflict broke out between the two powers 
(executive and legislative bodies) which manifested the political disharmony over FTZ policy 
formulation that marked the first inter-factional tension (emphasis added). 
Although FTZ Law was ideologically approved at the 2000 legislative commission, what explains this 
duality in legislative attitude, one that often delays the legislation process and the other that is too 
ambitious to propose a bill? Moreover, what explains Wahid’s policy confusion and the resultant 
                                                          




gridlock on putting the incentive scheme on hold while undertaking a drastic liberalisation agenda for 
Batam?  
In a separate interview, think tanks such as CSIS and IGJ view this as one of the institutional constraints 
causing collective action problems.  
“It is necessary to recognise that the post-reform era brought significant challenges which 
are new to Wahid’s team. On one hand, although Wahid had a narrow political and 
economic base and lacked cohesion in his cabinet, his economic team preferred to be 
involved in a strategic economic development. The strategies only slightly came to fruition 
as he frequently disrupted his own cabinet (such as agreeing to frequent cabinet 
reshuffles). On the other hand, unlike the NO, the legislative body gained its constitutional 
supremacy to overpower the executive in policymaking. However, they still attempted to 
maintain old populists of NO that shift from the executive to legislative through 
mobilisation of alliances with the regional (DPRD) and local (DPD) legislative branch”.  
This evidently creates bureaucratic inefficiency (governance structure in Williamson’s third layer of 
institutional constraint) in which Batam FTZ investment projects including those sponsored by the 
government, remain stagnant. In addition to the problem, Wahid’s active role in international fora by 
soliciting support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and economic recovery through building strong 
ties with regions other than the West turns a blind eye towards not only Batam but Indonesia’s 
stagnating economy (see chapter 4 for details). 
 “The BIDA and Pemkot situation after NO barely improved over the next decade. 
During the period of decentralisation between 2000—2004, major interruptions had 
occurred in the execution of Batam’s status as an FTZ. After Batam’s transformation 
into an FTZ (based on Law No. 36/2000 in November 2000) until Megawati assumed 
office in 2001, the guideline or government regulation (PP) for the employment status 
of and the relationship between BIDA and Pemkot Batam had yet to be ratified. To 
recall the legitimate position of both agencies, Pemkot Batam was established by Law 
No. 53/1999 and BIDA was established by presidential decree No. 41/1973”.  
Interesting to note that according to the hierarchy of Indonesian legislation (See Figure 4.3), a 
presidential decree is below a law. Therefore, the position of BIDA ought to be lower than Pemkot 
Batam in the bureaucratic function.  
However, based on Hutchinson (2015: 107), under the regional autonomy measures, Pemkot Batam 
received additional tributary and land zoning authority in 2001. However, surprisingly, Law No. 
53/1999 recognises that Pemkot Batam should ‘engage’ with BIDA in Batam development which means 
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Pemkot’s position remained equal to that of BIDA despite being established by a law and the highest 
authority to oversee Batam after the regional autonomy.  
This was one of the obstacles to the development of future Batam, the polarised power that remains 
today103. See figure 6.2 the dualism of power. 
Figure 6.2 
 
Further investigation on the expected ‘engagement’ setting through document and literature reviews, 
the roles and functions of BIDA and Pemkot Batam were not clearly stated to anticipate Batam FTZ 
becoming a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Therefore, based on an interview with the former Batam 
Authority official, 
“At the time… a guideline to differentiate both roles and responsibilities was highly 
needed which includes the rule settings and legal platform between BIDA and Pemkot 
Batam. But not until the next administration led by Megawati, was Batam’s autonomous 
position redefined after Megawati’s new regional autonomy (decentralisation) law was 
passed (No. 32/2004)104.”  
                                                          
103By the time of writing this thesis, the present Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration has instructed to eliminate 
the dualism of authority to provide legal certainty for investors (CNN Indonesia—19th January 2016). Two options 
were offered whether to merge BIFZA (was BIDA) under one roof with Batam District administration (Pemkot) or 
to dissolve BIFZA and send its employees to join Pemda. "…. I demand an acceleration on the policy review based 
on one policy map (in particular thematic maps) to avoid any overlap on possession and use of land and spatial 
utilization on Batam Region," said Jokowi in closing his directives at a closed cabinet session (Indonesia President 
website—Press Release 5th January 2016). 
104Further discussion in section 6.3.2 
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In this phenomenon, Megawati as political institution not only determine policy outcomes but also the 
allocation of resources, the allocation offers power to the bodies (who have de facto power) who have 
the capability in influencing the CG and DPR as the political institutions (who have de jure power) in 
favour of the bodies’ respected interests of being the dominant group through rents.  
In support of the finding, the media had reported that: 
“Chairman of the local legislative branch of Batam (DPRD) Commission III, repeatedly told 
the government to immediately issue a guideline to harmonise the relationship between 
the two contending bodies; not only was the guideline serving as the mandate of Law No. 
53/1999 on Batam as an autonomous region, but the tense relationship between BIDA 
and Pemkot would spark further bureaucratic issues in the future” (Jakarta Post—23rd July 
2005).  
The relationship worsened in the 2000—2004 period when there were changes in the political 
leadership and uneasiness on the division of Batam’s jurisdiction (See figure 6.2). This dispute over 
territorial control manifested the first interjurisdictional competition of BIDA-Pemkot Batam (emphasis 
added). 
Added to the dispute and similar to that of Wahid’s administration, Megawati’s policymaking style was 
full of conflict and lacked coordination. 
Shiraishi (2006: 46: 1) has identified Megawati’s three economic agents who always at loggerheads in 
drafting a policy, they are: the old and traditional technocrats who lost their influence as they adhered 
to maintaining state intervention in industrial policy; 2) another breed of economic advisers who 
became influential in an era of budgetary decentralisation and fiscal austerity; and 3) the younger 
generation economists and intellectuals (i.e. Boediono) who later joined the economic advisory team 
and increased their influence in economic policy design. The vital institutional reform for 
macroeconomic stability was by reforming the Ministry of Finance and appointing Mr Boediono as its 
minister to take the leading role in the investment policy. However, this form of service delivery not 
only gestured to the public and investors that the economic agents were divided at the expense of 
BAPPENAS and long-term national planning but strengthened Megawati’s position.  
Furthermore, added to the dispute, according to BAPPENAS official and KADIN policy advisor: 
“When Megawati ruled, she knew there were unclear property rights going on in Batam 
which concerns BIDA and Pemkot Batam. However, rather than ratifying the guideline to 
discern the roles and functions of BIDA and Pemkot Batam, Megawati, through her 
economic advisers instigated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to be signed by 
the two bodies in 2002 with the addition of DPRD Batam. The MOU encouraged them to 
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join forces in the development activities on the island’s infrastructure after negotiating at 
central government level by local interests”.  
Despite the implementation of the regional autonomy (decentralisation) and MOU being signed to 
integrate roles and responsibilities of the interest groups, evidence suggests it also triggered emerging 
confusion and uncertainty among businesses as demonstrated in the following paragraphs. 
First, in a media coverage, businesspersons and associations who strived to produce more to meet 
demand such as KADIN (Indonesian Chambers of Commerce) and APINDO (Asosiasi Pengusaha 
Indonesia or Indonesian Entrepreneurs Association) were also divided into two power centres, one 
that adhered to the executive power of Pemkot Batam and the other to BIDA’s professionalism. The 
division forced them to collaborate with political elites in a joint negotiation and intervened in the 
structure of local politics (Tribun Batam—30th March 2001). This manifested itself through various 
policymaking schemes in section 6.3.2 and subchapter 6.4 by the business community’s interference 
in the legitimate electoral procedure. 
Second, based on three reliable sources, Gatra News—3rd March 2003, van Klinken (2007), and 
Evaquarta (2012) revealed: 
“After the MOU took place, Pemkot Batam accrued a substantial amount of PAD (Own-
Source Revenue) of more than Rp8.8 billion in 2002 some of which derived from Perda 
(local legislation) on the issuance of over 140 alcoholic beverage licences (first scheme) 
and Batam’s tourism sector (or the second scheme from the amusement and gaming 
complex) with total disregard of public discontent. Initially, these legislations did not 
encounter any strong public opposition as the PAD was being used to help build Batam 
infrastructure and there was no interference or direct supervision from the Kepri (Riau 
Islands) provincial government. Despite the peculiarity of the project considering national 
regulations forbidding any gaming practices, controversially, the second scheme was 
legalised and pursued by Pemkot Batam with the support of GOLKAR (Functional Group 
Party) and the PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) leaders in the DPRD. 
Pemkot Batam’s justifications were: to use Batam’s ‘gateway for international commerce’, 
boost PAD as part of a government policy on KWTE Exclusive Tourism Area (Kawasan 
Wisata Terpadu Eksklusif), enhance Batam’s market price in competing with Malaysia and 
Singapore’s popular business-amusement centres, and essentially localise and limit the 
industry already established on Rempang Island”.  
Evaquarta (2012: 9) further added that later, the first Perda as the first scheme was withdrawn by 
Minister of Home Affairs arguing that alcoholic beverage was the Kepri provincial government’s 
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jurisdiction due to its effects on public health. The second scheme was challenged by various streams 
from the established clandestine gaming industry to protests from Malay/Moslem communities. These 
developments accordingly decreased Pemkot Batam’s tax-based PAD significantly to Rp545 million in 
2004. Pemkot Batam had to find other sources since their tax-based PAD showed signs of decreasing 
and they took advantage of regional autonomy provisions to generate more PAD. 
The next period narrates the second episodes of conflict between BIDA and Pemkot Batam as well as 
the executive and legislative bodies but under the influence of non-state actors who played a key role 
in navigating Batam FTZ policy process. 
6.4.2. 2003—2004: The Second Series of Conflicts of Interest 
This section analyses the conflicts of interest between the Central Government (CG) representing the 
President and the House of Representatives (DPR/Parliament) to defend the Batam Authority (BIDA or 
BIFZA) through the implementation of the Free Trade Zone (FTZ). It shows how dominant the influence 
of actors or any groups in the conflict. Institutional reform became unimportant to the two political 
institutions as a reference in carrying out the ongoing principles of reformation, either economic, 
political or legal reform. How the conflict took place can be observed and started through the 
establishment of the Batam FTZ.  
The study starts with the focus on the alarming rate of smuggling (Indonesian Customs database) which 
during this period has disrupted the national economy. The smuggling events based on the information 
gathered from former Indonesian Customs official triggered the old technocrats into influencing 
Megawati’s administration to seek strong government intervention with a series of institutional 
changes in Batam.  
In view of this contingency, further detail from the former Customs official recounted: 
“There were multiple even in parallel meetings only to discuss Batam matter with other 
relevant ministries and agencies. Based on the results of the meetings, there were 
changes particularly in the status of Batam in early 2004 which was downgraded to 
‘Bonded Zone’ and the imposition of the VAT and Luxury Sales Tax (PPnBM)105. The taxes 
were imposed only on products sold domestically or shipped to other parts of Indonesia, 
not those that are exported, which include electronics, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, 
and motorised vehicles. It was in part due to encouraging more exports as a national 
priority and there had been an unprecedented record of uncontrolled goods from and to 
Batam”.  
                                                          
105Formerly, the reconsideration of Batam gaining its de facto special exemption from VAT and PPnBM was 
established since 1980s through central government’s decision in Jakarta (tax haven period).  
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As confirmed by the Minister of Industry and Trade and the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) Annual 
Report (2004-2005), there had been differences in export and import data between Singapore and BPS 
which there was a strong indication of illegal trade occurred between those periods. 
Furthermore, the former Chairman of the Batam Forwarder and Expedition Association of Indonesia 
(GAFEKSI) as reported in the media noted: 
“Batam society had been lenient in allowing the circumstances of import and export 
leakages to get out of control without being fully aware that the incentives (tax-free 
haven) given to investors and business sectors were only enjoyed by certain interest 
groups (corrupt officials colluding with ‘black-list’ businessmen) and not the public. We 
have never tried to solve and minimise the smuggling problems and let the state and 
community bear the cost of losing a large number of revenues” (Kompas News—12th 
January 2004). 
To confirm the statement by GAFEKSI Chairman above, based on CSIS study by Anas et al. (2006) and 
Hutchinson (2015) observed: 
“The imposition of taxes, the downgrading of Batam, not to mention the high rate of 
smuggling had a substantial impact on the investment in the electronics sector, which 
has fallen year-on-year since 2003 with almost half of the firms folding or relocating. 
Furthermore, the new fiscal policy received mixed reactions, especially from business 
communities. The policy degraded the business climate in Batam and the surrounding 
areas. Local business groups felt disadvantaged as it indirectly increased labour wages 
and production costs”.  
Based on the interview with the business association (HKI and KADIN) on separate occasions, 
“The acceptance or rejection attitude of the implementing agency will greatly affect 
the success or failure of the formal regulatory mechanism of the Batam FTZ 
development. This is very possible because the policies implemented are not the result 
of formulation that involved local people who know the fundamental issues. But the 
policy which will be implemented properly is the ‘top-down’ policy. Very unlikely the 
decision makers realise the fundamental needs, desires, or problems that Batam 
residents or investors want to solve”. 
This evidence suggests the persistent institutional changes in Batam’s status and policy forced the 
business community to work together with a solid agenda (e.g. public dialogues with the government) 
to ensure a definite legal base for Batam’s status and their businesses.  
According to KADIN policy advisor, in many occasions, they influenced policymakers by rolling back the 
policy direction from government protectionist measures to a more liberal approach and had to 
reallocate ‘extra costs’ for possible graft in their budget plans. Evaquarta (2012) also argues that they 
financed Batam’s political bargaining on DPR as their manifesto in mobilising support and funds. This 
idea has received strong support from the Riau Islands Regional Government and the people of Batam 
Island as a whole. Given the enormous support and importance of the bill, DPR immediately put it into 
the National Legislation Programme (PROLEGNAS) in 2002. 
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Consequently, based on Anas et al. (2006: 5), DPR under intense pressure from the business 
community proposed an initiative to change the status of Batam Island from a bonded zone to FTZ in 
2003, but Megawati’s economic team disagreed, thus the plans were delayed. Evaquarta (2012: 10) 
further states that the major reason was that the CG intended to re-enact the Presidential Decree of 
1974 on a bonded warehouse in Batam industrial areas based on the principle of fiscal equality for all 
regions for the implementation of regional autonomy, and more importantly to circumvent smuggling 
activities.  
Choi (2008) in Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) and Evaquarta (2012) further argue that despite Pemkot and 
BIDA’s support, the on-going power struggle for Batam’s status was instead a threat to the success of 
the bargain. However, with the involvement of influential businessmen and BIDA’s ‘infiltration’ of the 
structure of Pemkot Batam, the battle was progressively resolved by ‘harmonising’ the power 
constellation through contributions to and winning the campaign of 2005-6 Pilkada (regional election) 
as the businessmen’s grand strategy.  
Through gathering information from studies and research on extant literature, in this period more 
importantly in September 2004, DPR unilaterally agreed on the FTZ bill recommended by inward-
looking populist politicians who seemed to have a greater chance of promoting the development of 
democratisation. Moreover, the increasing power of DPR meant an increased risk of opportunistic 
pressures from DPD (local representatives in DPR or Dewan Pimpinan Daerah) for protectionism and 
governmental interventionism with the help of their business affiliates granting Batam FTZ status. 
However, the CG led by Megawati confronted the DPR and refused to ratify. The presidency and 
bureaucracy were weakened by pluralistic and vague power centres and configurations. Thus, this 
executive-legislative dispute over FTZ policy formulation marked the first-factional tensions (emphasis 
added). The bill was automatically annulled after three months during the SBY presidency.  
 2004: The First Commission Meeting 
Zaenuddin (2013) and Choi (2007) study argue that the reluctance of President Megawati to sign the 
FTZ bill the DPR proposed, aggrieved the MPs since their position as public representatives was 
arbitrarily disregarded by the executive.  
It appeared that there was political vengeance in not immediately approving the FTZ bill into a Law 
even though the structure of the MPs had undergone many changes.  
Further, Choi (2007: 2) in her study argues, in the context of the FTZ bill, DPR’s version seemed contrary 
to the bill proposed by the CG. When the CG began discussing the Batam FTZ bill in DPR, the discordant 
effect surfaced instantly. The status of Batam ‘as a whole’ FTZ put forward in the DPR version which 
stated that all the areas, excluding the hinterlands, in Batam, Bintan, and Karimun be developed as 
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FTZs, contradicted the status as an ‘enclave system’ proposed by the CG, which allows only certain 
industrial areas free trade status. 
Media coverage also reported that the government was determined to make corrections to the 
idiosyncrasy that had taken place in Batam for years, with the attempt to restore Batam’s strategic 
position. The government was called to clarify provisions of their FTZ bill at a commission meeting held 
at DPR. The meeting had a subtle tone of disagreement. As alluded to by the Finance Minister, 
Boediono, Batam’s current position with its taxes and import duties amenities needed clarification as 
for its status and definition in the two opposing bills was not synchronised (Bisnis Indonesia and Media 
Indonesia editorials—December 2007).  
Based on the document review, DPR’s version intended to convert the entire Batam region into an FTZ 
and become part of Pemkot Batam territorial responsibility in accordance with Law No. 53/1999—as 
embodied in the regional autonomy policy—and to be implemented gradually through PP (government 
regulations). The first phase would cover Batam, Rempang, Galang, and Belakang Padang regions.  
The CG’s version included issuing a PP that states Batam will be divided into a number of FTZs: the so-
called enclaves such as Rempang and Galang and certain zones in Batam region divided into seven FTZ 
areas (Figure 5.9): Batu Ampar in the district of Batu Ampar, Batam Centre and Kabil in Nongsa, Muka 
Kuning in Sei Bedug, as well as Sagulung, Tanjung Ucang, and Sekupang in the district of Sekupang. The 
government accentuated that seaports and airports are assets belonging to the CG. 
Further remark from the former BIDA official in an interview as well as other supplementary 
documents and media reports (Bank Indonesia 2007; Bisnis Indonesia—22nd August 2007): 
“Despite the differences, the executive and legislative bodies had settled an agreement 
that an independent management body should be established before Batam FTZ area is 
chosen in order to accelerate Batam investment development. On the one hand, in the 
transitional provisions of the bill, the legislature (DPR) requested all the assets and land 
management within the sovereignty of BIDA be transferred as the property of the new 
zone management body (a form of resource allocation on property rights). On the other 
hand, representing the executive, the State Secretary explained that based on one of the 
provisions in the PP, all the assets and employees of BIDA were to be transferred to the 
zone management body, except for the assets submitted to Pemkot Batam and the land 
management rights under the authority of BIDA; the authority of Pemkot Batam located 
in Batam FTZ should also be transferred to the zone management body”.  
Added to the evidence on the dualism of power, a study by Siregar (2013) on the land management 
rights as mentioned by the sources above noted, 
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“The main problem is when the issuance of Government Regulation No. 46 of 2007 on FTZ 
where Batam area was established into an FTZ, it also regulated the transfer land 
management rights (HPL) (another example of allocation or resource on property rights) 
to BIDA through a Government Regulation as well as the rights transferred to Pemkot 
Batam, this caused the dualism of authority to be more visible. 
In response to this issue, BIDA and Pemkot Batam may consult and settle the issue by 
prioritizing the interest of the community above any interest by making a joint decision 
agreed by both parties. The object of the land management rights is the rights to extract 
sea sand, in this case, the reclaimed land, while BIDA and Pemkot Batam are the subjects 
of the land management rights (HPL). 
BIDA as HPL holder in Batam Island based on Presidential Decree Number 41/1973 juncto 
Presidential Decree Number 94/1998 while Pemkot Batam as HPL Subject based on 
Government Regulation number 8/1953. Furthermore, Article 67 of the Regulation of the 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head of the National Land Agency Number 9/1999 also 
mentioned that one of the subjects of HPL is the government institution including the 
regional government (Pemkot) and the authority bodies (BIDA). Thus the two subjects of 
this HPL between BIDA and the Pemkot Batam can make a joint decision to solve this 
problem and can manage together the reclaimed land”.  
In his work, Hasan (2007: 129-135) in Albintani (2010) explains that prior to the issuance, the law on 
Free Trade Zone and Free Ports Batam failed to be approved due to the different views between DPR 
and the Central Government (CG) on the concept of the zone. The seriousness of DPR to totally validate 
the island of Batam as a Free Trade Zone (not limited to certain areas) and the strength of the CG to 
maintain the concept of clusters (a part of an economic area) into a law remains a debate.  
In terms of tax privileges, the government’s version did not regulate exemption of various types of 
Non-Tax State Revenue levies (PNBP), while VAT, PPnBM, import duty and excise remained imposed 
outside the FTZ. 
Furthermore, information gathered from various sources from interviews on during DPR’s 
parliamentary sessions to the minutes of the plenary session revealed, 
“On the plenary session held on September 14, 2004, from 18.30 to 21.00 West Indonesia 
Time (WIB) the agenda of ratification of the proposed (initiative) Bill on 'Free Trade Zone 
and Free Port of Batam' became a law coloured by a sharp debate. At the hearing, the 
Minister of Justice and Human Rights (MENKUMHAM) Yusril Ihza Mahendra, objected to 
the views of each faction in the House. This was due to no common views among each 
faction. Yusril who represented the CG questioned the DPR's position on which areas will 
actually be used as Free Trade Zone. He suspected the DPR’s version could trigger 
misinterpretations with regard to the vague definition of FTZ. For instance, FTZ should be 
governed by a different authority based on Perppu No. 1/2000 which was finally 
confirmed by Law No. 36/2000. This law allows a region within Indonesia to establish an 
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FTZ and enjoy various exemptions, but they will be imposed ‘in the customs territory. The 
faction's answered in the DPR, though agreed to legalize, is different from the argument”.  
This reality was what causes ‘anger’ of the CG at the same time rejects the enforcement of Batam FTZ 
into a law (Bisnis Indonesia—16th August 2007).  
Extant literature noted that the Minister of Trade and Industry was more stringent that DPR’s definition 
was not applicable at the time and some of the elements in their version would be difficult to 
implement. If imposed, the provisions of the bill would lead to ‘jealousy’ between regions. Despite DPR 
having the right to approve major economic policies including FTZ bills, no single party has overall 
power in it. Therefore, DPR’s version was not strong enough to persuade the government which 
prompted the Minister of Trade and Industry to explain the circumstance to DPR:  
First, an area for FTZ should be demarcated because of the development of Batam now deviates from 
the initial thoughts [as an industrial area] ...Batam is now home to around 500,000 inhabitants and the 
industrial activity is only part of the region’s activities. If the bill was enforced, other areas would ask 
for the same incentive treatment (Bisnis Indonesia—22nd August 2007). 
Second, given the widespread smuggling activities coupled with a weak control mechanism, the law 
could not guarantee that smuggling would not occur; due to the huge price disparity between FTZ and 
its periphery region, the exposed tax-free based area would be flooded with cheap imported goods. 
Despite the condition has been slightly dealt with through various joint ministerial-level security 
measures, smuggled goods by the residents are still ongoing and entering the FTZ then transported to 
other areas within Kepri province and other areas in the Indonesian territory that do not fit the 
category of an FTZ (Ibid). 
Therefore, the CG emphasised that their position was clear, that the establishment of FTZ was only 
intended for the industrial area to spur national exports and, therefore, required legal protection for 
their activities. Natallis-Bank Indonesia (2010), Susanto (2009), and Burmansyah (2008) argue, the CG 
claimed that it was imperative to transform Batam into an FTZ as it already applied the rules and 
regulations as de facto FTZ characterized by a variety of fiscal incentives (tax incentives i.e. VAT and 
PPnBM exemption)—gradually abolished for certain commodities.  
In October 2004, prior to Megawati’s end of term, her administration launched Law No. 32/2004 as an 
amendment to Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy which reinstated the CG’s withdrawal from 
superseding local policy structure (as opposed to technocratic arbitrary intervention in policy or legal 
drafting in NO due to the absence of established and more powerful vested interests).  
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Evidence from the conflict between CG and DPR suggests that based on Law No. 10/2004 on 'The 
Establishment of Legislation and Procedure of DPR, does not clarify the deadlock position, i.e. the DPR 
and the CG do not reach mutual agreement in the First Level Talks and Second Level Talks (See figure 
4.7 of chapter 4). Finally, DPR runs with confidence, thus continuing to enact the Batam FTZ Law in the 
Second Level Talks. Meanwhile, the CG did the same which did not enforce the law passed in the State 
Gazette. 
 Budget Allocation as the second interjurisdictional competition 
Ahead of the 2004 presidential election, due to the withdrawal of the CG’s authority, the sensitivity of 
local budget (APBD) as a political commodity106 triggered more intense involvement—compared with 
the previous regional autonomy policy—of the local executive and legislative bodies (Pemkot and 
DPRD) in the APBD formulation process. For the purpose of building power, APBD has been an open 
space for debate and seized by Batam authorities as well as bartered between the ruling elites.  
A study by Evaquarta (2012: 8) noted, in order to participate in future projects, interest groups must 
follow ‘the rules of the game’. Profiting and manipulating funds from APBD, BIDA and Pemkot Batam—
who have the power to generate tax and manage local development—increasingly intensified 
competition and authoritatively promoted their important project plans according to their interests.  
This dispute over projects and budget allocation marked the second interjurisdictional competition of 
BIDA-Pemkot Batam (emphasis added).  
Finding suggests, Megawati was widely regarded for her pragmatic leadership and yet seriously 
criticised for her policy indecisiveness when she was depending on economic advisers to overcome 
issues of Batam’s budgetary autonomy arrangement. In hindsight, she was seen to be fully submissive 
to the PDIP party, as a pro-wong cilik (lower class society). Through her economic team’s initiatives to 
attract investments, she managed to be appreciated despite clearly expressing their emphasis in 
generating instant funding through tax, loan, and privatisation on several occasions (see chapter 4).  
6.5. Stagnation Period (2004—2007)  
Learning from past mistakes, the SBY administration was cautious to fully rely on his economic team 
to determine economic policy. During the fuel crisis in 2003-2005, SBY had complete confidence in and 
appointed ex-reformist Sri Mulyani, the Chief of BAPPENAS and Boediono as his key players in 
prioritising macroeconomic stability. SBY’s first term manifested by avowing his power from the 
                                                          
106Currently (until 2016), the unstable combination between energy and politics remains, as energy has been one 
of the most volatile political commodities. Based on the analysis of this chapter, other political commodities 
significant to the study are land or territorial limit and budget. 
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domination of Vice President, Jusuf Kalla (JK) and Economic Coordinating Minister, Aburizal Bakrie, in 
economic policymaking. Both of which are influential GOLKAR leaders. 
A study review by Shiraishi (2006: 48) suggested, once GOLKAR found itself as the sidekick of the ruling 
party Democrat in 2004, there was an explicit sentiment within GOLKAR, as well as Democrat, that this 
would not last.  
Appear out of the crisis, many Democrat leaders embraced a profound scepticism of GOLKAR and 
thought that it will be very long before the GOLKAR dominated the government. This conviction 
strengthened after JK’s influential role was revealed (see the previous chapter as it relates to JK’s 
political aspiration) and remained.  Based on an interview with a former and retired MP of GOLKAR 
faction supported by Shiraishi (2006), three factors sum up this point: 
1) His control over GOLKAR as the dominant government coalition in DPR. He openly and deliberately 
persuaded SBY to fill the cabinet with GOLKAR people involving some of the nation’s most promising 
political and corporate figures, i.e. Mr. Aburizal Bakrie, known to be one of Indonesia’s business 
tycoons who was also appointed as Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare in SBY’s cabinet 
reshuffle and Mr. Paskah Suzetta, known to have a construction business to be appointed as State 
Minister for Planning;  
2) He has the mandate as directly elected vice president by coalition parties; and  
3) He has a political contract to team up with SBY in winning the election. By interfering with the 
empowerment of BAPPENAS, JK recommended Mr Suzetta as BAPPENAS Chief after Sri Mulyani in 
2004-2009 clearly shows technocracy was no longer shielded from ‘political interest’. It was also 
evident, where JK was partly responsible for persuading SBY to further realise the SEZ plan in 2006 and 
immediately endorse the status of Batam, Bintan and Karimun regions as FTZs in 2007 (as elaborated 
later in this subchapter).  
Furthermore, following democratisation, economic agents’ influence on politics and bureaucracy had 
grown. Under such pressure and bound by political feasibility, SBY’s reforms had to succumb to vested 
interests. It was an act that remained at disagreements due to peculiar tension between SBY and JK. 
The channels of the bureaucracy of both sides were mindful of not go beyond the acceptable political 
function but caused unclear policy directions concerning Batam’s FTZ development or other policies. 
However, these policy directives as illustrated in the following paragraphs show signs of political tactics 
by accommodating the goals of the Democrat-GOLKAR coalition party to enhance their neoliberal 
stance to promote investment disregard the public interest. 
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During the first year of SBY in office in 2004-2005, the investment climate was unattractive (see figure 
4.9) with closures and relocations of factories in the manufacturing sector as a consequence of the 
imposition of VAT and PPnBM and bureaucratic uncertainty ahead of the 2003 gubernatorial election 
(Pilkada in Kepri Province). Pemkot Batam and DPRD patronage network was significantly disrupted by 
the Pilkada following the defeat of the PDIP-backed former Pemkot Batam Mayor, Nyat Kadir and the 
victory of the GOLKAR-backed pro-BIDA group, Ismeth Abdullah as the Kepri Province Governor (Choi 
2007; Evaquarta 2012). The networking establishment was short-lived. Furthermore, there was a 
change in the political constellation of local governance post-Pilkada in 2005-6 which ensured the 
abandonment of some projects including the KWTE project. From April 2005 to June 2006, Mustofa 
Widjaya107 replaced Ismeth Abdullah as acting Chairman of BIDA and through a Presidential Decree of 
2006; he was appointed BIDA definitive chairman (Ibid).  
This unexpected institutional change was the culmination of a power struggle beginning in 2001 
between Pemkot and BIDA with the addition of DPRD and it was regarded as the business elites’ first 
success in their harmonising agenda. The second success of the business community’s scheme was the 
victory of one of the BIDA’s deputies and a Democrat Party politician, Ahmad Dahlan, as the next mayor 
of Pemkot Batam in the 2006 mayoral election which underscored BIDA’s consolidation with the 
incumbent regime (Evaquarta 2012: 11). The business groups finally had accomplished the goal of 
better business consideration after BIDA had been transferring their staff gradually to Pemkot Batam’s 
structure, which led to a more harmonious relationship. The new pro-BIDA and pro-central 
government leadership of Kepri provincial government and Pemkot Batam, embracing the neoliberal 
paradigm as its new ideology, subsequently decided to take the region in hand and redevelop it as a 
free trade zone (Yeung 2000; Kompas News—10th June 2005). As these local politicians and 
businessmen in their respective areas constantly enjoyed virtually unimpeded power due to the 
businessmen’s influential role as patrons to mobilise support for the democratic election purposes, 
therefore the ruling Democrat party had no alternative to avoid them.  
The diverse factional (legislative versus executive) and ideological (neoliberal and nationalism) 
pressures within interest groups, quite predictably, spilt over into the realm of SEZ policymaking. SBY 
was in a dilemmatic position between balancing his pro-growth initiatives to attract investment and to 
address the public criticism over his new investment policy.  
Therefore, his first step was to restore Batam’s status to ‘Bonded Zone Plus’ in July 2005 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit—2008; Wong and Ng 2009). The government offered investors more legal certainty, 
including enhanced incentives to investors, less bureaucracy, streamlined customs inspection 
                                                          
107He was a technologist since 1979 and ex-BIDA Director of Planning from 1989 to 1992. 
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procedures and exemptions for import duties, VAT waivers for raw materials, and exemptions from 
retroactive taxation (Jakarta Post editorials—June 2005).  
However, in an interview with former MP of GOLKAR faction decried, 
“This policy was being politicised, and not too convincingly, as the central government 
acknowledged their interference and kept a stronghold on Batam’s future 
development by placing ‘their men’ in Batam’s strategic position and discreetly 
proposed a new national investment scheme”.  
For instance, Finance Minister’s affirmed Batam’s status as a ‘Bonded Zone Plus’ during Mustofa 
Widjaya’s temporary leadership in BIDA. The status was followed by the issuance of various reform 
packages signed by SBY to improve the island as well as the overall national investment climate through 
a Presidential Instruction of 2006. SBY proposed to ease bureaucracy, which boded well for growth. 
However, the packages which aimed at customs bureaucratic formalities to be simplified, facilitating 
more raw material imports and export goods movement between zones, tax reduction, etc. (Economist 
Intelligence Unit—2008; Wong and Ng 2009) were also followed by the government’s schedule for 
submitting the forthcoming investment bill to DPR. 
In a further development, on 25th June 2006 at Turi Beach Resort Batam, President SBY and Singapore 
Prime Minister (PM), Lee Hsien Loong, agreed on economic cooperation by organising the 
establishment of SEZs in Batam and the signing of an MoU by the Coordinating Minister for Economic 
Affairs, Mr. Boediono and Singapore’s Trade and Industry Minister, Lim Hng Kiang (Bako 2009; 
Pahlawan et al. 2009; Arafat 2010; Maramis 2014). Clearly, both parties were committed to making 
Batam a profitable centre of dynamic growth. The scope of cooperation between the two parties 
ensured the successful development of capital investment, finance and banking, taxation, customs, 
immigration, labour and capacity building. The SEZ was based on the development principles of an 
effective, clear, and reliable institutional and policy framework. It would simplify the investment 
procedures, provide adequate infrastructure, and offer a well-organised administrative management 
toward building an effective and efficient economic zone (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Coordinating 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 2010 and 2014 database). However, Singapore’s dominant position as a 
rising high-tech industry country led some scholars to believe that Singapore was able to convince and 
subsequently put pressure on the GOI regarding the inevitability of the neoliberal policies with 
Singapore formally collaborating with Indonesia to develop Batam into a major SEZ capable of 
attracting foreign investors from Japan and other major industrialised countries (Phelps 2004; Latt 
2007; Burmansyah 2008; Wulandari 2012).  
This form of external pressure originated from Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong who once 
observed Batam as a place of high economic value, for both Indonesia and Singapore. The pattern of 
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cooperation applied in Indonesia was based on the successful SEZ development in China who also 
invited Singapore. Lee’s rhetorical justification that Singapore has proven to be more knowledgeable 
in providing feedback and contributing ideas in a number of SEZs in China, Vietnam and India induced 
Indonesian policymakers to accept the SEZ model. The key policy actors also withdrew some of their 
former radical nationalist attitudes alongside private investment to comply with Singapore’s terms and 
conditions of how to develop SEZs.  
“We are close to the investors. We know what they need. We know the existing problems, 
and we will communicate this so that Indonesia’s investment climate can be friendly to 
investors” (BIFZA online news—26th June 2006; Burmansyah-IGJ 2008). 
The GOI at the time was intensely ambitious to prepare an SEZ, not as a shortcut for boosting 
investment, creating employment, increasing exports, earning foreign exchange, and improving 
competitiveness; the issue, in fact, had circulated since early 2006 when the Vice President, Jusuf Kalla 
(JK) visited Bojonegoro in the province of Banten and considered Bojonegoro as potentially an 
integrated industrial park to be developed as a highly competitive SEZ (Ibid).  
In 2006, in an attempt to further realise the SEZ plan and address investors’ concerns, the GOI had 
attempted to deal with confusion and overlaps of responsibilities between BIDA and Pemkot Batam 
through an MOU signed by both authorities who stipulated that Pemkot Batam would take charge of 
social issues and welfare, and BIDA would retain authority for investment coordination. However, this 
did not result in an appreciable difference (Choi 2011; Hutchinson 2015). Overlapping authority in 
Batam occurs not merely because of the unclear division of authority between BIDA and Pemkot 
Batam, but when referring to the laws on Regional Autonomy Law and Batam as an Autonomous 
Region, the CG should provide large executive authority to Pemkot Batam (City Government) to 
manage the region. On the one hand, it is realistic if today there are increased pressures that the 
various authorities held by BIDA be handed over entirely to Pemkot. On the other hand, BIDA rejected 
the requests for the dissolution of the institution or the transfer of a number of its authorities to 
Pemkot due to being the ‘agent of change’ and consider them more professionally responsible for 
Batam’s development progress as a significant economic zone. These two vested interests were 
reviewed more closely because of the socio-cultural, political and economic circumstances had 
undergone many changes due to the FTZ status being implemented. Therefore, it becomes natural if 
the CG was prompted to carefully resolve the fundamental problems of Batam today. 
The economic stagnation or quasi-growth rates experienced by Batam was a compelling reason to 
encourage SBY administration to immediately conduct a review and policy change in order to address 
the various problems. SBY was known to be the only Indonesian leader so far who established rules 
with vigilance. His strategy to balance domestic and foreign interest while preserving the euphoria of 
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his positive feedback from thriving national and international media and civil society was a clear sign 
of realising a good governance concept which was highly needed to create a conducive situation to 
achieve the objectives of FTZ implementation. However, given the situation at ground levels such as 
the persistent overlaps of authority between BIDA and Pemkot, it became considerably dissimilar from 
the pretence of an encouraging investment climate stemming from the highest authority. FTZ was 
difficult to implement and potentially caused confusion among investors and, therefore, contributed 
to the decline in foreign investment.  
Although the SBY administration took various measures to eliminate the tension between the two 
bodies through implementing transparent regulations and good leadership (Wahyuni et al. 2010), the 
institutional structure with regard to their distinct roles and responsibilities had yet to be clearly 
identified. In addition, these two bodies have also been unsuccessful in efficiently communicating a 
better rule setting to enhance their cooperation in order to circumvent any confusion and uncertainty.  
Furthermore, prior to the GOI’s intention to upgrade Batam FTZ to an SEZ and the plan to set up 
economic corridors under the MP3EI master plan (Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of 
Indonesia’s Economic Development) as cited in previous chapters, the SBY government ambitiously 
enacted two interrelated legislations, the new Investment Law No. 25/2007 and Spatial Planning Law 
No. 26/2007. The Investment Law was set to connect the deficiencies observed in the previous policies 
in overcoming the decreasing investment problem (Tambunan 2008, 2013), whereas the Spatial 
Planning Law replaced the previous law of 1992 and gave authority to local government (provincial, 
district together with DPD) to draft their own zoning, spatial arrangement, and development plans. 
These laws were expected to stimulate investors and regain their confidence (Wulandari 2012: 2).  
For the second consecutive time in 2007, following the two legislations, SBY passed a Presidential 
Instruction to further increase the speed of real sector development and the micro, small and medium 
enterprises empowerment in order to boost national economic growth. It was also expected that 
based on the instruction, the government would schedule an SEZ bill to be submitted before DPR by 
November 2007 led by the Trade Minister and Chairman of BKPM (Investment Coordinating Board).  
Since then, Bojonegoro has often been seen as Indonesia’s selling point to various investment 
exhibitions in a number of countries. Despite still being in the preparation phase, the Chairman of the 
SEZ Executive Team in June 2007, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum, offered the city of 
Kendal in the province of Central Java, as an automotive SEZ to the CEO of an automotive company, 
Renault-Nissan Carloss Gohsn. Kendal was also a strong selling point at fairs and investment seminars 
held by BKPM in South Korea in early August 2007. The offer was important since South Korea is one 
of the world’s biggest automotive manufacturers (Ibid). 
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SEZs are not necessarily areas of new openings but could be the development and refinement of 
existing ones. According to former Deputy Chairman of the SEZ National Team, SEZs may be formed 
from new areas such as Bojonegoro or an upgrade of existing ones such as Marunda, but basically, 
depending on the local government proposal for the readiness and ability of the region until approved 
by the CG (Ibid). 
6.5.1. Overstated Neoliberalism  
 Who benefited from Batam FTZ? 
Despite the SEZ bill being scheduled for submission in November 2007 as clearly stated in the 
Presidential Instruction of 2007, the plan to convert Batam, Bintan, and Karimun (BBK) into an SEZ had 
yet to materialise after a series of inter-ministerial coordination meetings in Jakarta from August to 
October 2007 failed to reach a consensus. Meanwhile, SEZ did not seem to be pinned down to the BBK 
but rather other potential areas in Indonesia. The new issue emerged when the government 
considered BBK as an FTZ instead of an SEZ (Kompas—27th February 2006). The government argued 
that the designation of Batam into an FTZ stemmed from the contingencies of a stagnating economy 
due to lack of investment promotion. 
Given the articulated issue, the inter-ministerial coordination meeting heated up and the economy 
minister was split into two camps, the advocates of BBK as FTZ and the advocates of BBK as enclaves 
(Choi 2007: 2). The pro-enclave was led by the Coordinating Minister for Economy (CMEA) and Finance 
Minister assisted by the Trade Minister supported by PDIP leader, Megawati. Meanwhile, the opposing 
camp was guarded by the chairman of the BKPM (Investment Coordinating Board) and Minister of 
Industry supported by GOLKAR’s Jusuf Kalla (JK). The debate ended with victory to BKPM’s team. 
Following the FTZ legislation and advice from JK in a meeting on 28th June 2007, three government 
draft regulations (RPPs) were formulated as a legal basis for Batam, Bintan, and Karimun (BBK) to be 
transformed into FTZs (Kontan—15th August 2007). Irrespective of political parties, such dialectical 
oppositions are quite common in Indonesia and modestly expressed.  
However, the story that unfolds is individuals as actors are assumed to possess a set of specific traits, 
including the presence of particular tastes or institutional preferences and the capacity to decide 
rationally in choosing alternatives to social economic and political choices. 
After the victory of BKPM’s team, the Secretary of the Indonesian SEZ National Team suggested the 
FTZ location in BBK will be determined in accordance with the RPPs and the BIDA still functioning as 
the temporary management body until the legitimate body is set by the Zone Council. Nevertheless, 
the transition process was not as simple as it might have seemed. The day after Batam was set as an 
FTZ, Pemkot Batam claimed to hold the position as Chairman of the management body. This dispute 
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over territorial chairmanship marked the third interjurisdictional competition between BIDA-Pemkot 
Batam (emphasis added). 
Despite the dispute, under intense dialogue, lobbying, and various considerations, the draft regulation 
was finally completed and handed over to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to be officially 
legalised into a government regulation (PP). Thus, Batam was officially set as an FTZ for the entire 
Island plus Rempang and Galang with Bintan and Karimun as enclaves under three PP108 and BBK FTZ 
was officially established on 20th August 2007. However, PP was not enough to formalise the legal 
procedure. It appeared that JK had urged the relevant ministers and local government officials of the 
SEZ national team to upgrade the legal foundation under a law. JK’s advice was either ammunition or 
pressure to immediately formulate an FTZ bill and any necessary transformation procedures. The FTZ 
law refers to endorsing Perppu No. 1/2007 as FTZ’s official and legal framework (Bisnis Indonesia—
Herbawati 22nd August 2007). Such legal uncertainty contradicts what the businessmen and ground 
level authority especially Kepri government had expected. The behaviour caused issues of transaction 
cost and productivity levels to be disturbed. According to the interview results, high-level political 
interference and local interest continue to contradict and cause long delays in legal protection. 
Therefore, in order to speed up the upgrading process, the GOI at the time was compelled to endorse 
the previous FTZ law (Law No. 36/2000) rather than design a new FTZ law. Then, SBY signed a new 
Perppu No. 1/2007 to amend the content of Law No. 36/2000109 (containing the endorsement of 
Perppu No. 1/2000 as an official FTZ Law and legally adopted on 4th June 2007) (Ibid). What the 
evidence above suggests is that, unlike the NO, technocracy was again proven not to be insulated from 
the pressure of JK’s group. 
Despite one regulation being formally endorsed in Law No. 36/2000 on FTZ, the changes in the articles 
of the law did not specifically regulate BBK. Meanwhile, changes to the Perppu No. 1/2007 only 
encompassed three unsubstantial articles. In the first attempt, the government addressed the 
situation by using the Perppu as a legal foundation for BBK as an SEZ instead of FTZ. In the second 
attempt, the government prepared the SEZ bill where it was expected that the national assembly will 
legislate the bill into a law on SEZs110 by November 2007, but it failed to materialise (Bisnis Indonesia 
and Media Indonesia editorials—December 2007). It raised questions on the extent to which Perppu 
on FTZ was being endorsed and highlighted the fading analyses and predictions of Batam from various 
elements of society. Reactions and pressures from the business world, as well as allegations toward 
                                                          
108By the number 46, 47, and 48 
109Law No. 36/2000 was also used as reference to Law No. 37/2000 on the re-establishment of Sabang (in Aceh 
province) as an FTZ. 
110The aforementioned SEZ bill was initially prepared in anticipation if the Perppu No. 1/2000 was not endorsed 
into a law. 
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the GOI, emerged. For example, Chairman of APINDO Kepri Province shows the unsettling and rampant 
political culture among the elites at high and ground political levels. He asserted that there were signs 
of unscrupulous bureaucrats who were trying to push the FTZ issues in the realm of central and local 
political elites. Further information based on media coverage and interviews pointed that the 
respondents mostly appeal to the unscrupulous bureaucrats to better promote the interests of the 
public rather than the groups’ private interest. 
Despite the passage of Perppu No. 1/2007 on general FTZ, both national and subnational government 
had a number of issues to resolve which prompted the government to prepare its provisions and to 
design another Perppu bill to promote Batam as an FTZ. The Perppu bill was scheduled to be proposed 
to DPR during a commission meeting in mid-August 2007 and further passed into a law, although today 
the reason for the emergency is still being debated among MPs (Ibid).  
In a dialogue meeting between BIDA Chairman, Mustofa Widjaya and journalists of four notable 
national media (Bisnis Indonesia, Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Antara News Agency or LKBN) held on 
22nd August 2007, the journalists expressed their concerns over potential territorial conflicts with 
Pemkot Batam, the future of BIDA and its assets, infrastructure development, and other rhetorical 
issues, including the content of the PP No. 46 on Batam FTZ. Mustofa denied any confusion would arise 
with regard to the fate of BIDA after the enactment of this government regulation, whether dissolved 
or integrated into a single body known as BIFZA (Batam Industrial Free Zone Authority).  
Media coverage has succinctly posted Mustofa’s statement that all of the assets and employees will 
be transferred to BIFZA. In other words, BIDA will not be dissolved but it will only be a name while the 
organisation has changed (Bisnis Indonesia, Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Antara News Agency—23rd 
August 2007). Mustofa was able to convince the journalists that institutional change was inevitable 
and BIFZA did not constitute an immediate threat to BIDA. It is from this perspective that Mustofa 
seemed to firmly defend the legitimate rights of BIDA employees.  
The PP No. 46/2007 signed by the President was expected to provide more legal certainty not only for 
the island of Batam but also for the Pemkot Batam and its employees. It raised public debate in the 
local media keen to proclaim the dissolution of the BIDA and turned out to be a unilateral 
interpretation. The media, national scandals and acclaimed events involving public figures have divided 
public opinion and the government and MPs have been colouring Indonesian political economic history 
over nearly two decades post-Reformasi. 
In Article 1 of PP No. 46, Batam FTZ service is designed to last 70 years from 20th August 2007. The 
general provision accompanying this regulation further elaborates on the status of BBK Islands. Not 
only will Batam become a development centre for technology-intensive industries that can provide 
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high value-added industrial development111 (Kepri FTZ website cited 15th May 2014), but also a place 
for gathering and distributing products to and from the Indonesian regions and overseas (BKPM official 
website cited 20th November 2014). All these changes indicate that the basic motivation for assigning 
special status to the Batam region has been to accommodate foreign investors’ demand for land, 
access to cheap labour, and an easy export base for natural resources.  
Findings suggest that the status of Batam has been a source of controversy among the elites. From the 
beginning, the legal basis for the area to be built as an FTZ has never been properly discussed. This 
condition cannot be separated from the initial development plan of this area was not intended as an 
area for the industrial sector. Therefore, instead of establishing a law as the legal basis, Batam 
development was supported only under a presidential decree, ministerial decree, or local government 
regulations (See figure 4.3 of formal legislation). It caused problems when the reformation takes place. 
Moreover, in principle, the legal basis did not pay attention to two dimensions related to social welfare 
and land entitlement. These two dimensions are not formulated simultaneously and complementarily. 
Thus, the challenges of Batam Island development to find the perfect pattern or basic model to become 
an industrial cluster are always in terms of devising an appropriate legal framework followed by the 
interests of elites or certain groups. 
 2007: The Second Commission Meeting: FTZ Bill Constitutional Inaccuracy 
Nevertheless, another pressing issue escalated when it led to constitutional inaccuracy. Irmady Lubis, 
a member of DPR Commission VI of PDIP faction states that “Not because we are of the PDIP as an 
opposition party, but such methods cannot be justified. The Constitution must be upheld.” The process 
of formulating an FTZ bill did not show any signs of improvement. The initial draft was first intended 
to transform Batam. However, the CG’s measures undertaken to promote Batam as an FTZ were not 
without obstacles, MPs had been poised to reject the ratification of Government Regulation In lieu of 
Law (Perppu) No. 1/2007 concerning FTZ, which was signed by SBY (DPR website—18th February 2007; 
Kontan—15th August 2007). This marked the third inter-factional tension over inaccurate 
constitutional procedure between the executive and legislative bodies (emphasis added). 
In accordance with the policy formulation mechanism, the enforcement of Perppu No. 1/2007 on 
general FTZ and the PP No. 46, 47, and 48 of 2007 on the designation of Batam, Bintan, and Karimun 
as FTZs respectively was jeopardised for allegedly violating the constitution. To represent the MPs, 
Irmady deplored the publication of this regulation because it would jeopardise the trust from potential 
investors due to the government’s legal uncertainty on BBK. 
                                                          
111Such as telecommunications, electronics and medical equipment, industrial assembly and fabrication, 
shipbuilding, textiles, oil and energy services, agribusiness, and tourism. 
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Irmady asserts that there are many ambiguities and violations of the constitutional system in the 
issuance of the decrees and its derivatives mainly on three counts. First, the publication of PP must be 
based on a Law, not Perppu. “How can the president endorse a legal product such as PP while the base 
legislation (Perppu) has yet to become a law? Article 22 of the Constitution (UUD 1945) states:  
“(1) in cases of emergencies, the president has the authority to set a Perppu. (2) A 
government regulation must be approved by the parliament in the next parliamentary 
session (3) if no approval has been made, the government regulation and its derivatives 
should be annulled”.  
A person or group of people will not make an institution/rule when there is no impulse that demands 
such rules must exist (Hayek 1968 in Hanisch and Schlüter 1999: 9-10). This meant, unless, in a state of 
emergency, Perppu may be produced as a Law, while DPR did not see any urgency to issue a Perppu. 
Institutional change is ‘unintended results of intentional action’. It is spontaneous, not accidental, but 
is the result of deliberate action (Ibid). It stresses, in particular, the uncertainty within the changing 
process and the role of the cognitive limits of each interacting individual. What Hayek meant by 
‘spontaneous institutional change’ with regard to the case is that the momentum to create or modify 
the Perppu (the emergence of the need for regulation) is spontaneous (unintentional). The activities to 
make or to realise the Perppu based on a developing situation are deliberate (intentional).  
Due to no emergency in the Perppu case, Irmady further states the PDIP faction will file a judicial review 
to the Constitutional Court upon ratification of Perppu No. 1/2007 for violating the constitution.  
“This regulation is still likely to be cancelled and the parliament will not necessarily 
approve. If the parliament agrees to cancel then BBK FTZ’s legal status would be annulled” 
Irmady added (Bisnis Indonesia—23rd December 2007). 
Second, since there was no urgent situation, the government could just amend the already established 
Law rather than issue a Perppu especially if it only requires minor changes in an article/s.  
“The Perppu No. 1/2007 only made some changes to Articles 2, 3, 4, and the transitional 
provisions in which Article 4 mentions the establishment of FTZ is stipulated in a PP. If only 
to change an article, the government had to issue a Perppu, then it is not clear what the 
use of having any law discussion mechanism is? This issue can be solved by passing an 
amendment to the Law No. 36/2000 without stipulating an in lieu of law,” said Irmady 
(Ibid).  
Third, it had conflicted with other legal products, namely Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government 
and Law No. 25/2007 on Investment. The Perppu would seize the legitimate role of local authority by 
the presence of the SEZ management (Ibid).  
There were indications that the president had been surrounded in a contentious situation and entered 
a vortex of intra-factional tension between the executive and legislative bodies. The uncertainty of the 
fate of Perppu No. 1/2007 was in fact already known by the Governor of Kepri, Ismeth Abdullah. 
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According to the Governor, this regulation has to be reviewed as a legitimate law in order to be 
implemented. On the one hand, BIDA was forced to merge into a new form of zone management body 
known today as BIFZA (Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan or Batam Zone Management Agency) as 
promulgated in the Perppu which was challenged by groups in the parliament. They have sought to 
defy the Perppu and to converse it by informal practices such as negotiation and lobbying. It was, 
therefore, needed for the interest group powers, which have a special interest in Batam’s development 
and used BIDA as their instrument of control, to be cautious and so orientate their work to be able to 
overcome all possibilities, to any unforeseen events. On the other hand, there is Pemkot Batam who 
are backed by Kepri provincial government, the CG (the executives led by President SBY), and 
technocrats who thought that BIDA’s presence was rendered ineffective in facilitating investment-
related formalities (Media Indonesia; Kompas News; Bisnis Indonesia; LKBN Antara media coverage 
25th-29th August 2007).   
Findings indicate that the network of technocrats still exists to promote the advanced technology in 
BPPT and other institutions. Moreover, Habibie’s network of engineer since two decades ago remains 
as shown in BPPT and BIFZA’s persistent cooperation in 2013. The atomization approach which 
Demsetz and Alchian (1972) suggested is a utility maximising tool conjured to influence the distribution 
of jurisdiction between BIDA and Pemkot to further influence the use of valuable resources in Batam. 
The effort to change inefficient institutions during the transformation from BIDA to BIFZA was in a 
state of complexity; not only did the GOI face collective action problems (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000, 2001, 2003) but owing to the typical non-existence of third party enforcement to control and 
maintain the contract agreement between various interest groups, GOI also lacked credible 
(Williamson 1983) and to borrow Spiller et al’s (2003) term, ‘intertemporal’ commitment when some 
characteristics of the key actors evoked the policymaking process and affected certain features of the 
policy outcomes (Ibid: 4).  
In response to the reform process in the governance of Batam FTZ, for the second time since 2004, the 
government had been oversimplifying the problem by ignoring the applicable constitutional 
procedures. At the time, the executive proposed a regulation that should become a law while the 
legislative assembly in DPR refused; the regulation was annulled. This meant that BBK being given FTZ 
status was indefinite.  
Contrary to institutional change logic, taking the view of Williamson (1996): 
“…. ex-ante transaction cost derived from attempts to prevent transaction failures due to 
asset specificity and opportunism, including devising or drafting, negotiating, and 
protecting or safeguarding, and enforcing a contract or rule….” (Ibid: 379). 
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…and arising from weaknesses in the contractual situation, while: 
“…. ex-post transaction costs are the costs of altering contracts to correct ex-post 
misalignments, the costs of setting up and maintaining governance structures and the 
costs of bonding to guarantee contractual commitments….” (Ibid: 379). 
In the case of Batam, despite SEZ institutional rules being built to have a triple role, such as to reduce 
uncertainty/transaction cost, to define incentive structures, and to act as anchors of reference for 
incoming investors, the existence of parallel SEZ policy or rules of the game muddled prospective 
investors and finally triggered higher transaction costs and raised the level of uncertainty (Farole 
2011). The regulations indicate that the CG’s intention to withdraw from Batam’s development was 
simply rhetorical and to save some time and minimise transaction costs was dealt with by endorsing 
past legislation to designate Batam as an FTZ. Their presence represented by the zone management 
body (BIDA under a different name) remains to play an important role in Batam’s development to trade 
liberalisation. 
The executive government was known to have filed a discussion meeting on Perppu No. 1/2007 into a 
law with DPR and subsequently, the Commission VI was assigned to discuss this regulation in their 
internal meetings. But the Commission VI of DPR also scheduled a discussion meeting on this matter 
along with government representatives. Hence, an overarching question was the legal basis of the FTZ. 
Undoubtedly, the draft law spawned a new polemic that national agencies and local officials have 
taken opposite directions. The draft recently initiated by local officials was widely supported by the 
business community after lobbying with DPR. The FTZ draft motion, tabled by DPR, was put forward 
before the parliamentary meeting to defy the CG’s draft (Bisnis Indonesia and Media Indonesia 
editorials—December 2007). This marked the fourth inter-factional tension over parliamentary 
approval between the executive and legislative body (emphasis added). 
In November 2007, following the result of the 2006 MoU between BIDA and Pemkot Batam, and after 
going through several changes in its regulations, initiatives were taken by the CG. The joint negotiation 
between BIDA, Pemkot Batam and DPRD Batam successfully lobbied Jakarta’s political elites to ratify 
Law No. 44/2007 on FTZ on 1st November 2007 (a law endorsing Perppu No. 1/2007 to become an 
official law) and to make Law No. 36/2000 as reference for Law No. 44/2007 which hopefully will 
further integrate and expand Batam’s industrial ability and Kepri provinces at large.  
Despite the polemic ending with the issuance of Law on FTZ, the debate on the matter has still not 
produced any final conclusion. The end of the debate is ultimately up to the wisdom of the government 
(executive) and members of parliament (MPs) in discussing any formal rules of the games. Whether 
both groups put national interests above the insistence of maximising the group’s political interest will 
depend on their shared commitment and collective action to develop Batam.  
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A businessperson who played a significant role in Batam and had close relations with local authorities 
and the parliament, on condition of anonymity, asserted: “the government should not make wrong 
decisions, [because] it will threaten the development of [economic] Batam in the future” (Interview—
12th January 2015) 
The final decision from the government seemed to be an interesting insight into the path-dependent 
nature or known as a déjà vu of the FTZ policymaking process during 2000-2004 in the first commission 
meeting when the CG had finally confronted the DPR who passed Batam FTZ Law unilaterally in 
September 2004. Some businessmen were still sceptical about the decision. Questions were raised 
among local leaders and entrepreneurs due to the common thread of the three issues of BBK SEZ, 
Perppu FTZ, and ultimately a comprehensive FTZ in Batam which boils down to inefficiency. Further 
concerns were expressed by a spokesperson in the Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) who stated:  
“The momentum has passed because the government has been too long in providing legal 
certainty on the FTZ status for Batam. Agree or not, Batam already has an FTZ status and 
today people are still waiting for the next government’s breakthrough on government 
regulations that will strengthen the position of the FTZ”.  
At the macro level, he further stated that Kepri encompasses six strategic sectors: manufacturing, 
shipyard, tourism, trade, property, and supporting oil and gas industry.  
The respondent further argued: 
“If we can overcome the obstacles experienced by the six major sectors then I am sure the 
Kepri economy can accelerate and exceed 8% growth this year, but of course, it’s not easy. 
Barriers to customs and FTZ regulation remain a constraint to the development of the 
leading sectors. Not enough for only the governor to solve it, but it must be addressed by 
a special minister who can coordinate all relevant agencies to offer serious attention to 
the development of BBK FTZ ahead. If all boils down to the vagueness and difficulty, then 
how can Kepri economy grow rapidly to reach 8-10%? Only a miracle can do. Yet, during 
this time, shipbuilding sector grows without local and central government interference 
(including BIFZA)”. 
According to him, all industrial sectors develop on their own, such as trade flourishes and tourism 
grows because they support the existing industrial sector. Support for the oil and gas sector is growing 
because there are existing supporting industries. With lower promotion costs, the government hopes 
to attract investment— a strange strategy that is rarely applied anywhere in the world. Without clear 
incentives, how can investors get into this area? For example, because of the game played by land 
mafia in BIDA who intersected the legitimate process, ultimately investors worth US$150 million 
withdrew their intention to enter Batam. Uncertainty regarding the status and charges of land on the 
island discouraged the investors (Ibid). Local and foreign investors have struggled to deal with 
inconsistencies and contradictions in local governments’ policies and regulations. 
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When BIDA transformed into BIFZA, there were not many changes; instead, most agency’s operating 
budgets were absorbed in employees’ substantial cost. Similarly, with a budget of nearly Rp1.2 trillion, 
Pemkot Batam was not able to present an attractive and orderly city. They failed to perform a reliable 
service delivery. People’s tax money was disbursed only for compensating employees and officials’ 
routine costs, rather than to increase public welfare. 
6.6. Volatility Period (2008—onwards) 
Following up the FTZ law, drawing upon Commons’ governance structure terminology (Commons 1932 
in Williamson 2000: 599), the SBY government crafted order, mitigated conflict and realised mutual 
gains among interest groups and stakeholders by establishing an SEZ National Council through 
Presidential Regulation No. 30/2008 and the Zone Council based on Presidential Decrees No. 9, 10, and 
11 of 2008 for Batam, Bintan and Karimun respectively. Further emphasis was expressed by Boediono 
that after the establishment of the National Council and Zone Council, three-zone management bodies 
will also be established in three regions: Batam, Bintan, and Karimun. The zone management in Batam 
is known as BIFZA (Batam Industrial Free Zone Authority/BP Batam/Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan 
Batam/Batam Zone Management Agency). Moreover, he added that the Zone Council will only be an 
agency managing three FTZ regions centred on the provincial capital of Tanjung Pinang (Ibid) and in 
terms of funding; it will be allocated through local budget (APBD) and state budget (APBN).  
Former BIDA Chairman and the then Kepri Governor, Ismeth Abdullah, emphasised the presence of 
BIDA would not interfere with the formation of BIFZA because both institutions have different duties 
and responsibilities. Ismeth said in the media that: 
“BIDA’s core competency lies in infrastructure planning and development and 
management of the region’s critical assets such as airports, seaports, etc. while the BIFZA 
more specifically manages investment within FTZ. BIFZA should be established no later 
than 31st December 2008, while the same body for Bintan and Karimun no later than 
August 2007, following the issuance of three PPs of FTZ Batam, Bintan and Karimun” 
(Berita Sore—16th May 2008). 
These policies were expected to accommodate the required needs of every element in society. 
Moreover, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs at the time, Boediono, stated that the 
councils are set to centralise the management of SEZs including FTZ in order to further steer efforts to 
attract more investors and to formulate common policies for each of the free trade zones (Ibid).  
The structure of the National Council consists of Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs as the 
chairman and 16 other relevant ministries as members (Figure 4.14). The structure of the Zone Council 
of Batam, Bintan, and Karimun is chaired by the Governor of Kepri. Boediono further asserted that: 
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“The National Council and the Zone Council are effective since the launch of the policy on 
7th May 2008. However, a Zone Council is not an independent agency. It will be overseen 
by a National Council as adviser and supervisor. National Council also formulates the 
general policy that applies to all the regions” (Berita Sore—16th May 2008).  
Despite Batam FTZ being mixed with residential settlements governed by a self-governed authority 
(BIDA) and its own public administration (Pemkot Batam), the management will be authorised to BIFZA 
(Jakarta Post—13th October 2008). Interesting to note, perhaps there is no other single free trade area 
anywhere in the world all mixed together with the residential areas. Even Pudong district renowned in 
Shanghai is limited between the free trade zone and the residential zones as well as the daily activities 
of the population. Typically, an FTZ is free from settlements, so that it can curtail the occurrence of 
unofficial trade transactions, i.e. smuggling. Therefore, the FTZ is confined to a BZ area, in which there 
is no population or administration activity.  
Furthermore, contrary to what most scholars would believe that insular societies tend to take 
measures to protect themselves against foreign values (Williamson 2000: 598), it was not happening 
in Batam. Instead, they welcomed the idea and can enjoy the benefits of Batam being an FTZ. The 
transformation offered immense pleasure to the Batam population who are mostly of Malay descent, 
some migrants, and labourers from Java and other parts of Indonesia, where foreign and migrant 
labour contributed one-third of the Batam population in 2014 (see details in Appendix 5).  
6.6.1. The Birth of BIFZA 
After a series of managerial controversies, in 2008, BIDA was dissolved and integrated into BIFZA—a 
new governing body—based on the Chairman of the Zone Council’s decrees112. Low-level employees 
in the BIDA felt their fate was in the hands of BIFZA. Mustofa Widjaja continued his role as Batam 
authority’s Chairman under BIFZA. The new BIFZA period from 2008 emphasised the investment 
infrastructure and policy development given the facilities that the policy could accommodate for the 
benefit of investors, thus was expected to ultimately increase the investment rate (Jakarta Post—2nd 
September 2008).  
After the birth of BIFZA, Batam region experienced a rapid development, more importantly in the 
economic sector. Perhaps, this was in part due to the right design and policy implementation in the 
short-run, as well as a conducive economic climate which put industry, trade, services, tourism, and 
transhipment as development priorities, involving a maximum role for the private sector (large-scale 
foreign and domestic investors). This period can be viewed as a public maturation growth stage. The 
development progress clearly provides a positive impact on business opportunities and hence social 
                                                          
112The decree amended three times with the latest on 2011 
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and employment aspects. Henceforward, before long, other issues continued to grow and gradually 
arose in both Jakarta and Batam until recently (end of 2015). The CG soon dissolved BIFZA due to the 
unattractive investment climate and the gradual loss of state revenue from tax receipts of up to Rp20 
trillion (Kompasiana—5th January 2016). 
Interesting to note, despite the loss, the government still endeavoured to develop Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) at a national scale but tried to learn from the problems encountered in the past. Therefore, 
in October 2009, the government enacted Law No. 39/2009 on SEZ as a legal foundation for the 
establishment of SEZ in Indonesia, like those already running in China and other parts of the world 
(Hendrawan and Hidayat 2012). Subsequently, on 17th November 2009, the Minister of Industry, Mr 
MS. Hidayat stated that Batam’s status which originally was an FTZ will be transformed to SEZ. Batam 
became the ‘pilot project’ of the new type of SEZ development in Indonesia. This statement was later 
shown to correspond with the launch of Law No. 39/2009. It is a manifestation of economic diplomacy 
between Indonesia and Singapore in accordance with the MoU on the establishment of Batam SEZ in 
2006 of which Singapore will provide guidance based on their experience, developing and building 
several SEZs in China. However, there are some differences. In China, their FTZs were built after the 
SEZs were up and running and the FTZs are located inside their SEZs, such as in Shenzhen with 
Shatoujiao FTZ, Yantian FTZ, and Futian FTZ (Ibid). Meanwhile, in Indonesia especially in Batam, the 
SEZ platform was established after FTZ was formed and Batam will be transformed instead of built 
inside an SEZ once the legal framework has been set up.  
After BBK was set as an FTZ, the investment climate in the region showed encouraging signs, partly 
due to Ismeth Abdullah (Kepri Governor) having more powerful vested interest in the private sector. 
He boasted that at least eight companies from Singapore invested in Batam and Bintan with an 
investment valued at US$31.6 million with employment of 2,000 people (Bisnis Indonesia—24th July 
2010). The influx of foreign investment back to Batam was expected to be a magnet for foreign 
investors, particularly in the BBK region.  
Despite the FTZ being established, it has yet to accomplish the expected policy outcome as the will of 
the actors is still thwarted by political nuances that pervade the condition below government control 
in almost all policy initiatives in the Batam region, but these are beyond the scope of this study.  
6.7. Conclusion 
Batam has undergone significant physical, economic, and political transformation, thus, the 
contemporary debates on its free trade zone (FTZ) policymaking process has to acknowledge every 
phase of its historical dimension that set down the pathway of SEZ policy. The changing FTZ history 
and political settings have shaped the ‘long and winding road’ of governance and the central-local 
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relationship in Batam especially in Indonesia’s Reform and Democratic order (hereafter RDO) from 
1998 to 2014.  
To employ Williamson’s (2000) second thematic series of institutional constraints, the governance 
structure and resource allocation, the period of change in Batam’s governance structure takes years 
to legislate while the ‘resource efficiency and incentive structures’ were established continuously (Ibid: 
973-6) following the change of the regime. This chapter validates the second hypothesis that bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behaviours emanates when actor’s action unable to settle conflicts 
occurred in the policy process and the problems of principal-agent, moral hazard, and adverse 
selection in SEZ governance structure at the central government level render contractual relationships 
to be unclear in SEZ policymaking process at the local government level. 
In Batam, the evidence reveals the main features that help augment the commitment of the 
government to increase Batam development under imperfect governance structures even with the 
continued and persistent change to authorities and numerous actors in their development. 
Nevertheless, findings suggest that the government’s (GOI) appeared to have manipulated Batam’s 
governance structure in order to sustain power under the guise of economic reform and equal 
development.  
In practice, before the decentralisation, only Batam Authority (BIDA) has the only governing capacity 
to engage in investment related and FTZ regulations in Batam island (centralisation of power) and in 
post-decentralisation (the institutional reform to local government) has created other entity (the 
Batam city government/Pemkot Batam) with legal capacity to enter institutional arrangements which 
were to oversee the administrative matters of Batam City. Batam FTZ has always been a well-known 
interplay and conflict of power between BIDA and Pemkot Batam from the NO to the RDO. The failure 
of these two forces to drive Batam into a leading SEZ structure has led to the unproductive 
development of Batam Island as a whole characterised by the territorial tug of war and the failure to 
reduce transaction cost presented by the failure to allocate resources (roles and functions of the 
governing bodies through the ratification of the FTZ bill which gave a part of the control authority to 
Pemkot Batam).  
There were little or no significant improvements after decentralisation that specifically design the 
development of Batam Island as a strategic area located on the periphery, except only maintaining the 
existence of BIDA as the centralised institution representing the CG. However, BIDA and the CG during 
the thesis writing has yet to realise the upgrade status of Batam from FTZ to SEZ. The FTZ which sought 
to be a policy strategy for growth at the time was only a rhetoric: easy to pronounce but has never 
been implemented.  
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The formal institution from the decentralisation law has influenced the governance structure in Batam 
which yield to the constraint in distributing the territory and authority to the rightful entity (resource 
allocation). The discussion exhibited that the fundamental features of governance structures and 
design were fashioned by numerous actors (policymakers, bureaucrats, or other influential actors) 
through political means, but can never completely anticipate all future contingencies.  
There were difficulties in ensuring all actors coordinate. Findings indicate that actors have influenced 
and deliberately bound governance structure and regulatory frameworks in order to pursue an overall 
reform such as restructuring a country’s political authority (e.g. big-bang regional autonomy and 
revenue sharing policy), through smaller changes (e.g. BIDA restructuring and fiscal incentive policy), 
or through abandonment (exit from the competition), while the overall governance structure was 
subject to evolutionary change (Williamson 1975: 20-30).  
Further evidence suggests, that the central government was unable to promote perfect policy 
solutions and adapt institutions to social, political, and economic fluctuations. The existence of 
policymakers was incapable of matching policies with institutions and vice versa. There was evidence 
that policymakers did not seize the moment to create a more conducive political environment and 
institutional foundation. Furthermore, because governance is a dynamic process, policymakers did not 
make a feasible policy choice under market-oriented reforms. Moreover, single events (such as Jusuf 
Kalla’s visit to Bojonegoro which gave a new motivation for the FTZ transition in Batam) or the demise 
of authoritarian rule Soeharto and the AFC served as triggers or catalysts and crucially affected Batam’s 
development trajectory, but cannot serve to determine an appropriate political leadership or 
institutions.  
In the resource allocation aspect, this case displays the behavioural elements of actors in allocating 
resources under the economic reform model in order to minimise transaction costs. The principal-
agent problem occurred when each president after Soeharto as persons with interests (principal) 
delegated the formal institution responsibilities of Batam’s development to BIDA as the other party 
(the agent), thus bounded rationality factors occurred (Simon 1947 in Boston et al. 1996).  
Given the evolutionary background, the informal institutions of patronage network are embraced and 
display a great deal of inertia. Despite each regime government set their own definition of 
responsibilities, two contending bodies such as BIDA and Pemkot have always been thought of as the 
administrators of Batam. Consequently, a well-designed structure of resource allocation that 
constitutes the distribution of benefits was ostensible, such as appointments and elections of high-
ranking BIDA and Pemkot officials made based on patronage rather than merit. Others at times took 
the president’s symbolic value in order to create an alliance as the essential aspect of strong rent-
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seeking pervasiveness. This shows the deficiency of accountability of both central and local 
government leaders as well as bureaucrats.  
BIDA plays an important role and was unaffected by the institutional change under different regimes 
and therefore was not immediately transformed or scheduled to be dissolved. The reasons can be 
synthesised as follows: first, BIDA not only as an old player in the business development of Batam but 
an instrument of CG control since Soeharto and further as a legislative control in post-New Order. Due 
to the strong power of the BIDA and CG and the weakness of the Regional Government law, BIDA was 
unprepared to surrender their duties, managerially or financially. Second, the capabilities of BIDA’s 
appointed leaders and officials are not easily transferable, i.e. Ibnu Sutowo’s strategic capability, 
Habibie’s technological capability, Ismeth Abdullah’s cultural approach, and Mustofa Widjaya’s 
professionalism. They are appointed as capable of guarding CG’s concerns and interest in their ‘high-
valued and subtle projects’ in cooperation with Singapore. It is a highly-politicised project easily 
transferred to only the trusted and loyal individuals. This meant GOI’s political legitimacy is a crucial 
precondition for CG’s emerging societal consensus with Batam authorities in favour of Batam’s distinct 
development strategies. Third, BIDA was recognised as an ‘agent of change’ for the astonishing 
development of Batam from an isolated island into a significant economic zone today. Therefore, the 
position of BIDA which was legitimised through only a Presidential Decree was maintained despite 
arguments on the status of the decree is weaker than a law.  
Principals are rarely omniscient for instance; the president’s rationality was constrained by 
multifaceted moral hazard problems such as asymmetric information where the hidden action of the 
agents such as Ismeth Abdullah’s appointment as BIDA chairman cannot be observed by the president 
(Azfar 2006: 978). Other factors included the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive 
limitations of each regime’s mind, and the finite amount of time available to make the decision. 
Furthermore, the presidents’ lack of capacity for conscious foresight caused adverse selection 
problems such as where the value of the land being transacted by BIDA (land mafia) cannot be 
observed by one party (or ‘hidden value’) while the BIDA chairman’s unobservable action bears little 
consequence.  
The chapter argues that SEZ initiatives in Batam were used as subjects for political interest both in the 
policymaking as well as in the execution process. BIDA-Pemkot Batam conflicts in the RDO are not 
separate events, but the peak of the inherent conflicts since NO. The BIDA and Pemkot conflict show 
that their policy execution initiatives were translated into exercises for maximising political benefits. 
Despite Batam’s uniqueness in Indonesia, it could hardly be considered to embody archetypes of 
equitable and sustainable growth to be adopted more extensively in the decentralisation arena if 
multifaceted dilemmas concerning jurisdictional management and central-local industrialisation 
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strategy still occur. The chapter founds the significance of policy negotiation in supporting any attempt 


























Indonesian SEZ development often comes from the overreliance on the neoclassical paradigm (NCE) 
by employing macroeconomic investigations which often ignores the institutional perspectives as the 
basis of the entire development and policy formulation process.  
NIE theory can be thought of as complementing and continuing the view of NCE, emphasising the 
efficiency of the market mechanism without interference from the state in neoliberal ideology, 
however, this study found a causal logic whereby some institutional determinants constrain the state 
(political actors and economic agents) into making the market well-functioning thereby increasing the 
risk of SEZ policy change. The actors’ boundedness to their own rationalities has complicated the 
process of SEZ policy formulation which resulted in SEZ mixed performance. It promotes further 
questions on the policy appropriateness and the actors’ logic in their policy choice. This chapter recaps 
the issues by reiterating the research questions and validating the hypothesis followed by presenting 
the findings and pointing out the contribution of the study to knowledge. 
This chapter is divided into five subchapters: first, the introduction; second, reiterates the research 
questions and hypotheses and presents the key findings derived from the empirical chapters 4 to 6; 
third, concludes the chapter; fourth, provides the contribution to knowledge; and fifth, summaries of 
the limitations and suggestions for future study. 
7.2. Main Findings  
7.2.1. What are the institutional intricacies surrounding the process of SEZ policymaking? 
This section brings up the first aim of the study which is to examine the institutional intricacies behind 
the process of making the SEZ policy. The findings based on the arguments that unfold in the study are 
as follows: 
The central argument has been that SEZ policymaking is influenced by institutions. Findings suggest 
that SEZ policymaking was potentially affected by the bureaucratic legacy of previous authoritarian 
rulers (NO). The legacy of ideology and rent-seeking culture play a large part and have a pervasive 
influence upon Indonesian economic character and are entrenched in the political culture of every 
ruling elite. The informal institutions did not support formal institutions in reducing transaction cost, 
instead, they increase transaction cost as well as uncertainty in a variety of ways. 
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Indonesian policy and institutions have been mutually influencing each other, entailing change or 
continuity of the status quo and contributing to the institutional arrangement where the government’s 
current economic reform policy decisions affect their SEZ policy decision as a form of neoliberal 
ideology in the future. Therefore, this study supports Jenkin’s (1999) argument that economic 
liberalisation is all about preserving power.  
The contemporary SEZ policy platform as the key policy actor’s choice of economic reform is generally 
a mechanism to preserve the ruling elite’s traditional rhetoric. The SEZ policy practised by Indonesian 
rulers has deviated from its conventional objective to stabilise the economy by promoting exports, 
generating employment, and attracting FDI. SEZ policy platform is embedded in the investment regime 
to stay in the course of neoliberal ideology. The Indonesian policy reform has not fulfilled the required 
set of institutions that can provide the right incentives for all economic actors. Since policies and 
institutions are difficult to separate like two sides of a coin, the Indonesian SEZ policy was established 
based on institutions which hinder the economic development process to achieve maximum results. It 
can be inferred that Indonesian actors’ used the preferred inappropriate institution that restricts their 
action due to the institutions were created by a social system that has the power to control and direct 
actors’ interaction and their decision where the entry into force depends on the existing social 
condition.  
The Indonesian government (GOI) of the reform and democratic order (RDO) was burdened with a 
remarkably heavy economic and political reform agenda, with civil society and government institutions 
that do not function to handle the variety of policy issues and new inter-organizational relations. The 
SEZ policy actors have been unable to build an organized response to the changing environment. The 
result was that intra-elite rivalry, inter-factional tension, and interjurisdictional competition were 
inevitable due to loss of control over the policy agenda, weakening of the structure of coordination 
inter-ministries, a dramatic decline in the superiority of the formal rules, and the obscuring of the 
boundary between responsibility and authority. 
The most serious impact from the influence of institutions was seen in the failure of the SEZ policy 
process which showed the inability of GOI to develop a clear SEZ policy vision and priority programme 
that can be communicated and supported by the public. The clarity of policy vision is of utmost 
importance, especially in times of systemic transition because it involves a major political shift, while 
in Indonesia the strength and economic excellence weaken and deteriorates. Particularly under 
circumstances of decentralisation, the important policy question at the time was not about technical 
matters, but about beliefs, value systems, and incentives that were subject to change. For example, 
efforts to promote investment policy did not succeed in attracting investment due to the policy was 
not well-defined to accommodate public aspiration and was not accepted due to issues of 
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unacceptable inequality or economic gaps. These evidence endorse the context of political institutions 
by Johnson (1999), Spiller et al. (2003), and Bardhan (2007) in some respect but go a step further where 
Indonesia might not be included in their use of variables on politico-institutions as SEZ policy uses 
country-specific context with regards to the complexity and patterns of SEZ policy outcome and the 
fundamental role the key actors play in the policymaking process besides the direct effect institutions 
or rules of the game have on the outcome. 
The failure in establishing a strategic vision in Indonesia led to opportunist reform, the reform 
supposedly moves in an area that has a strong agent of change or where there is a window of 
opportunity with stable institutional structure and has a high political legitimacy, but in a systemic 
transition period in Indonesia this method is less practical. The key policy actors did not provide a clear 
strategic roadmap, which made them unable to determine which parts of the previous order should 
be preserved and which should be reformed. The actors’ were unable to distinguish tactical issues and 
strategic questions. The change in the whole political culture was supposed to be a prerequisite for a 
consolidated democracy, and the actor’s material for democratic transition was the construction of 
political legitimacy. 
The findings above addressed the first research question and confirmed the central proposition that: 
1) informal institutions, both productive and non-productive, have not been compatible in support of 
formal institutions and vice versa, 2) property rights are not yet optimal in the bureaucratic level of 
SEZ policymaking process during transitional period of centralist paradigm shift towards 
decentralisation, 3) continuous and discontinuous SEZ bureaucratic policies have shifted the pattern 
of abuse of power by a handful of people in public institutions hindering the clarity of contractual 
relation of the SEZ relevant authority, 4) lack of clarity of the principal-agent relationships lead to moral 
hazard, adverse selection problems, and uncertain structural incentives. 
7.2.2. How and why do institutions influence the behaviour of actors in SEZ policy decision? 
This section brings up the second aim of the study which is to investigate how institutions influenced 
political institutions and economic agents’ decision and why do these institutions affect the decision. 
The findings based on the arguments that unfold in the empirical chapters 5 and 6 are as follows: 
One of the factors that appeared to justify the GOI’s course of policy choice and the making of such 
decision was the level of SEZ success and performance of the EA Tigers. Not only was the SEZ 
policymaking determined by the successful performance of the EA Tigers, but the idea to swiftly 
increase the country’s development prompted each ruling power to adhere to the neoliberal principles 
propagated by market-oriented external forces such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.  
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The study has also exposed the institutional core of why the government is so persistent in developing 
new zones if some zone schemes in Indonesia only succeed in the short term and fail in promoting 
positive contribution to long-term economic growth. That one-size-fits-all strategy to adopt and craft 
country-specific decentralisation and SEZ institutional structures are as significant to effective 
governance as the devising of efficient regulatory and SEZ policies. However, empirical evidence now 
suggests that effective governance is independent of the form of government. Best-practice 
governance for SEZs in China, Korea or even Singapore or transferring governance structures under 
authoritarian or democratic rulers from those countries to Indonesia cannot be fully embraced and 
will be doomed to fail; due to the extent to which institutions suitable for those countries are not 
applicable in Indonesia and the cases presented in the study, Jakarta or Batam SEZs, depend on the 
period of Indonesia’s political and economic progress and the transfer cannot account for the enduring 
informal institutions. Moreover, adopting Chibber (1998; 2003), compared to the successful coalition 
between the state and business class in Korea in supporting the development model at the time, 
Indonesia ironically was unable to affect the performance of the economy or export-oriented 
industries through the establishment of SEZ Law and Investment Law in which both rules can oversee 
the behaviour of the relevant stakeholders. The dynamic movement of institutions in the Batam case 
is an effort to minimise transaction costs, and the changes in the transaction cost affect the incentive 
or motivation of individuals interacting with others (North 1990; Williamson 2000). However, the 
institutional framework of SEZ and investment policy is not optimal to form the ‘incentive structures’ 
as the maximum possible payoff. Therefore, it can be said that the SEZ and investment policy 
institutional framework has not produced any maximum results or outcomes. Another example: a 
regional minimum wage in Jakarta or mineral extraction regulations in Batam is viewed as inhibiting 
factors by businessmen and investors seeking economic gains. Thus, investors will try to change, repeal 
or ignore the regulation by way of negotiation. Other than political motives, some of the businessmen 
in Indonesia are none other than the politicians themselves who subvert public goals for their parties’ 
or groups’ intention. Having identified the potential outcomes to avoid conflicts and divergences, the 
legal and regulatory frameworks in Indonesia (contracts or organisational rules) are unable to set fair 
boundaries and regulate transactions (policy dialogue) between members, in this case, businessmen 
and politicians (Azfar 2006: 966). 
In chapter 5 and 6, the author suggests the successive regime took upon themselves the task of 
engineering different types of SEZs as merely to sustain their legitimate power and not necessarily the 
best reform policy option for the open market system. Moreover, the half-hearted attitude of the 
officials in the SEZ policymaking process was the major factor behind the rather halted SEZ projects 
and stunted economic growth in Jakarta and Batam which based on the SEZ policy trajectory posed 
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significant risks in its future performance. It argued that the SEZ schemes represent the government’s 
ill-suited model of a country’s economic development strategy or a precondition to market-oriented 
reform due to political factors when the local government officials make strategic decisions. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the local government was unable to reform due to their inability to form a 
strong political coalition and expand their network of public support. Nevertheless, when there is a 
window of opportunity and the political coalition becomes ever more decisive, local officials instead 
tend to put more consideration to the constellation of political parties in the region.  
Moreover, the interaction between executive, legislative, and political parties in the two regions has 
shown that democracy in Indonesia is still elitist. Because the public control of the executive in the 
post-election period is still weak, not only do most politicians not truly reflect the people’s views, but 
also the SEZ policy is also exclusive. The phenomenon of serving the interests of political parties or, 
rather, the political elite means that there is still much to be done in Indonesia regarding a direct link 
between the platform of the party and its relevance to everyday public policy in local government. 
7.2.3. Which institutions affect the SEZ policy decision and why? 
This section brings up the third aim of the study, to examine the type of institutions generally affects 
actors’ decision. The findings based on the arguments that unfold in the empirical chapters 5 and 6 are 
as follows: 
Findings suggest that the formal institutions’ importance was largely recognised until it was hampered 
by internal political interest coupled with the central government’s chance to pit local government and 
SOEs control—with prolonged tensions over state resources—against one another by opening new 
prospects for profiteering and political patronage at the local level.  
Informal institutions, in the SEZ policy dealings, are often overlooked as effective instruments in 
distorting the allocation of resources and in general, influencing economic efficiency (Phelps 2007; 
Maramis 2012). This, in turn, at times leads to the effect of informal institutions as a complement to 
business transformation but not necessarily constrain the enactment of formal policy. 
This study reveals that the SEZ policymaking was influenced by the prevailing norms of behaviour, 
ideologies, and values of the NO under political economic complexity coexist with formal ‘rules of the 
game’ resulted in both durable and fragile institutional change in distinct contextual bases during the 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) period which at times the nature of formal rules tend to provide 
weak incentives for policymakers to make SEZ policies and reveals that more informal processes 
govern SEZ policymaking and shape the incentives that policymakers might have in requesting SEZ 
policy change at the implementation level. 
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Informal institutions were applied by local elites to adjust to changes in the zone management when 
elites’ were lacking in their ideological consensus, i.e. in Jakarta Bay reclamation which generated 
public disbelief. These institutions distort policy effectiveness. In exploring SEZ as a form of neoliberal 
policy in forty years, as Williamson (2000) also argues,  culture (small kings, kinship-based organisation) 
and ideology (nationalism and neoliberalism) were the two most relevant characteristics that have 
affected SEZ development policy (formal institutions) as they are deeply inherent in the society. This 
study finds that there was a multifaceted cultural condition of political and economic behaviour as 
informal rules. As North (1991: 111) further asserts, they play a large part and have a prevalent effect 
on the key policy actors’ character in the long-run to maintain the government’s status quo. The elites 
not only adopted culture (informal) as an important determinant of economic outcomes but also 
adopted economic policies (formal) that helped avoid loss of popular support and prevent institutional 
traps (Spranz et al. 2012: 461). Both institutions influenced each other. 
For instance, informal practices give more emphasis on culture in the centralisation of power at the 
local level as an effect of the decentralisation system. Besides nationalism, they are associated with 
the colonial legacy (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008) and local traditions (embedded in society), 
such as the KKSS role (kinship-based organisation) in chapter 5. To maintain the groups’ social viability 
in their internal and external environment, these cultures were the basic rules by the interest groups 
to mitigate the main problems they encountered (DiMaggio 1994: 596), such as KKSS platform was 
used to influence trade lobby emphasising bargaining power. KKSS had been promoting South 
Sulawesi’s potential to foreign investors and KKSS nationalist ideology and the influencers behind it, 
such as Jusuf Kalla and Sattar Taba, had more political and capital access which enabled them to control 
more information and to take advantage of the local constituent and investment opportunity. In 
accordance with the concepts of Williamson (1985), North (1990) in Shirley (2005), North (2006), and 
Azis (2008), rather than settling disputes by means of legal framework (courts or other third-party 
enforcement), the informal approach in share appropriation policy can significantly reduce the cost of 
exchange (transaction). Over time, the informal institution is more efficient from legalistic to more 
negotiated methods in conflict settlement. The kind of negotiation used by both sides evolved out of 
previous ‘significant other’ relationships.  
The finding on the influence of formal institutions is in partial agreement with Williamson (1996) that 
formal institutions are built to reduce uncertainty and transaction cost, but in full agreement with 
Farole (2011) that in the case of Batam, SEZ institutional rules which were supposed to ‘act as anchors 
of reference for potential investors’ (Hazakis 2014) triggered the existence of higher uncertainty 
through parallel rules of the game or programmes with regard to fiscal incentives which raised 
transaction costs and finally confused incoming investors. 
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To illustrate the ideological characteristic that coexists with formal rules in Jakarta Bay reclamation, 
this involves the local elites challenge against the additional SEZ policy-change dilemma. Ahok, the 
Jakarta governor (the agent) tried to change the president’s (the principal) ideological stance toward 
developing SEZ for economic reform without jeopardizing his own public and political support. The 
dilemma was addressed through a democratic agenda of party coalition between the Democrat and 
PDIP parties where they may have to accept unless they are willing to be electorally penalised for not 
supporting the reclamation which was regarded as a pro-poor policy and supporting the earlier 
nationalist ideological commitments (from the PDIP and Ahok side). In addition to this dilemma, there 
were issues of credibility of the party which continued to haunt SEZ development prospects and 
extensive public and investors’ disbelief and uncertainties on Ahok’s political objectives which made 
promoting his coalition party exceptionally hard. Therefore, even after the 2009 SEZ Law, it was not 
clear how the state would support the radical nature of Ahok’s reforms which, on the one hand, earned 
Jakarta praise amongst observers and instilled interest from the general public in SEZ and investment 
matters, but on the other hand evoked resistance among Indonesia’s key policy actors who felt that 
their vested interests were being increasingly threatened.  
The larger debate was Ahok’s land reclamation idea, which ironically mounted well-constructed 
critique and public disbelief. The allegations constitute the fragmented political power emanating from 
the pervasive coexistence of informal and formal institutions. It was raised on the following basis: the 
erstwhile moral betrayal of the PDIP nationalist dream, the emotional outbursts accusing Ahok of 
selling out Jakarta to capitalists, and the illegal phase of policymaking frameworks. Ahok’s idea was 
reinforced on the grounds to ambitiously expand Jakarta EPZ into an SEZ to accommodate Jakarta’s 
growing population and economic activities which differed to DeArmas and Sadni-Jallab’s logic (2002) 
where jobs are only significant to small population countries. However, what often goes unnoticed is 
how his neoliberal idea was justified to bring in subtle, yet comprehensive change for Jakarta while 
ignoring the public’s need not only in terms of fisherman’s livelihood but Jakarta fishery supply in 
general. The interest of big business was prioritised by deliberately undermining the legitimate 
constitutional procedure in the policy change. Moreover, in the reclamation licence, it generates 
politics of duality involving a multiplicity of actors evolved within the executive and provincial level. 
This had spawned the intra-elite rivalries between technocrats and technologists which allowed more 
flexibility in the SEZ policy directives by the central government and political parties mainly due to a 
regulatory ambiguity context.  
In retrospect, as far as SEZ initiatives in Jakarta were concerned, the conflicted ideology between PDIP 
and Ahok has not only prevented both entities from conducting a fruitful and clear dialogue with their 
constituencies on the importance of the initiative but caused a ‘one step forward two steps backwards’ 
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attitude in both parts. Their orientations were not transparent, rarely touched the grassroots for public 
opinion, and limited to only a handful of higher elites. Furthermore, despite Ahok’s justification as an 
ideologue conciliated some of the debates within the party, it opened up new ground for factional 
tension on issues of neoliberal establishment of free private enterprise from state intervention.  
Ahok’s justification was that capitalism is required to build a new strategy by adopting an entirely 
global trade structure to accelerate growth and ‘accumulation of capital’. Therefore, SEZ was seen as 
an adequate shortcut by Ahok to recover from these issues and overcome problems of infrastructure, 
inefficient bureaucracy, and the high-cost economy. Hence, he deliberately cut the proper 
bureaucratic channel for the Jakarta reclamation policy to quickly be implemented. Even though it was 
done by keeping the formula of ‘to get things done’ and tough measures, he encountered tough 
decisions against the elites’ ‘reluctance to go beyond their comfort zone’ in the short-sightedness circle 
of political power around him. But findings suggest that a political conundrum remains even until the 
final process of thesis writing in 2017 with regard to Ahok as to whether: first, he genuinely set his 
unique SEZ operational practices for growth per se; second, a hidden agenda has taken over his 
adeptness for change (ahead of regional election in 2017); or third, under ideological, political, and 
administrative challenges his entrenched misbehaving circle of power seeks to sustain the status quo. 
Against Williamson’s (1975) thesis to embrace hierarchies that serve as organisations or in this regard 
‘the state’ in order to allocate mechanisms, mediate and economise transaction costs—not only 
private firms but also state bureaucracies—this thesis has also examined Pepinsky’s (2012: 8) 
argument on the difficulties to distinguish which problems are associated with the principal and the 
agent if the role of each individual in the Indonesian case is unclear. There has been a shift in 
accountability structure in the RDO from the strict bureaucracy of the NO. Therefore, it is unlikely to 
identify a specific principal-agent relationship because accountability is a dynamic process that moves 
either up or down the government level. The finding also revealed that basic features of governance 
structures and their design can be fashioned by numerous actors (policymakers, bureaucrats, or other 
influential actors) through political means. These actors are subject to high transaction costs and large 
cognitive demands, and generally, play games and utilise resources through political lobbying (access 
and use their legitimate rights) to control decisions and make choices based on evolving trial and error 
(Brousseau and Glachant 2008). There were difficulties in ensuring all actors coordinate. Therefore, 
actors can affect and deliberately delineate a governance structure and regulatory frameworks 
depending on whether in need of overall reform such as restructuring a country’s political authority 
(e.g. big-bang regional autonomy and revenue sharing policy) or through smaller changes (e.g. BIDA 
restructuring and fiscal incentive policy), or in need of abandonment (exit from the competition), while 
the overall governance structure is subject to evolutionary change (Williamson 1975: 20-30). 
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Batam FTZ has experienced two major leaps over four decades, in 1974 during NO and in 1999 during 
RDO, concerning the separation of powers, which have resulted in conflicts of interest and shifting 
series of key players in the FTZ institutional arrangement. Findings suggest Batam has an exceptionality 
in its FTZ trajectory. The finding also considers that although decentralisation was in effect, the central 
government still put pressure towards the local Batam authority to make Batam as a prototypical for 
resource-based industrialisation while being hesitant to discuss Batam status due to the fragmented 
jurisdictional authority in Reformasi Indonesia.  
It was shown that Batam’s economic and political events, as well as policy processes in the RDO, were 
still dominated by general features of the NO’s political economy legacy where sometimes greatly 
limiting the space and weakens the roles and responsibilities for the local Batam authority to establish 
and implement operational rules and regulations. The sites and structure of the patronage network, 
as well as basic oligarchic authority and predatory elites, remained. A high dispersion of numerous 
political, economic, and social forces was noticeable within this period signalled by the fluctuation of 
winners in Batam local government structure and party participation in every election. Similar to 
Jakarta, Batam has assumed inordinate authority via the regional autonomy policy. However, despite 
Indonesia’s drastic institutional reforms with the devolving power structure, the transformation from 
authoritarian to promoting democratic rule was superficial. Their use of this greater authority has not 
always been effective as it has fuelled more jurisdictional ambitions and dominant political 
competition, for instance, from a volatile mixture of Batam’s dual power centres—the BIDA and 
Pemkot Batam. BIDA has been known to represent the central government to oversee the 
development of Batam; therefore, the central government officials not only regularly interfere in FTZ 
daily decision-making within the local authorities, but Pemkot’s role as the executive branch has been 
insignificant. These unlikely roles have triggered risk of increasing the violation of procedures through 
manipulation and rent-seeking practices.  
Nevertheless, the systematic moral hazard and adverse selection elements (Azfar 2006) which 
occurred in every regime caused the likelihood of the legitimate political authority in Batam to be 
unclear and made the FTZ policy counterproductive. How particular regulatory-free zone policies make 
it onto the policy agenda is itself a complicated matter. Some FTZ policies were proposed by the 
incumbent leaders under the guise of public welfare or shutting down abusive transactions. Those 
initiatives were politicised since such themes resonate with each constituency of their respective 
parties.  
Based on the discussion, the principal-agent problem persisted with varying degrees of contingency. It 
is attributed to, for instance, Megawati (as a principle) appointed Ismeth Abdullah as BIDA chairman 
and continued in the SBY period who then appointed Ismeth as Kepri governor (as agent). Due to 
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asymmetric information between the principal and the agent, the principals were unable to observe 
the transactions made by the agents. What remains a controversy is that the transformation of Batam 
Island as an SEZ was highly motivated by the agent’s hidden action and the dysfunctional land delivery 
concerns by the land mafia within BIDA. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that compared to the Jakarta case, the Batam case showed that 
intra-elite rivalries between technocrats/neoliberals and technologists/nationalists were far less 
visible. It can be recognised that the Reformasi era led by Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati sought to 
find economic and political alternatives to the discredited technocratic economic policymaking 
process. While in the segmented democracy era of SBY, the old technocracy influence was insignificant 
and generally left the process to ex-reformists and young economists as his key players in prioritising 
macroeconomic stability. Despite their presence, technocrats were unable to contribute practical 
advice to overcome the ongoing conflicts identified between BIDA-Pemkot Batam since the 1970s, and 
between the executive and legislative bodies since the penultimate decade of Soeharto.  
Prior to the 1998 NO demise, the President was the key policy player and main programme planner of 
the FTZ policy which made FTZ a robust policy and the first SEZ ever built in Indonesia. From 2000, 
after decentralisation was issued, FTZ developed into a combination between de facto and de jure 
status to oversee the area, especially after a constitutional amendment in 1999 when some functions 
of the executive branch were acquired by the legislative, and they became powerful authorised key 
players. Nevertheless, the new constitutional amendment after NO, as in the Jakarta reclamation case, 
not only caused political prerogatives to be unclear between the legislative and executive branches 
but there was a duplication of authorities among key players in the government branches (provincials 
and regionals). The key players were used as veto device by the contending political elites after 
decentralisation. Compared with the Jakarta case, four inter-factional tensions were identified 
between the executive and legislative bodies: the first and second tensions constitute a political 
disharmony over the FTZ law proposal during the Wahid and Megawati rules, the third strain over 
inaccurate constitutional procedure during the SBY period, and the fourth over parliamentary approval 
during the SBY period. In addition, the BIDA and Pemkot dispute persist on such an alarming scale but 
in different nuances, such as the two interjurisdictional competitions between BIDA and Pemkot 
identified in the RDO and over territorial authority since the Wahid period and over projects and 
budget allocation since the Megawati period. 
These events open the opportunity for formal political manoeuvres by the non-state actors 
(businesspersons and associations) where they were divided between the two patrons. Nevertheless, 
despite being impacted by the persistent change in GOI’s FTZ policy decision, the business community 
has not been consistent in infiltrating the process of policymaking. Their influence mostly occurred 
255 
 
where the political and business interests were not synchronised and have been the exception rather 
than the rule. Whilst both power centres have a solid legal basis, BIDA’s vast patrimonial network and 
past money inherited from the NO era have more power to gain support from business communities 
compared with Pemkot Batam and/or DPRD. BIDA’s role continued as Jakarta’s representative while 
business communities were actively involved in shaping local politics through lobbying Jakarta’s elites 
for contributions to campaigns. The business community even plays a major role as members of the 
DPRD and Pemkot Batam. It was revealed that generating funds from ‘goods’ through formal (taxation 
and other project sanctioned) and informal means (patronage networks) was highly needed by both 
Pemkot Batam and DPRD in order to quickly build their power foundation against the domination of 
BIDA. Furthermore, the conflicts of power between different government levels had also been 
amplified by the erosion of Kepri provincial government’s (Pemda) oversight authority. 
7.3. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, this thesis illustrates the insights of Williamson’s theory of hierarchy (2000). The cases 
presented here to some extent prove that SEZ policymaking in Indonesia during the RDO era took a 
deviating route which to some extent is more complex, full of polarised power and transactions, when 
the interest groups (individual or organisation) inside the nation-state erode governance gridlock; a lot 
of redundancy in the system produces assemblages of territory authority.  
Findings suggest that any institutional changes affect the process of policymaking. It depends on how 
the changing key policy actors in each regime government deal with the institutional intricacies and 
negotiate with each other, while the ruling elites sustain their outdated rhetoric and short-sighted 
character. The view here, therefore, is that Indonesian political economy particularly the SEZ policy is 
a complex and dynamic set of variables; whether it will remain unchanged under a new regime 
government is difficult to depict and ascertain in hindsight, and highly unpredictable as a future form.  
The NO and the RDO era have essential dissimilarities in their policymaking styles and mechanisms, 
but both bought their way to preserving power. Competition for access to resources in different 
political settings is an indispensable aspect of political consensus and the access affects the ways in 
which political actors devise economic policies. Even after decentralisation—often thought to improve 
the allocation of resources, minimise and recover transaction cost, accountability, and reduce 
corruption in policy delivery (Phelps 2004a, 2004b; Azis 2008; Bunnell and Miller 2010)—ample 
evidence presented in chapter 4 to 6 suggests that it has not led to better policymaking or it only 
addressed the policy inappropriateness.  
In addition, although not explicitly admitted, neoliberalism flourished while the industrial structure still 
lags behind due to overdependence on foreign capital and high exploitation of natural resources. 
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Consequently, the foreign capital in these SEZs can easily shift, whereas almost no domestic 
entrepreneur is able to change the situation. This results in a drastic decline in export performance, 
foreign exchange earnings, and employment. Even though SEZ has many forms with fundamentally 
different policies, there are still some comparable features to be considered. Notably, these economic 
tools were characterised by their neoliberal consensus that disregarded Indonesia’s economic 
nationalism and self-sufficiency initiated by the old order (Cassing 2000, 2002).  
Furthermore, the SEZ policymaking process based on the above illustration still leaves some complexity 
of problems. To confirm Pepinsky’s (2012) accountability thesis, the cases showed that different 
transactions have different governance needs. The regional autonomy law has created an unclear 
‘principal-agent’ relationship. Specifically, in line with Spiller et al. (2003), these were expressly 
recognised as to whether Batam governments’ credible commitments were undertaken to promote 
exchange (FTZ policy formulation) either to support Batam resource-based industrialised development 
or in support of their respective alliances in the reform programme. Under such pressures, between 
facing the political pressure on the one hand (status quo) and economic pressures on the other, Batam 
political elites are likely to carry out risky choices through a covert manner utilising their authority and 
not by appealing with the stakeholders or relevant interest groups. The experience in Batam FTZ policy 
transition plotted by the central government with the help of BIDA over the last three decades 
recounts one such case. However, despite reaching a high-level credible commitment, transaction cost 
will also be much higher than mainstream NCE due to the higher cost of exchange in formulating an 
institutional framework.  
The institutional change presented in the Jakarta Bay reclamation and Batam FTZ law proposal was 
seen as ‘unintended results of intentional action’. The idea for economic efficiency (Hanisch and 
Schluter 1999a, 1999b) was questioned when in the Jakarta case, the Governor tried to bypass the 
standard reclamation policy procedure and disregard the constitutional rules. Meanwhile, in the 
Batam case, the new FTZ law proposal was not approved by the parliament due to its urgency being 
questioned and the executive being unable to demonstrate the emergence for the rule to be passed.  
The policies deliberately offered by Jakarta governor and the executives were unable to show the 
urgency for it to be formulated, approved, and legalised and spawned some actions unsupported by 
the vested interest in other executive members and the parliament. The lines of accountability in 
Jakarta provincial government generates unclear rules of the game, ownership authority (institutional-
environment) and governance structure (institutional arrangements), and although not entirely 
absent, there is a lack of control mechanism (reward and punishment) which ultimately leads to an 
increase in transaction costs. Corresponding to North’s (1990) study, credibility refers to good 
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institutions that must have clear rules, are widely accepted, predictable (high level of certainty), 
organised correctly and properly implemented.  
The lines of accountability between the executive and parliament in both Jakarta and Batam cases are 
too weak in deciding who becomes principal and agent, and what the supervisory agency becomes. 
The condition leads to credible threats appearing in the context of conflicts and rivalries. The last lines 
of accountability are also weak between constituents as principal and local government as an agent. 
However, constituents have limited information (bounded rationality) to elect members of parliament 
(MPs) or political parties. With limited supervision, unscrupulous MPs perform a moral-hazard 
behaviour (opportunistic behaviour). This condition was used by those actors by setting up agreements 
for both parties to endorse SEZ policies that hurt their constituencies and organisations. In return, 
these elites are promised some form of output-based compensation or extra incentive to sustain or 
increase their stronghold as illustrated in Batam (i.e. financial rewards, better political authority, 
promotion, etc.). These practices pose a great risk of biased socio-economic stability which continues 
to be propagated by the dominating section of ‘small kings’ in the Batam society or a group of political 
elites who tend to disintegrate from national rules. As North would argue, in order to reduce 
transaction cost and adapt to environmental changes on market-based contracts under regional 
autonomy, the RDO government initially delegated their work by ordering technocrats to specify and 
enforce contracts—which can be problematic—to cover the costs of negotiating, calculating, and 
imposing exchange (North 1991 in Klein 2000: 464) but further delegating their power to BIDA. By 
corollary, given their inaccuracy in putting trust in BIDA to take advantage of market mechanisms 
(Williamson 1989, 1996), the RDO government failed in mitigating hazards from the transactional 
exchange carried out by BIDA. 
The roots of corruption in Indonesian political history can be traced to the entrenched rent-seeking 
practices since the pre-independence era. The widespread entrenchment of patron-client and 
patrimonial relationships in chapters 5 and 6 suggests that a change in the presidency simply 
transforms the appearance of government but not the policymaking processes. The patrimonial groups 
in both cases undisputedly have other hidden agendas to orient policy toward their best interest 
through a back-door approach to the politicians. Chapter 6 shows the intricacy between BIDA and 
Pemkot Batam which was backed by the relations of politico-business. The politico-business 
relationship reappeared in a more orderly and respectable manner through intense political party 
involvement which endured as “expressions of shifting alliances of predatory interests” (Hadiz 2004: 
619). Chapter 6 also displays the formal institution as a consequence of the unconstitutional approach 
when the key player (neoliberalists) and the group of nationalist compete for the lion share of the 
President’s blessing and parliamentary approval. 
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Compared to chapter 6, in chapter 5 despite MPs having been frequently reconfigured, the budgetary 
planning has always been systematically influenced by the enduring corruptive behaviour of the 
powerful elites in the parliament which the trend indicates, as a few MPs have business backgrounds. 
For instance, the instrumental role of the vice president, Jusuf Kalla, a businessman and devotee of 
GOLKAR’s New Order immersed in patronage politics far more devoted to political intrigues in Jakarta 
than political discretion in representing the constituents. He established a political alliance through a 
patron-client relationship with the masses in order to reduce the cost of exchange. Technocracy was 
also no longer shielded from his ‘political and business interest’. It implies that the big political issue is 
still the mainstream agenda of the parliament who extensively transform from an ideal form of 
constituency representation to mere rent-seekers and try to sustain or buy their way to stay in power. 
The main lesson here is that aligning the incentives of agents with the interests of principals, and 
improving information flow about actions and outputs can improve outcomes. 
An SEZ should be free from complex regulatory bureaucracy; however, in support of the study by 
Wahyuni (2009), the Indonesian cases suggest the existence of bureaucracy encumbers and regulatory 
confusion still occurs, raising issues of investor confidence in the political-economic stability. 
Moreover, an SEZ according to Easterling (2007: 81): “…….prefers to manipulate both state and non-
state sovereignty, alternately releasing and laundering their power and identity to create the most 
advantageous political or economic climate.” Indonesian economic downturn in the aftermath of the 
AFC intensified the distrust. SEZs in Indonesia is a resource-based policy where the central government 
has been consolidating its authority over primary commodities after decentralisation, i.e. timber, coal 
mining and other minerals, and palm oil licences by opposing the district and provincial governments 
which contradict the regional autonomy law (McCarthy in Aspinall and Klinken 2011: 103). Thus, it is 
almost impossible to ignore the political factors when the local government officials make strategic 
decisions. In contrast, empirical evidence suggests the ability of local government officials to reform is 
dependent upon their ability to form a strong political coalition and expand their network of public 
support. Moreover, as mentioned in the second section when the political coalition becomes ever 
more decisive, local officials tend to put more consideration to the constellation of political parties in 
the region.  
The thesis reveals that the SEZ policymaking process in the following regimes has been potentially 
affected by the bureaucratic legacy of previous authoritarian rulers. The continual intra-elite rivalry 
and interjurisdictional competition still seemed to colour the access to state power while inter-factional 
tension emerged with higher intensity in the RDO era, often reflected in elite polarisation resulting in 
highly polarised policies as evident in the variants of SEZ policy schemes.  
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Based on this evidence, this study confirms the first and second hypotheses that: informal measures 
bring influence to the formal rules and actors’ choice of institutions directs to the use of informal 
practices rather than formal practices in the SEZ implementation level. It also indicates that rather than 
the formulation level, actors use informal measures at the implementation level more due to the policy 
has been established and running and the actors’ cultural and ideological beliefs are developed at the 
implementation level. Furthermore, bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviours emanate when 
actors unable to settle conflicts occurred in the policy process. The study has also proven that principal-
agent, moral hazard, and adverse selection problems in SEZ governance structure at the central 
government level render contractual relationships to be unclear at the local government level.  
These institutional findings are believed to be applicable to many other developing countries, but other 
case studies on other countries are required to accumulate more lessons, and to examine in detail the 
factors which affect the effective institutions in the politics of policymaking. This study as a whole will 
spur further in-depth studies on the topic of SEZ and institutions in Asia. 
7.4 Research Contribution  
The study contributes to the knowledge that institutions do matter in the policymaking process, 
particularly, its influence towards SEZ policy and the nature of the institutional interaction and 
constraints in SEZ policymaking. It further contributes to the methodological application of 
Williamson’s institutional constraints.  
First, from the influence of institutions in SEZ policymaking based on the literature review in chapter 2 
that not only institutions matter on economic reform policy but on actor’s behaviour and action in 
their policy decision. NIE conceptualises the roles that specific ‘institutions’ and ‘institutional change 
and reform’ have on structuring socio-cultural and political economic ways of human interaction. 
Second, by utilising the insight originally conceived by North (1990) and further reinvigorated by 
Williamson (2000) and the seminal institutional concept of ‘transactions and their related costs’ that 
Coase (1960) accentuated (Ménard and Shirley 2011: 3), this study perceived a causal logic that some 
institutional elements constrain the state (political actors and economic agents as SEZ policymakers) 
into making the market (SEZ policy) well-functioning causing the increased risk of frequent change in 
SEZ policy. The analytical chapter in chapter 4 combines the causal mechanism of institutional 
constraint model by Williamson (2000) to study the influence of institutions on the SEZ policymaking 
process. The thesis contributes through providing other option of analytical approach on how and why 
institutions affect actors’ policy decisions and through applying the approach in the case of SEZ 
policymaking in Indonesia. The actors’ policy preferences pose great risks that through the institutional 
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interaction they increase transaction cost through complex political-economic dilemma rather than 
minimise them by reducing the political-economic uncertainty.  
Third, the decentralisation period marks the beginning of another shift of getting the rules of the game 
(institutional environment) right but governance structures (institutional arrangement) wrong from 
the reform order and in SBY’s ex-post governance to ‘get the institutional support right’ due to the 
lessons learned from previous administrations is not a good prescription of eliminating informal 
institutions. The study uncovered that informal institutions remain due to political allegiance that 
exists even before the reform and democratic phases. The commitment to change rest on the change 
of the social structure embedded in society.  
Fourth, this study contributes to the methodological application to the study on the effects of 
institutions (Hazakis 2014) to SEZ policymaking. Extant literature mostly focuses on a quantitative 
method to study institutions (Spiller et al. 2003) which add to the breadth of knowledge while this 
study contributes on the qualitative method to study the phenomenon of institutional aspects of 
policymaking which add to the depth of knowledge. This study fills the gap by mixing multiple 
approaches into the methodology (Yin 2003) which include interpretive, analytic narrative, and 
content analysis methods to explain the causal mechanism and help answer the how and why 
questions. 
Three empirical chapters help clarify the SEZ policy process from what intrigues the actors to choose 
SEZ as a policy instrument, how did they propose on maintaining the policy as their political tool, and 
why did they choose to do so. The empirical chapters deepened the knowledge through mixed 
evidence of how SEZ policy as a global phenomenon yield mixed results not only between countries 
who adopt it but within a country in different periods such as in Indonesia.  
These findings on SEZ policy processes and performance that lead to the establishment of new forms 
of SEZ are a departure from literature i.e. Knoth (2000), Seshadri (2011), and Moberg (2012, 2013) 
specifically on SEZ policy in China and India. The literature has tended to treat SEZ policy process 
without clear acknowledgment of SEZ variances in different period of government with political 
economic and collective action complexities in the size, homogeneity and purpose of the policy actors 
that can be construed as key determinants of success (Kherallah and Kirsten 2001) as well as their 
institutional patterns at different government levels.  
7.5. Delineations and suggestions for further research  




The limitation of this study is that apart from the difficulties faced during the course of the research as 
pointed out in chapter 3 the study of institutions and the influence of it to the SEZ policy process is 
dynamic and tend to change over time. It should be noticed that institutional change occurred when 
there is an outstanding event happening in a country such as economic crisis or war, therefore the 
institutional framework most probably changes and the entire policy structure will also change.  
Moreover, using a single case study on Indonesia as the research design is not generalizable to other 
countries in the world. It is better to incorporate a comparison of two or more countries in the study 
and better to make it a repeatable formula to get more understanding as economic reform evolved 
over time. Lastly, this study only generates information from a few respondents which only used 
subjective understanding and cannot represent the general public in assessing the SEZ policy 
objectively. 
Suggestions for further research  
This study presents two empirical case studies that represent two among many issues of national SEZ 
policymaking process in Indonesia or perhaps globally. This is a micro-study research that points out 
two episodes of political intrigues among the key actors involved in setting up the SEZ policy. There 
are many rooms for further research as this study is just a tip of the iceberg within the SEZ 
policymaking.  
First, the qualitative approach used in this study can be developed and complemented with 
quantitative surveys of responses to generate more data and more general insights on the SEZ policy 
study under-researched. Second, the research sites can be added with more areas where institutions 
have influenced other SEZ policies located in other regions to gain more insights. Third, the methods 
gleaned from Williamson’s model are not well-developed, therefore future research requires more 
ways of employing the model as any form of policy also have institutional constraints laying in the 
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Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye (1978) ‘The World Market for Labor and the World Market for 
Industrial Sites’, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1978): 843-858, Association for Evolutionary 
Economics.  
Fukuoka, Y. (2012) Politics, Business and the State in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, CS, 34(1): 80. 
Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf (2005) Institutions and Economic Theory the Contribution of the New 
Institutional Economics Second Edition, Ann Arbor: The University Of Michigan Press. 
Gareev, T. (2013) ‘The Special Economic Zone in the Kaliningrad region: Development Tool or Institutional Trap?’ 
Baltic Journal of Economics [online] 13(2): 113-129, Retrieved: 
http://biceps.org/assets/docs/bje/bje2013_no2/Special_economic_zone [Accessed 23 May 2014]. 
Ge, Wei (1999) ‘The Dynamics of Export-Processing Zones’, UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 144 December 1999,  
Gellert, Paul K. (2010) ‘Extractive Regimes: Toward a Better Understanding of Indonesian Development’, 
Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee Rural Sociology, Rural Sociological Society 75:1, 28–57. 
Gerring, John (2004) What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
98, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 341-354, American Political Science Association 
Gestrin, Michael (2001) Is Export-Oriented FDI Better? OECD Global Forum on International Investment New 
Horizons and Policy Challenges for Foreign Direct Investment in the 21st Century, Mexico City, 26-27 
November 2001 
Glaeser, Edward L., La Porta, Rafael, de-Silanes, Florencio Lopez and Shleifer, Andrei (2004) ‘Do Institutions Cause 
Growth?’ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10568, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, 
Cambridge, MA 02138. Available online: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10568. 
Glick, P., and Roubaud, S. (2006) ‘Export Processing Zone Expansion in Madagascar: What Are the Labor Market 
and Gender Impacts?’ Journal of African Economies 15 (4): 722–56. 
Goldberg, V.P. (1976) ‘Regulation and Administered Contracts’, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2 
(Autumn 1976). 
Graham, Edward M. (2004) ‘Do Export Processing Zones attract FDI and its benefits: The experience from China, 
Institute for International Economics’, International Economics and Economic Policy, Washington DC : 
Springer-Verlag. 
Greenaway, D., Morgan, C.W. and Wright, P.W. (2002) ‘Trade Liberalisation and Growth: New Methods, New 
Evidence’, Journal of Development Economics, 67, 229-44. 
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hadiz, Vedi (2002) ‘Studies in the Political Economy of New Order Indonesia’, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. 
Issue 1 (March 2002). Power and Politics, retrieved: https://kyotoreview.org/issue-1/studies-in-the-political-
economy-of-new-order-indonesia/ [Accessed 15 June 2014]. 
Hadiz, Vedi (2004) ‘Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to Neoliberal Reform’, in: Garry Rodan 
and Kevin Hewison (Eds.), Neoliberalism and Conflict in Asia after 9/11 (2006), New York: Routledge, 227. 
Hadiz, Vedi (2010) Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press. 
Hadiz, Vedi and Dhakidae, D. (2005) Social science and power in Indonesia. Jakarta: Equinox Pub. 
Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R. (1995) ‘The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions’, Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow (Apr. 
1997): 263-283, Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York. 
277 
 
Halim, U. (2007) ‘Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Untold Agonies Experiences from Asian Countries’, SPECIAL 
RELEASE A Publication of Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific (PAN AP) and People’s Coalition on 
Food Sovereignty (PCFS), February 2008, Penang, Malaysia: Pesticide Action Network Asia-Pacific Issue No. 6. 
Hall, Peter A., and Soskice, David (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Hamada, Koichi (1974) ‘An Economic Analysis of the Duty Free Zone’, Journal of International Economics 4 (1974): 
225-241, North-Holland Publishing Company, University of Tokyo, Japan. 
Hamilton, Carl and Svensson, Lars E.O. (1982) ‘On the Welfare Effects of a ‘Duty-Free Zone’, Journal of 
International Economics 13 (1982) 45-64. North-Holland Publishing Company, lnstitute for International 
Economic Studies, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. 
Hanisch, M. and Schlüter, A. (1999a) Institutional Analysis and Institutional Change – What to learn from the Case 
of Bulgarian Land Reform? In: FAO-IAMO-conference on Land Ownership, Land Market and their Influence 
on the Efficiency of Agricultural Production in Central and Eastern Europe [online] Halle/Saale, Germany: 
Humboldt University Berlin Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences, Retrieved: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237087717_Institutional_Analysis_and_Institutional_Change_W
hat_to_learn_from_the_Case_of_Bulgarian_Land_Reform [Accessed 27 September 2015]. 
Hanisch, M. and Schlüter, A. (1999b) ‘Theories of Institutional Change and Their Applicability to the Privatization 
Process in Agriculture in a Transition Economy’, Working Paper, Department of Resource Economics, 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany. 
Harriss, John, Hunter, Janet and Lewis, Colin M. (Ed.) (2003) Introduction: Development and Significance of NIE. 
The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, London and New York: Routledge. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, Dani Rodrik, Andrés Velasco (2005) Growth Diagnostics. Kennedy School Lunch Group on 
International Economic Policy (LIEP), John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Revised 
March 2005. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, Hwang, Jason, Rodrik, Dani, Velasco, Andrés (2005) ‘What You Export Matters’, NBER 
Working Paper Series 11905. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. (1945) ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic Review, XXXV: 4, 519-530.  
Hayek, F. A. (1968) ‘Bemerkungen über die Entwiklung von System von Verhalternsregel’, in: F. A. Hayek. 
Friburger Studien. Tübingen. 
Hazakis, K. (2014) ‘The rationale of special economic zones (SEZs): An Institutional approach’, Regional Science 
Policy & Practice 6(1): 85-101. 
He, Guizhen, Lei Zhang, Arthur P. J. Mol, Yonglong Lu, and Jianguo Liu (2013) ‘Revising China’s Environmental 
Law’, Science and Law Policy Forum, Science Vol 341 12 July 2013. 
Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (2004) ‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda’, 
Perspectives on Politics, 2 December 2004(4): 725-740. 
Heng, Toh Mun (2006) ‘Development in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle’, Singapore Centre 
for Applied and Policy Economics, Department of Economics, SCAPE Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2006/06 
– 31 March. 
Henisz, W. (2000) ‘The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth’, Economics & Politics 12(1): 1-31. 
Henisz, W. (2002) ‘The institutional environment for infrastructure investment’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 
11(2): 355-389. 
Henisz, Witold J. and Zelner, Bennet A. (2004) ‘Explicating Political Hazards and Safeguards: A Transaction Cost 
Politics Approach’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 13(6): 901-915. 
Hertanti, Rachmi (IGJ) and Ceresna-Chaturvedi, Laura (Cividep India) (2012) Working and Living Conditions in 
SEZs-A Comparative Study Between India and Indonesia, Published by Cividep India & Indonesia for Global 
Justice with the financial support of Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations – SOMO.  
Hertzmark, Donald I. (2007) PERTAMINA Indonesia’s State-Owned Oil Company, The James A. Baker III Institute 
for Public Policy, Rice University. 
Hill, Hal (1994) Indonesia’s New Order, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
278 
 
Hill, Hal, Resosudarmo, Budy P. and Vidyattama, Yogi (2008) ‘Indonesia’s Changing Economic Geography’, Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2008: 407–35 Australian National University, Routledge. 
Retrieved: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074910802395344 [Accessed 02 December 2013].  
Hirschman, A. (1958) The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Higley, J. and Burton, M. (2006) Elite foundations of liberal democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. and J. W. Stoelhorst (2014) Introduction to the special issue on the future of institutional 
and evolutionary economics, Journal of Institutional Economics / FirstView Article / September 2014, 1-28. 
Hoffmann, N. (2010) Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: The Political Constraints Approach of Henisz. 
Hofman, B., Rodrick-Jones, E. and Thee, K. (2004) Indonesia: Rapid Growth, Weak Institutions. Jakarta: World 
Bank. 
Holsti, O.R. (1969) Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Hussey, J. and Hussey, R. (1997) Business research: a practical guide for undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, London: MacMillan. 
Hutchinson, F. (2015) Mirror images in different frames? Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Inada, J. (2003) ‘Governance Factors in Indonesian Economic Development’, in: Y. Shimomura, ed., Asian 
Development Experience Vol. 2: The Role of Governance in Asia, 1st ed. Singapore: Japan Institute of 
International Affairs-ASEAN Foundation-ISEAS, 147-163. 
Ishida, Masami (2009) ‘Special Economic Zones and Economic Corridors’, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 
Development Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan, June 2009. 
Jan Luiten, van Zanden and Marks, Daan (2012) An Economic History of Indonesia: 1800-2010, London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Jayanthakumaran, K. (2002) ‘An Overview of Export Processing Zones: Selected Asian Countries’, in: N. 
Nitungkorn (Eds.) An Overview of Export Processing Zones: Selected Asian Countries. Bangkok, Thailand: 
Faculty of Commerce-Papers (Archive), Faculty of Business. New South Wales, Australia: Department of 
Economics, University of Wollongong.  
Jenkins, Rob (1999) Democratic Politics and Economic Reforms in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jensen, Nathan M. (2006) Nation-States and the Multinational Corporations: A Poiitical Economy of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ch. 1 (1-11) 
Jensen, Nathan M., Malesky, Edmund J. and Weymouth, Stephen (2011) Unbundling the Relationship between 
Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk, British Journal of Politics, 1-40. 
Johnson, Robin (1999) The Role of Institutions in Policy Making, Paper contributed to Annual Conference of the 
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, 1999, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Joskow, Paul L. (2008), Introduction to New Institutional Economics: A Report Card, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jütting, Johannes and De Soysa, Indra (2005) ‘Informal Institutions And Development–What Do We Know And 
What Can We Do?’ Overview Paper: Roundtable Discussion, Informal Institutions and Development: Think 
Local, Act Global? OECD Development Centre And Development Assistance Committee – Network On 
Governance International Seminar, 1-16.  
Jütting, Johannes, Drechsler, Denis, Bartsch, Sebastian and De Soysa, Indra (2007) Informal Institutions: How 
Social Norms Help or Hinder Development, OECD Development Centre Studies: OECD Publishing. 
Kang, D. (2002) Crony Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kasper, W. and Streit, M. (1998) Institutional Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Kasuya, Y. (2013) Presidents, Assemblies and Policy-Making in Asia. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kawamura, K. (2013) President Restrained. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kellerman, B. (2004) Bad Leadership. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 




Khan, Mushtaq H. (2000) ‘Rent-Seeking as Process’, in: Khan, M.H. and Jomo K.S. ed. Rents, Rent-Seeking and 
Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Khan, M., Zhuang, J., Cham, M., Khor, N. and Maidir, I. (2012) ‘Critical Constraints to Growth’, in: H. Hill, M. Khan 
and J. Zhuang, ed., Diagnosing the Indonesian Economy Toward Inclusive and Green Growth, 1st ed. [online] 
New York and Manila: Anthem Press and ADB, 33-86. Retrieved: 
http://www.adb.org/publications/diagnosing-indonesian-economy-toward-inclusive-and-green-growth 
[Accessed 12 Oct. 2014]. 
Kherallah, Mylène and Kirsten, Johann (2001) ‘The New Institutional Economics: Applications For Agricultural 
Policy Research In Developing Countries’, MSSD Discussion Paper, Markets and Structural Studies Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute No. 41. 
Kirsten, Johann F., Dorward, Andrew R., Poulton, Colin and Vink, Nick (2009) Institutional Economics Perspectives 
on African Agricultural Development, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Klein, Peter G. (2000) ‘New Institutional Economics’, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Department of 
Economics, University of Georgia, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, Vol. I: 456-489. 
Knight, J. (1992) Institutions and social conflict, Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press. 
Korte, Nina (2013) The Political Economy of Public Administration Reforms in Southeast Asia: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Tax Administration in Indonesia and the Philippines, PhD Dissertation, University of Hamburg. 
Krueger, A. (1992) Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries, Massachusetts: Blackwell. 
Krueger, A. (2002) ‘Why crony capitalism is bad for economic growth’, in: S. Haber, ed., Crony capitalism and 
economic growth in Latin America: theory and evidence, 1st ed. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1–24. 
Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2009) International Economics: Theory and Policy 8th Edition, Pearson-
Addison Wesley. 
Kunneke, R. (2008) ‘Institutional Reform and Technological Practice: The Case of Electricity’, Industrial and 
Corporate Change [online] 17(2), 233-265 Retrieved: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31073908_Institutional_reform_and_technological_practice_Th
e_case_of_electricity [Accessed 7 May 2015]. 
Kuroiwa, I. (2009) Plugging Into Production Networks. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Kusago, Takayoshi and Tzannatos, Zafiris (1998) ‘Export Processing Zones: A Review in Need of Update’, Social 
Protection Discussion Paper No. 9802, January 1998, Social Protection Group Human Development Network, 
The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Lai, H. (2006) Reform and the Non-State Economy in China: The Political Economy of Liberalization Strategies. NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lai, Lawrence W. C (1997) ‘The Property Rights Justifications for Planning and a Theory of Zoning’, Progress in 
Planning 48 (3): 161. 
Lal, D. (1983) the Poverty of Development Economics, London: Hobart Paperbacks. 
Lal, D. (1992) Development Economics, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007) The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Lang, Andrew (2010) ‘Trade Agreements, Business and Human Rights: The case of export processing zones’, 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 57. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. 
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1997) ‘Legal Determinants 
of External Finance’, Journal of Finance 52:3, 1131-1150. 
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1998), ‘Law and Finance’, 
Journal of Political Economy 106:6, 1113-1155. 
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1999), ‘The Quality of 
Government’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15:1, 222-279. 
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei (2008). The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLVI (June 2008) 46:2, 285–332. 
280 
 
Lasswell, H. (1927) Propaganda techniques in the world war. New York: Knopf. 
Latt, Sai S.W. (2007) Triangulating the State, Market and Society Indonesia’s Batam Export Processing Zone, York 
University. 
Lauth, H. (2000) ‘Informal Institutions and Democracy’, Democratization 7(4): 21-50. 
Lavigne, M. (1999) the Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy, London: Macmillan. 
Leifer, M. (1995) Dictionary of the modern politics of South-East Asia, London: Routledge. 
Levi, Margaret (1988) Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Lieberherr, Eva (2009) ‘Policy Relevance of New Institutional Economics? Assessing Efficiency, Legitimacy and 
Effectiveness’, November, Discussion paper series on the Coherence between institutions and technologies in 
infrastructures, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland and Delft University of Technology, 
The Netherlands. 
Lindsey, T. (2008) Indonesia, Law and Society, Leichhardt, NSW Australia: Federation Press. 
Lin, J. and Monga, C. (2010) ‘Growth identification and facilitation: The role of the state in the dynamics of 
structural change’, Policy Research Working Paper [online] May 2010 (5313), Retrieved: 
https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2011conference/program/retrieve.php? [Accessed 30 Mar. 2013]. 
Lipsey, R.G. and Lancaster, K. (1956) ‘The general theory of the second-best’, Review of Economic Studies 24 
(1956): 11-32. 
Mackie, Jamie (2010) ‘Patrimonialism: The New Order and Beyond,’ in: Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (ed), 
Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010), 81-96. 
Madani, D (1999) ‘A Review of The Role And Impact of Export Processing Zones’, Research Paper 2238, 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
Mainwaring, S. (1989) ‘Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative 
Issues’, Working Paper #130 (November 1989). Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, Helen Kellogg 
Institute for International Studies. 
Mallampally, Padma and Sauvant, Karl P.  (1999) Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, Geneva: 
UNCTAD 36:1. 
March, J. and Olsen, J. (1990) ‘Rediscovering Institutions: the Organizational Basis of Politics’ Choice Reviews 
Online ARENA Working Papers, 27(09), 27-5387-27-5387. 
March, J. and Olsen, J. (2004)’ The logic of appropriateness’ [online] Centre for European Studies ARENA Working 
Papers WP 04/09, Retrieved: https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf [Accessed 13 Jun. 2015]. 
Mas’oed, M. and Savirani, A. (2011) ‘Financing Politics in Indonesia in Power, Conflict and Democracy’, Conflict 
and Democracy Journal III (1-2), 63-94. 
Mayers, James (2005) Stakeholder Power Analysis, International Institute for Economic Development, UK: DFID. 
Mburu, John, Birner, Regina and Zeller, Manfred (2003) ‘Relative Importance and Determinants of Landowners’ 
TCs in Collaborative Wildlife Management in Kenya: An Empirical Analysis’, Ecological Economics Vol. 45 
(2003), 59-73. 
McCarthy, John F. (2011) ‘The Limits Of Legality: State, Governance And Resource Control In Indonesia’, in: 
Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (Eds.), The State And Illegality in Indonesia by KITLV Press Leiden 
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 89-106. (Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian 
and Caribbean Studies). 
McCulloch, L. (2003) ‘Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business’, in: J. Brömmelhörster and W. 
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Appendix 1  
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No Institution Position and Responsibilities Interview Date 
1.  Ministry of Finance Former Deputy Director of Revenue Policy 
Evaluation at Centre for State Revenue 
Policy 
30 October 2014 
2.  Institute for Global 
Justice (IGJ) 
Researcher 31 October 2014 
3.  Main Research Contributor 
4.  Fiscal Policy Agency 
(BKF) 
Former Deputy Director for State Revenue 
Policy Evaluation 
6 November 2014 
5.  Section Chief for Customs Policy 
Evaluation with reference to SEZ 
6.  Expert Staff with reference to SEZ 
7.  Directorate General of 
Customs and Excise 
Former Director of Customs Information 
System/Now Deputy Minister of Finance 
8 November 2014 
8.  Former Director of Customs Facility/Now 
Director General 
9.  Director of International Affairs 
10.  Section Head of Duty Exemption, 
Directorate of Customs Facility 
11.  Head of Marunda Customs Office 4-5 December 2014 
12.  Head of Cakung Customs Office 
13.  Head of Customs Facility Section 
14.  Data processing personnel 
15.  The Parliament (House 
of Representatives and 
People’s Consultative 
Assembly/DPR and MPR)  
MP - GOLKAR Party 
faction 
Commission VI 







16.  MP - Democrat Party 
faction 
17.  MP - PDIP Party 
faction 
18.  MP - Gerindra Party 
faction 
19.  MP - PPP Party 
faction 
20.  Budget Policy Staff 
21.  Budget Policy Staff 
22.  Former Vice Chairman of People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) – GOLKAR 
Party faction (2009-2014) 
15 November 2014 
23.  Jakarta local parliament 
(DPRD) 
Former MP 10 November 2014 
24.  University of Indonesia Assistant Professor of Economics and 
Business with reference to Southeast Asia 
11 November 2014 
25.  Investment Coordinating 
Board (BKPM) 
Former Deputy Chairman for Investment 
Planning  
13 November 2014 
26.  Former Director of Investment Services 
and Regional Planning  
27.  Ministry of SOE Former Deputy Director 
28.  SEZ National Council Secretary 13-14 November 
2014 29.  Head of Information Management Division 
30.  Head of Planning Subdivision 
31.  Staff in charge for programme evaluation, 
monitoring and reporting 
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32.  Sei Mangkei SEZ, Jakarta 
Office 
Head of Planning and Development of PT 
Perkebunan Nasional (PTPN) -III 
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2014 
33.  Secretary to Head of the North Sumatra 
Regional Development Planning 
(Bappeda) 
34.  Tanjung Lesung SEZ, 
Jakarta Office 
Secretary of the Tanjung Lesung Zone 
Management 
35.  Palu SEZ, Jakarta Office Team Leader Palu SEZ 
36.  Bitung SEZ  Head of Regional Industry and Commerce, 
Bitung, North Sulawesi 
37.  Assistant Vice Mayor of Bitung 
38.  Morotai SEZ, Jakarta 
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Jababeka Morotai Ltd company 
representative 
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Development Planning 
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Head of Data and Information 
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Cooperation 
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65.  National Development 
Planning Agency 
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Development 
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Staff of Directorate of Industry, State 
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67.  Ministry of Trade Former General Secretary 19 December 2014 
68.  Former Deputy of Foreign Trade 
69.  Indonesian Industrial 
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Secretary 5 January 2015 
 
70.  ASEAN Secretary Assistant Head of data, ASEAN FTA 
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International Studies 
(CSIS) 
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Governance 
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80.  Indonesian Central Bank 
(BI) 
Staff of Central Management of 
Information Systems 
81.  Media Indonesia Journalist 14 January 2015 
82.  Kompas Journalist 
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